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The European Commission in the WTO: A Question of Roles, Responsibilities and 
Interests 
This thesis sets out to answer the question: What roles and responsibilities have accrued to the 
European Commission iu relation to its operations within global trade negotiations, how have these 
been interpreted and pursued, and how have they been affected by changing patterns of interests 
and institutions in the world trading system? 
The thesis has as its central empirical focus the activities of the European Commission in the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) from 1995 to 2003- that is to say, from the foundation of the 
Organisation to the failure of the Cancun Ministerial. It focuses on the roles and responsibilities of 
the Commission within trade negotiations and identifies the ways in which it has been affected both 
by the interests that it serves, or confronts, and by changes in the broader context of the 
negotiations themselves. The thesis argues that the need to maintain this complex balance of roles, 
responsibilities and interests in a changing environment creates patterns of path dependency and a 
search for consistency that reduces the possibility of creative adaptation on the part of the 
Commission. 
Acting on a global stage invokes particular difficulties for the Commission in that it has to serve 
and/or confront a number of different interests on three specific levels and build a supportive 
coalition at each level in order to make progress with policy initiatives. At the first level, the 
Commission has to develop a mandate proposal for WTO negotiations. The second, intra-European, 
level is where the Commission has to submit its proposals and obtain a negotiating mandate from 
the Council of Ministers as well as, informally but increasingly importantly, the European 
Parliament. The third, extra-European, level comes into play when the Commission begins 
negotiations, and its position has to accommodate the diverse interests of WTO members and the 
WTO Secretariat. These interests are not unitary actors and their preferences are dynamic. 
Therefore they can be enabling or constraining on the Commission over time and over different 
issues. 
Early chapters of the thesis synthesize the existing literature in an effort to define what roles and 
responsibilities the Commission has both in general, and then in external trade. This leads in 
chapter I to the generation of four key propositions - on roles, responsibilities, interests, and 
change/politicisation - that form the central organising focus of the thesis The thesis then goes on in 
chapter 2 to provide historical context by exploring the developing roles and responsibilities of the 
Commission under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well as outlining the 
new institutional structure within which it has had to work in the WTO. Chapters 3-8 of the thesis 
focus on the period since the establishment of the WTO, dividing it into two sub-periods - the 
period up to the Seattle ministerial of 1999, during which Sir Leon Brittan was Trade 
Commissioner, and the period 1999-2003, when Pascal Lamy held that position. These chapters 
trace in detail the processes through which the Commission participated on the one hand in the 
setting of the framework for trade negotiations, and on the other hand in the negotiation of specific 
sectoral issues. 
The conclusion suggests that negotiations within the GATT and the WTO have been politicised 
since the Kennedy Round in 1964, although the process has now become more pervasive and 
unpredictable. Although the Commission's roles and responsibilities have not so far come under 
threat from the Council of Ministers, there are questions as to whether the Commission can 
continue to make progress given the growing difficulties of aligning the preferences of key interests 
and the reducing 'policy space' the Commission has to achieve its objectives, particularly because 
of the entrenched debates surrounding agriculture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Commission in the World Trade Organisation: 
A Question of Roles, Responsibilities and Interests 
Overview 
In 2003, the Cancun Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was 
'killed' with the European Union (EU) named as one of the suspects.1 Criticism was 
levelled at both its inflexibility on agriculture and its misguided attempts to force 
through unpopular policy initiatives.2 Although the Hong Kong Ministerial in 
December 2005 did not fail, it was not widely regarded as a success and the EU was 
again criticized for going along with outdated 'consultation' procedures and insisting on 
a late date to abolish agricultural export subsidies.3 The consultation procedures at 
issue, known as Green Rooms, were also partly blamed for the failure of the Seattle 
Ministerial in 1999 (Hawken, 2000: 50, Schott and Watal, 2000: 286). Taken together, 
the EU, with the Commission as its negotiator, appears to have made little headway, 
and to have failed to adapt its positions or actions to changes in the WTO negotiating 
environment. Why is this and what factors might it reflect? Should we look for 
explanations in the nature of the Commission's roles and responsibilities, the ways in 
which they were interpreted and pursued? Should we look at the ways in which shifting 
patterns of interests created constraints and/or opportunities, or the changing nature of 
the WTO environment, the issues that were at stake in the negotiations and the 
increasing politicisation of trade issues? 
1 From 'Content, Not Pontificating, Was What Killed Cancun' edited by Max Gebhardt from the 
Independent (Johannesburg, South Africa) on 16th September 2003 reproduced at 
http://www.mindfully.org/WT0/2003/Cancun-Content-Kil1ed16seo03.htm accessed 8th Apri12008 
2 From Action Aid 'Divide and Rule. The EU and US response to developing country alliances at the 
WTO' at hnp://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc lib/30 1 divide rule.pdfaccessed 7th April2008. The 'unpopular policy 
initiatives' are the Singapore Issues 
3 From 'How the WTO's Conference adopted its Ministerial Declaration in Hong Kong' by Martin Khor 
of the Third World Network 21" December 2005 at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo336.htm accessed 7th 
April2008 
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In order to investigate these questions, this thesis has as its central empirical focus the 
European Commission in the WTO from 1995 to 2003 -that is to say, from the 
foundation of the Organisation to the failure of the Cancun Ministerial. It will focus on 
the roles and responsibilities of the Commission within these trade negotiations and 
identify the ways in which the Commission was affected both by the interests that it had 
to satisfy and by changes in the broader context of the negotiations themselves. The 
thesis argues that the need to maintain this complex balance of roles, responsibilities 
and interests in a changing environment creates patterns of path dependency and a 
search for consistency that reduce the possibility of creative adaptation on the part of 
the Commission. 
The key research question on which this thesis centres is thus: What roles and 
responsibilities have accrued to the Commission in relation to its operations within 
global trade negotiations, how have these been interpreted and pursued, and how have 
they been affected by changing patterns of interests and institutions in the world trading 
system? 
This broad initial question can be broken down into four secondary research 
questions: 
a) What roles does the Commission have in external trade, and how are these 
expressed in its operations within the WTO? 
b) How effectively does the Commission fulfil the responsibilities associated with 
those roles in implementing its policies within the WTO? 
c) To what extent are these roles and responsibilities affected by the patterns of 
interests to be found within European institutions and the WTO and, in 
particular, the convergence or dispersal of preferences among those interests? 
d) How is the interaction between roles, responsibilities and interests in the 
Commission's operations within the WTO affected by time and issue? 
2 
Research rationale 
The thesis has its roots in Meunier and Nicola'idis' article from 1999 - 'Who Speaks for 
Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU'. In essence, the authors argued 
that the 1/94 Opinion of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which followed the often 
acrimonious Uruguay Round negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), was indicative of the Commission's sole competence to negotiate for 
the Union in goods being subjected to "roll back" (p477). 
They suggested that this rollback came about because of the domestic importance, for 
Council members, of new issues discussed in the Tokyo Round such as "aviation and 
product standards" (p483). These 'new issues' became more important in the Uruguay 
Round, which covered areas such as Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) and 
Trade-Related Aspects oflntellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) alongside services 
negotiations. Following the Round, questions were asked as to whether it was the 
Commission or Council, which was 'competent' to conclude such negotiations. In an 
attempt at resolution, at the end of the Round, the Commission asked the Court "for an 
advisory opinion on the issue of competence" (p485) seemingly expecting that the ECJ 
would rule in its favour. As it was, the Court ruled that although the Commission would 
continue to have sole competence for negotiating in trade in goods, there was mixed 
competence, shared between the Commission and the Member States, for trade outside 
goods. Meunier and Nicola'idis concluded that this mixed competence had implications 
for the Commission's roles and responsibilities in external trade. These implications 
would not just affect the Commission but could destabilize "all other areas of trade 
negotiations" (p498) and even influence the "world political economy" if bargains and 
package deals did not hold because of national considerations or if a 'divide and rule' 
strategy was used by other actors to ensure outcomes favourable to themselves (or to 
keep the status quo). 
This thesis arises out of the need to take this argument further and to put it in a broader 
context. The end of the Uruguay Round was not 'just' about the 1/94 Opinion; it also 
heralded a transition from GATT to the WTO. In terms of context, the thesis looks also 
at the earlier GATT Rounds to allow an appreciation, at the outset, as to whether 
Opinion 1/94 could be held to be such a watershed in terms of the relationship between 
3 
the Commission and the Council of Ministers in external trade as Meunier and 
Nicola\dis seemed to suggest. However, the WTO forms the main focus of the work and 
the significance of the change from GATT to WTO is clearly important, particularly 
because the European Communities (and thus the European Commission as its 'voice') 
became a Contracting Party in its own right. IfMeunier and Nicola\dis were correct in 
their assumptions, the Commission's eroding roles and responsibilities in external trade 
and growing concerns on the part of the Member States (that the Commission was 
intervening in national issues), could be tracked through WTO negotiations. It is 
anticipated that this might even become more acute over time because of increasing 
politicization of the trade field. 
Furthermore, the thesis set out to probe the differential successes of trade negotiations 
under the WTO. These had seemingly started well at the Singapore Ministerial and 
apparently continued at the Geneva Ministerial (given that there was very little 
reported about it in the media) but had fallen down badly in Seattle before picking up 
again at Doha then collapsing ignominiously at Cancl1n. The thesis assesses what part 
the Commission played in these outcomes and seeks to identify what pressures were on 
them (internally and externally in the Council of Ministers and the WTO) in their 
efforts to negotiate for the Member States in the WTO. In considering the 
Commission's part in these negotiations, it was also important to reflect upon the 
parties who were influencing the Commission and how they were aligned or dispersed 
around the key issues that were being tackled. These interests might be centred on the 
European Commission itself, the Council of Ministers (or even the Parliament) at the 
European level and the WTO itself. The thesis, then, seeks to assess how the 
convergence or dispersal of preferences among those interests might affect the 
Commission's roles and responsibilities therein. 
In terms of data management, that both Brittan and Lamy had presided as Trade 
Commissioners from 1995, when the WTO was created, to 2003 in the aftermath of 
Cancl1n, afforded an opportunity to compare the two time periods. This allowed 
consideration ofMeunier and Nicola\dis' contentions at each point in time. In deciding 
on this comparison, it was important to structure both parts the same way. Therefore, 
not only does the narrative focus on the Ministerials over Brittan's and Lamy's tenures 
4 
but case studies, that appeared to be the best representative of each period, were chosen 
for both. This allowed distinction to be made between the high political Ministerials and 
the technical negotiations. 
In sum, although Meunier and Nicolai:dis (1 999) started the process, in that their article 
formed the basis of the rationale for this piece of research, efforts were made to put 
their findings in a significantly wider context and to test their contentions in a more 
thorough way through the WTO negotiations. 
The structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis reflects the key research questions outlined above. Chapter 
One establishes a broad analytical framework, which discusses roles, responsibilities 
and interests in general terms and proposes some broad propositions arising from the 
initial research questions. The aim here is to put the practice of the Commission's roles 
and responsibilities in external trade into the context of the literature on the 
Commission and on European external trade policies, and into a conceptual framework 
that will frame the rest of the thesis. Chapter Two provides further analytical and 
empirical context by exploring the ways in which the Commission operated within the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between the late 1950s and the mid-
1990s, and by identifying key aspects and implications of the change from the GATT to 
the WTO in 1995. By the end of this first phase of the thesis, the foundations for the 
argument both in analytical and in empirical terms will have been established. 
Chapters Three to Eight contain the empirical core of the thesis, and deal with the 
Commission's involvement in WTO negotiations between 1995 and 2003. The six 
chapters naturally divide between two distinctive time periods- Leon Brittan's time as 
Trade Commissioner from 1995-1999 and Pascal Lamy's tenure from 1999 to 2003-
and the thesis ends at the last Ministerial meeting that Lamy presided over in this 
position. Within these two distinctive periods, there is a further division between the 
high political Ministerial level negotiations and the, perhaps more technocratic, sectoral 
negotiations. The expectation is that the Ministerial meetings will be more politicised 
than the task-oriented negotiations. This might be expected to influence the choices the 
5 
Commission makes in terms of exercising its responsibilities, and the effectiveness of 
its discharge of those responsibilities. 
Thus, Chapter Three focuses on the WTO Ministerials between 1995 and 1999, 
including the preparations for the Seattle Ministerial, whilst Chapter Four explores 
sectoral negotiations in relation to the Information Technology Agreement, the Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement and the Financial Services Agreement, and Chapter 
Five provides an overall evaluation of the period 1995-1999 in relation to the 
propositions advanced in Chapter 1. In the same way, Chapter Six focuses on 
negotiations at the Ministerial level between 1999-2003, centring on the fate of the 
Doha Development Agenda, whilst Chapter Seven explores the sectoral 'Singapore 
Issues' relating to market access, investment and other issues and Chapter Eight 
provides an overall evaluation of the period 1999-2003. Chapter Nine returns to the 
propositions made at the end of the opening Chapter and reassesses them in the light of 
the evidence, taking an explicitly comparative approach to the two periods under 
discussion (1995-1999 and 1999-2003). This research design and chapter structure is 
intended to provide both an analytical 'spine' to the thesis and a detailed empirical 
study of key negotiation issues. 
Key defmitions 
For the purpose of the thesis, 'roles' are taken to mean the "patterns of expected or 
appropriate behaviour and ... the expectations or role prescriptions of other actors" 
(Elgstrom and Smith, 2006: 5) and 'responsibilities' as ways in which "a role is played" 
(ibid, page 6) in terms of accountabilities, capacities or tasks within role performance 
(Bovens, 1998: 25; Hamilton, 1978: 320). 
'Interests' have been defined as "state and non-state actors ... attempt(ing) to influence 
European public policy" (Fairbrass and Warleigb, 2002: 2). These may be within and 
without the European institutions, national governments, the European Parliament, 
regional and local authorities (Lord, 1998:45) or "social and regional interests" (Jeffery, 
2002:343). In the context of the WTO, these interests may also be global, for example 
from groups of countries with specific interests in matters of agriculture or 
development. 
6 
'Politicization', meanwhile, is defined as "the addition or accretion of political 
meanings, understandings and consequences to particular areas and instruments of 
policy" (Smith, 1998: 83) and here will be applied to external trade. 
Methodology and sources 
In terms of methodology, there are a number of aspects of historical institutionalism 
that are useful for the analysis herein. The central methodology employed through the 
thesis is that of process tracing, which plays an important part in historical 
institutionalist analyses. The aim is to identify the factors, which affect the 
Commission's roles and responsibilities in external trade over time as decisions made at 
one time can influence policies and practices in a later time (Katznelson, 2003, Pierson, 
1996, Smith, 2005).4 An early definition of process-tracing within political science was 
given by Alexander George and Timothy McKeown (1985), who suggested that its 
purpose was to "attempt to uncover what stimuli ... actors attend to; the decision process 
that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behaviour that then 
occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and 
behaviour; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and 
behaviour" (p35 [also cited in Falleti, 2006:9]). It was felt that this methodology would 
allow the research question to be addressed as fully as possible in terms of the roles and 
responsibilities that had accrued to the Commission in external trade and how it had 
been affected by the changing patterns of interests and institutions over time and issue. 
The time factor is important in process tracing as it also helps to establish whether 
particular outcomes were "sensitive to the choices made by earlier decision makers" 
(Elman and Elman, 2001: 30) so whether the problems in CancU.n arose because of 
problems at Doha, for example. In sum, the efforts made to identify the causal 
processes leading to particular outcomes, at a high and low political level, explains why 
process tracing is a key analytical technique here. 
4 Also seeS. Steinmo (2001) 'The New Institutionalism' in Clark, Band Foweraker, J (eds) The 
Encyclopedia of Political Thought, London Routledge reproduced at 
http://stripe.colomdo.edu/-1iteinmo/foweracker.pdf accessed August 20th 2008 
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Other relevant aspects to historical institutionalism that need to be introduced are that 
institutions can "influence or constrain the behaviour of the actors who established 
them" (Pollack, 2004: 139) so, in these terms, member states may find themselves in 
conflict with the Commission, and each other, over what outcomes are expected at any 
given stage. Also, the choices made by those actors, often at "critical junctures", 
(Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 341) can become "locked-in" (Pollack, ibid) insofar as 
such institutions either do not change, or change only slightly in response to changes in 
the environment in which they operate (Pierson, 2000). This "constraining power of 
context" (Schneiberg, 2007: 50) would suggest that the European Commission has the 
capacity to influence the Council of Ministers, perhaps strongly, but yet does not have 
the flexibility of manoeuvre, which would allow it to make structural changes even if 
the circumstances in which it was working changed significantly. Thus the level of 
continuity and change will be shown through the thesis. 
Pollack (2005:363) explains that political structures incentivise actors "to perpetuate 
institutional and policy choices inherited from the past, even when the resulting 
outcomes are manifestly inefficient" a condition which is termed path dependence. In 
the case of the relationship between the European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers, this is partly due to the short-term view held by member states; most 
concerned with political support as expressed through the ballot box (Pierson, 1996) 
and becomes more obvious overtime (Femandez, 2008).5 Moe (1990) further suggests 
that because of this short time horizon, it is in governments' interests to 'lock in' 
institutional arrangements making them difficult to reverse when an opposition party 
comes into power (p 125). In his seminal article on path dependence for the American 
·Political Science Review in 2000, Paul Pierson notes that the costs of changing to 
different forms of organisation increase over time and that "issues of timing and 
sequence ... reinforce divergent paths" (p251, also see Bennett and Elman, 2006:464). He 
suggests this is an "increasing returns process" (p252) in that the more steps that are 
taken down a particular path, the more likely that the path will continue to be followed 
and, in fact, that the path is "self-reinforcing" (p260) and change resistant. Therefore, 
he would argue that because the member states created the European infrastructure for 
5 From A M Femandez (2008) 'The EU Council Presidency Dilemma: An historical institutionalist 
interpretation" Cahier europeen number 0112008 Sciences Po at 
http://www.portedeurope.org/IMG/pdf/Cahier N 012008 ANAMAR 090508.ndfaccessed August 20th 2008 
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their own ends, and have shown commitment to it, it is most likely that they will 
continue to demonstrate their commitment to it. This is partly due to the "cost of exit" 
(p259) and partly because agreement for change needs to be wide ranging before it can 
be put in place such as the need for unanimity from Council (p262). Furthermore, he 
agrees that it is difficult to establish causal links between process and development and 
accepts the reality of "the complex mix of stability and bursts of change that 
characterize ... political processes" (p265). This 'mix' is another factor that will be 
explored in the thesis. 
The process tracing in the thesis is primarily qualitative, depending on close analysis 
of policy actions and policy positions. This was thought to be most useful in an effort 
to infer the motivations behind and the impact of a wide range of Commission 
activities, and to relate them to the ways in which key interests are arrayed. Process 
tracing, then, will build up a detailed narrative account of Commission positions and 
activities, their reception and subsequent adaptation by the Commission, and identify 
the positions occupied by key interests at each stage of the negotiation process under 
examination. This approach uses the Brittan and Lamy periods (1995-1999 and 1999-
2003) as key foci in order to provide a comparative analysis of the Commission's 
roles and responsibilities and their intersection with the changing pattern of interests 
across time periods and across types of negotiating context i.e. by dealing with, on the 
one hand, the 'high political' process ofWTO Ministerials and on the other with the 
sectoral politics of negotiations about specific parts of the WTO agenda. It also 
enables the tracing of key changes within the WTO and its environment, particularly 
those related to the increasing politicisation of international trade negotiations. The 
assumption is that the growing politicisation ofWTO negotiations would be felt on a 
cumulative but uneven basis. In other words, it should be possible to discern the 
growth of politicisation, and thus the intrusion of political interests into the 
Commission's activities, across the two time periods studied. It should also be 
possible to see differences between the 'high politics' ofMinisterials and the sectoral 
politics and technocratic processes of more specialised negotiations including the 
extent to which these change over time or are path dependent and 'locked in' even 
where greater change in response to policy or process changes would be optimal. This 
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would then impact on the Commission's aims, its interpretation of its mandate, its 
adaption of its roles and its tactics. 
The sources used in preparation of this thesis fall into three broad categories. First, use 
has been made of the extensive secondary material on EU policy-making, on the role of 
the Commission, and on European external trade policies. Second, the investigation 
relies upon a very extensive exploration of a wide range of primary documentation from 
both EU and WTO sources, and on the use of newspaper and other materials, many of 
which are web-based. Finally, a number of semi-structured interviews were conducted 
both in Geneva and in Brussels as a means of confirming or enriching conclusions 
reached through the documentary analysis. The interviewees were generally selected on 
personal recommendation of my contact in the President's office in the European 
Commission and the questions asked were open ended and allowed exploration of the 
issues if this was thought to be desirable at the time. As the volume of primary 
documentary material is so great, and such a high proportion is available through web-
based sources, footnotes have been used for websites and for newspaper articles as well 
as for Minutes of official meetings, which are accessed as Word documents from a 
central portal. These sources are listed in summary terms in the bibliography. 
A note on terminology 
There were several changes in terminology over the period covered by this thesis. The 
four changes that affect the thesis are outlined here. First, following the Maastricht 
Treaty (TEU) (1992), the European Communities (EC) became known as the European 
Union (EU). As the 'first pillar' of the Union, the European Community (EC) has the 
legal personality to sign WTO agreements; since this acts as the basis for the 
Commission's roles and responsibilities vis-a-vis the WTO, reference is made to the 
EC throughout except where other authors refer to it differently. Second, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997) renumbered Articles in the Treaty of Rome so that Article 113 (and 
the Article 113 Committee), which pertains to trade policy, became Article 133. The 
thesis uses Article 113 when discussing issues occurring prior to 1997 and Article 133 
for those that occurred thereafter. Third, although the numbering system for Directorate 
Generals (DGs) in the Commission was only removed in 1999, DG Trade is referred to 
as DG Trade throughout. Fourth, although COREPER I and CO REP ER II (the 
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Committee of the Deputy Permanent Representative and the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives respectively) are separate bodies and it is acknowledged that 
COREPER I is responsible for external trade, it is referred to throughout as 
'COREPER'. 
Note too that when 'the member state' interest is being discussed with reference to 
external trade, this is the General Affairs Council, except where other Council 
configurations are specifically mentioned (such as the European Council).6 Both 
forums provide a platform for domestic concerns to be expressed (Sherrington, 2002: 
38). 
6 Although this has been meeting as the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) since 
June 2002, separate meetings are held for each. Therefore, this thesis uses the term General Affairs 
Council (GAC) throughout (information sourced from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3 fo/showPage.asp?id==388&1ang-en accessed 25th Apri12008). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The European Commission: a question of roles, responsibilities and 
interests 
Introduction 
Just as it was when Coombes was writing in 1970, it is still the case that the European 
Commission's roles and responsibilities are difficult to pin down in "any meaningful 
classification" (p 234). This is because, as Edwards and Spence (1997: 5) reveal, 
definitions of the Commission range from "a putative government of a United States of 
Europe at one extreme and (as) a traditional international secretariat at the other". In spite 
of this obvious difficulty, it is important to be able to define the Commission in a more 
useful way, for the purposes of this thesis, both in terms ofConunission roles and 
responsibilities in a general sense, which will form the first part of this chapter, and then in 
terms of their roles and responsibilities as an actor in external trade, which will form the 
second part of the chapter. 
The third part of the chapter, meanwhile, will look at the 'interests' and their intersection 
and interaction with the Conunission's roles and responsibilities. These interests can be 
defined as fitting into three broad categories; the Commission (internal) interest, the 
Member State interest and the WTO interest. The capacity that each has for influencing the 
Commission's external trade function will then be examined and assessed. This section will 
show that the preferences of the interests are not stable- at certain times they are 
permissive and at others they are much more constraining. This links back to the research 
questions, set out in the Introduction, where it was suggested that the two external interests 
have become more constraining on the Conunission over time, and this has been magnified 
by the increasingpoliticization of the external trade field. The concept ofpoliticization will 
only be introduced here, as it will be explored in detail over subsequent chapters. 
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The chapter will conclude by reassessing the arguments put forward and by revisiting the 
four key research questions advanced in the thesis Introduction- about roles, 
responsibilities, interests and change. It will then translate these questions into 
propositions, which will form a broad framework for the investigation that follows and 
which will be explicitly reappraised in the thesis Conclusions. 
The first part begins by identifying what has been said in the literature about the 
Commission's roles and responsibilities, in a broad sense, and then using these points to 
develop a comprehensive picture of what the Commission's roles and responsibilities are in 
external trade for the second part of the Chapter. The argument will not dwell on the 
Commission's basic legal functions (as the 'engine ... of the Union' [Cini, 2002: 52] and as 
'Guardian of the Treaties' [Hallstein, 1972:38, Docksey and Williams, 1997: 128, for 
example]) as such responsibilities, which were given to the Commission in the Treaty of 
Rome, have not been contested in the way that some of the less tightly defined roles and 
responsibilities have been. Similarly, the specifics of the Commission's role as external 
negotiator and representative will not be included in the first part of this chapter; because it 
is taken as a given bearing in mind it will be the sole subject of the second part of this 
chapter and is also the focus of the thesis as a whole. 
The first step is to categorise the roles and responsibilities that the Commission has. Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace (1997: 178-9) draw attention to Rometsch and Wessels' (1994) 
accounts of the Commission-Council relationship. The latter asserted that four, very 
general, behavioural characteristics, that could be termed 'roles and responsibilities', in this 
instance, could be evidenced. Very concise explanations follow in brackets; the 
"technocracy" model (Commission as Expert), the "federal executive" model (Commission 
as Government), the "secretariat" model (Commission as Administrator) and the 
"promotional brokerage" model (Commission as Policy Entrepreneur/Coalition Builder). 1 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, in agreeing that these roles exist, also emphasise both their 
instability and their variance over policy issues and timescales (see also Cini, 2002: 55). 
1 for completeness here see also Elgstrom and Jonsson, 2000: 693 for their list of policy issues [following 
Lowi, 1972],Temple Lang, 2002: 333, Cameron, 1997: 100, Cini, 2002: 52, Spence, 2002:2 and Coombes, 
1970: 235-241 I opine that these fit into the Rometsch and Wessels classification. 
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Helen Drake (2000: 55) summarizes the problems of definition thus: "The 
Commission ... suffers from 'multiple accountabilities' ... 'identities' ... and probably 
personalities". This echoes the distinction made earlier between the different interests that 
the Commission has to satisfy, which is a distinction that will grow in importance in the 
second and third parts of the chapter. This description also emphasises the Commission's 
"many faces as a result of its uneven institutional history and the complex nature of the 
Treaties that created it" (Fligstein and McNichol, 1998:5) which might be best explained 
by seeing the Commission as a "multi-organisation" (Cram, 1999: 49). 
In the light of this, or maybe in spite of it, it is important to define a set of general roles and 
responsibilities, which apply to the Commission and, later, in analysis of the Commission's 
external relations capacity, it will be appropriate to look at these roles and responsibilities 
in this specific context. To this end, this chapter will use Rometsch and Wessels' four 
definitions in these two different ways. 
General Roles and Responsibilities 
The Commission as Expert 
This model sees the Commission as a technocratic leader in the policy areas for which it 
has competence and using this expertise to shape the European agenda. Recounting the 
origins of the High Authority within the European Coal and Steel Community, Meynaud 
(1968: I 07) highlights: 
"Iron and steel industry employers ... stressed the danger of a technocratic power which 
could deprive Parliamentary assemblies and administrative authorities of their legal 
prerogatives". 
Monnet's ambition for a technocracy-led Europe was not a secret, even if the way he 
developed his plans was; making sure that no details were given to the public until he was 
sure of French cabinet support and trade-offs had guaranteed that the project would not be 
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derailed by other politicians (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970:21- 2). The rationale for this 
secrecy was because Monnet did not believe that anyone outside the elites would 
appreciate what was being developed (Featherstone, 1994) although this tactic ultimately 
had the effect of creating "an 'attitudinal gap' ... between the general public and ... the EU" 
(Hueglin, 1999: 255). 
When it came to plans for how the new European Commission would look within the 
European Community infrastructure, again Monnet put his faith in the superiority of the 
technocratic approach (see Mazey, 2001: 36). He sought a Commission, which was as 
powerful as the High Authority had been, over an increased range of sectors, with only a 
minimal role played by the Council of Ministers and an even smaller part played by 
Parliament. Central to that was his belief that "intergovernmental cooperation had never led 
anywhere" (Monnet, 1978: 328) hence he wanted the Commission to dominate the Council 
"which would remain a kind of 'sounding board' or 'ratification body' without any m~ or 
role of its own" (Rometsch and Wessels, 1994: 204). 
In reality, though, the High Authority does not appear to have exercised a hegemonic role 
over the coal and steel sector; rather it "worked in harness ... with the Council whose 
opinion it sought more often than was legally required" (Mayne, 1970: 234-5) possibly 
because integration could not take place without the agreement of the member state 
governments (Lindberg, 1963: 52). The High Authority, in other words, needed the 
Council's political support in order for it to work effectively. This also meant that the EEC 
Treaty formalised this relationship and both Council and Parliament were made 
proportionally stronger in the Treaty of Rome than they had been under the Treaty of Paris. 
Furthermore, that it was called 'The Commission' rather than keeping the name 'the High 
Authority', and that the word 'supranational' was omitted in the Rome Treaty, had 
sigoificance to its position in the new European institutional infrastructure (Robertson, 
1973: 183 also Tugendhat, 1986: 72). Therefore, looking at what the Rome Treaty tried to 
achieve vis-a-vis the balance of the relationship between the Council and Commission, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that it indicated a political reining-in of any Monnet-like 
technocratic ambition, as well as curtailing any existing technocratic ideals of the High 
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Authority itself, which could be carried over into the new organisation. After all, if the 
Connnission was to epitomise the continuation of such an approach, the level of 
involvement by the Council would (at most) have been kept to that set out formally in the 
Treaty of Paris. This might suggest that the member states were more permissive and 
enabling of the High Authority in the Treaty of Paris and became constraining on the new 
Connnission under the Treaty of Rome and that this constraint had become more evident 
over time. Another example of the constraint was that the Connnission became subject to 
Parliamentary oversight, which would be 'upgraded' from 1979 with an assembly elected 
by universal adult suffrage (Article 138:3, EEC Treaty)? 
Although the Connnission, then, is not a technocracy, it nevertheless exercises some level 
of policy leadership, specifically under the first pillar where it has a duty to put forward 
initiatives in order to promote a European rather than a national view. The extent to which 
it is able to exert this authority in the field of external trade will be tackled in the second 
part of this chapter; Bemard (2002: 228) suggests that although "the Connnission may have 
a near-monopoly on the right oflegislative initiative under the first pillar .. .it does not have 
full control over the legislative agenda". Similarly, conflict between the Council and the 
Connnission may also demonstrate ambition in specific areas of responsibility. Meynaud 
(1968: 295) reveals that, after all, "the politician cannot dream of ejecting the technician 
from the government machine but the reverse is not true". 
The Commission as Government 
This model sees the Commission assuming attributes of a European 'government' allowing 
it to operate alongside Council and to take over from it in areas where it held substantive 
powers. Rometsch and Wessels (1994: 217) suggest that this potential outcome was a 
direct contradiction of the previous model, in that the Connnission would "develop into the 
'government', the head of which would be elected by and ... responsible to the European 
2 Although this section in the Treaty sets out the intention that there should be universal adult suffrage for 
electing members ofthe European Parliament, this did not happen until 1979. According to the Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe, in their Joint Declaration ofNovember 1959 (1969, p42) "the 
EP's Committee on universal suffrage expects that its first elections by universal suffrage will be possible in 
1963". Hence, this was expected earlier. 
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Parliament". To contextualise this by using the Westminster model, the European 
Parliament would be the House of Commons, the Council would be the House of Lords, 
and the Commission would be the Cabinet, with the President of the Commission as Prime 
Minister or rather European President. This structure would reconfigure the relationship 
between the Parliament and the Commission as the most important in the European 
infrastructure, rather than that between the Council and Commission. Rometsch and 
Wessels suggest that this view was particularly important to the early federalists and this 
would seem to be supported considering the opinions of both Deniau (1967:30) and Haas 
(1968: 4) who advise that the ECSC could be "a European government in embryo" or "a 
quasi-federal government" respectively.3 It was Waiter Hallstein's aim, as the first 
Commission President, to make the Commission into a 'government', which caused the 
Empty Chair Crisis, resulting in (amongst other things) an assurance within the 
Luxembourg Compromise that the Member States would retain authority within the 
European structure (Christiansen, 2001: 98).4 
When they were writing, Rometsch and Wessels seemed to believe that this model was 
virtually redundant, except as a form of "yardstick" (p217) by which to measure the extent 
of integration. However, rightly or wrongly, this discussion has persisted. He! en Drake 
(2000: 152) noted that Prodi's use of the term 'government' appeared to be tolerated, 
alongside "the political and ethical accountabilities to the state and citizens that are 
characteristics of modem political executives".5 This suggests that the argument is evolving 
into a more sophisticated discussion over national sovereignty, in the face of increasing 
authority being ceded to the European level, and, specifically, into the first pillar. Such 
debate is rooted in discourses on, for example, European citizenship (Shaw, 1997, Wiener, 
1998 and Bellarny and Warleigh, 2001) where rights, duties and obligations on the citizen 
as a European, rather than solely a national citizen, have been discussed, involving its 
virtues in providing an "ethical glue to enhance the stability of the European condominia" 
3 Memedovic et al 1999: 10 say that the EU "is an incomplete state with the ultimate objective to acquire all 
the attributes of sovereignty" which also fits in well here 
4 For further elaboration on the Luxembourg Compromise, as I have only sketched out the barest minimum 
here, see Nugent, 2001: 30-32 
5 Although this statement by Prodi, according to Peterson (2002: 92) "provoked a backlash that lasted well 
into Prodi's term in office''. 
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(Bellamy and Warleigh, 1998: 456). Even though Michael Newman (2001: 364) terms the 
outcome as "largely symbolic", as citizenship was previously the domain of the member 
states it is, perhaps, not surprising that discussion has continued in this vein. 
For the Commission to become a 'European government', when it was established by 
member states at least partly to fulfil national needs (Vilella, 1999:212), the European 
institutions would need to be able to encourage the emergence and solidarity of 
'Europeanness', as the primary attachment for citizens in place of national loyalty. 6 Were 
this to happen, it could be suggested that the European Union had turned into a nation state, 
not that it had superseded nation states (Canovan, 1996: 119). Whether this could happen or 
not, and although it is an interesting argument it is somewhat tangential to the thesis; what 
is clear is that, although the European Commission may not be 'a government', neither is 
"the state ... the omnipotent political sovereign" (Bernard, 2002: 234, also Hueglin, 1999: 
253, Keohane, 2003: 116, van Ham, 2001: 130). The term is also equally applicable, 
however, to activities in particular portfolios so it can be said that the Commission "has 
some of the institutional attributes of a 'government' for trade policy purposes" (Smith, 
2001:790). This confirms the currency of the issue and will be further explored in the 
second part of the chapter. 
The Commission as Administrator 
Although this model in its absolutist form sees the Commission as highly passive because it 
holds little independent power and has no authority beyond what is directly granted to it by 
Council, to suggest that the Commission is "like the secretariat of a typical international 
organisation" as does Michelmann (1978:12) is probably a little too critical (see Henig, 
.. 1980: 56) given its right of initiative in the first pillar (Rometsch and Wessels, 1996:220, 
Schmidt, 1999: 155). Even Andrew Moravscik (1998: 161), although scathing about the 
Commission being viewed as having any independent authority beyond what is granted to 
it by Council, at least credits it as being able to "lock in agreements against defection by 
6 see Lord 1998: 132, Shaw 1996, 1997, Eleftheriadis 1998 and other writers on the need for a European 
'demos' 
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foreign governments" which is not, one might suggest, solely an administrative function. A 
related issue is that of the nature of the Commission as 'civil service' (or bureaucracy), 
which will be looked at here. 
Again, the definition of what constitutes such an animal is problematic. Peters (1995: 27) 
explains the dichotomy of bureaucracy thus: 
"On the one hand, bureaucracy is seen as a Leviathan seeking to increase its powers 
and operating as an integrated, monstrous institution. On the other hand, 
bureaucracy is pictured as a court jester- a fumbling, bumbling collection of 
uncoordinated agencies that at best muddle through and at worst make absolute 
fools of themselves". 
He does not go on to say which view he would be closer to subscribing to so it can be 
assumed that the perception of bureaucracy is somewhat personal (also Gladden, 1956: 
196). With this in mind, it is interesting that Mazey and Richardson (1995) suggest that the 
Commission is "both an adolescent and a promiscuous bureaucracy" (quoted in 
Richardson, 2002: 12) and Cram (1999: 44) agrees that the Commission can be "best 
understood as a bureaucracy with a mission" (also Smyrl, 1999: 97). 
There are advantages for a civil service, in the main because of its stability compared with 
that of the legislature, it can 'wait out' for a prevailing climate that is more sympathetic to 
their proposals if the current one is not (Peters, 1995: 32) There is some evidence of the 
Commission taking advantage of this more permissive environment in discussions about 
trade competence in Amsterdam when, essentially, the bulk of their recommendations were 
simply carried over to Nice when the Council was more enabling (see NicolaYdis and 
Meunier, 2002: 189). There is also a "reliance" (Peters, ibid) on the civil service to develop 
policy proposals although, in the EC, these proposals are then scrutinized by comitology 
committees to the extent that "def(ies) any notion that the Commission is an omnipotent 
and unaccountable bureaucracy" (Nugent, 2002:153). 
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The rationale behind the view of the Commission partly as a bureaucracy could be because 
as a "purposeful opportunist" (Cram, 1997:156) it will seek out ways to maximise its status 
(also Nugent and Saurugger, 2002: 345) including opportunities to evade the influence of 
national governments through its information advantages, long term planning ability and 
because it can play off differences between member states (Schmitt, 2000: 41).7 Pollack 
(1998:222) agrees that the Commission is able to predict the views of the principals, which 
enables it to change its own approach in response; a more proactive stance. An agent, like 
the Commission, cannot then be seen as wholly subordinate, or passive, even if the member 
states may choose to be more constraining- the Commission is able to exert its own 
influence through the policy process and can, with perhaps the right political environment, 
follow its own policy preferences. 
It has subsequently been suggested that trying to isolate administrative functionality might 
risk obscuring the increasing level of administrative cooperation "in all phases of the policy 
cycle, from agenda setting over decision making to implementation of policies" (Curtin, 
2007: 523). Administrative cooperation stretches over all policy areas and cannot be 
separated from other types of tasks, reiterating its importance not just as one of the 
Commission's roles and responsibilities but also as a necessary aspect within other roles 
and responsibilities. The totality of the Commission's behaviour as an agent, in this sense, 
could become important over the next chapters when the Commission's roles and 
responsibilities in the WTO will be assessed. 
The Commission as Policy Entrepreneur/Coalition Builder 
This model sees the Commission as a broker and mediator of policy. In order to succeed in 
this role, it has to be able to negotiate and broker and put together package deals to gain 
support from Council. As was noted earlier, the Commission has the sole right of initiative, 
a "monopoly" (Lord, 1998: 27 also see De Gucht, 2003:165) perhaps, under the first pillar. 
It is not quite as simple as that as the Commission receives proposals for such initiatives 
7 Echoed by Hooghe and Marks (2001: I 0) who say that "The more hands there are on the steering wheel, the 
less control any driver will have" 
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from Council, the European Parliament, national parliaments, sub-national groups, lobby 
groups, international actors and others. The Commission is, then, a "clearinghouse, a 
springboard of ideas and ... a first stage compromise of ... many interests" (Commission 
official quoted in Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 148). As might be expected, these multilevel 
discussions at the policy instigating stage work both ways. For example, the Commission 
might be able to use informal discussions with Council members or COREPER (Keating, 
1999: 445) to pressurise member states to support its own proposals or reveal the way other 
governments are working (Hull and Rhodes, 1977: 69). This could be considered as 
profiting from using "subterfuge" in developing policy networks (Heretier, 1999: 279), in 
terms of the Commission putting itself in a position to be able to mitigate the effects of any 
constraints by the Council and the other interests. 
There is a view that the Commission President plays a particularly important role in any 
effort to build coalitions in order to further the Commission's policy ambitions. This could 
be achieved by the President being able to "identify, persuade, cajole and, at times, threaten 
other key actors" (Endo, 1999: 3 7). The logical continuation of that argument would be that 
the Commission is most successful in exercising a brokerage function when its leadership 
is strong, such as when Jacques Delors was President from 1985 tol995 (see Warleigh, 
2002). There are two issues here; the first is the (macro) diplomatic function, which can 
undoubtedly be exercised most effectively by the Commissioners, if not the President or 
other strong "personalities" alone (Sidjanski, 2003: 79), and the wider issues of building 
coalitions at a micro level, which can be just as important.8 
Coalition building is the responsibility of all 'A' grade officials in the Commission, and, of 
which, personality would dictate that some are better at it than others (see also Bellier, 
1997: 105, Stevens and Stevens, 2001: 143). A good example is the New Approach 
enabling products to be placed on the market in all member states if they are able to satisfy 
the minimum requirements set for each specific product. 9 This began as a loose idea from 
the Industry Commissioner to his services but it was the services, which had to put flesh on 
8 Sidjanski (2003: 79) says that "other personalities" besides the President who have "left their mark on 
Commission policy" are "Mansholt, Barre, Spinelli, Davignon and Brittan" 
9 This applies to products coming under the New Approach (e.g. lifts, hot water boilers, toys) 
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those bones and make the New Approach concept broadly acceptable to the Member 
States. 10 The system of comitology enables those who work in the Commission to meet 
influential representatives from all member states in order to promote ideas to them at a 
very early stage (Murphy, 2000:1 07) which may be why it could be said that the 
Commission is "geared towards promotional brokerage" (Bouwen, 2002: 379). The alleged 
watchdog role (see Smith, 1994:256) that committees have in the structure can, then, work 
both ways. 
The need to consult with a range of people prior to putting a proposal on the table has led 
to accusations that the Commission is practicing "a kind of extreme consensus democracy" 
(Lord, 1998: 78). This is not much of a smprise considering the need for large majorities in 
Council before proposals are accepted (officially under QMV for the first pillar, but 
normally through consensus,) which results, according to game theorists, in the need to first 
build a 'winning coalition' (Axelrod, 1970, Riker,l962 as detailed in de Swaan, 1973). 11 
Helen Wall ace (2000: 59) concludes that "the development and sustainability of European 
policies require the satisfaction of multiple interests" which can be interpreted as an 
acknowledgement that the interests have to be satisfied in the end, whether they are 
enabling or not, under both QMV and unanimity. This has been the case from the earliest 
days of the Commission. 12 
Mediation is particularly important when there are a lot of people around the table with 
divergent views and vested interests. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997: 188) point out 
"part of the Commission's 'street credibility' and ability to win confidence from its 
interlocutors in the Council depends on its capacity to stitch agreements together" .13 This is 
important when there is disagreement within the Council and may result in the Commission 
10 It was actually the responsibility of a relatively low level British fonctionnaire in the Industry DG, Jacques 
McMillan. He also wrote the Council Resolution of7'h May 1985 (see Vincenzi, 1996: 206 for the full text) 
11 Most policy is decided by consensus whether it should officially be by QMV or unanimity as the 
Commission noted in the White Paper on Governance, 2001. This disputes Shore's observation (2001:210) 
that "decision-making in the Council...has moved dramatically from the rule of unanimity to that ofQMV". 
Also see Hayes-Renshaw et al, 2006: 161 
12 See PEP, 1968: 173 on the preliminary "far reaching discussions" held by the Commission before policy 
proposals are put forward. 
13 Supported by interviewees 2, 4. 5 and 9 
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putting together 'package deals' (see Chapter Two where the process of finalising the 
Uruguay Round accords is explained). 
Concluding Remarks 
It has been shown above that the Commission demonstrates many types of roles and 
responsibilities. Even though, when we first look at the headings for each section, we may 
believe (as Rometsch and Wessels seemed to believe) that the roles and responsibilities 
identified are mutually exclusive, instead they can be evidenced, not according to the 
different theoretical perspectives applied to them, but according to the different activities 
the Commission carries out and/or according to the timeline of a specific task. Thus, it has 
provided evidence of the sheer complexity of the Commission's roles and responsibilities. 
The implications of this complexity will be subject to further analysis. 
This section has only barely introduced the importance of the interests. These interests, as 
well as the Commission's roles and responsibilities, change over time and can be enabling 
or constraining depending on the issue. This will become more important both in the next 
section when the Commission's roles and responsibilities in external trade will be 
considered, and in the final section where the interests are explicitly addressed. 
Roles and Responsibilities in External Trade 
Introduction 
Here the Chapter will look at the above roles and responsibilities as they apply specifically 
to external trade in order to define the Commission's external function as the 'single voice' 
of Europe (see, for example, Meunier and Nicolaldis, 1999). As noted earlier, the roles and 
responsibilities identified by Rometsch and Wessels in 1994 (i.e. the Commission as 
Expert, the Commission as Government, the Commission as Administrator and the 
Commission as Policy Instigator/Entrepreneur and Coalition Builder) will herein be used to 
define the functions within the external trade portfolio. 
23 
The Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community, signed in 1957, gave a 
"pivotal function" (Smith, 1994: 249) to the European Commission for developing 
legislation, supervising implementation and acting on behalf of the member states in 
external trade negotiations (Nugent, 2001: 26). There were two main reasons why trade 
was considered so important by the Six for inclusion in the Rome Treaty. The first was that 
trade policy would be the main instrument of foreign policy and the other was that member 
states thought that they could achieve more by acting collectively in trade than they would 
individually.14 This was partly because of the potential size of the market (Meunier, 2000: 
I 03, 2007:5) which would allow the Community to exert greater influence on their largest 
trading partners, specifically the USA and possibly Japan (Ginsberg, 2001: 253, Bergsten, 
2000: 53, Meunier, 2007:5). At the same time, the new, larger market would be protected 
from national interests allowing for greater liberalisation (Meunier and Nicolaldis, 1999: 
480). Because Article XXIV of the GATT Agreement treated the customs union "as though 
it were a (single) contracting party", trade was made a Community competence. This made 
the Commission into a neutral arbiter, steering a course between the needs and wants of 
each member state and a negotiator, in order that the Community could be seen to speak 
with one voice (Smith, 1996: 248). 
Where the Commission has these roles and responsibilities, and what these mean in 
practice, will be the subject of this section. Once again, this will emphasize the importance 
of the Commission within the external trade function. At the same time, it will highlight 
the extent to which the three categories of interests (the internal Commission interest, the 
Council and the WTO), that were mentioned earlier, have contested it. This will confirm 
the assumption, as set out in the introduction, that the Commission has to satisfy the often-
differing wants and needs of those interests and that this can prove particularly difficult. 
14 See, for one example, Memedovic et a11999 who suggest that the EC did this in order to exercise 
1
'economic hegemony" (pl2) 
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The Commission as Expert 
The Commission has certain duties regarding the provision of expertise in external trade 
negotiations. There are, of course, many stages in negotiations, which will be detailed in 
subsequent chapters, but the first stage is that the Commission drafts proposals for 
negotiations and submits them to Council (see Murphy, 1990: 118). 
One of Andrew Moravscik' s arguments is that the impetus for proposals under the first 
pillar would emanate from the Council and the Commission would be "reactive" (1998: 
616,621) in accepting them. However, when the Council does suggest initiatives, they can 
be nebulous (Cloutier, 1999: 180) and the Commission then needs to expand them into 
something more meaningful. Although the Commission may have the right of initiative 
under the first pillar, it does not have the right to set the legislative agenda (Bernard, 2002) 
so the question is on the extent of the authority that the Commission has to act as an expert 
in the field of external trade. 
The Commission has the basis for its authority to provide expertise in external trade set out 
in the Treaty of Rome. Arguably the most important section is Article 229 which says, "It 
shall be for the Commission to ensure the maintenance of all appropriate relations 
with ... the GATT". As part of this ceded authority, the Commission also has the 
responsibility to negotiate (Stevens and Stevens, 2001: 142) and, even though the Member 
States are in attendance, in their own rights, it is the Commission who participates in 
discussions and who exercises voting rights (see Macleod et a!, 1996: 180). Furthermore, 
although the obligation to negotiate is Treaty-based, the ways and means to negotiate are 
matters for the Commission to decide (Somerset, 2002: 58). 
The Commission is able to act as an expert because there is no other institution that is 
capable of so doing. Parliament does not have any authority in negotiating trade 
agreements (see Nugent, 1999: 445) and with its multi-party character and multi-sited 
meetings it would be a challenge for it to do so even if it was. Similarly, the Council would 
have problems balancing the different national perspectives of its Members (ibid) and 
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although there have been discussions on the merits of setting up an independent trade 
agency, it seems doubtful that it would be seen as a credible negotiator by internal and 
external countries.15 It also seems unlikely that it would be able (structurally) to incorporate 
the broad base of knowledge, which would enable it to cope with the "many multilateral 
agreements being negotiated separately" at each Ministerial (Landau, 2000: 12). Finally, the 
Council would have to be sure that this would not sacrifice the knowledge, breadth and 
depth of experience and political acumen that the Commission has. 
This does not mean to say that the Commission's roles and responsibilities in external trade 
are uncontested. Council has claimed that the Commission Jacks competence to negotiate 
in certain trade areas in spite of Commission arguments, since the Uruguay Round, that its 
expertise should be extended. 16 National governments also seek to retain the national veto, 
such as in the cultural sphere on audio-visual agreements, (see Collins, 1997: 329-355, van 
Ham, 2001: 81-85). Furthermore, individual Member States feel they have a right to 
negotiate with third countries in areas such as civil aviation (for example) (Woolcock, 
1997: 232) rather than simply allow the Commission to use its expertise in order to develop 
Europe-wide agreements, although this may now be changing (Meunier, 2005: 145). As 
well as Council, Parliament has complained that it too should have more of a say on trade 
matters (see Duff, 200 I) although this has yet to be forthcoming. 
Finally, the Commission's expertise has also come under fire as part of the general global 
backlash against the multilateral trading system, epitomised by the WTO. It maybe that the 
Commission has been targeted specifically because it is seen as the "voice" of Europe 
within the widened agenda which now "touches upon areas that are arguably part of the 
domestic social fabric" (NicolaYdis and Meunier, 2002: 174). This contestation is not only 
on the part of the member states but also the wider global interest such as NGOs rallying 
around the WTO and affecting its own policy preferences (O'Brien et a!, 2000: 212) and, in 
turn, affecting the EU' s policy preferences (Winters, 200 I: 28). 
15 See Christiansen 1996: 90 and the European Commission's White Paper on Governance 2001 where the 
Commission acknowledged the need for further autonomous agencies 
16 This can be tracked from its appeal to the ECJ for its Opinion on competence after the Uruguay Round, its 
proposals for changing Article 113/133 in Amsterdam and Nice and the 2001 White Paper on Governance 
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The Commission as Government 
The Commission has a number of functions in external trade that are completely 
independent of the Council, for example, import relief, competition and diplomatic 
representation (Featherstone and Ginsberg, 1996: 79, Macleod et al, 1996: 166). This latter 
diplomatic representation function "flow(s) from the Commission's own powers to 
organize its services as seems most appropriate to it as an institution" (Mac1eod et a!, 1996: 
55). This was particularly helpful to the Commission and the member states in the Uruguay 
Round as the insider knowledge garnered by the diplomatic representations allowed the 
Commission to develop proposals they knew member states would consider (Taylor, 1983: 
136-7). The Commission also has permanent representations in many international 
organisations, which indicate the importance it places on its external role (Macleod et a! 
1996: 225) and this level of supporting infrastructure puts it, again, on a par with member 
states. 
Another governmental function exercised by the Commission is that of the "voice" of the 
Union within the WTO. It could be argued that in the WTO it "exercises authority at a 
higher level... (and) ... operates on a larger scale than the sovereign authorities" (V ollaard 
2001: 98) as the member states are not free to speak where competence rests with the 
Commission (see the introduction to this section above). This suggestion of "de-
territorialisation of political authority in the EU", the title ofVollaard's chapter, is an 
indication of the growing responsibilities that the Commission has, at least in first pillar 
issues and specifically when their responsibilities have an external dimension. However, 
the Commission's position is contested by wider arguments about legitimacy and 
accountability; Susan Strange suggested that the lack of national control in the European 
structure created "a yawning hole of non-authority, ungovemance it might be called" 
(2003: 154). Another term used to describe the lack of national involvement is the 
'"democratic disconnect' in recognition of the increasingly attenuated nature of direct 
national control and oversight" (Lindseth 2002: !51), which also fits with this argument. 
27 
The attempt to rationalise the duality of governance, between the member states and the 
European institutions, has been embodied in the principle of 'subsidiarity', elaborated in 
the Maastricht Treaty (TEU). 17 This was introduced to satisfy vehemently disparate 
demands, which is best indicated by both federalists and intergovemmentalists claiming it 
as a positive step forward. The general concept is that issues would only be dealt with at 
the European level when they could not be tackled at a more intermediate, local level 
(Peterson, 1994: 117). The vague way in which it was mentioned in the TEU (Van 
Kersbergen and Verbeek, 1994: 216) suggests that it was an effort to develop an ambitious 
consensus to reject federalism, ensure the primacy of the member state interest yet adopting 
some measure of 'political union' .18 One problem with the concept of subsidiarity is that 
the TEU mentions it in two different ways (Warleigh, 2003: 64)- firstly as a "substantive 
issue" which sets out that decisions must be made as close as possible to the citizen and 
then as a "procedural issue", to set out where the Community should and should not have a 
role. 19 To add more complexity, the importance of the principle as it related to the citizen 
did not appear in the European Council's Edinburgh Declaration of 1992 where 
subsidiarity was mentioned solely as a means of regulating power between the member 
states and the European institutions (Warleigh, ibid p65). This debate has continued since 
the definition of the term has remained unchanged in subsequent Treaty revisions. 
Therefore, although subsidiarity may have set out to draw a solid line between the 
responsibilities of the member states and the European institutions, because of its deliberate 
and necessary vagaries, it has failed to do so. This may be a contributory factor as to why 
the issue of Commission competence in external relations is still unresolved, because 
sovereignty transfers are especially political when considered in the context of global trade 
(Nicolai'dis and Meunier, 2002: 174).20 
17 Which was known, in DG Industry/Enterprise after the TEU, as 'the Sword' no doubt parodying John 
Major's insistence that no reference was made in the Maastricht Treaty to the federal nature of the EU, 
terming federalism 'the F word' (see Nicoll and Salmon 1994: 259) 
18 Van Kersbergen and Verbeek (1994: 216) suggest these three aspects constituted "the seemingly insoluble 
'trilemma"' hence why subsidiarity was mentioned in the TEU. 
19 Andrew Duff(1993: 10) suggests that one of the main problems with the TEU was its "failure to set out 
clearly the distribution of power between the supranational and the national levels of government" 
20 At least with respect to cultural and audiovisual, education, social and human health services, transport and 
non-commercial aspects of intellectual property, which are all subject to 'mixed competence' rather than sole 
Commission competence (see Neunreither 2000: 194). This was also echoed by Interviewee 9 that although 
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It has been shown that the Commission's 'government-like' roles and responsibilities that it 
demonstrates in external trade have not been uncontested. Furthermore, within its external 
trade responsibilities, efforts have been made (according to Meunier and Nicolaldes, 
1999:477) to 'rollback' the competence ofthe Commission. This will be looked at in the 
next section and elaborated upon in Chapter Two. 
The Commission as Administrator 
The entry in the first part of this chapter showed that it was difficult to pinpoint the 
administration functions of the European Commission as they are bundled up within policy 
responsibilities and capabilities. Nevertheless, these functions could be said to be most 
obvious in the implementation area, where "most front line implementation is undertaken 
by appropriate agencies in the member states" (Nugent, 2001: 312) with the Commission 
merely checking that this has been done in the correct manner, as far as possible, with the 
proviso that resource constraints meant that this might not be as detailed or efficient as the 
Commission might wish it to be (ibid). 
The Commission's roles and responsibilities in anti-dumping activities could also be said to 
be administrative in nature, at least at first glance. Formally, the Commission's primary 
activity in this area is to carry out what is essentially a desk review to determine whether 
there has been any 'injury' to producers in terms of the amount of goods that have been 
either subsidized, the price being charged for the goods and the likely impact on the 
relevant European industry (Cunnane and Stanbrook, 1983: 64-6). Dumping can be 
identified either when the price charged for the export is less than the price charged in the 
market of manufacture or when the price charged can be shown to be lower than the 
production price (Davenport, 1989: 1 ). In anti-dumping issues there is no legal authority 
invested in the Commission to change or enforce the relevant legislation or to "impose 
definitive anti-dumping duties" (Stanbrook, 1980: 40). In addition, the Commission is also 
usually obliged to consult with an Advisory Committee, with representatives from all 
he represented his country in the Article 133 Committee, he did not deal with issues that were 'mixed 
competence'. 
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member states, through the investigative process (ibid). Informally, however, this seems 
much more of a way to allow the Commission "to pursue protection under the acceptable 
guise of 'fair play' or 'levelling the playing field"' (Davenport, 1989: 23) and, secondly, to 
maximise the Commission's scope for manoeuvre. It would appear that the Commission 
has sought to increase its authority by using its ability to agree pricing strategies with 
exporters who are identified as dumping goods "as an alternative to the imposition of duties 
(from which) part of the economic rent ... then goes to the exporter in the shape of higher 
revenue at the expense of the EU consumer"(Woolcock, 2000: 391 ).21 By using this 
method, the Commission can minimize the role of the Council (Winters, 2001: 27). 
It would not seem to suit anyone if the Commission was 'just' an administrator in anti-
dumping matters. Anti dumping is a European issue, not just a national issue; goods come 
on to the European market, not just the national market (this is a principle of the Single 
European Act of July 1987 [when it came into force]) so it makes commercial, as well as 
logistical, sense for it to be dealt with at the European level. Furthermore, this builds on 
the Commission's reputation as the 'single voice' for trade matters. Nevertheless, that the 
Commission has this responsibility in anti-dumping is because it has achieved that role, 
rather than been granted that role, and there are questions, if not of efficiency and 
effectiveness, then about legitimacy. This echoes Susan Strange's argument highlighted in 
the previous section as to the extent of 'ungovemance' within the European structure. 
lfMeunier and Nicolaldis (1999:477) are correct in their assumption that Council actively 
sought to roll back the competence of the Commission in the Uruguay Round of GATT , 
there should be evidence of it becoming more administrative and less able to follow its own 
preferences. This contention will be assessed through the thesis. It is possible that the 
Council might wish to see the Commission's authority reduced and further analysis of this 
point will take place in the following chapters. 
21 For an excellent case study on the anti-dumping procedure, as applied to piezo-electric quartz watches,_ see 
Viilker and Steenbergen, 1985: 236-252. 
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The Commission as Policy Entrepreneur/Coalition Builder 
The Commission has an advantage in developing coalitions because of its "relative 
cohesion" vis-a-vis the Council and Parliament (Nugent, 1995: 611-2). Policy proposals 
from the Commission, setting out the 'European view' and their vision for progress, are 
developed through many stages of discussion and negotiation. This takes place through the 
College of Commissioners and their services and, by the time they reach the Council table, 
proposals should be "well designed technically with both the common goals of all the 
members and the specific needs or problems of individual countries" (Lindberg and 
Scheingold, 1970: 93).1t would be difficult, then, for Council to dismiss any suggested 
resolution from the Commission entirely except on grounds of individual national 
interest. 22 This is an important reason why the Commission has this policy initiator 
function i.e. "it eliminates the inconvenience of the Council being forced to choose 
between rival texts submitted by member states on the basis of their opposing positions" 
(Lister, 1996: 99). Because of the Commission's position, it can develop proposals on the 
basis of what it thinks the member states will accept (as mentioned in the 'government' 
roles and responsibilities) and can choose when best to "take advantage" of particular 
situations such as changes in industry practices or growing public concerns about particular 
issues (Deeken, 1993: 2 also George, 1995) 
In the external trade context the Commission must satisfy both the member state and the 
wider global interest in order to be able to make forward progress. As far as satisfying the 
member states is concerned, the next chapter will detail the events that happened at the end 
of the Uruguay Round, where the Commission was instrumental in getting Council 
agreement to finalize the Round in spite of, initially, strong disagreement from France and 
. Portugal (Devuyst, 1995:459, Wiener, 1995: 226). As well as achieving this level of 
consensus, Woolcock (1993: 556) points out that the Commission was also able to get the 
negotiating mandate changed as although in the original mandate, the European 
22 This was supported by interviewees 1 ,2,4,5,6, 7 & 9. Interviewee 5 commented that it would be unlikely 
that countries would show their hands at the outset but would try to find other countries who shared their 
pefspective. Interviewee 6 said it was rare for the Commission to directly tackle a country in this way without 
discussion first. 
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Commission (at Uruguay) was instructed to oppose the setting up of a dispute resolution 
mechanism with more teeth "by 1991 ... the European Commission had endorsed Section 5 
of the draft final act of the Uruguay Round which contains just that". Global aspects will be 
considered within the narrative chapters, where it will become clear that consensus 
building is imperative although difficult to achieve. 
Within the GATT, there were a number of examples of the Commission acting as an 
entrepreneur. The first example, from the Dillon Round, was where the Commission 
unilaterally agreed not to pursue reciprocity in trading relations with the least developed 
countries (Dam, 1970: 238). Later, the Tokyo Round relied on the Commission's 
entrepreneurship because it was conducted on the basis of bilateral deals between the US 
and EC negotiators, which were then sold on to the Japanese and "other industrial nations" 
once they had been agreed (McDonald, 2000: 207). Within the WTO, although this 
particular example is tangential to the thesis, it is also instructive to note that in the 
Singapore Ministerial of the WTO in 1996, the Commission sought an agreement on 
environmental issues. Although its initiative was unsuccessful, the Commission simply 
transferred the work to the Hague, which eventually resulted in the Basle Convention on 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Oxley, 2002: 81). 
This demonstrates the Commission's wider ability to push forward its policy preferences, 
even without building a supportive coalition in the WTO. In 1997, the Commission "played 
a major role in pushing through the ... Information Technology Agreement" in the WTO 
(Moussis, 2000: 375), which will be discussed in more depth in a future chapter as a case 
study, and, that same year, attracted a supporting coalition within the WTO for a 
Millennium Round (Brittan, 2002, van den Hoven, 2004). 
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Interests 
Introduction 
The issue of interests is important in terms of the effects that their positions and 
preferences have on the Commission (see earlier sections). As the WTO system and 
Council voting works on consensus, and through the fact that the WTO "reflects ... existing 
power structures" (Hoefuagels, 1981 : 3 5) the EC as a whole is able to dictate priorities as 
the joint 'superpower' (van den Hoven, 2004: 258) within the WTO alongside the US. 
However, although the member states may retain collective overall control, provided they 
can agree a common line, the interests can also enable or constrain the member states' 
individually and collectively as well as the Commission's policy choices. These enabling 
or restraining influences are, in the same way as roles and responsibilities are, unstable and 
vary over policy issues, timescales and even through the involvement of different 
personalities (see Hayes Renshaw and Wallace, 1997: 178-9, Jorgensen and Phillips, 
2002:37 and Johnstone, 2002:134). It could be concluded that it was the importance of 
these interests, which shaped Europe's foreign policy exercised through the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) (Young, 2002:21 ). 
The political environment (Nugent, 1997: 17) or the "negotiating context" (Meunier, 2000: 
104) that prevails at a given time also affects the views of the interests. Where there is less 
politicization and an enabling environment, it is likely that the Commission is going to be 
less controlled by Council and more able to pursue its policy preferences (Dalton and 
Eichenberg, 1998: 251). Where the environment is more politicized, or there is less 
support, perhaps precipitated by economic problems, (see Hindley and Nicolaidis, 1983: 3) 
it is the converse -the Commission is likely to have fewer opportunities to act as a policy 
entrepreneur and is less likely to be able to build a supportive coalition. On the global 
stage, if world economic conditions are unfavourable (oil price increase, recession, etc.), 
states are likely to prefer unilateral rather than multilateral arrangements (Wiener 1995: 
220) making it more difficult for the Commission to get broad agreement from the member 
states. This tension between the three interests underpins what Smith (200 1: 789) terms the 
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"coherence and fragmentation" of external trade policy with the "fluctuating balance of 
views" (ibid) of the interests being enabling or constraining on the Commission as agent. 
This, according to Drake (2000: 152) has been more noticeable "since Delors' departure" 
suggesting that the politicization of the trade field has increased since 1995, adversely 
affected by the lack of a strong politician at the helm (Endo, 1999). 
The impact of the interests cross-cuts the roles and responsibilities; they do not stand alone 
because their interaction is "part of the overall negotiation process in multi-actor settings" 
(van den Hoven, 2004: 258) and, furthermore, the relationships between them form "a 
continuous bargaining process that constantly reinterprets and reshapes (itself) thus 
possibly giving birth to policy changes" (Fouilleux, 2004: 236) making it important to 
understand how discussions and relationships manifest themselves at any particular 
moment in time. 
The Commission interest 
Suggesting that the Commission is a unitary actor is a misnomer; it is, as noted earlier, a 
'multi-organisation' (Cram, 1999:49). Because of portfolio allocation, there are a number 
of parts of the Commission, with an interest in trade Rounds, which need to work together 
in order to develop a draft mandate for negotiations, on behalf of the Council. This is 
particularly important since the scope of those Rounds widened to include issues other than 
tariffs i.e. from the end of the Dillon Round in 1962 (Bretherton and Vogler, 2000:168, 
Curzon and Curzon, 1970:70). Although Directorates General I (External Relations) and VI 
(Agriculture) had the co-ordinating and negotiating roles, DG Ill (Industry), for one, also 
had a great deal of interest and technical expertise in certain of the issues covered (e.g . 
. sectoral issues, technical barriers and trade harmonization) as did DG VIII (Development), 
at least as far as relations between the EC and the developing countries were concerned. 
To arrive at agreement and a 'Commission view', there are a number of often-difficult 
internal meetings, from Commissioner to general administrative level, first in each DG, or 
maybe even each Unit within a DG, with an interest and then in a larger meeting chaired by 
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the appropriate Director in DG External Relations (Nu gent, 2001: 310-311, Cram, 1997: 
157, interviewees 1 & 4). The situation is complicated by the differences of opinion, not 
just on policy, but in terms of different perspectives, which might be "political, national, 
religious, professional, linguistic and administrative" in nature (Cirri, 1997:75) with the 
associated risk of"institutional friction ... policy inconsistency and policy failure"(ibid, p86, 
also Metcalfe, 2000:821 on Commission 'fragmentation'). This is a further illustration of 
the Commission's nature as a 'multi-organisation' (Cram, 1999). 
In terms of external trade negotiations in the WTO, it is the Trade Commissioner who is 
the "negotiator .. arbitrator (and) defacto leader of the policy process" (Baldwin, 2006: 938, 
also Diir and Zimmerman, 2007: 773). In order to deal with the evolving perspectives of 
the interests, within trade Rounds, the Trade Commissioner is the person who must 
"reinterpret" the mandate in order to make progress risking disapproval from other parts of 
the Commission, from the Council or from the WTO (Woolcock, 2003: 206). 
The member state interest 
The way the member state interests are articulated is somewhat complex in the external 
trade arena and, for this reason, they shall be explored in detail here. 
The Treaty of Rome, as a document creating a Customs Union between the member states, 
defined the basis upon which the Commission would negotiate on behalf of the 
Community. 23 This was elucidated in Article 110, which committed the Community to 
"contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs 
barriers". Articles 113-114, meanwhile, set out how this would be achieved, what roles and 
responsibilities the Commission had to facilitate trade agreements and how the Council of 
Ministers would exert control over the process, mainly through the development and 
approval of a negotiating mandate. The methodology outlined in the Treaty of Rome 
remains practically unchanged to date. 
23 From 'External Trade: Introduction' at http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvh/rllOOO htm accessed 30th August 2007 
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In accordance with the Treaty, it is the responsibility of the Commission to alert the 
Council to multilateral trade negotiations and it is also their responsibility to develop a 
draft mandate for discussion by the Council; the process for which was discussed earlier 
(Heidensohn, 1995:154). Once this has been agreed, the Commission is sent away to begin 
negotiations. During the negotiation process, the Article 113 Committee is essentially the 
eyes and ears of the Member States (Smith, 1994:256)?4 It has a two way communication 
loop to ensure that the Commission is kept abreast of Council views on each aspect of the 
draft mandate (Houben, 1999:300). Although the 113 Committee itself is a fairly recent 
construct, dating from 1970, earlier groupings, dating from 1959, performed much the 
same function (Lewis, 2000:277). The previous, and identical, incarnation of the Article 
113 Committee, the Article 111 Committee, was established for the Kennedy Round in 
1964 (Winham, 1986: 318) and it metamorphosized into the 113 Committee for the Tokyo 
Round in 1973. Certain authors (e.g. Elsig, 2002: 12, Peterson and Bomberg, 1999) have 
suggested that the Committee is confrontational. However, representatives on the 
Committee get to know each other very well, as membership is relatively constant, so it 
seems more the case that although there may be some initial scepticism, it tends to 
"work(s) with rather than against the Commission indicating to the latter what is and what 
is not likely to be accepted by Ministers" (Nugent, 2001: 308 also Hayes, 1993 and 
Somerset, 2002, generally supported by interviewees 5, 7 & 9). Although it might limit the 
extent to which the Commission might want to pursue its own preferences, it does 
legitimise the Commission's negotiating stance, as approval by the 113 Committee often 
equals approval by the Council, mainly because the members of this Committee are the 
trade specialists from the member states which is not true of the personnel in the other 
groupings (Dinan, 1999:485)?5 There is also scope for the Commission to discuss issues 
informally both within and outside that forum in order to resolve disputes, even if the full 
. committee is not officially in session (Ha yes, I 993: I 3 I also Brittan, 2000). 
24 As explained in the Introduction, Article numbering was changed in the Amsterdam Treaty and the 
Committee renamed the Article 133 Committee. Because the focus here is on the Committee under GATT I 
have retained its 'old' name. 
25 Although they may have briefings from trade experts; perhaps even from the 113 Committee in their 
national roles. 
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Once the Article 113 Committee has agreed the draft position, it is submitted for scrutiny 
by COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (i.e. the representations of the 
member states in Brussels), which has been responsible for preparing agendas for Council 
since 1958 (Lewis, 2002: 285). It is particularly important in the structure since it acts to 
create a "bottlenecking-effect" (Lewis, 2000:283, also Freestone and Davidson, 1988:86) 
for the Council of Ministers. Items for the Council agenda first have to be passed through 
either COREPER I! (the Committee of the Permanent Representatives), which deals with 
GATT/WTO issues) or COREPER I (the Committee of the Deputy Permanent 
Representatives) (Bostock, 2002:232). Although, officially, there is no difference between 
the two, Roy Jenkins an ex-President of the Commission in his memoirs talks about " ... the 
junior COREPER" (1989: 43) (also Sherrington, 2000: 28). 
When COREPER was established, there were concerns that it would become an Executive 
institution in its own right, thus threatening the roles and responsibilities of the 
Commission (Lindberg, 1963) and it has been suggested subsequently that CO REP ER 
occasionally works against the Commission seeing it as some sort of competitor (Rometsch 
and Wessels, 1994). However, Roy Jenkins (1989: 212) wrote in a diary entry that, far 
from being a threat to the Commission, he found COREPER "bitty (and) lacking any 
leadership" suggesting that this is not always the case.26 It appears likely that the influence 
of the Commission within the forum (as they are present at each meeting), and the 
usefulness of the Committee's discussions, and no doubt their behaviour towards the 
Commission, depends upon the subjects being discussed.27 It is worthwhile noting that 
decisions on certain arcane parts of trade policy made by the Article 113 Committee may 
not be revisited by COREPER. (see also Bostock, 2002: 232 ). In terms of working 
relationships within COREPER, it is seen as a mutally supportive forum and this must also 
include the relationships between the Permanent Representatives and the Commission 
officials that attend each meeting (Lewis, 2000:269-271 ). 
26Diary entry for 28th June 1978 
27 This was echoed by Interviewees 6 & 7. 
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It is the Council of Ministers which bears the responsibility for issuing the agreed 
negotiating mandate and ensuring that this is adhered to throughout the process. COREPER 
II members sit next to Ministers during their deliberations (Lewis, 2002:288) but the 
position, since the Treaty of Rome, is for the Council to decide (see, for example, Hine, 
1985:94) even if they actually take decisions in only a small number of instances (Van 
Schendelen, 1996:544). In trade negotiations it is usually the General Affairs Council 
(GAC), consisting of the foreign ministers of each member state, which agrees a 
negotiating mandate on behalf of the Council. However, because of the stages that the 
negotiating mandate has been through before it arrives at Council, it is unlikely that 
discussion at this stage is substantive but rather concentrates on areas of particular political 
sensitivity as flagged up by COREPER (Somerset, 2002:65,Westlake, 1999:76). 
Although, since January 1996, Common Commercial Policy decisions should be taken by 
qualified majority voting in accordance with the Treaty it has been noted that, in practice, 
Council makes decisions on the basis of consensus (Young, 2002: 24, Meunier, 2000: I 07, 
also Haaland Matlary, 1998).lt is possible that this reflects willingness on the part of the 
Commission to amend contentious proposals or because member states have felt able to 
discuss issues and agree them within that forum. Others have suggested that it is more 
because countries feel it unacceptable to proceed where even one member has a concern 
about the line taken (interviewee number 6, further explained by Henig 1980: 28). This 
suggests that there is an unofficial veto, which comes into play before issues might be 
discussed. 
The WTO interest 
The global interest, and the role it plays in informing the role of the Commission, is also 
important in this context. However, at this point, because of the multiplicity of interests 
that position themselves around the WTO, it is important to limit the categorization to 
cover only those that are articulated through the members, Secretariat and the Chairs of 
Committees rather than the associated NGOs. 
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The WTO can be defined as an example of global governance (Falk, 1999: 135, Held et al, 
1999: 50, 85) responsible for a "universal public good" (Mendez, 1995: 39) i.e. global 
trade. Multilevel governance suggests that dealing with global issues means that there is a 
need to establish institutions in order to level the playing field and order rewards or 
sanctions in the case of non compliance (Ostrom, 1986 and North, 1990 quoted in Prakash 
and Hart, 2000:2). 28 It is an acknowledgement that "local, regional, national, transnational 
and international (levels) ... collectively shape integration" (Holland 2002:241) and all these 
levels together can be envisioned as "a complex congeries of multilevel games, played on 
multilayered institutional playing fields above and across, as well as within, state 
boundaries" (Cerny, 2000: 118). 
The purpose of multilateral institutions is to reduce transaction costs and minimize 
uncertainty (Pierson, 1998: 33). Furthermore, they "aggregate the preferences of actors into 
policies and ... set the rules of conflict resolution through bargaining" (Kahler and Lake, 
2003: 24) thus they are key to ensuring countries work together (Keohane and Nye, 2003: 
386). The WTO Secretariat has certain roles, responsibilities and interests of its own. It is, 
like the Commission, not a unitary actor but a collective of 151 members (as of 18th 
January 2008) with the assistance of some 625 staff(as of 18th January 2008). Its decisions 
have to be taken by consensus although there is often complaint that certain parties, for 
example developing countries, have been excluded from the consensus-building process 
(Arai, 2000:62). 
The WTO is important as an interest because the member states of the EC, although 
individual members in their own right, cannot (at least individually) control it (Holland, 
2003, Winters, 2001, Lake, 2000, Busch, 2000, Brown, 2001, Farrands, 2003).29 Not only 
can they not control it, but also their domestic policy choices are constrained (Sasse et al, 
1997) or, at the very least, influenced (Goldstein, 1996) as a result of its existence and this 
is particularly difficult to challenge because of its consensus-based decision making 
28 also Morris 1998: 295 who opines that it is more a contractual than institutional arrangement, although the 
effect remains the same 
29 To the point to which certain authors (e.g. Casson, 1986: 57) have asked whether member states are even 
"viable" in a globalized economy. 
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(Jackson, 2000: 43, Qureshi, 1996: 6-7) and because of the rule base upon which it has 
been constructed. Not only national but also European policy choices are constrained, even 
from the beginning of the Union, particularly in development policy (Holland, 2002:11) 
but, at the same time, choices have also been enabled, perhaps "most dramatically ... by 
supporting EU advocates of agricultural reform over the 1990's" (Winters, 2001: 28). This 
influence on policy has been particularly marked in the agricultural field with post-
Uruguay Round discussions on CAP reform "framed in terms of the WTO" (Coleman and 
Tangermann, 1999: 402, Fouilleux, 2004: 250). The possibility of future Rounds tackling 
agriculture in more depth was used as an incentive to change the CAP prior to enlargement 
(Akrill, 2000, Egdell and Thomson, 1999, Hennis, 2001). In addition, the WTO has been 
used to give Commission officials "more scope for policy entrepreneurship" (Skogstad, 
2001: 487). In talking about the WTO and food safety policy, she says that where two types 
of negotiations are taking place (one which is politically sensitive and one which is 
"technical and 'bureaucratic" (ibid), the Council tend to concentrate on the first, allowing 
the Commission free rein on the second. 
The WTO, like the Council of Ministers, could be said to be a 'fulcrum' of interests (see 
Henig, 1980: 28 on the Council) with the Secretariat having to liase between the members 
and between various civil groups such as women's groups (O'Brien et a!, 2000: 229) as 
NGOs neither have membership nor attendance rights in Ministerials. Furthermore, the 
WTO staff is proactively "involved in providing legal, economic and policy advice to 
individual delegations in Geneva" specifically in "developing approaches on particular 
issues" (Blackhurst, 2000: 42). They also produce papers, chair meetings and give speeches 
(ibid) as well as carrying out membership negotiations (Krueger, 2000: 402) and 
conducting trade policy reviews (Blackhurst, 2000: 42 and 2001: 535). In negotiations, 
their role has been noticeably different from 'traditional' secretariat functions- this was 
evidenced in the closing stages of the Uruguay Round where there was "strong personal 
leadership" by Peter Sutherland, the then Director General (Henderson, 2000: 112). It is 
likely that the role of the Secretariat will be increased in the future. After the Doha 
Ministerial the Commission commented that the WTO would be able to "play a fuller role 
in the pursuit of economic growth, employment and poverty reduction in global 
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govemance".30 Since then, Pascal Lamy expressed the view that the role ofthe Director 
General should be enlarged and upgraded (2004: 17); this issue may feature on the agenda 
of a future Round. 
This section has shown the importance of the WTO as an interest in this context. 
Participating in the WTO has both constrained and enabled the Commission to make policy 
choices and, at the same time, the structure minimizes the possibilities of defection by one 
member state because of its rule-base. It is also, according to Russell (2001: 52) working in 
a "politically charged atmosphere" partially because globalisation "focus( es) on the losers" 
(Robertson, 2002:3) and has thus become "pejorative because it is so often defined ... by 
reference to job losses, intrusions on sovereignty (and) corporate misdeeds" (ibid). This 
increasing politicization will be demonstrated in the following chapters. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has introduced many issues that will be recurring themes throughout this 
thesis. The overall theme that this chapter highlights is the complexity inherent in the roles 
and responsibilities that the Commission has in external trade and the interests that the 
Commission has to satisfy therein. This is summed up very well by van Ham (2001: 129) 
who comments that "the image of policy-making as an ordered and predictable operation is 
surely obsolete" instead it "offers an intricate web of multi-level, multi-arena and nested 
games determined by uncertainty and ambiguity". With the involvement of the 
Commission, the Council, the Article 113 Committee and COREPER, the member states, 
the WTO Secretariat and the members of the WTO (as well as influence from pressure 
groups and business interests) this seems an extremely apt remark. 
The administrative structure of the Commission was shown to be very similar to that which 
was put in place after the Treaty of Rome. The question will be brought up later as to 
whether this is adequate given its increased responsibilities and the growing complexity of 
3° From the External Trade FAQs page under 'EU, WTO, Multilateral issues' subheading at 
http://ec.europa.eu/tradelgentools/faqs en.htm accessed 9th April 2008 
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the trade field. The multiplicity of points of view and the division of responsibilities, mean 
that it is often difficult to see where the Commission's authority begins and ends through 
the whole raft of issues where they have roles and responsibilities. This will be explored 
further within the case studies in Chapters Four and Five. The European Court of Justice, in 
its Chemobyl ruling of70/88 (given in 1990), contained the principle that "each of the 
institutions must exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of the other 
institutions" (from Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 2002: 37) which had the potential to be a 
useful delineation of responsibilities within the European infrastructure- but what does this 
mean in practice when not only do relationships change over time, but there is no fixed 
structure (to date at least) to shape that interaction? Division of responsibilities solely on 
this basis might perhaps have been used to clear up outstanding questions on the 
competence issue, as it was the Commission, which had the treaty-given responsibility to 
'speak for Europe' in external trade. Perhaps, if one included the national parliaments 
within the 'institutions', it could be argued that this ruling might negate the need for any 
subsidiarity clause. 
There have been issues raised about sovereignty and on the division of competence 
between the Commission and Council within external trade, which are still not entirely 
resolved. This brings a focus on the possibility of fragmentation in the internal interest 
when politically sensitive issues are discussed. The difficulty in reaching agreement on 
such issues is not helped by the Jack of a demos on the European level and national 
priorities may be shown to be paramount under certain circumstances. 
The difficulty of arriving at a single conclusion on the extent of the Commission's agency 
was also introduced here. Although activities might appear to be predominately 
. administrative, they may be much more a way of increasing policy capabilities. It was 
noted that the Commission had a number of weapons in its arsenal to enable it to pursue its 
policy preferences. It could either use 'personalities' to get its message across (Delors, 
Brittan or administrative personnel were all mentioned), it could exert leverage on the 
Council using information received from the WTO or other parties, it could build 
supportive coalitions and it was even able, perhaps through force of will, to get its 
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preferences on the agenda and/or to follow its preferences in spite of Member State wishes. 
Whether that would change because of the politicization of external trade is something that 
will be tracked through the rest of the thesis 
Finally, the context in which the Commission exercises its roles and responsibilities is 
important given the extent that the interests intersect through them. They also interact with 
each other causing this "coherence and fragmentation" (Smith 200 I: 789) of external trade 
policy. The interests, depending on the issue, the context and the timeframe could be either 
enabling or constraining on each other in a 'multilayered game' and this could have either 
positive or negative effects on any of them. 
At this point, it is appropriate to revisit the four central research questions- about roles, 
responsibilities, interests and change - on which this thesis is based, and to put them in the 
form of positive propositions about what we would expect to find as we investigate the 
Commission's role(s) in the GATT and the WTO. This will serve the function of providing 
a broad conceptual framework for the investigation, and will then be explicitly reappraised 
in the thesis Conclusions. In brief, the four key propositions can be stated as follows: 
I. Roles: We would anticipate that within the GATT and the WTO, we would find traces 
of all four key Commission roles: expert, government, administrator, coalition-builder. 
Further, we would expect to find that the 'mix' of these roles would vary across levels of 
activity, across issues and across time, and that reconciling the roles would be a key aspect 
of the Commission's 'self-management'. This proposition brings into play a number of 
issues discussed in this chapter, including the nature of Commission agency and autonomy. 
2. Responsibilities: In a study of the Commission's role in the GATT and the WTO, we 
would expect to encounter questions relating to the Commission's ability to carry out its 
responsibilities- in other words, to fulfil the functions entailed by the roles. As with the 
roles themselves, we would expect the Commission's ability to fulfil its responsibilities to 
vary across levels of activity, issues areas and time. This proposition brings into play issues 
relating to the gap between role conception and performance, and thus the institutional, 
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political or personal constraints that may be encountered by Commission leaders in 
achieving their objectives. 
3. Interests: We would expect interests to play a key part in shaping the Commission's 
combination of the roles discussed in this chapter, and equally to condition the extent to 
which the Commission is able to fulfil its responsibilities. Broadly stated, we can expect 
interests to be 'permissive', 'supportive' or 'constraining': the first when they allow the 
Commission considerable freedom of action but within a relatively undefined environment, 
the second when they are positively aligned with specific lines of Commission activity, and 
the third when they are negatively aligned with Commission activities. In all three cases, 
the combination of interests at three levels will be important: within the Commission, 
within the Council of Ministers representing the Member States, and within the 
GATT fWTO context, representing the external interest in progress through trade 
negotiations. 
4. Change: Finally, we would expect the interaction of roles, responsibilities and interests 
to be linked to and conditioned by processes of change, both within and outside the 
Commission and the EC. In particular, we would expect changes in Commission structure 
and leadership, changes in the alignment of Member States and changes in the political 
context for GA TT/WTO negotiations to be significant. More specifically still, we would 
anticipate changes in institutional structure and membership and changes in the level of 
politicisation around trade negotiations to play a key role in the capacity of the 
Commission to develop a stable mix of roles and responsibilities and to balance competing 
interests in the pursuit of its aims, and thus to link with issues such as innovation, path 
dependency and entrepreneurship. 
With these propositions in mind, Chapter Two will assess the broad changes which took 
place both on an institutional level for the Commission over the period with which it was 
engaged with the GATT and then the WTO (including changes in their relationships with 
the Council, and whether those relationships were enabling or constraining and when and 
on which issues), the changing institutional structures of the GATT/WTO wherein the 
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Commission had to work and the increasingly politicized context of the external trade 
arena, with the aim of establishing a broad analysis that can be carried forward into the 
detailed study conducted in Chapters Three to Eight. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The European Commission in the GATT and the transition to WTO 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to look at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) as a necessary prerequisite to the succeeding chapters. This establishes why 
external trade was made a Community competence and looks at the evolving roles and 
responsibilities of the European Commission within external trade as well as at their 
changing relationships with the interests. This Chapter also details what the shift to the 
WTO in 1996 meant to global trade and trade politicization and the impact this had on 
the Commission. 
In order to assess the 'mix' of the Commission's roles and the contested nature of the 
responsibilities, the history of Community involvement will be described by looking at 
the behaviour and performance of the European Commission in GATT Rounds. 1 This 
will identify, first of all, the development of collective action through the actions of the 
European Commission within the negotiations, and, secondly, the evolution of the 
'internal interest' in terms of the relationship between the Commission and the Council 
of Ministers. It will also track the strong, if not cohesive, external interest through this 
time set within a backdrop of change and increasing politicization. It is important to 
note at the outset that the European Parliament was still very much in its infancy, at 
least at the start of this period, and does not contribute as part of the European interest 
within this chapter. 
This chapter will not only set the scene for the rest of the thesis but the thick description 
that it generates will facilitate comparison with future chapters in terms of tracking the 
evolving roles and responsibilities of the European Commission in this area, the 
dynamic nature of the interests and the growing politicization of the trade field. 
1 i.e. from the Dill on Round of 1960-1962 (the fifth Round of GATT talks) onwards 
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The GATT 
Twenty-three countries signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
one of the Bretton Woods instruments (along with the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank) in 1947 accepting it as a binding agreement based on the three 
principles of"non discrimination, reciprocity and transparency" (Heidensohn, 1995: 
154). 
The GATT was never intended to be an international trade organisation in its own right 
(Jackson, 1990) but rather a constituent part of a much wider International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) (Hine, 1985: 38). For many reasons, however, the ITO negotiations 
failed and the GATT continued to be the most important regulator of world trade, until 
the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) following the end of the Uruguay 
Round in 1994.2 The GATT, as its name suggests, consists of a list of commitments on 
tariffs and common trade rules and sets out information about the organisation 
including how it would be administered, how negotiations would be facilitated and how 
disputes between the members (a.k.a. Contracting Parties) would be resolved (Alien, 
1960). 
The six member states of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had all 
signed the GATT Agreement at its inception. However, when the Six started 
discussions aimed at furthering their economic and political integration (Lindberg, 
1963), during preparations for the Messina Conference in 1955, there may have been an 
opportunity to design a radically different trading infrastructure. The German 
government, though, demanded that EEC rules complied with GATT (Young, 2002) 
and accepting this principle meant that the Six would not be able to create a unique 
trading arrangement (Hine,l985, Ranieri and Sorenson, 1994). 
2 Not least because the US Congress failed to ratify it, concluding that the ITO was a threat to its 
sovereignty. Palmeter and Mavroidis (2006: I) suggest that "The ITO was ... too ambitious for the United 
States Congress and, perhaps with the advantage of hindsight, too ambitious by almost any reasonable 
standard". 
47 
- - -·--·----------------------------
Even after accepting that there needed to be a degree of commonality in national trade 
policies, the member states continued to retain individual membership of GATT. 
Although the Community was treated as a single entity for negotiating purposes as per 
Article XXIV of the GATT Agreement (Haas, 1968: 297) the European Commission 
was not itself a Contracting Party to the Agreement. GATT had to be asked formally to 
accept the EC as a Customs Union and a Panel was convened for this purpose, as was 
normal practice. Although, at the time, it was not the case that the EC 's arrangement 
covered "substantially all the trade" between them, the main criterion for acceptance as 
a Customs Union, because of the perceived political importance of this step, the EC was 
not only accepted but it received special dispensations allowing it to eliminate tariffs 
internally without needing to grant concessions to others (Heidensohn, I 995: I 72, Dell, 
!963:II 1). 
As was shown in the previous Chapter, the Treaty of Rome, as a document creating a 
Customs Union between the member states, defined the basis upon which the 
Commission would negotiate on behalf of the Community. 3 Once the negotiating 
mandate is approved, it is returned to the Commission allowing them to begin 
negotiations on that basis. The Article 133 Committee must be periodically consulted 
during the process (Nugent, 1999), as it is the Commission's main contact point 
throughout (Murphy, 1 990: 118). Therefore, although there are a number of steps before 
the final negotiating mandate can be issued, the Commission is involved at every stage. 
In addition, the membership of all of these groups is relatively constant over time 
allowing for the development of solid personal relationships. The close involvement of 
the Commission with the member states, through all parts of this process (Cini, 1996) 
enables it to develop solid proposals capable of wide support as it is constantly aware of 
the evolving views of the member states. 
3 From 'External Trade: Introduction' at http://europa.eu/scadplus/leglen/lvb/rllOOO.htm accessed 30th August 
2007 
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The European Commission in the GATT 
That the Commission is aware of these evolving views plays a very important part in 
fulfilling its roles and responsibilities in GATT and also the WTO because, after all, it 
has to negotiate on behalf of the Member States. The first GATT Round, where the 
Commission had to act as the 'single voice', was the Dillon Round in 1960-62. A 
restrictive mandate had been issued by Council, concerned that the Commission "might 
act imprudently in its newly acquired role" (Murphy, 1990: 11 0). The Commission 
would also negotiate in the Kennedy Round (1964-7), the Tokyo Round (1973-9) and 
the Uruguay Round (1986-94). These will be considered in turn. 
The European Commission in the Dillon Round 
Although the Council of Ministers might have been worried about asking the 
Commission to speak for Europe in the Dillon Round, which had, after all, been 
inaugurated partly because of the existence of the EC, the evidence suggests that they 
had no cause for concern (Hoekman and Kostecki, 1996: 18).4 The Dillon Round was 
the last Round, which concentrated solely on tariff reductions, or at least tariff 
reductions discussed on a country-by-country, product-by-product basis (Golt, 1974:2). 
This methodology was beginning to fall out of favour, probably because of the time it 
took once membership started to increase, and the end of the Round saw an attempt to 
adopt a formula by which tariffs would be dropped by a given percentage unless 
justification could be given; a process which would be used in the Kennedy Round 
(Heidensohn, 1995:157). This suggests awareness on the part of negotiators that the 
next Round would be more important- perhaps anticipating Britain's membership of 
the EC as they had applied to join at the Dillon Round's close (Miles, 1968:16, Evans, 
1971: 138). 
4 Also partly because the US Congress had extended the Trade Agreements Act allowing tariff reductions 
to be discussed. 
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For the larger trading countries, even bearing in mind this slow tariff negotiation 
process, the results of the Dill on Round were somewhat disappointing, especially 
considering that there were relatively few new tariff concessions as a result (Koch, 
1969:87, Hoekman and Kostecki, 1996:18). This tends to obscure the importance of 
what was to happen after the Round. The USA, as the EC's largest trading partner, 
viewed the development of the EC acting as a trading bloc, as a threat to its export 
markets and recognised that there could be serious repercussions on its balance of trade 
if it did not make changes to its policy.5 This meant it could either become 'Fortress 
America' and choose a strategy of protectionism or reduce its own trade barriers (Dell, 
1963:14). Congress chose the second option and passed the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962, which enabled the President to reduce duties on industrial and agricultural goods 
by a maximum of fifty percent (see Koch, 1969: 88). The passing ofthis Act led to the 
Kennedy Round. Sophie Meunier (2005: 75) suggests that "the impending 
establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy" acted as a further incentive to 
encourage the US to return to the negotiating table. 
The European Commission in the Kennedy Round 
Preliminary talks on the Kennedy Round were held, for the first time, between the US 
and the Six (although not specifically the Commission) in Brussels (Koch, 1969: 89), 
making it clear at the outset that agreement between the US and the EC would be 
particularly important in this, and perhaps future, rounds. Piers Ludlow (2007:353) 
builds on this by suggesting that the Kennedy Round was the first time since 1945 that 
the EC and the US held the same bargaining power. The Kennedy Round has been 
called ''the first real trade negotiation" since the Second World War (Curzon and 
Curzon, 1976: 70) primarily because it was concerned with issues other than tariffs. It 
was plarmed that the Round would have a wide agenda encompassing negotiations on 
anti-dumping, technical barriers to trade (TBTs), the involvement of the developing 
countries, the American Selling Price (ASP) procedure for chemicals and footwear and, 
perhaps most controversially, agriculture, specifically on access to EC markets. (see 
Koch, 1969: 91). The main actors in the negotiations were the EC, the US, the UK, 
Canada and Japan who became known as "the Bridge Club" (Winham, 1986: 65,note 9, 
5 Golt (1974: 2) suggested that the Dillon Round marked the beginning of''the shift from overwhelming 
US trade dominance". 
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Kahler, 1995:688).6 It was within that small group that most of the real work of the 
negotiations appears to have been conducted. After deals had been done therein, they 
were then 'sold' to the other countries although it is difficult to see that a negative view 
could have had much impact on the outcome apart from an outright veto. 
As far as the relationship between the Council of Ministers and the Commission was 
concerned, Golt (1974: 11) commented that the Kennedy Round highlighted the need 
for unanimity on negotiation points in the Council of Ministers (also Moravscik, 1998: 
208). The problems in achieving that unanimity and, specifically, problems that the 
French had with the agricultural position combined with strong objections to QMV, 
caused the Round to be effectively stopped for over a year until the Luxembourg 
Compromise in May 1966 (Meunier, 2005: 91). The Commission appeared able to 
counteract this stalemate by continuing to negotiate, albeit more on technical issues 
(Meunier, 2005: 89) and it is likely that this helped to develop a an embryonic 
supportive consensus within the WTO (Curzon and Curzon, 1970:43-44, Winham, 
1986:324). This suggests either that other members of the Council responded positively 
to trade offs between sectors, or that the existence of the Ill Committee gave the 
Commission more of a free rein than the member governments did individually, making 
protectionism less of a day to day problem (Winham, 1970: 64-6 and 318, Ludlow, 
2007: 359 also see Koch, 1969: 131).7 
Ultimately, although there were great hopes for the Round, and although tariffs were 
again reduced substantially (Curzon and Curzon, 1976: 36), there was still very little 
progress on agriculture (Golt, 1974: 3) partly because of the French (Wiener, 1995:73). 
Even the little progress that was made meant that negotiations were "interspersed with 
one crisis after another" (Koch, 1969: 91). The TBT code was elaborated to a certain 
extent but would be further developed in the next Round but no agreement was 
forthcoming on the ASP in spite oflast minute manoeuvring and because Congressional 
approval wasn't forthcoming, a substantive amount of work on chemicals and footwear 
was apparently lost from the final text (Winham, 1986: 78, Dunn and Mutti, 2004: 190). 
6 Quad meetings did not start until 1982, so this must have been a very informal gathering. 
7 Ludlow (2007: 359) also says that within GATT, "the Community machine ... depended on the smooth 
running of both the Commission and the Council ofMinisters. Any attempt to explain how the EEC came 
to decisions merely by looking at the Commission or the member states acting collectively through the 
Council is ... bound to fail". 
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The positive aspects were that an anti-dumping code was developed (Curtis and 
Vastine, 1971:234, MacBean and Snowden, 1981:73) and, perhaps most importantly, 
the Round also agreed that preferential treatment should be given to developing 
countries (Hoekman and Kostecki, 1996: 18) although what this meant in practice was 
yet to be seen. 8 The developing countries, which participated, though, said afterwards 
that they were disappointed that they had not received enough from the developed 
countries, especially on products of special interest, so perhaps 'preferential treatment' 
was more for the future than for the current time (Glick, 1984: 6). Perhaps the most 
positive outcome, though, was that the Commission had "established its reputation as a 
strong bargainer" (Meunier, 2005: 97), including within the Council (N eunreither, 
1972: 239), particularly as the Round was "concluded on European terms" (Meunier, 
2005: 99). 
The European Commission in the Tokyo Round 
The Tokyo Round, with ninety-nine countries participating representing ninety percent 
of world trade with a value of $155bn, took place after the UK/Ireland/Denmark 
enlargement of the EC (Hoekman and Kostecki, 1996: 18, Jackson, 1990: 37). In 
contrast to the Kennedy Round, there were more bilateral discussions in evidence than 
had been noted in previous rounds (Winham, 1986: 272) possibly because the US and 
EC were both lobbying countries for their support. 
The importance of tariff negotiations had, by now, reduced dramatically and the focus 
changed towards developing trade rules amongst members (Heidensohn, 1995: 157).9 
The difficult subjects on the agenda were the embryonic Codes on government 
procurement, technical barriers to trade and civil aircraft as well as agriculture 
(Murphy, 1990: 41). The EC's priorities were listed in a document issued in 1973 called 
an "Overall Approach to Trade of the European Community". 10 These go from the very 
general aims of further trade liberalisation and helping the developing countries to a 
more detailed objective for a better Safeguard Clause. That the EC did this seems to 
8 Perdikis and Read (2005:11) comment that the antidumping rules was the "first major amendment to 
GATT" 
9 Dunn and Mutti (2004: 190) note that following the Tokyo Round, "tariffs were so low that they did not 
constitute a major barrier to trade in industrial countries" 
10 the full text of which can be found in Golt, 1974: Annex B pp59-68 
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suggest increased confidence that they could expect certain outcomes from GATT 
rounds as a major player in tandem with the US (Winham, 1986: 386). This was greatly 
helped by the US being extremely supportive of the Commission within the 
negotiations and "develop(ing) a mutual sympathy, for instance about dealing with the 
French" (Taylor, 1983: 140). 
Although, because of the difficult subjects on the agenda, Council may not have been 
able to put together a strong coalition in favour of any particular measure, nevertheless 
Paul Taylor (1983: 137-8) suggests that Council at least shared a desire for the 
European Commission to be seen as a strong negotiator on their behalf. Because of this, 
Member States worked hard to appear united behind the Commission. Furthermore, 
Council agreed not to revisit deals done by the Commission in the negotiations in spite 
of there being agreements in areas where no EC rules existed (Taylor, ibid, p 122, 
Murphy, 1990: 41). No doubt this assisted in the successful albeit apparently slow 
(Ciine et a!, 1978:237, Croome, 1995: 5) conclusion of the Round, which ended with a 
range of instruments being developed including on preferential tariffs in favour of 
developing countries, NTBs, bovine meat, dairy products and civil aircraft (see 
Hoekman and Kostecki, 1996: 19). 11 
At the end of the Round, Council agreed that the Commission could sign off the results 
of the Round on their behalf with the exception of reduced tariffs in the ECSC area, 
TBTs and aircraft, which Council and the Commission would both sign (Taylor, 1983: 
123). However, these Final Agreements were only given assent "after the rejection by 
the Council of two earlier versions ... and the return of the Commission to the negotiating 
forum in Geneva to seek adjustments to the package" perhaps reflecting the perceived 
political importance of trade necessitating a firmer stance on the part of Council 
(Taylor, 1983: 134). 
11 Note that David Robertson (2006: 48) says that the NTB agreements were tantamount to "a shambles 
of commitments and offers" and led to approaching negotiations as a Single Undertaking although this 
does not seem to have been formalised at this point. 
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The European Commission in the Uruguay Round 
At the end of the Tokyo Round, negotiators thought another GATT Round was 
necessary in order to cement in the Tokyo reforms and as a response to increasing 
globalization (Jackson, 1990: 38). Uruguay was chosen because of the need for strong 
developing country endorsement (Croome, 1995: 28). The Uruguay Round is 
particularly important, not only because it was the last trade Round under GATT but it 
was also distinct from its predecessors in that it was the first time that agricultural trade 
in its entirety came under GATT rules; this was because of the end of the waiver on the 
applicability of GATT rules to agriculture which had been agreed in 1955 (Swinbank 
and Tanner, 1996:157, Bhagwati, 2000: 58). 
The Uruguay Round could be said to be more ambitious than earlier Rounds mainly 
because only the more contentious issues were left to be dealt with after the relative 
success of previous Rounds (Nedergaard, 1993: 57, Moussis, 2000: 375, Woolcock, 
1999: 31). In addition, there were 123 countries involved in negotiations by the end of 
the Round and it att=pted to cover many new areas; as such, it became exceedingly 
complex, controversial and lengthy (Jackson, 1990: 91, Dinan, 1999: 488). 12 
Furthermore, certain of the issues allegedly covered by the Uruguay Round returned 
later to the WTO agenda seemingly because they were not resolved to the satisfaction 
of a number of participant countries or because they were disputed at the end of the 
Round. It has been suggested that the Round was a watershed for the Commission in 
that it heralded not only a "strict return to intergovemmentalism" in external trade but, 
furthermore, that it showed the member states attempting to "rollback" external trade 
competence from the Commission (Meunier and Nicola'idis, 1999: 477). This provides 
key contextual evidence for the argument that the politicization ofthe trade field has 
meant the Commission is less able to satisfy the diverse interests by which it is 
surrounded. 
12 General information sourced from 'Understanding the WTO: The Uruguay Round' at 
httn://www.v.1o.om/enCT!ish/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact5 e.htm accessed 30th August 2007 
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The EC played a lead role in agenda setting here due to its "increased economic 
leverage" on the world stage but it was not the only player with an important voice 
(Woo !cock, 2000: 374). As an influential actor in the previous Rounds, it is worthwhile 
to consider the position of the US in the Uruguay Round. Their main concern was in 
covering agriculture in as great a depth as possible (Roederer-Rynning, 2003: 184). 
There was concern about the protectionist nature of the CAP, which had been 
instrumental in setting off trade wars (Moon, 1996: 20, Rieger, 2000: 195). This 
precipitated the US' call for the abolition of agricultural subsidies and gradual phasing 
out of export subsidies and other such barriers (Meunier, 2000: 122). They were also 
keen for the Round to tackle other disputed areas including audio-visuals, of which 
more later (Featherstone and Ginsberg, 1996: 170). 
More generally, the US had, perhaps, a concern about "Fortress Europe", and 
outstanding questions over their market access, which had come to the fore after the 
Single European Act of 1986. This drove them to ensure the Uruguay Round tackled 
the question of trade "discipline" (Minshull, 1996: 106). In addition, the US had also 
claimed that they should be negotiating with the individual member states of the EC 
rather than with the European Commission on their behalf because of the complexities 
of reaching agreement (Featherstone and Ginsberg, 1996: 254). In a contradiction of the 
ease with which the US had allied with the Commission in the Tokyo Round, at this 
time the US was somewhat reluctant to accept the EC speaking with one voice with the 
Commission as their mouthpiece. This may have manifested in them being more heavy 
handed, and far less supportive of, the Commission than they had been in the Tokyo 
Round (Taylor, 1983: 141). Although, then, relations between the US and the 
Commission may not have been as positive as in the Tokyo Round, nevertheless, their 
commitment to the GATT process was demonstrated at the end of the negotiating 
schedule where the US demonstrated its determination to hold the agreement together 
(Meunier, 2000: 126). It seems that without this commitment to reopening the Blair 
House negotiations, the reasons for which will be detailed later, the Uruguay Round 
may never have been completed (Devuyst, 1995: 456). 
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Although other groups played an important part in the negotiations, in many cases for 
the first time, perhaps the main concern for the Member States was that of keeping 
domestic farming lobbies happy (Landau, 2000: 9). The MacSharry Plan for reforming 
the CAP, which had been tabled in 1992 as a solution to US/EC disputes, had resulted 
in violent demonstrations, particularly in France (Paemen and Bensch, 1995:210) 
raising concerns that farmers felt distanced from consultation procedures. It was 
because of the political risks involved that the level of agricultural liberalisation prior to 
the Uruguay Round was extremely small. 13 The importance of the farming lobby meant 
that France only agreed to discussions taking place on agriculture if its primary 
concerns could be addressed in the Round. These included services and investment 
liberalization, the vacillation of interest rates and the rather ominous sounding 
''rebalancing of former privileges" (Meunier, 1998: 198). At the same time, France also 
wanted, and achieved, cultural (especially audio-visual) areas excluded from the 
negotiations, which was a major blow to the US as this was so important to its trade 
balance (Collins, 1997: 330). This refusal to consider cultural issues did not meet with 
unanimous support from member states either, with concerns that it might reflect a lack 
of will towards liberalizing markets. 
The developing country perspective, particularly those who were net importers of food, 
was also an influential factor informing the agenda for the Uruguay Round, for the first 
time, and the Round was undoubtedly considered important for helping developing 
countries within the GATT system (Martin and Winters, 1995: v). 14 However, there 
was also concern that developing countries would feel pressured into making 
substantial commitments so they would be "taken seriously" (Safadi and Laird, 
1996: 1223) and may have expected significant market access commitments from the 
developed countries in return. They did persuade other members to commit to "phasing 
out ... the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA)", although perhaps this was thought 
insufficient (Krueger, 1999:909). Similarly, there was some support for the position of 
the Cairns Group, a group offourteen industrialized agricultural producer countries, led 
13 Miles (1968:21) commented that "fanners tend to be the best organised and often most numerous" of 
pressure groups, which was why it had proved difficult to address agriculture in the Kennedy Round. The 
same reason for the difficulty of agricultural negotiations could be applied to subsequent Rounds. 
14 Also S Healy, R Pearce and M Stockbridge (1998) 'The Implications of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture for Developing Countries -a Training Manual' Prepared for the Agricultural 
Policy Support Service, Policy Assistance Division. Training Materials for Agriculture Planning 41at 
http://www.fao.om/docrep/004/w7814e!W7814E04.htm accessed 21st January 2008 
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by Canada, Australia and Argentina, who sought greater access for their agricultural 
products in both the EC and US markets. 15 Some of these issues had been tackled but 
left unresolved by the Tokyo Round. The demands from the Cairns Group should not be 
underestimated when considering the politicised environment of the Round - they 
(together with the USA) had put the EC under pressure to cut agricultural subsidies; in 
some cases by up to ninety percent (Nugent, 1999: 430). 
Negotiating the Round 
As far as negotiating the Uruguay Round was concerned, developing common positions 
addressing each of the Member States' main concerns was extremely difficult and, 
perhaps, forced the Commission to be more reactive than proactive within the Round 
(Murphy, 1990: 128). Council, however, sought to use bargaining and issue-linkages to 
break deadlock amongst its members rather than using the Commission as proactive 
policy makers, making it clear that they did not want to lose advantageous settlements 
because of a lack of progress in agriculture (Devuyst, 1995: 450, Balaan, 1999: 60). 
Evidence for this can be found in the outcome on dispute resolution where, prior to the 
Round, the Courmission was told not to give this measure its support but, by the end, 
had agreed that this could go ahead (Woolcock, 1993: 556). Therefore, in spite of the 
mandate, the Commission was able to take initiatives and make progress with the 
negotiations even though the Council may have been arguing backstage. It has been 
suggested that this was primarily because of the Commission's ability to draw 
coalitions together (Coleman and Tangermann, 1999: 400, Smith, 1999: 286), 
especially in the latter part of the negotiations. 
With the Cairns Group and the US on one side and the European Community on the 
other, agriculture was always going to be a problem. Significant pressure had been put 
on the EC to make radical changes to their tarifflevels. Council of Ministers' meetings, 
although wholly concerned with agricultural support, involved not only agriculture 
ministers but also (at least latterly) trade and foreign ministers showing how complex 
and interlinked the whole sphere became (Nugent, 1999:431, Devuyst, 1995: 452). 
Even then, when results weren't immediately forthcoming, the US raised the stakes by 
15 See btto:l/www.caimsgroup.org/milestones.html accessed 21st January 2008 
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threatening an escalation of trade actions, including a two hundred percent tariff on 
food imports from Europe in an attempt to force their hands (Meunier, 2000:123). As a 
result of this, the Agriculture Commissioner, Ray MacSharry, immediately attempted to 
develop a compromise position with the US in order to make make headway and 
"provide bargaining leverage" for the rest of the Round (Croome, 1995: 288). Jacques 
Delors (the Commission President) "threatened to block the agreement as he claimed it 
went beyond the Council's mandate" (Cini, 1996: 93) thereby creating huge internal 
difficulties for the Commission within the negotiations. MacSharry resigned until 
Delors was outvoted in the Commission whereupon he rescinded his resignation and 
continued to negotiate. As it was, the Commission wanted to reduce agricultural support 
(Meunier, 1998: 199) due to an "all too real prospect of bankruptcy" (Paemen and 
Bensch, 1995: 25) so it would have been a Pyrrhic victory for Delors had this 
agreement been blocked. 
Agreement within the Commission did not prevent serious problems emerging at the 
end of the Round threatening the internal consensus. Firstly, France, Ireland and 
Belgium thought that the final agreement went further than the proposed changes to the 
Common Agricultural Policy as set out in the MacSharry Plan. Secondly, France was 
concerned that the Blair House Agreement would affect Community participation in 
agricultural market expansion.16 Thirdly, France, Ireland, Belgium, Germany, Italy and 
Luxembourg were anxious to ensure that the measures in place which complied with 
GATT rules should be untouchable for longer than the agreed six years and, finally, the 
UK was determined not to reopen the negotiations while the French were determined to 
renegotiate (Devuyst, 1995: 455). 
16 The Blair House agreement (named after the guest quarters in the White House) was negotiated in 1992 
and covered grain export subsidies and soy (and other oil) beans (seeK Bradsher, International Herald 
Tribune September 14 1993, 'US seeks to keep trade talks on track' at 
http://querv.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res-9FOCE4DE1 638F937 A2575ACOA965958260 accessed 25th March 2008) 
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Although Paemen and Bensch (1995: 94) point out that the Conununity at the time was 
"far from being (a) coherent whole" because of the vast "geographical, economic and 
social diversity" of the Member States, nevertheless agreement was reached. 
Ultimately, the Commission was able to defuse a potentially catastrophic situation, 
whereby the entire agreement could have been vetoed, by agreeing to revisit some of 
the decisions made at Blair House (see Meunier, 2000: 126). This was achieved even 
though the US had not been enthusiastic about it previously (Meunier, 2005: 117).17 
The key point, however, is that this compromise position adopted by the Conunission 
was only achieved with the acquiescence of the Council even though the Conunission 
facilitated the agreement and was genuinely concerned that France would break ranks 
by openly not supporting the common line (Sperling and Kirschner, 1997: 146, 
Teasdale, 1993: 577, Devuyst, 1995:126). This shows the pressures that mounted on the 
internal consensus because of agriculture. 
The issue of competence would also become very important both during and after the 
Uruguay Round. Although it is tempting to blame this on the fact that there was a very 
wide agenda, or that there were a number of 'new issues', it has been suggested that it 
was heralded by the difficulties in achieving a collective view on agriculture (Meunier 
and Nicolaldis,1999: 483). One reason for the issue of competence becoming critical 
may have been the level of secrecy surrounding the Blair House negotiations (see 
Meunier, 1998: 203, Swinbank and Tanner, 1996: 105). One Italian trade Minister 
suggested that EC Ministers received "what has been somewhat cynically (termed) as 
'the mushroom treatment' ... kept in the dark and every so often the door is opened and a 
bucket of manure thrown over them" (cited in Hayes,1993: 125). It could be argued that 
the Conunission was right to uphold the secrecy of the negotiations, which, after all, 
enabled them to come back to Council with a compromise proposal (Coleman and 
Tangermann, 1999: 401 ). Not only did the US agree to revisit the agreement but no 
other agreements were re-opened or jeopardised and, in addition, the Conunission 
extracted even further concessions (Devuyst, 1995: 456, Meunier, 2000: 126 and 2007: 
122, Swinbank and Tanner, 1996: 109, Reiger, 2000: 198) as the French may have 
hoped at the outset (Wiener, 1995: 218). 
17 seeP Horvitz, International Herald Tribune September 22 1993, 'US spurns Europe's call to reopen 
fann accord' at http://www.iht.com/articles/1993/09/22Jreact J.nhp accessed 25th March 2008 
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Although Meuoier (2000: 125) reads the outcome as being indicative of"a clear step 
towards a return to strict intergovemmentalism in trade negotiating matters and a 
reining in of the Commission's negotiating powers" (also Meuoier and Nicolaldis, 
2000: 334) the evidence seems unclear. That Couocil had also rejected the first version 
of the Final Agreements in the Tokyo Round, resulting in further negotiation, could be 
more indicative of 'retention' of Council control rather than a "return" to 
intergovemmentalism. Additionally, Germany eventually changed its position (at the 
end of the Rouod) to support the Commission, thereby showing that there was no 
sustained member state opposition to the Connnission en bloc (Devuyst, 1995:453, 
Balaan, 1999: 60). German agreement also had the effect of"isolating the French who 
did not carry through on their threat to veto the agreement" (Balaan, ibid). Partly this 
came about due to effective issue trade-offs along with a strong desire not to throw the 
baby out with the bathwater; France was a strong proponent of the WTO, for example 
(Devuyst, 1995: 450). 
The Aftermath of the Uruguay Round 
Although there were a number of areas within the Rouod where there was conflict 
between the Council and Connnission, there seemed to be some optimism that the 
behaviour of the negotiators and the level of agreement were both extremely positive 
and boded well for the future (see Baldwin, 2000: 44, for example). This may have been 
considered true for the WTO as a whole although perhaps not for the EC because of 
growing member state concern about increasing Commission competence (Pollack 
2000: 524-5). This concern may have arisen because of the sensitive issues that had 
been brought up through the Round but there was speculation that this might have an 
adverse impact on other areas of Community competence and would lead to what 
Meunier and Nicolatdis referred to as "rollback" (1999: 477) from the supranational 
level to the national platform (also Andersen and Eliassen, 1993: 261 ). 
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The Commission attempted to bolster its position for the next Round by clarifying the 
position on competence. Therefore, it sought an Opinion from the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) as to which areas it was able to negotiate in. In doing this, it was clear that 
the Commission anticipated that the Court would interpret Article 113 of the Treaty in 
its favour, i.e. that the Article would be deemed to cover all aspects of trade, be that in 
goods, services, intellectual property or anything else. The Council, meanwhile, seemed 
to hope that the Court would delineate between the competence of each in order to 
assure that the Council's preferences would be paramount enabling them to keep 
control over sensitive and new areas oftrade. 18 In this they were also supported by the 
Parliament hoping, perhaps, to achieve more of a say in external trade (Meunier and 
Nicola'Ldis, 1999: 485). 
Given the views prevalent in the Council of Ministers, it may have been the case that 
the Commission did become concerned at the likely outcome of the Court's judgement. 
As if reiterating their authority within the structure, the Commission threatened to delay 
circulating the final version of the Marrakech Accords until the issue of competence 
was resolved. 19 This jeopardized any forward movement and suggested that the 
ratification of the Agreement could be delayed.20 Because of the likely amount of time 
elapsing before the Court issued a Ruling, it was deemed necessary for a Code of 
Conduct to be produced, which "would detennine which EU institutions take the lead in 
new, non-trade areas ... (in) ... the WTO" although Belgium (along with the other smaller 
states) was critical of efforts to do this prior to the Court ruling possibly because they 
thought the Court would agree with the Commission making this exercise a waste of 
time. 21 There was also concern that divided competence was inescapable due to 
increased politicisation and perhaps the IGC, not the Court, should decide the 
operational extent.22 Fortunately the Court agreed to issue its ruling on November 151h, 
18 See Leal-Arcas, R (2004)- The EC in GATT!WTO Negotiations: From Rome to Nice- Have EC Trade 
Policy Reforms Been Good Enough for a Coherent EC Trade Policy in the WTO? European Integration 
Online Papers (EioP) vol8 No I at http://eiop.or.at/eion/textel2004·00la.htm accessed 20th July 2006 
19 T Buerkle, International Herald Tribune of Monday October 3'' 1994 'GATT Outlook is Brightened by 
EU Accord' at http://www.iht.com/articles/1994110/03/gatt.php accessed 22nd January 2008 
20 From Sunsonline September 23'' 1994 C Raghavan 'Sutherland wants actions to match intentions' at 
http://www.sunsonline.orn/trade/process/towards/09230094.htm accessed 8th August 2006 
21 E Tucker page 4, 'EU seeks means to ratify GATT' in the Financial Times of 3'' August 1994 .This 
article was followed by another on 61• August, 'EU set for clash on GATT ratification' (page 2, also by 
Emma Tucker 
22 The Financial Times editorial, 'Ratifying EU Agreements' on August IIth 1994 (page 13 
61 
before the ratification deadline and, at the same time, Council consented to sending the 
information to Parliament for their views, which ended the turf war. 23 
The Court gave its ruling in Opinion 1194 concluding that the Community had 
competence in goods but not for other areas such as the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreements.24 
This meant that the Commission had no choice but to accept the involvement of the 
member states in the negotiations (Demaret 2000: 446-447). This could be read as the 
Court espousing the merits of a "return to intergovernmentalism" (Meunier, 1998: 209), 
which seems unlikely as trade in goods remained unaffected, or, that it merely reflected 
Council views at the time, which were that the importance of national politics 
superseded the supranational trade competence centred on the Commission (Pollack, 
2000: 527, Messerlin 1999:58, Cremona 2000b: 12-13). How this worked in practice 
would be far more significant than the decision. 
At the time, the Commission commented that it "always realised some areas would 
have to be shared" and Leon Brittan acknowledged that the ruling at least "provided 'a 
clear basis' on which Europe could participate in the WT0".25 He pointed out that 
member states and the Commission had a duty to cooperate on trade matters including 
where shared competence applied so this would still prohibit member states from acting 
individually, lessening a risk of paralysis if agreement could not be reached (Young, 
2002:31) . It seemed to have been recognised that a code of conduct might still be 
appropriate but a new one would need to reflect the totality of the judgement.26 Judging 
from reactions, the Commission, although undoubtedly dissatisfied by the Ruling, 
accepted that this Judgement was a reflection of Council views following the Uruguay 
23 Report that the Court was to issue its ruling prior to the ratification deadline from E Tucker in the 
Financial Times of3"' October 1994 (page 4, 'EU hopes for the Uruguay Round'). The European 
Parliament voted on the Uruguay Round accord on 14th December 1994 (according to L Barber in the 
Financial Times of 15th December, page 5, 'Ministers endorse Gatt trade pact') The result of the vote was 
given as 325 in favour with only 62 against and 12 abstentions. The Council of Ministers did the same on 
22"d December (from E Tucker's Financial Times 23'd December, page 3, 'EU clears Uruguay Round') 
thus "meeting the end of year deadline allowing ... the WTO, to be set up on January 1 1995" (ibid). 
24 See Leal-Arcas' 2004 paper (details in fooinote 13) page 3 
25 Shared competence quote from A Marshal! The Independent, 16th November 1994, page 13 'Brussels 
trade wings clipped'. Leon Brittan quote from T Buerkle International Herald Tribune November 16th 
1994, page 15 'European Trade Authority Clipped' 
26 E Tucker, Financial Times 16 November page 5 'Court clears EU path on trade accord' 
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Round and further analysis will show that this did not affect the working relationship 
between the Commission and Council. 
Even once the judgement had been issued and the Council had sent the information to 
Parliament, this was not the only problem facing the final ratification process of the 
WTO. The US was considering rejecting the Uruguay Round accords unless there was a 
stated commitment from the WTO that it would address labour standards in the future.Z7 
Both Mexico and India had already spoken strongly against this, with other countries 
suggesting that this would not be supported.28 Leon Brittan, however, seemed to agree 
that this was important although this did not culminate in him threatening not to sign for 
the EC.Z9 At the Conference marking the signing, the Chairman commented that there 
was no consensus so the wording could not be changed and, perhaps figuring they 
weren't going to get anything better than was already in the opening preamble of the 
Marrakesh Agreement, the USA signed the Accords. 30 This did not mean that the issue 
went away; just that it was held over for the future and, indeed, will be mentioned in 
future chapters. 
The World Trade Organisation 
The WTO was created essentially, according to Wolff(1998: 361), to an American 
design, to supersede the existing GATT infrastructure. The transfer of responsibilities 
from one to the other was almost seamless -many countries, when they signed the Final 
Accord ofthe Uruguay Round in Marrakech on 15 April1994, also signed the 
agreement establishing the WTO which was to be officially launched on I January 1995 
(Dunkley, 2000: 47). The 'grand plan', if there was one, was that a new, stronger 
organisation would be in a better position to further build on what the Uruguay Round 
27 Low (1993: 234) suggests that the US had tried very hard to have this negotiated in the Uruguay Round 
although they had been unsuccessful. Further information from Trade Week in Review and other 
publications Vol 3 No 13, Friday April I" 1994 'Labor Standards Jeopardize Final Deal' at 
http://www.etext.org/Politicstrrade.News!Volume 3/tnb~03.013 accessed 30th August 2007 
28 C Raghavan, Sunsonline March 16th 1994 'US Tries To Push New 'Trade Related' Agendas' at 
http://www.sunsonline.org!trade/nrocess/towardsl03160094.htm accessed 30th August 2007 
29 G de Jonquieres, Financial Times March 24th 1994 (page 6), 'Brittan wants rights put on WTO agenda' 
3° Chairman's comments from 'WTO Briefmg Notes from the Doha Ministerial2001'- Trade and 
Labour Standards: A Difficult Issue for Many WTO Member Govermnents at 
http://www wto.org/english/thewto elminist e/minOI elbrief e/brief16 e.htm accessed 30th August 2007. The wording 
from the Marrakech Agreement reads; "relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be 
conducted with a view to raising standards ofliving (and) ensuring full employment ... ". 
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had achieved (Schott and Buurman, 1994: 39, Bayne, 2003: 87) and thus accelerate 
multilateral trade liberalisation (Dent, 1997: 196). Moreover, it could also be said that 
the formation of the WTO was a tacit acknowledgement that the GATT was ill 
equipped to deal with new trade issues and, thus, had to be changed (Perraton, 2000: 
179). Changing the organisation was intended to resolve outstanding questions 
surrounding the authority of the GATT, which had arisen because of"its 'provisional 
status', 'birth defects' and significant ambiguities concerning the legal status of 
particular texts" (Jackson, 1999: 37). 
However, any ambitions for this new organisation to echo the long-awaited 
International Trade Organisation, the aims of which were described earlier, were soon 
thwarted. Instead, the WTO agreement was only around 15 pages long and was more a 
"mini charter" than a clone ofiTO (Jackson, 1999: 36). This meant that some of the 
work items proposed in the Havana Charter of 1948 would continue to be excluded 
from the work programme of the new organisation, including "Employment and 
Economic Activity, Economic Development ... (and) Restrictive Business Practices" 
even though it would embrace some issues outside trade through the Uruguay Round 
accords (Dam, 1970: 11, also Tay, 2002: 92 and I 05). Perhaps, in terms of its agenda, it 
could be said to be, "something more, but not much more, than the GATT" (Irwin, 
2002: 186) although this is in danger ofunderplaying the significance of the move. 
Because of the name change, even iflittle change in anything else, it became more 
obvious that the WTO would have a clearer and higher status in the world economic 
arena than the confusingly named, non-organisation that was GATT. The name change 
would place the WTO squarely "within a wider international community" on a par with 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; a place that was always expected 
to be filled by ITO (Tay, 2002: I 05). This new found visibility might also exert a price 
on the trade administrations of the members as the WTO became identified in public 
consciousness as a "symbol of globalisation ... fix(ing) the spotlight on trade as a core 
factor" in the inequalities that globalisation had wrought (Cosgrove-Sacks, I 999: 348, 
also Irwin 2002: 95). This seems to be supported by the increased involvement, or at 
least increased publicity surrounding the involvement, ofNGOs in the trade arena post-
1994 which will be investigated in the following chapters. 
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Although the name may have been the most obvious change, arguably, the most 
important institutional change, was that WTO became a 'single undertaking'. This had 
been "invented for the use in the Uruguay Round" (Ahnlid, 2005:13 I) to enable issue 
linkages and the creation of package deals. This initiative meant that membership of the 
WTO committed members to adopt, implement and enforce the totality of the trade 
rules rather than there being any element of 'pick and mix' or, for that matter, any 
significant derogations from the rules for the benefit of the less developed country 
members (Biackhurst, 2001: 528, Hoekman, 2002: 45).31 In other words, a "one size fits 
all approach" prevailed in the WTO's structure and founding (Ganesan, 2000: 87) and, 
furthermore, "essentially award( ed) veto power to every individual negotiation" (Moon, 
2004: 28).32 This single undertaking included the incorporation of some of the 
previously voluntary Codes into the central agreements, such as the TBT Code along 
with the results ofthe Uruguay Round (Eisig, 2002: 143).33 
Signature of the WTO Agreement also demanded the acceptance of a new Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (TPRM), which would be prepared by the Secretariat, the purpose 
of which was to assess the adequacy of domestic policy (or common policy in the case 
of regional groupings such as the EC) for compliance with WTO requirements 
(Biackhurst, 2000). The progress each country/group of countries made towards 
fulfilling their WTO commitments, and the state of their markets, would be assessed on 
a regular basis to make sure progress was continuous and there was no lagging behind. 
There would also be a stronger, formal and juridicial dispute settlement understanding 
(DSU), the results of which were binding and which would be automatically set up 
when a complaint was received with strict time limits established for each stage 
(Sandholz, 2000:93, De Bievre, 2006: 856). This was very different from GATT's 
mechanisms of establishing Panels that could be blocked and of failing to set time limits 
and implementation requirements compounded by a lack of clarity on rulings making it 
difficult for countries to identify the necessary remedial measures (Trebilcock and 
31 This did not apply to the built-in agenda from the Uruguay Round (e.g. information technology, basic 
telecommunications and financial services). See Philip I Levy's paper on 'Do we need an undertaker for 
the Single Undertaking? Considering the angles of variable geometry' ofFebruary 2004 at 
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globaliz.ation!levv paper.pdf accessed 6th March 2008. 
32 Supported by Interviewees 2, 3, 9 & 10 
33 Blackburst (2000:32) was to say that, in volume, this consisted of"twenty nine individual legal texts 
and twenty eight additional ministerial declarations, decisions and understandings ... (all together 588 
pages in the English version)" 
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Howse, 2001:51, Costello, 1999:337, Peterson, 2001:61, Guay, 1999:74, supported by 
interviewee 2). The new DSU had to be rigorous enough to deal with trade infractions 
by member states, responsive enough to cope with the ever-changing trade 'climate' 
and able to treat developing and developed countries equally rather than having "the 
more powerful countries simply dictat(ing) outcomes" (Irwin, 2002:189-90 also 
Costello, 1999: 338). 
As well as upgrading the DSU, the management structure was also revamped in the 
hope of making the WTO more efficient and effective. Specifically, the Ministerial 
Conference, which would hold the strategic leadership role for the organisation, would 
now meet regularly every two years (Hoekman, 2002: 46). In between those meetings, 
the general management function would become the responsibility of the General 
Council which could also sit as the Trade Policy Review Body and the Dispute 
Settlement Body and which would have the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for 
Trade in Services and the Council for Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights reporting to it (see Blackhurst, 2000: 33). 
To accompany these changes, the Secretariat was made permanent. The GATT had 
been using the secretariat services of the Interim Committee for the International Trade 
Organisation (ICITO), which had been set up within the UN in 1948, rather than having 
its own staff. 34 Even then, the staffing numbers were extremely small "equating to just 
one per member state" with a total budget "equivalent to the IMF' s travel budget" 
(Peterson, 200 I: 61-2). This had ramifications for the level of support poorer countries 
could expect to help them participate in the WTO and there were still countries without 
permanent delegations, negatively affecting their ability to work with the Secretariat 
(Blackhurst, 2000, see also Michalopoulos, 1999, Schott and Watal, 2000). 35 
Furthermore, the level of specialist knowledge needed by the delegations, given the 
breadth and complexity of the agenda, was ever-growing, meaning that countries 
without even a single permanent representative were at risk of becoming increasingly 
marginalised within the structure. 
34 See Jackson (1999: 52) for the full account. Although, defacto, these were its own staff officially, at 
least, it had no way to reward or sanction their behaviour. 
35 Blackhurst (2000: 36) names Chad, Guinea, Rwanda, Niger, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Mali and 
Mozambique as countries without permanent delegations. 
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This would seem to suggest that the WTO was not free of the structural impediments of 
its predecessor and that it perhaps even had some new problems of its own. Some of 
these were its tenuous links to other institutions such as the ILO (Schott, 2000: I 0) and 
"the imbalance between the WTO's consensus-plagued, inefficient rule making 
procedures and its highly efficient dispute settlement system" (Barfield, 2001: I), which 
would only grow in complexity as membership grew, risking policy standstill (Preeg, 
1998: 52, Hudson, 2003: 248). Simon Bromley's summation (2001: 298-9) was to see 
the WTO as an institutional "golden straitjacket", minimizing domestic policy choices 
to benefit the global market with the potential to cause public unrest. Finding the 
necessary mix of ingredients to get all players to accept the "cocktail" (Richardson et a!, 
1998: 55) of results from Ministerials, some good but some bad, was in danger of 
becoming increasingly difficult. 
There was no suggestion, at transition, that the preparatory sessions for WTO Rounds, 
which were conducted for GATT mainly through the informal Green Room process, 
would be changed. The Green Room meetings under GATT typically involved around 
25 nations, although there was "no objective basis for participation ... (and) generally 
only the most active countries in the negotiations participate( d)" (Schott and Watal, 
2000: 285). Partly as a result of countries not having delegations, as described above, 
and partly (possibly) because of the low share of world trade, developing countries had 
tended to be excluded from this process, affecting their attitude about the WTO to one 
which was less than positive (Arai, 2000: 62). However, not only had developing 
countries felt themselves shut out of key decision making processes in GATT, but 
NGOs had also expressed their dissatisfaction with the way trade policy making 
worked, suggesting that without greater involvement there was a risk of a growing 
democratic deficit in the WTO with, perhaps, public demonstrations resulting from this 
lack of civic involvement (Frost, 1998: 73, Kingsbury, 1995: 17, Wood and Moore, 
2002: 25). 
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Although this sounds conclusive, it cannot be said that NGOs are completely excluded 
from WTO deliberations in practice. One trade official told me that an Oxfam 
representative was an official member of his country's delegation to the WTO and, 
although they were not able to participate in the actual Ministerial meetings, they were 
briefed "once or even twice a day" on developments. Furthermore, the same official 
said that, even without an Oxfam delegate, he felt that the situation of the rural poor 
would inform his country's trade policies, not least because if nothing was done then 
the LDCs would not be able to "buy our stuff'. 36 
That NGOs have been involved at this level perhaps supports Robertson's contention 
that "ten percent of the EU budget is distributed to NGOs who tend to lobby in member 
countries to support EC policies" (2002: 9). There are concerns that NGOs should be 
kept out of the policy 'fray' altogether for fear that they might dilute the direct public 
accountability of member governments (Barfield, 200 I: 81 ). The reverse argument 
holds that as the WTO has a duty of"pursuing social goals" as part of its wider trade 
agenda, NGOs could contend that they should have wider access to the WTO policy 
process (Marable, 2000: 83). However, as there are issues surrounding their lack of 
accountability their presence may not have a positive effect on the democratic deficit 
(Harriss, 2002: liS). 
As NGOs have complained of the institutional strictures of the WTO for their lack of 
involvement, so have they accused multinational enterprises (MNEs) of embedding 
themselves into the WTO in order to promote their own trade rules agendas. On the one 
hand, MNEs are said to be "supranational powers" because their economic performance 
enables them to bargain in order to extract concessions from both developed and 
developing countries (Hamilton, 1986: 16). They can also use this power to influence 
the WTO in a way that NGOs can't, helped by the lack of a strict Code of Conduct to 
regulate their corporate behaviour (Madeley, 1999: 164).37 Some authors go so far as to 
suggest that this was the reason why the WTO came about - because MNEs could 
36 Interviewee 5 
37 See Jungnickel and Koopman (1984: 295) for the suggested, yet ultimately unsuccessful, Code of 
Conduct for Multinationals developed at the Raw Materials Conference in Dakar in February 1975 and 
then transferred under the auspices of the UN. However, how successful it would have been even if 
adopted is a moot point. Madeley (1999: xiv) recounts a trip to Nigeria where he spoke to one of the 
directors of an MNE who told him, "point by point" how MNEs would evade the requirements. 
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increase their influence through further 'marketization' and privatisation as a result of a 
more liberalized global market (Dunkley, 2000:102-3, Watkins, 1992: 37). The 
opposing view is that MNEs are too busy trying to make profit and to grow to be able to 
influence areas outside this direct sphere of interest although they remain "a convenient 
symbol" of wider world problems not of their making (LaPalombara and Blank, 19 84: 
19, Rugman, 2002: 7). There is evidence that conglomerates of companies have 
influenced WTO policy but it seems unlikely that MNEs could push initiatives through 
the WTO if there was not popular support of govermnents who would be participating 
in the discussions (as neither MNEs nor NGOs could). It is also important to note that, 
at least on a national basis, NGO leaders can have influence on political power, together 
with the industrial sector, partly because of the class positions that they each hold 
(Feldman, 2003: 20) suggesting that the three (MNE, NGO, govermnent) are not as far 
apart as is often pictured. 
The EC within the WTO 
It has already been noted that the end of the Uruguay Round was fraught for the 
Commission. It had proved difficult to gain agreement from the member states for the 
compromise on agriculture with the United States, as set out in the Blair House 
Agreement, France had threatened not to ratify the Final Accords and because of this, 
Leon Brittan (fairly new to the portfolio as the Round had taken so long to negotiate 
that two Commissions were involved) had been sent back to Washington to try to 
renegotiate. Because the Commission was a Contracting Party in its own right under 
the WTO, which it had not been under GATT, there was a possibility that the Council 
might try to rein it in in the future using the Article 113 Committee or by rolling back 
authority from the Commission in order to make it have more of an administrative 
function (Nicolatdis & Meunier, 2002). A harsher and less supportive Article 113 
Committee might be entrusted with assuring that there would be no agency slack or 
slippage in negotiations. 
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Although the Article 113 Committee has been restructured since the Uruguay Round 
(according to interviewees 5, 6 & 9) by having more working groups dealing with 
different agenda items in more detail, there seems to be no substantive changes in their 
oversight function; perhaps this is because of a lack of leadership and effectiveness 
leaving it incapable of so doing (Eisig, 2007: 938). Nevertheless, the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) (2002: 18-20) suggested that the Committee should be opened, especially 
to national and European Parliamentarians, and that it should become much more 
transparent. If it was to open, there would be pressure on it to allow more 
representatives from diverse organisations, perhaps even civil society. 38 However, it 
could be considered partisan, particularly by NGOs, were it to allow industry 
representation. The seeming lack of concern of the membership to pursue such 
ambitions for openness and transparency could be because they see themselves solely as 
an advisory committee rather than a policy-making committee. This may explain why 
"no formal votes are recorded and its deliberations are not published". This advisory 
status may also be why it is subject to very little industry lobbying (Shaffer, 2001: 114) 
with business still focusing more on their "national capitals" (Eisig, 2007: 933). 
As well as seeking resolution of the competence issue following the Uruguay Round, 
which would enable it to lead negotiations on all issues, the Commission also hoped to 
cement in the new WTO infrastructure by extending its agenda into new areas. The 
growing politicization, that was hinted at with the name change from GATT to the 
WTO, and the suggested extension of the WTO's remit, could also be expected to have 
an impact on the Commission's roles and responsibilities, especially in terms of the 
extent to which the interests contest the Commission in the WTO and the extent to 
which the Commission is able to make forward progress. 
38 As advocated by Klasing and Christopher, 2003: 7 
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Conclusions 
This Chapter established the historical background to the Commission as the 'voice of 
Europe' in the World Trade Organisation. In doing so, it introduced the practical side of 
its roles and responsibilities in external trade, which were elaborated in the previous 
Chapter. Importantly, it has been shown that there was increasing politicization of the 
trade field before the WTO was created; noticable after the Dillon Round when issues 
other than tariff reduction came to the fore. That the Kennedy Round was stalled for a 
period oftime, the Tokyo Round Final Agreements needed to be renegotiated (Taylor, 
1983: 134) the Uruguay Round discussions on agriculture almost resulted in punitive 
tariff action on the EC from the US (Meunier, 2000:123) and critical aspects had to be 
revisited at the end of the Round at Blair House (Swinbank and Tanner, 1996: 105) 
highlight the growing difficulties of achieving consensus in GATT. This has 
implications on the level of politicisation that might be expected within the WTO and 
how that might affect the Commission. 
The period of time leading up to the creation of the WTO seems to show a supportive 
internal consensus, excepting in agriculture, and a relatively strong external consensus, 
with the exception of agriculture and labour standards. There were a variety of different 
groups involved in the Uruguay Round, some of which did not appear to be particularly 
supportive of the Commission's stance, especially the USA (after the Tokyo Round, 
partly because of its alignment with the Cairns Group on agricultural issues). This 
demonstrates the importance of the Commission not only understanding and even 
anticipating the views of the member states (presumably with the help of the Article 
113 Committee) but also understanding and anticipating the views of its negotiating 
partners. This information could then be used as a way to develop and hold together a 
supportive internal coalition at the same time as building a supportive coalition within 
the WTO. Whether this continued to be successful, or even possible, will be a theme 
running through the rest of the thesis. 
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In terms of the status of the Commission, there is a lack of strong evidence for any 
'rollback' (Nicolatdis and Meunier, 1999: 477) of the Commission's responsibilities by 
Council between the Dillon Round and the completion of the Uruguay Round, 
suggesting that the mechanisms put in place in the Treaty of Rome were thought to be 
fit for purpose under the WTO as well as under the GATT. It will also be shown later 
that Ruling 1/94, after the Uruguay Round, did not affect Council-Commission relations 
in practice. In the Rounds following Dill on, there seemed to be every effort for the 
member states to appear united behind the Commission as negotiator suggesting that the 
Council at least tried not to act like a principal to its agent within the negotiations 
themselves and allowed the Commission varying degrees of room for manoeuvre 
(Ludlow, 2007: 359, Taylor, 1983: 137-8, Woolcock, 1993: 556). 
On the basis of the roles and responsibilities of the Commission within the GATT and 
what they managed to achieve, one could suggest that the Commission's position was 
"far more significant than the Treaty of Rome would predict" (Sbragia, 1998: 283). 
That the Commission began negotiating for the member states only on tariffs in the 
Dill on Round then, by the Uruguay Round, was negotiating on tariffs, intellectual 
property rights, technical barriers to trade, tradeaid, environment, services, agriculture 
and textiles supports this summation. This might suggest that the Commission would be 
able to make just as much progress within the WTO as ithad managed to make within 
GATT. However, this does not take account of any fragmentation of preferences within 
the interests or of the growing politicization within the trade field, as has been 
highlighted herein. Furthermore, discussions about the openness or otherwise of the 
Article 113 Committee suggests that the European Parliament would continue to seek a 
greater role in trade policy, which could threaten the Commission's ability to develop a 
supportive European consensus. Whether the control mechanisms would remain 
appropriate, or whether the Conunission would be able to have much room for 
manoeuvre, or, indeed, whether the Commission would have increased competence to 
negotiate in new areas, will be covered later. 
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Another important aspect that has been covered in the Chapter is that the creation of the 
WTO did not seem to herald a huge shift from the methodology and structure of the 
GATT. In spite of the aims being to rectify some of the "birth defects" of the GATT 
(Jackson, 1999: 37), the WTO appeared to have some of its own. Whether its own 
structure might suggest the Commission would have problems in making forward 
progress will be looked at over the next six chapters. This is in addition to the increased 
politici~ation around, and public focus on, the WTO because of the name change and 
the widened (and growing) membership of the WTO. The increasing number of 
developing countries joining was evidenced within the Uruguay Round of GATT. 
It is appropriate now to revisit the contentions outlined at the end of the previous 
Chapter in order to build a picture of the Commission's roles and responsibilities in 
GATT and how these are likely to play out in the context of the WTO: 
1. Roles: As expected, aspects of all four of the Commission's roles have been 
evidenced within this Chapter. For example, negotiating in the Dillon Round, where 
the Commission had a very tight mandate limiting its room for manoeuvre, seems more 
administrative in nature and being seen as "a strong bargainer" (Meunier, 2007: 97) in 
the Keunedy Round suggests it was able to act as an expert and as a coalition builder. 
Looking at the agricultural negotiations as a whole, we can view elements of the 'mix' 
of roles across levels of activity issues and time such as with the Uruguay Round 
agricultural negotiations. The background to the negotiations had been the MacSharry 
Plan (Commission as expert), resulting in serious domestic pressures, particularly in 
France (Commission as administrator) but France was eventually encouraged to agree 
to accept the results of the Round (Commission as coalition builder) and the 
Commission signed off the results and became a Contracting Party to the WTO 
(Commission as government). The evidence suggests that the extent of flexibility that 
the Commission has in fulfilling its roles is important ( Cremona, 2000a: 94) and that 
this depends on a number of interlinking issues: the level of agency that it is given by 
Council; the room for manoeuvre it has to ensure trade offs and the level of 
politicization surrounding each issue. That this takes place in a dynamic environment 
means that the nature of the interests is of critical importance. 
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2. Responsibilities: This Chapter has shown that the Commission's role in GATT was 
contested by Council. This was seen in the agricultural negotiations, which almost held 
up the launch of the WTO. After the Uruguay Round, the Commission appealed to the 
ECJ to evaluate the competence that it had to negotiate agreements. Ruling 1/94 
suggested that the Council might expect the Commission to take more of an 
administrative responsibility in areas subject to mixed competence. Furthermore, it also 
looked as if the Commission would not be able to exercise its responsibility to finalise 
the Marrakesh Agreement because the US was loath to re-open the Blair House 
Agreement. Although the latter was eventually resolved, later Chapters will show 
whether the Council did expect to be able to rollback the Commission's authority with 
Ruling 1/94 and, if so, what effect it would have on the Commission's ability to fulfil 
its responsibilities. In sum, there appears to be an evident gap between the Council's 
role conception and the Commission's performance- brought into sharp contrast at the 
end of the Uruguay Round. Further chapters will show how that might have been 
manifested in the WTO. 
3. Interests: The Commission interest played a key role in ensuring agreement in 
agriculture at the end of the Uruguay Round. The MacSharry compromise and the 
opening of Blair House (including the re-negotiation) showed the importance of the 
Agriculture and Trade Commissioners working together with the acquiescence of the 
Commission President. The Council interest was also important; particularly in granting 
the Commission leeway to pursue trade-offs in spite of the politicized internal 
environment and domestic pressures. This shaped the Commission's combination of the 
roles and conditioned the extent to which the Commission was able to fulfil its 
responsibilities; even though this was also being contested from outside (the Cairns 
Group and the US). In this example, the Commission was permissive and Council was 
supportive as the US was constraining (as it threatened to implement huge tariff 
increases) alongside the Cairns Group. This fits with the contention outlined in the 
previous Chapter. The extent to which the Commission is able to build a supportive 
coalition of the diverse interests will be further explored in the thesis. 
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4. Change: There were hints in the Uruguay Round that the 'Bridge Club' method of 
elite bargaining, prevalent in earlier Rounds, was changing. Agriculture, as already 
mentioned, was extremely difficult to negotiate because of the Cairns Group and the US 
with directly opposing views to that of the EC, the developing countries were becoming 
more involved and NGOs were also seeking to make an impact on trade policy 
formation (as was the European Parliament). This might suggest that the changes from 
GATT to WTO, including the 'birth defects' that were explained earlier, might increase 
the level of politicization. This would have an impact on the capacity of the 
Commission to exercise a stable mix of roles and responsibilities because of their need 
to respond to diverse groupings raising different, conflicting, issues. Balancing these 
competing interests and building supportive coalitions was likely, then, to become more 
difficult in the future. How the Commission might respond to these challenges and, in 
particular, the level of innovation and entrepreneurship that they are able to 
demonstrate, will be detailed in further Chapters. The difference between the Delors 
Commission and the Santer Commission may also be significant in the next three 
Chapters 
The next six Chapters will explore the efforts that the Commission made to this end 
through assessing the progress that was made through the more political Ministerial 
process and the more practically oriented issue areas- the latter using case studies 
highlighting fields where the Commission particularly wanted to make progress. These 
Chapters have been broken down into time periods. The first set of three Chapters look 
at Leon Brittan's tenure as Trade Commissioner from the signing of the Marrakesh 
Accords to the lead-up to the Seattle Ministerial in 1999; the second set of three assess 
Pascal Lamy's time as Trade Commissioner from the Seattle Ministerial to the failed 
Canclin Ministerial in 2003. Conclusions from these six Chapters will be drawn in 
Chapter Nine. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Trade Negotiations Framework from Marrakech to Seattle 
Introduction 
As explained in the previous Chapter, and in the Introduction, the purpose here is to 
show the Commission's role in the WTO from the aftermath of the Marrakech 
Agreement to the lead-up to the Seattle Ministerial in 1999. This will focus on the high 
political level of the WTO, which is the Ministerial process. In common with the 
following two chapters, this spans Leon Brittan 's tenure as Trade Commissioner. 1 This 
will allow comparison between his period of office and Lamy's period of office (which 
will be the subject of Chapters Six, Seven and Eight) with overall conclusions being 
drawn in Chapter Nine. 
This Chapter will track the evolution of the Commission's roles and responsibilities 
pertaining to the WTO Ministerial process and consider the evolving internal 
consensus, along with the increasing difficulties of establishing an external consensus. 
It will also explore the growing politicization over the period in order to assess whether 
this impacted on the Commission's roles and responsibilities and negatively influenced 
their ability to satisfy the three central interests. This is important in the light of the 
previous Chapters where it was made clear that the interests are not static and can be 
constraining, supportive or permissive on the Commission not only according to 
different work areas but within work areas. This Chapter will, then, set out how far the 
Commission was able to achieve progress both on its own agenda (where this differed 
from that of the Council) and with its mandate in the timeframe given above. 
1 It also almost coincides with Renato Ruggiero's period as Director General of the WTO (from I" May 
1995-1" September 1999) 
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In spite of the ECJ's 1/94 ruling, outlined in Chapter Two, this Chapter will show that 
the Commission still had sufficient 'policy space' to pursue its own aims both internally 
and externally. Internally, this is especially noticeable in the document on the 'EU 
Approach to the Millennium Round', COM(1999)331, which sets out negotiating 
positions outside, as well as inside, the Commission's areas of competence as defined in 
Ruling 1/94. This, then, tends to cast doubt on the contention ofNicolai:dis and Meunier 
(2002) that the Commission's responsibilities were 'clawed back' by Council following 
the Uruguay Round. 
As regards the external consensus, this Chapter explores Brittan's efforts to set up a 
'Millennium Round' of trade talks. This endeavour was successful although the 
progress within the preparatory Ministerials turned out to be less than expected. With 
this in mind, it is valuable to look briefly at the Commission's relationships to the other 
players in the WTO in order to ascertain the possibilities for forward progress over this 
timescale, as well as to show whether the wider environment was permissive, 
supportive or constraining on the Commission. In order to demonstrate this more 
overtly, this Chapter uses tables as a proxy for politicization to set out the differences 
and similarities between the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Quad positions 
within the WTO at the Singapore and Geneva Ministerials. In addition, the theme of 
trade-labour linkages, which will recur through the chapter, will be used to 
contextualise this gap and will show evidence that the increasingly politicized context 
coupled with the increased membership, would create problems in achieving a 
supportive external consensus. 
It is important to test the contentions as well as identifY the expected problems for the 
future noted in previous chapters. In particular, to what extent the views of the 
Commission and the interests change over time and are dynamic rather than static, 
whether there is a demonstrable increase in politicisation through the time period 
affecting the mix of tactics used by the Commission (in terms of technocracy, 
bureaucracy, coalition building and administration) and thus the extent of the 
Commission's internal and external influence within the WTO. 
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The First WTO Ministerial- Singapore, 9'h-13th December 1996 
The Lead Up 
The Singapore Ministerial had been scheduled to revisit the workings of the Marrakech 
Agreement and to cement in the successes of the Uruguay Round, as well to incorporate 
some of the issues where discussions had continued after the end of the Round (Young, 
2000). It was also to be used to consider new aspects of the trade agenda (Zampetti and 
Sauve, 1996:335) and to "equip the multilateral trading system with the range of 
instruments and institutional flexibility required both to mediate the tensions ... and to 
successfully promote the system's efficiency enhancing liberalisation objectives" (ibid, 
p336). 2 The Singapore Ministerial would also have to take on board the views of a 
number of new members and deal with concerns expressed by the developing countries. 
In short, there was a great deal riding on the outcome both for the European 
Commission and the WTO. 3 In order to maximise its chances of success, public 
demonstrations were banned and a number of Green Room meetings were held 
beforehand in order to agree on policy priorities, no doubt antagonising the developing 
countries.4 
The European Commission's own aims for the Singapore Ministerial were for 
agreements on a number of new issues, perhaps most importantly on a new Round of 
trade talks. The first mention of a new Round by the Commission, or indeed by any 
WTO member, seems to have been in October 1995 when Leon Brittan "called on 
WTO members to make investment rules, competition policy, the environment and 
labour standards the top priorities for future international trade negotiations". 5 This 
proposal seemed to be a canny move considering 1999 would herald further agricultural 
2 This is supported by the Draft Council conclusions of the meeting of Trade Ministers on 29 October 
1996 at htto://www.ilo.org/public/eno-lish/standards/relm/gbldocs/crb267/sdl-l-3a.htm accessed 24th July 2006. 
3 This was agreed by interviewees 2,3,5 & 9 
4 Demonstrations banned from J Kynge and G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times November 15ili 1996 
page 7 "Singapore Bans WTO Demonstrations". Report of Green Room meetings from A Mittal, !PS 
Columnist Service November 7"' 2002 'WTO in Sydney: Rule by the Rich for the Rich' reproduced at 
htttJ://www.foodfirst.org/archive/media/opcds/2002/wtosydney.htmi accessed 26th July 2006 
5 G de Jonquieres the Financial Times of October 24'h 1995, page 6 'Brittan attempts to map out WTO's 
agenda' 
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negotiations with further talks on services taking place the following year.6 A new 
Round bringing a raft of different issues to the table might be expected to take the focus 
off agriculture and enable trade-offs between policy issues (Swinbank, 1999:46). 7 As 
was shown at the end of the Uruguay Round, detailed in Chapter Two, this had already 
worked well for the Commission. 
Another Commission aim was for the WTO to establish a mechanism to look at the 
links between trade and environment issues and between trade and labour issues. 8 The 
member states were particularly influential in establishing the trade-environment 
agenda mainly because stringent EC environmental legislation created an incentive to 
block imports from countries that did not meet it.9 In parallel, the Commission was also 
asking the WTO to "make it easier for countries legally to impose trade restrictions in 
support of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)". 10 Internally, it had 
submitted a Communication on this matter noting the importance of compatibility 
between internal and external measures." This had been adopted by GAC, which 
agreed with the Commission that the WTO should establish agreements in this area. 12 
The Environment Commissioner was later to comment that if the WTO failed to do this, 
there could be "conflicts, which might be politicalJy devastating for the WTO", which 
shows the importance that this initiative was given internally. 13 
6 
'Fifty Years On' May 14th 1998, The Economist at ht1n://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Stmy 10=128462 
accessed 27th July 2006 
7 Taking the focus off agriculture from F Williams, the Financial Times of 26th February 1999 p3 'EU to 
press case for poor'. Trade-offs had notably happened in the Uruguay Round where the French had to 
accept the MacSharry reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy or they would have risked losing the 
WTO (see also Swinbank 1999: 46, looking specifically at agriculture in the Millennium Round. 
8 Both trade-environment and trade-labour linkages could be termed "sensitive topics" (from Item 8 of 
the European Commission Spokesman's Briefmg of24 April1996 at 
http://www.hri.org/news/europe/midex/l 996/96-04-24.midex.htm1#08 accessed 15th July 2006. 
9 B Maddox, the Financial Times of March 3'd 1994, page 11, 'Black skies, red tape, green fields, grey 
area'. This was agreed by interviewee 8 
10 G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 14th February 1996 page 5, 'EU initiative on environment' 
11 On 28th February 1996, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on Trade and 
Environment (COM (96)34) Full text in EU Bulletin 1/2- 1996 at 
http:l/europa.eujntlabc/doc/offlbull/en/9601/pl 04026.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
12 On 15th July, full text in EU Bulletin see 7-1996 at hnp:lleuropa.eu.int'abcldocloff/bulllen/9607/pl04036.htm 
accessed 26th July 2006 
13 European Spokesman's briefing for 24th June 1996 'Ritt Bjerregaard on Trade and Environment' (at 
http://www.hri.org/news/europe/midex/1996/96-06-24.midex.html accessed 26th July 2006 (she was speaking at a 
Conference on'EU Policy and Global Trade and Environment') 
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As regards trade-labour linkages, the Commission had been including clauses on this in 
agreements with individual third countries since 1992, suggesting they had a good deal 
of internal experience. 14 Although it has been suggested that Brittan was at first hostile 
to furthering this in the WTO because of concerns about protectionism being levied on 
the EC, this negative stance cannot have lasted for very long- particularly since he had 
made a formal proposal for trade-labour to go on the agenda in Marrakech. 15 Even 
though this had not proved possible, the first effort to incorporate such a statement into 
multi-country agreements was in a Communication from the Commission on 1st June 
1994 recommending that the EC give incentives to countries, which enacted legislation 
in accordance with ILO conventions.16 This was later given further elucidation in a 
Commission White Paper on 'European Social Policy- A Way Forward for the Union'; 
a position which was subsequently agreed by the Corfu European Council. 17 A 1996 
paper, jointly written by Leon Brittan and Padraig Flynn, asked Council for the 
authority to launch a working group at Singapore, in addition to supporting capacity 
building measures for the ILO. 18 This appeared to have been agreed between the 
Commission and the ILO already, giving the initiative, perhaps, more chance of success 
in Singapore although risking criticism from Council that the Commission was 
exceeding its mandate. 19 Although no criticism seemed to result, Council was warned 
by the Director General of the WTO that it would be difficult to get trade-labour issues 
onto the WTO agenda especially since Mexico and India had criticized the US for 
wanting a more overt reference to the WTO and labour standards in the Marrakech 
14 COM(2001)252, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
'The EU's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries' at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/human rights/doc/comOl 252 en.pdfaccessed 26th July 2006 
15 Brittan's hostility from C Southey, the Financial Times of 12th July 1996 page 20'Brussels seeks trade 
deallinks with workers' rights'. Concerns about protectionism from L Barber, the Financial Times of 
January 18th 1994 page 6, 'Brittan warns on protectionism'. That Brittan made a formal request for trade-
labour to go on the agenda in Marrakech from G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of March 24th 1994 
}page 6), 'Brittan wants rights put on WTO agenda' 
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament of I June 1994 on 'The 
Integration of DI!Veloping Countries in the International Trading System -Role of the GSP 1995-2004', 
COM(94)212 (at http://europa.eu.int/scadp1usneg/enllvb/r1 1014.htm) accessed 22"d July 2006 
17 COM(94)333 fmal at http://europa.eu.int/scadp1usneg/en/chalc!0112.htm accessed 22nd July 2006 
18 Brittan and Flynn (who was the Employment and Social Affairs Commissioner) paper within a 
Communication from the Commission to the Council on 24 July 1996 entitled 'The Trading System and 
Internationally Recognised Labour Standards' COM(96)0402 (a summary of which can be found at 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus11eg/en/cha/c11907.htm accessed 25th July 2006. Also see G de Jonquieres the 
Financial Times of 24th July, page 6 'WTO urged to tackle labour standards'. ILO capacity building taken 
from the Spokesman's Briefmg of 24th July at http·//www.hri.org/news/europe/midex/l996/96-07-24.midex.html 
accessed 26th July 2006 
19 The ILO said that it wanted to ""push ... the trade-social clause link" in the WTO. From the ILO 
Position Paper, quoted in SUNS Online, January 20th 1995 at 
http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/areasldevelop/01200195.httn accessed 26th July 2006 
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Agreement.20 In addition, at that meeting it was clear that there were significant 
differences in perspective between the member states suggesting a fragmented internal 
consensus: although it was reported that the Northern members seemed to be very 
supportive, there were concerns from the Southern members (along with Ireland, 
Belgium and France) of going ahead with these measures too quickly.21 As well as 
resolution of these more contentious policy areas at the Ministerial, the Commission 
was also looking for a political push to the Information Technology (ITA) and the Basic 
Telecommunications Agreements (BT A).22 However, the Commission also remained 
alert to the concerns of the developing countries, especially the LDCs, noting they 
would have to be given additional support to fully implement the Uruguay Round 
accords and that efforts should be made to afford closer aligrunent of the WTO to other 
international bodies, which would maximise effectiveness and capacity.23 
As well as the Commission's own agenda, it is important to consider the mandate given 
to it by the Council of Ministers (the process for which was explained in the opening 
Chapter). Council asked the Commission to pursue agreements on trade and investment, 
competition, tariffs, the ITA and trade-labour links within the Singapore Ministerial, 
suggesting that the Commission's and Council's agendas were closely aligned. 24 
Perhaps mindful of what Ruggiero had said, Council advised the Commission to be 
careful of its tone on trade-labour and insist that there was no desire to undermine 
competitive advantage. It is not just the Commission's agenda or the mandate that 
concerns us here. In terms of the internal consensus, the European Parliament wanted 
20 The WTO Director General spoke at the Council's 'informal' meeting of trade ministers in Dublin on 
18 and 19 September 1996. Difficulty of furthering this from the 'European Union' section of the ILO 
Report for the Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of International Trade 
athttp :1/www. ilo.org/public/ english!standards/rehnt gb/docs/ gb267/sdl~ 1 ~ 3 .htm#World %200rganisation%20f\VTO accessed 26th 
July 2006. 
21 G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of20th September 1996, 'Brittan sets tough line for WTO'. 
Supported by interviewees 5 & 9 
22 E Vermulst and B Driessen in The European Journal oflnternational Law Vol 8 (1997) Number 2 
'International Trade Developments, Including Commercial Defence Actions in the European 
Communities XII: !July 1996-31 December 1996' at http://www.ejil org/journaVVo18/No2/srl.html accessed 26th 
July 2006. 
23 The Commission donated 50,000ECU to enable some of the Ministers from LDCs to attend. From the 
European Commission Spokesman's Briefing of31" October 1996 at 
http://www.hri.orglnews/europefmidex/1996/96~10-31.midex.html accessed 26th July 2006. Closer alignment from the 
European Commission Spokesman's Briefing of24 Aprill996 as is set out in the Commission 
Spokesman's briefmg of24 April1996 http://www.hri.org/news/europe/midex/l996/96-04-24.midex.html- 08 
accessed 26th July 2006. 
24 Meeting held 29 October 1996 in Luxembourg. Draft Council Conclusions submitted to the ILO 
Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization oflnternational Trade' in November 1996 
sourced from http://www.ilo.org/publiclenglishistandards/relm/gb/docs/gb267/sdl-l-3a.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
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the Commission to pursue progress in other areas than those previously stated including 
"health and plant health standards, textiles and intellectual property" suggesting that 
they had even wider ambitions for increasing the scope of the WT0.25 However, as was 
shown in Chapter One, because of the European Parliament's position in external trade, 
it would appear unlikely that the Commission would push for progress in these areas. 
The issue, then, would be whether this would cause conflict between the European 
Parliament and the Commission. 
The Singapore Ministerial 
The views of the Commission and Council at Singapore, as expressed in their 
statements to the Meeting, were very similar. The Commission made clear that its 
priorities were to: complete the BTA and ITA negotiations; enlarge the WTO; try to 
encourage members to open their markets to LDC imports; achieve new work items on 
the environment, labour standards and a general widened agenda (including financial 
services, competition and investment); proceed with the built-in agenda and, finally, 
emphasize the importance of a Millennium Round. 26 The Council of Ministers' 
statement was in line with these aims, even though, as was shown earlier, the consensus 
for trade-labour work was not strong. 27 In addition, Council cited the importance of 
making sure that regional integration supported the WTO and opined that the relevance 
of the WTO had to be demonstrated to "political leaders, to business and to consumers". 
However, notably, Council did not mention anything about a Millennium Round, which 
would suggest, firstly, that this was the Commission's own aim and, secondly, that, 
because of this, the Commission might not achieve its goal of getting a supportive 
statement in the Declaration text. It further suggests that the Commission still had room 
25 The call for textile liberalization may have been precipitated by the failure of the EC to get textile 
exporting countries including India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Argentina 
and Brazil to agree to remove certain trade barriers in return for allowing them to export more textiles. 
See C Southey the Financial Times of September 13th 1996, page 6, 'EU's call for textile deal goes 
unheeded'. It is possible that there was a connection between the lack of take-up ofthis initiative and an 
associated anti-dumping action instigated by the Commission on undyed cotton from India, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, China, Taiwan and Egypt launched in the week of 16th September 1996 (see J Luesby, the 
Financial Times of 16"' September, page 4, 'Brussels to act over cotton'). Parliament's position from the 
European Parliament Resolution on the WTO on 13 November 1996from the EU Bulletin 11-1996 at 
h!tj>:/leuropa.eu.int/abc/doclofL'bulllen/96! llpl04023.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
26 Circulated as WTIMIN(96)/ST/2 
27 Circulated as WTIMIN(96)/ST/3 and ST/3/Addl 
82 
for manoeuvre in pursuing such policy intentions, even without direct Council 
agreement, in spite of Ruling 1/94. 
Moving on from the internal consensus, it is important to consider the views ofWTO 
members because of the principle of consensus-based rule making, which was the same 
as in the GATT. Forward progress could, thus, only be achieved ifthere was wide 
agreement on particular issues. In order to gain such consensus, the Commission or the 
Council of Ministers, or both, would have to embark on a coalition building process (as 
outlined in Chapter One). To have a clear indication of the differences between the EC 
position and those of some of the other players, and, thus, to see the pressures on the 
them, this section uses tables to show the similarities and differences of the preferences 
between the Quad (Canada, Japan, the European Commission and the USA), as the 
group of the richest countries in the WTO, and the LDCs as the group of the poorest. 28 
These tables have been constructed using the texts of the Ministerial Statements. 
The commonality of developing country positions will be assessed first. Logic would 
dictate that were the developing countries to agree a common position, given their 
numerical supremacy it would be difficult for the European Commission, or the Quad 
as a whole, to pursue policy preferences contrary to them. However, if the Quad had 
more political weight, it might be that the concerns of the LDCs could simply be 
glossed over. Therefore, the following tables show what, if any, new agenda items 
countries were proposing for the WTO, limited (in order to facilitate comparison and to 
keep the table as useful as possible as a tool to show the views of all countries) to three 
for each country. The next three columns look at country views on the European 
Commission's main objectives for the round, namely trade/investment, trade/labour and 
trade/environment links. The final column reveals whether they expressed any 
particular concerns. Where countries believed other organisations than the WTO were 
responsible for rule making, the name of the organisation is placed in brackets. For 
28 The OECD classifies developing countries in five categories, depending on their income (least-
developed, other low income, lower middle income, upper middle income and high income) Information 
can be found at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/9/2488552.pdfshowing the state of play on I" January 2003, 
accessed 25th January 2008 
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ease of reference, the results will be presented in tabular form with a more detailed 
explanation following.29 
TheLDC/0 
Table 3.1 The positions of the least-developed countries {LDCs) in the Singapore 
Ministerial. 
New Trade/investment Trade/labour Trade/environment Concerns 
Bangladesh No Debt 
WT/MfN(96)1ST/12 
Burundi (UNCTAD) (ILO) Unsure (domestic issues) 
WT/MfN(96)/ST/125 
Chad Limit Technical assistance 
WT/MfN(96JiST/31 
Gambia Marginalisation 
WT/MfN(96)1ST/86 
Lesotho Limit (lLO) Limit Implementation 
WT/MfN(96)/ST/78 
Madagascar Yes (ILO) Market access 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/119 
Malawi (UNCTAD) (ILO) Technical assistance 
WT/MIN{96)/ST/129 
Maldives No Marginalisation 
WT/MfN{96)/STII13 
Mozambique No No No Marginalisation 
WT/MIN(\J6)/ST/115 
Myanmar Yes (ILO) Implementation 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/124 
Nepal No No No Market access 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/92 
Senegal · (UNCTAD) (ILO) Implementation 
WT/MINJ96l/ST/122 
Sierra Leone Limit Limit Limit Technical assistance 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/59 
So1omonls. Marginalisation 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/58 
Sudan Debt 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/94 
Tanzania (UNCTAD) (ILO) No Marginalisation 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/50 
Togo Yes Yes Poverty 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/87 
Uganda (UNCTAD) (ILO) No Poverty 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/85 
Zambia (UNCTAD) (ILO) Marginalisation/Debt 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/102 
29 It should be noted that the countries' concerns and suggestions for new issues (where they have been 
f,iven) are deliberately simplified for ease of comparison. 
0 Although WT/MIN(96)/ST/95 is a statement from Cambodia, the statement brought up none of these 
issues, and did not highlight any points of concern from the Government, therefore Cambodia has not 
been included in this table. 
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No LDC put forward any suggestions about new issues they would like to see pursued, 
presumably because of their problems implementing the WTO Agreement in its totality 
(as was suggested in the previous Chapter and previously noted by the Commission). 
Trade/investment was one area subjected to a mixed welcome, although there is a 
majority negative view. Consensus is particularly strong on trade/labour issues, which 
was rejected as a possible new work item for the WTO by twelve out of nineteen 
countries; nine of which clearly indicating that they felt this was ILO's domain and not 
the WTO's. The countries that mentioned trade/ environment were generally opposed to 
discussions about it, but insufficient numbers stated a definitive objection. The main 
concern that the LDCs had was about marginalisation (raised by six countries). The 
other issues raised could be contributory factors to this including debt, the need for 
technical and other forms of assistance in order to achieve implementation of the 
Marrakech Agreement and, finally, issues of market access and poverty. As these issues 
are interrelated, it is difficult to unbundle them. This strongly suggests that the LDCs 
would not welcome any new issues being put on the table at Singapore and, because of 
the extent of this disagreement; it would seem unlikely that the European Commission, 
or the Quad, would be able to convince them otherwise. 
The Quad countries 
Table3.2 The positions of the Quad countries in the Singapore MinisteriaL 
New Trade/inv Trade/labour Tradelenv Concerns 
Canada IT/competition! Yes Yes Yes Dynamism 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/I tran~parencv 
EC IT/ Basic Yes Yes Yes Marginalisation/ 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/2 Telecoms! Enlargement/ Data 
Millennium protection. 
Round 
Japan IT/competition/ Yes Yes Marginalisation/ 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/34 gov't Enlargement 
procurement 
USA !T/gov't Yes Yes Yes Agriculture! 
WT/MIN(96)/ST/5 p!_ocurement Dvnamism 
This table shows that there are strong similarities between the positions of the 
Commission (and because of the strong similarity between the Commission's and 
Council's statements already noted, this can be said to represent the EC as a whole) and 
the rest of the Quad. A great deal of emphasis was placed on the successful completion 
of the ITA within the Singapore MinisteriaL Leon Brittan suggested that if the ITA, and 
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the BT A, were not concluded, the Ministerial could not be said to have been a success. 
Government procurement and procedural transparency were also deemed important as 
was trade/environment and trade/labour (although not for Japan). Both Brittan and 
Charlene Barshefsky, the US Trade Representative (USTR) hastened to reassure 
developing countries that trade/labour was not to "be a cloak for protectionism" 
(Brittan), in that "we are not proposing an agreement on minimum wages ... We are 
proposing that concerns of working people ... be addressed in a modest work 
programme" (Barshefsky). However, the views of the developing countries outlined 
above would suggest that they remained unconvinced either of the merits of such a 
programme or, indeed, that the WTO was the right place for such discussions to take 
place. 
The three most significant concerns expressed by this group were marginalisation, 
enlargement and dynamism, each being raised twice. Both Japan and the European 
Commission recognised there was a need to help the developing countries although the 
Commission went much further in what it thought would address this, seeking 
agreement on duty free market access for products from LDCs. The membership issue 
centred on the need for the speedy conclusion of negotiations with China and others. As 
for concerns about dynamism, this is an oft-repeating theme within the Quad 
statements, even where it is not raised as a primary concern and seems, again, to be 
very much against what the LDCs were calling for i.e. the Quad wanted to extend the 
work progranune to demonstrate this 'dynamism' while the developing country 
members preferred to keep the status quo. This, exemplified by Brittan's call for a new 
trade Round, will be a recurring theme through the rest of this chapter. 
In sum, if the Quad could drive the policy process in the WTO because of their relative 
political rather than numerical weight it might be expected that there would be 
negotiations beginning on trade/investment, trade/labour and trade/environment. It 
could also be anticipated that the ITA and BTA would be concluded and government 
procurement, and procedural transparency, would become new work items. However, if 
the developing countries acted in concert and made the most of their numerical 
superiority, it was likely that there would be no new work items and instead an effort to 
improve the trading situation to benefit them. Either way, it might be an indicator of 
increasing politicization given the wide dispersal of preferences. Whether the Final 
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Declaration would be a balance between the two views, or whether there would be 
friction as a result, will be assessed in the following sections. 
The negotiations 
As was shown in earlier chapters, the Ministerial process had not changed from the 
GATT to the WTO. Consensus was still all-important and building supportive 
coalitions in order to achieve priorities was as critical at the Singapore negotiations as it 
had been in the Tokyo Round of GATT (for example). As has already been made clear, 
one of the main aims of the Commission was to promote work on trade/labour standards 
yet the tables earlier in this chapter suggest that the Commission was likely to confront 
the developing countries who did not wish to see the WTO extend its remit to this area. 
The problems with the Commission getting its way on trade/labour issues started early 
on in the Ministerial. Michel Hansenne, the Director General of the ILO, was asked by 
the WTO Council to give an address to the Ministerial but this invitation had to be 
withdrawn either because "some members pointed out that the ILO was not one of the 
seven I GO's accredited to the WTO Council" or because the developing countries 
raised serious objections to the extent that it could not go ahead (Leary, 1997, 
Roozendaal, 2001). 31 In addition to the lack of consensus within the WTO, Brittan was 
unable to make headway because the internal consensus showed that it would not hold, 
as it had not done in the earlier Council of Ministers meeting, this time with clear 
opposition evident from the UK and Germany.32 It was suggested that this was 
indicative of the high level of"disagreements during the week on contentious issues" 
although consensus did eventually emerge in agreement to the Final Declaration. 33 
From the evidence in the Statements, the Commission and, seemingly, most of the 
Council of Ministers, hoped for more in the outcome on labour standards. Instead, the 
relevant section of the Declaration was ambiguous. Although the commitment to labour 
31 From the ICTSD Bridges Report 'WTO Ministerial Conference Highlights' of 9th December 1996 at 
http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/singapore/story09-l2-96.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
32 A Reyes, Asiaweek (WTO section) 20th December 1998 'Rich versus Nearly Rich: Small Nations Try 
to Hold Their Own in Singapore' at http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweck/96/12201biz4.htm! accessed 19th May 
2003 
33 P Watson from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, reporting on the 
meeting in CSIS Watch, Number 169 January lOth 1997 at http://www.cs;s.ornlhnnl/7wtchl69.html accessed 14th 
May2003 
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standards was spelt out, and ILO acknowledged as the competent body, the Chairman 
of the meeting said that this did not "inscribe the relationship between trade and core 
labour standards on the WTO agenda". 34 Furthermore, he noted that there was "no 
authorisation in the text for any new work on this issue". 35 This was somewhat different 
from what was given as Leon Brittan's own interpretation (from the same article) that 
"The EC believes this agreement marks a breakthrough in world-wide dialogue ... 
(which) ... must now be taken further so we can promote greater respect of core labour 
rights in all our countries". 
Brittan got no further with his plea for duty free access to markets for products from the 
LDCs either; it was reported that this proposal, also supported by Ruggiero, was 
roundly rejected. 36 However, the general principle that developing countries needed 
more help was accepted even ifBrittan's methodology for addressing it was not (at least 
at this point). It was agreed that LDCs should receive increased technical assistance, 
that the impact of agricultural reform should be assessed and that there should be a 
'Plan of Action'. This Plan would, according to the Declaration, aim to "enhance 
conditions for investments and provide predictable and favourable market access". The 
LDCs, at a meeting held at UNCTAD earlier in the year, had already commented that 
the proposed 'Plan of Action' would not be enough to address the existing imbalances; 
instead they needed support "to address the fundamental constraints on their production 
capacity". 37 This was likely too radical, and/or too expensive, a proposal to gain 
popular support, especially if the Commission, and the Quad, thought that the agenda 
would be extended anyway. 
34 O'Brien et al (2000: 227-8) suggest that the US used the 'weak' statement on labour as a "bargaining 
chip" to achieve Asian sign-up to the IT A. However, buy in from Malaysia and Thailand, for example, 
was not fully achieved until March 1997 so although it may have been the first push, it was not the only 
initiative needed. 
35M Khor in SUNSonline of December 17"' 1996 'After SMC, the Battle oflnterpretations' at 
http://www.sunsonline.om/trade/process/fol1owup/J996/12170196 htm accessed 26th July 2006 
36 Information sourced from G de Jonquieres and F Williams the Financial Times of 11th December 1996 
page 4, 'Information Technology deal is close'. Also L Elliott in the Guardian of the same day, page 11, 
'Poorest traders kept outside', commented that it was rejected "by Canada, the US, Spain, Italy, France 
and Portugal" as well as by "the big textile exporters- India, Hong Kong, Pakistan and Indonesia" 
37 From the UNCTAD Press Release TAD/INF/NC/96_23 of IO'h October 1996 'LDCs urge the 
international community to action' at 
http://www.unctad.org!femplates/Webflyer.asp'?dociD=3725&intitemiD=2068&lanc=l accessed 261h July 2006 
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The Commission did not go away empty handed; further work in trade and environment 
became more likely with a commitment to use the existing Working Group as a 
foundation for further development. 38 Likewise, although the BT A and IT A had not 
been signed in Singapore, there was a commitment in the Declaration to conclude the 
BTA in February and restart the FSA negotiations in April along with establishing three 
committees on investment, competition and transparency in government procurement, 
all of which reflected Commission and Quad aims. 39 The only fly in the ointment here 
was that there was a clear statement in the Declaration that work to develop policies on 
investment and competition would only take place following not just a consensus but 
"an explicit consensus decision" of the membership.40 Brittan's comment that; "On 
investment... we have at last put WTO on the map" will be shown to have been a little 
premature.41 
The most important outcome for the Commission, however, was a stated commitment 
in the Declaration to begin another Round of trade talks in 1999 called, just as Brittan 
had asked, 'The Millennium Round'. It was expected to be launched at the next 
Ministerial in Seattle in 1999 even though the WTO consensus was by no means 
assured (Srinivasan, 1999: 1061,Tangermarm 1999: 1176). This was especially true on 
the part of the developing countries, concerned that this would be another opportunity 
for the Quad to widen the agenda (Tharukan, 1999: 1145).42 In spite of these concerns, 
this was a clear statement that Brittan, and the Commission were influential within the 
38 Supported by interviewee 8 
39 These topics would become known collectively as 'the Singapore Issues'. Cook and Kirkpatrick ( 1996: 
62) note that the importance attached to investment stemmed from the "rapid" increase in the flow "with 
the share of developing countries in total FDI flows increasing from 17% in the second half of the 
1980's, to 32% in 1992". This, they felt, made an approach to develop policy on this issue particularly 
timely. T Wall in Africa Recovery Vol 10:3 December 1996 'New WTO Investment Rules Cause 
Concern' commented that this paragraph within the Final Declaration reflected "a proposal. .. that had 
been beaten back by developing countries at an early November meeting to set the agenda 
for ... Singapore" and that this was (in TWN's words), tantamount to '"a return to the colonial era"' 
(sourced at http://www.globalpolicy.oro'fsocecon/bwi~v.1o/wtoinvst.htm accessed 25th January 2008). 
40 The Pocket Oxford English Dictionary defmes 'explicit' as being "unambiguous in expression [with] 
such verbal plainness and distinctness that there is no need for inference and no room for difficulty in 
understanding", which suggests that silence or failure to actively object on the part of any member could 
not, under explicit consensus, be taken to be in agreement with the action. The insinuation is that a single 
member might veto onward progress if they did not agree with work on investment and/or competition 
going ahead. 
41 from M Khor Sunsonline, 17th December 1996 'After SMC, the battle of interpretatations', at 
http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/nrocess/followup/1996/l2170196.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
42 Also see the section on 'International Trade' in 'Developments in Intergovernmental Organizations of 
Interest to the Business World' Volume 17: 4, November 1996 at 
http://www.uscib.org'index.asp?documentiiFII03, which raises all these issues, accessed 26th July 2006 
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WTO structure, particularly noticeable since this aim had not been supported, explicitly 
at least, by the Council of Ministers. 
The results of the Singapore Ministerial were endorsed by the Council of Ministers, 
which then "authorized the Commission to sign (the Final Accords) on behalf of the 
Community and the member states". 43 At its January meeting it asked the Commission 
to continue its efforts to ensure the implementation of the agreements reached, 
especially the BTA, ITA and FSA.44 This was absolutely in line with what the 
Commission itself wanted and again shows that the internal consensus was strong and 
the Council was permissive on the Commission in allowing it to proceed unhindered by 
other proposals and additional requirements on Council's part. This is in spite of what 
might have been deduced from the ECJ's 1194 ruling. 
The Second WTO Ministerial- Geneva, 18-201h May 1998 
The Lead Up 
It was a proposal from Canada that there should be a Ministerial to celebrate fifty years 
of multilateral trade arrangements and that the meeting should focus on two core issues 
of implementation and the LDCs.45 The Geneva Ministerial would be different from the 
Singapore Ministerial because the outcome would be agreed informally at Head of 
Delegation level and then formally agreed at General Council.46 This would have the 
effect of minimizing the scope for argument in the wider forum and authority being 
given to the negotiators involved at the preliminary stages, most certainly including the 
Commission, who would be able to decide upon the agenda and the outcome 
simultaneously. 
43 At its meeting of 13th December. From the EUBulletin 12-1996 at 
http:!/europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off!bull/en/9612/p 1040 13.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
44 Meeting 20'" January In the EU Bulletin 1-1997 at http://europa.eu.int!abcldoc!oft?bul!/enmoi/pi03023.htm 
accessed 26th July 2006 
45 C Raghavan, Sunsonline 7"' February 1997'Canada Proposes Ministerial Meet Early 1998' at 
http:/fwww.sunsonline.org'trade/process/followup!l997/02070097.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
46 C Raghavan, Sunsonline 8th May 1998 'Second Ministerial: 'A meeting about another meeting' at 
http://www.sunsonline.ora/tra.de/process/followup/1998/05080l98.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
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It did not appear, on this basis, that a wide consensus would be difficult to achieve. At 
Singapore, labour standards had been discussed, and seemingly resolved in the wording 
of the Ministerial Declaration (although, as was shown, different parties believed the 
wording had indicated different things); conflicts on trade and investment, trade and 
competition, government procurement and regional trading arrangements had been 
addressed through the inauguration of committees and work on trade and environment 
links had been continued. Subsequent to the Singapore Ministerial, the ITA, the BTA 
and the FSA had all been concluded, even if not necessarily to the complete satisfaction 
of all parties (see Chapter Four). In addition, focusing on implementation and the LDCs 
would encourage consensus, as these issues had not been fully explored at Singapore. 
Progress might also persuade the LDCs to accept a new Round of trade talks, which 
was not a given as it had not been officially launched, and, in addition, a strong 
consensus in Council would be permissive on the Commission, allowing it to exercise 
the more teclmocratic leadership that it had exerted through the ITA, BTA and FSA 
processes. 
The Council of Ministers discussed this Ministerial in March 1997 when the primary 
task for the Commission was set out, i.e. to conduct ''thorough groundwork on all the 
areas likely to be covered by the (1999) ministerial meeting (and) ... to secure a trade 
pledge from all the parties".47 Apart from the 'trade pledge', and what form it would 
take was not set out, this seemed not to disagree with the Canadian proposal too much. 
However, Council conclusions in April suggested that the Commission should now seek 
agreement on a "work programme" in order for future negotiations to have an agreed 
basis to work from.48 To this end, Council suggested that agreement should be sought 
on the Singapore Issues, tariffs "and all matters not yet included, including trade, the 
environment and core labour standards" for inclusion into the Work Programme. In 
other words, they did not see discussion on the contentious issues in Singapore as being 
closed and, moreover, seemed to suggest that the Geneva Ministerial could be used to 
gain agreement to incorporate them into the next Round. 
47 EU Bulietin 3-1997 at http:ilwww.europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en19803/p103020.lttm accessed 26th July 2006 
48 EU Bulletin 4-1998 at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/offlbulllenl9804/pl030l6.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
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Council also wanted the Commission to achieve consensus on the integration of 
developing countries into the multilateral framework, for accession negotiations to be 
finalized and for measures to inform the public of"the benefits of trade liberalisation". 
In sum, Council wanted a comprehensive and highly politicized agenda for the third 
Ministerial, the latter, which was intended to mark the beginning of a new trade Round. 
Although the European Parliament did not have a formal role in external trade 
negotiations, it too was proposing a wider agenda, convinced of the merits of including 
"non-economic policy objectives, such as the protection of the environment, public 
health, cultural and ethical diversity and animal welfare" in the WTO. Furthermore, it 
urged the Commission and Council to seek a "binding declaration or decision" on these 
issues from WTO members within the Ministerial. 49 
Taking the agreed conclusions from a number of internal and external meetings at 
which the Commission was represented and where the WTO was discussed, along with 
the stated priorities of Council and the European Parliament, it can be assumed that 
there were around fifteen agenda items that the Commission was expected to advance 
within the WTO and these have been grouped for ease of reference. 50 The 'social 
issues' category would be particularly difficult to progress as it had proved impossible 
to reach agreement on any of these issues at Singapore (beyond discussions), due to 
strong developing country resistance aided by German and British reluctance to 
promote regulations on labour standards. 51 The 'institutional issues' seem to reflect a 
general concern with demonstrations of public dissatisfaction with the multilateral 
49 EU Bulletin 4-1998 at http://europa.eu.inVabc/doc/off/bu!Ven/9804/pl 030!7.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
50 Meeting outcomes used include ASEM, which prepared for the Geneva Ministerial in their meeting of 
5ili to 6'• February 1998- well before the Council's discussions began (see 
http://www.iias.nl/asern/offdocs/docs/ASEM SOMTIJ-CoChSumm.pdf for the full report, accessed 261h July 2006 the 
TABD whose Mid Year Report was issued on May 10"' (at http://!28.!21.!45.!9itahdlmedia/MYM98.pt!() where 
they set out 21 priorities, to be addressed at both the 1998 and 1999 Ministerials. Accessed 12"' May 
2002 and various G-8 configurations (the Joint Finance and Foreign Ministers 
Meeting 91h May in Birmingham, UK. Conclusions found at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fi980509.htm 
accessed 26th July 2006 and the G-8 Birmingham Summit held 15th -17ili May 1998, Final Communique 
sourced at hnp:l/www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit11998bimlingham/finalcom.htm accessed 26th July 2006 The issues 
brought up by these meetings are: the launch of a PR initiative to educate the public .of the advantages of 
the multilateral trading system; further removal of industrial tariffs and 'nuisance' tariffs; the Singapore 
Issues; trade/environment (perhaps involving the setting up of a Council for the Environment and 
Sustainable Development); trade/labour; trade/investment; market access for the developing countries, or 
at least the LDCs, and the implementation of the Plan of Action; transparency; 
outstanding accession negotiations (especially China); full implementation of existing Agreements; 
regional trading arrangements; electronic commerce; reform of the Government Procurement Agreement; 
a general 'deepening and widening' of the agenda and agreement on the launch of a new trade Round in 
1999. These issues have been grouped in footnotes. 
51 trade-labour, trade-environment, market access. 
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system, thus encouraging more transparency of working combined with appropriate PR, 
in an attempt to defuse the potential negative effects on the multilateral system. 52 The 
question of membership was also ongoing from Singapore. Interestingly, the 'traditional 
issues' are practically the same as those that came up at Singapore- specifically 
implementation of agreements and tariff removal (it is instructive that little progress had 
been made on these). 53 Finally, it is important to note that the largest category of 'new 
issues' is incredibly broad; to promote a "widened agenda" in addition to addressing all 
the other topics would seem to have been a practically impossible aim given the 
developing country position. 54 
The Geneva Ministerial 
The Commission's Statement to the Ministerial set out four key aims centring on the 
importance ofmultilateralism and the need to implement commitments, the push 
towards global membership and the "recognition of the benefits of further broad-based 
liberalization within the WTO framework". 55 In particular, Brittan emphasized what he 
thought were core issues: investment, IT, competition, environment and sustainability. 
He saw the Millennium Round as a way "to frame a response" to address public concerns 
with globalisation. This emphasis on civil society may have been partly in response to 
"the first mass demonstrations to which the WTO was to be exposed; after the calm of 
Singapore ... the extent of the protests surprised many". 56 Council's Statement to the 
Ministerial again did not mention a 'Millennium Round' but cast it in terms of 
"maintaining the momentum of multilateral liberalization"; a repeat of the 'dynamism' 
argument that had been expressed at Singapore. 57 As such, it went on to promote a wide 
'
2 PR, transparency, membership and a new trade Round 
53 tariff removal, implementation and government procurement 
54 Singapore issues, regional trading arrangements, trade/investment, electronic commerce and a 
'widened agenda' 
ss delivered by Leon Brittan on 18th May, statement circulated as WT/MIN(98)/ST/76 
56 Quote from R Wilkinson, !PEG Papers in Global Political Economy Number 3 'A Tale of Four 
Ministerials. The Rise and Demise of the Trade-Labour Standards Debate' April 2002 at 
http://www.bisa.ac.uk/gmups/18/papers/RordenWilkinson.ndf accessed 15th July 2006. A useful website detailing 
the kinds of actions planned by protesters in Geneva is 
http·//www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/global/geneva98.htm accessed 26th July 2006, although it is likely that 
these details are simply representative of a wider set of activities designed to disrupt the Ministerial 
and/or the city of Geneva as a whole. 
57 circulated as WTIMIN(98)/ST/90 on 20th May, submitted by Margaret Beckett for the British 
Presidency 
93 
--·---------------------------------------
ranging agenda and wider membership, as well as advocating a joint approach on 
electronic commerce, which had seemingly not been mentioned before. 
Perhaps the most important part of Council's statement was that "The European Union 
also attaches importance to the language in the Singapore Declaration on core labour 
standards", with no suggestion as to what that meant in practice- was this an attempt to 
take the issue off the table (as the British and German governments had tried to do in 
Singapore) or was this an effort to avoid confrontation with the developing countries by 
being deliberately vague? As the Council did not mention a 'Millennium Round'; neither 
did Brittan mention labour standards although Santer did in his speech; which could be 
indicative of a more fragmented internal consensus than first thought. At this Ministerial, 
groups of countries (apart from the EC) issued statements for the first time. 58 This could 
have been merely symbolic, considering the original Canadian proposal, or an attempt to 
maximise the impact of representations through collective action and/or to ensure that 
there was an element of cohesion in positions. As only eight developing countries made 
individual statements to the Ministerial, it suggests that there was at least a residual 
symbolism. 59 However, if there was a genuine wish on the part of the Commission and 
the rest of the WTO to take account of the concerns of the developing countries, then the 
issues that they raised, as individuals as well as collectives, would be clearly visible in the 
Final Declaration. 
As before with the Singapore Ministerial, tables have been compiled to show what, if 
any, new agenda items countries or groups of developing countries were proposing for 
the WTO, limited (in order to facilitate comparison and to keep the table as useful as 
possible as a tool to show the views of all countries) to three for each country. The next 
three columns look at individual and collective LDC views on the European 
Commission's main objectives for the round, namely trade/investment and 
trade/environment along with trade/labour to see if any changes were evident from the 
58 The Groups represented were the South Centre, an intergovernmental organisation of developing 
countries, the Organisation for African Unity/ African Economic Community (OAU), the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (CO MESA), a grouping of20 states, the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a group of7 states, ASEAN, APEC and lbe Ministers oflbe Least 
Developed Countries. In addition Tanzania made a statement on behalf oflbe Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), a group of 14 states. 
59 Unfortunately lbe WTO could not find a copy ofMyanrnar's statement that was accessible so it has not 
been included in lbe table. 
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positions taken at Singapore. The final column shows whether countries expressed any 
particular concerns. For ease of reference, the results will be presented in tabular form 
with a more detailed explanation following.60 
TheLDCs 
Table 3.3 The positions of the least-developed countries CLDCs) in the Geneva 
Ministerial. 
New Trade!inv Trade/labour Trade/env Concerns 
Bangladesh SDT/poverty/ 
(WTIMIN(98)1STI60) ODA 
Burundi Multilateral Marginalisation 
(WT/MIN(98)1ST/78) work plans on 
developmental 
issues 
Chad Coordination Financial 
(WT/MlN(98)1ST/79) between assistance/ 
agencies integrated 
initiatives/ 
capacitv 
CO MESA Capacity Market access/ 
WT/MIN(98)/ST/74 building SOT/integrated 
programmes initiatives 
LDC Group Plan of action 
WT/MJN(98)1ST/91 & integrated 
approach/ 
accession/debt 
Maldives Harmonization No Technical 
WT/MIN(98)/ST/88 and regulation assistance/ 
of preferential investment & 
rules of origin market 
access/textiles 
Myanmar RTAs/ Yes but in Probably not Possibly but Integration/ 
WT/MJN(98)/ST/6 globalisation of parallel with must support tariff and NTB 
free trade by others trade reduction/ 
2010 accession 
Nepal SDTI global 
WT/MIN(98)/ST/51 fund for export 
development 
OAU Measures to deal As long as not Market access/ 
WT/MIN(98)/ST/72 with country a guise for integrated 
specific protectionism initiatives/ 
situations accession 
SAARC No No Debt/transfer of 
WT/MJN(98)/ST/49 technology/ 
areas of interest 
to developing 
countries 
SADC Country-specific No No No Capacity/ 
WT/MJN(96)/ST/96 programmes! implementation 
coordination & enactment/ 
between SDT 
agencies 
60 It should be noted that the countries' concerns and suggestions for new issues (where they have been 
given) are deliberately simplified for ease of comparison. 
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Solomon Is Multilateral Integrated 
WT/MIN(98)/ST/93 Agreement on initiatives/ 
Labour accession/ 
implementation 
South Centre Coordination No No SOT/reciprocity 
WT/MIN(98)/ST/20 between UN and /accession 
Bretton Woods 
institutions 
Zambia Mechanism to Implementation 
WT/MIN(98)/ST/82 restore lost /debt/integrated 
rights (due to initiatives 
lack of technical 
capacity) 
There are very few comments on trade-investment suggesting either that countries 
remained to be convinced of the benefits of such an agreement or that this fitted in with 
their general wish not to have new items on the agenda except where it benefited them. 
Of countries and groups that commented on trade/labour, there was a general negative 
opinion, akin to that expressed at Singapore. Only the OAU and Myanmar expressed a 
wish to perhaps consider trade environment although they seemed to have a concern 
that it might be used for the purposes of protectionism. 
There are a number of ideas for new work items here although preferences are 
dispersed. Where these countries or groups expressed views, the most popular idea was 
for coordination between agencies (Chad, OAU, SADC, South Centre, CO MESA, the 
LDC Group, Solomon Islands and Zambia [the latter four suggesting this should be a 
new work item]) and country-specific programmes (which could be linked). There are 
also a number of countries and groups that mention ongoing problems with 
implementation and financial and technical assistance, alongside SDT, which are also 
linked (Bangladesh, Chad, CO MESA, Maldives, Nepal, SADC, Solomon Islands, South 
Centre and Zambia). 
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The Quad countries 
Table 3.4 The Quad countries positions in the Geneva Ministerial. 
New Trade/inv Trade/labour Trade/env Concerns 
Canada 'Cluster Yes Cultural industry 
WT/MIN(98)/ST/73 approach' to protection/ Erosion 
Rounds rather of rights to 
than large regulate/electronic 
multilateral commerce 
negotiations/ 
Civil society 
involvement 
EC Tariffs/ Yes " Yes Implementation! 
WT/MIN(98)/ST/76 promoting membership/ need 
wider for a 'far reaching 
understanding agenda' for future 
of social and negotiations 
economic 
benefits of 
WTO/ICT 
Japan"" Tariffs Yes Yes Developing 
countries/RTAs 
USA ITAIII Yes Yes Agriculture/services/ 
WT/MIN(98)/ST/57 electronic Intellectual property 
commerce/ rights 
transparency of 
state trading 
enterprises 
Preferences here are quite dispersed with no issue attracting support from all four Quad 
members, unlike at Singapore where trade-investment and trade-environment had 
unanimous support. Trade/labour seems to have effectively gone from the agenda 
excepting for the US, who continued to want to pursue it. Whether there would be an 
effect on the internal consensus because Brittan did not want this on the WTO agenda 
whereas Santer did, will be shown. The extent of fragmentation within the Quad is also 
noted on new issues with the EC and Japan wanting to negotiate on tariffs, the EC and 
Canada considering civil society and Canada and the US looking at electronic 
61 Although Leon Brittan said nothing about labour standards in the Statement, Jacques Santer also gave a 
speech on the first day in which he remarked, "The WTO cannot allow itself to be branded with the 
image of an anti-democratic organisation which disregards ethnic diversity, has no respect for the 
environment or labour standards and which acts against the interests of a large majority of citizens in 
particular the most disadvantaged" (sourced at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e!minist e/min98 e!anniv e!santer e.htm accessed 7th Apri12008). Although 
Council's statement (WT/MIN(98)/ST/90) said it "attaches importance to the language in the Singapore 
Declaration on core labour standards", the speech from the Chairman of the Council, Romano Prodi, said 
only that there should be "enhanced cooperation between WTO and ILO" (from 
http://www.wto.orgtenglish/thewto e/minist e/min98 e/anniv e/prodi e.htm accessed 7th Apri12008) 
62 Statement delivered by the Prime Minister of Japan but not labelled or numbered as a statement yet no 
other statements circulated. Sourced at http://www.wto.org/english/the"'1o e/minist e/min98 e/anniv e/jap e.htm 
accessed 7th April 2008 
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commerce. This shows that the Quad could not have led consensus-building processes 
in the Geneva Ministerial even ifthere had been an opportunity for them to do so. 
The negotiations 
There are two Declarations from the Geneva Ministerial; both of which were adopted 
on 20th May. 63 The Council of Ministers had already considered them, in draft form, on 
18'h May and was content particularly with the Declaration on Electronic Commerce. 64 
As explained earlier, these Declarations had been negotiated prior to the Ministerial and 
from this positive reception, it could be expected that the Ministerial Declaration 
followed Council's preferences and laid the way for dynamic future developments, with 
a wider scope and the date for a future Round set. This, however, was not the case, 
again perhaps due to the ceremonial aspects to the meeting. 65 
There was very little substance to the Geneva Final Declaration in that there were no 
new work items set out, no indication of a wide consensus so a comprehensive work 
programme could be taken forward to the next Ministerial and no attempt to build on 
what had happened at Singapore; there wasn't even mention of a future Round (also 
Croome 1998: 47). As far as encouraging the developing countries, although there was 
recognition in the first section that, "More remains to be done to enable all the world's 
peoples to share fully and equitably in these achievements", as Brittan had been arguing 
for some time, there was very little else in the Declaration that might put flesh on those 
particular bones.66 There was a clear "commitment to achieve progressive liberalization 
of trade in goods and services" although the ways and means to achieve it were left 
unstated. The most substantive section established "a process ... to ensure full and 
faithful implementation of existing agreements, and to prepare (a work programme) for 
63 WT/MIN(98)/DEC/I is the 'Ministerial Conference- Ministerial Declaration and WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2 
is the 'Ministerial Conference Declaration on Global Electronic Connnerce', 
64 From EU Bulletin 5-1998 at http://www.europa.eu.inVabcldoc/off'bull/en/9805/pi03024.htrn accessed on 26 July 
2006 
65 R Thompson of the Evian Group, in her 2002 paper on 'Electronic Connnerce and the WTO' Accessed 
at http://www.sitrends.org/downloads/statistics/pdf'ECommWfO.pdfon 26th July 2006 
66 Section 5 looks to extend the benefits of the system "as widely as possible" and is related to Section 6 
on the particular problems faced by the least-developed countries. This calls on members to assist them 
by fully implementing market access obligations 
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the Third Session of the Ministerial Conference".67 This next Ministerial would be held 
in Seattle in November 1999.68 Council appeared to have wanted the agenda to be 
prepared (or at least settled) at Geneva so it is noteworthy, then, that there was no 
explicit mention of trade/investment, trade/labour, trade/competition or government 
procurement within the Final Declaration. Perhaps, the antipathy of the developing 
countries to new work items was impeding the Commission's progress towards a 
broadened WTO agenda. This contention is supported by Penny Fowler who 
commented that although the EC had called for a new Round, "several developing 
countries stressed that they will not accept negotiations on new issues unless their 
concerns about implementation of the existing agreements is taken into account". 69 This 
would appear to indicate a turning point in the developing countries' stance within 
negotiations, and it will be seen if this affected the internal consensus and boded ill for 
any future progress desired by the Commission. 
67 Rather than setting out exactly what the work programme would include, details were left sketchy with 
a commitment to look at (i) the implementation of existing agreements, (ii) the timeliness of negotiations 
already agreed in Marrakech to ensure the schedule remains on target, (iii) any "future work already 
provided for under other existing agreements", (iv) work items from the Singapore meeting, (v) "follow-
up to the High-Level Meeting on Least Developed Countties" and (vi) other issues "agreed to by 
Members". The only acknowledgement of the problems of the LDCs in developing a work programme 
was that there should be an "overall balance of interests of all members" although, as has already been 
shown, this would be difficult to achieve considering the antipathy of the developing countries to the 
incorporation of any new issues on the agenda that did not specifically benefit them. 
68 The superstitious may have wondered whether this was asking for trouble- Seattle was infamous for 
staging the USA's "first total sttike" on February 6'h 1919 (see J Cassy the Guardian of 24th November 
1999 p27 'Washington hopes Castro will follow Queen's example' and, for more information about the 
strike, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/centennial/marchllabor.html {accessed 12th May 2003) detailing the article 
by S Boswell and L McConaghy, Seattle Times March 31" 1996, 'Strike! Labor unites for rights' 
However, A Gumbel in the Independent on Sunday of 5th December 1999 (at 
http://www.gene.ch/gentech/1999/Dec/msg00029.html accessed 12th May 2003) 'City at bay after taking liberties 
with civil rights' pointed out that, in recent years, Seattle was a city where the "idea of civil disobedience, 
most weeks of the year, is a pedesttian daring to step on to the road before the traffic lights turn red". The 
invitation had been given by US President Bill Clinton to "come to America". From 'The Economist' 
Survey: World Trade October I" 1998 'Slow Road to Fast Track' at 
http://www.economist.com/surveys/displayStmy.cfm?Stonr id==605236 accessed 26th July 2006 
69 Penny Fowler's report on the Ministerial for the UK Food Group: Agricultural Biodiversity Coalition 
at http://www.ukabc.orWMo.htm accessed 26th July 2006. Even the Secretary-General ofUNCT AD, Rubens 
Ricupero, called for the WTO to "fmally address the cumulative 'unfmished business' of the Tokyo and 
Uruguay Rounds" (from the ICTSD Bridges Report of, 12th Aprill999 'Promoting the Millennium 
Round: On the Road with Sir Leon" at http://www.ictsd.orglhtmllstorv4.12-04-99.htm accessed 26th July 2006) 
rather than extending the agenda further. He was later quoted as saying, at Columbia University on 23'd 
July 1999 "There is not much excitement among developing countties in Geneva regarding the prospects 
of a new trade round. In fact there is hardly any excitement at all anywhere in the world about this ... ". 
From the FoE submission to the House of Commons Tuesday 9'h November 1999 at 
http://WWW.parJia.ment.the-StationeN-OffiCe_co.uk/pa/cm J99900/cmsJectfcmenvaud/45/911 0909.htm aCCeSSed 26th July 2006 
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The second 'Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce' is a statement 
that General Council would develop a programme of work in this area. The 
Commission's 1998 Report said that this had come about because the European Union 
had pushed for it; Council had also mentioned it in their Statement to Geneva. 70 It has 
been suggested by others that the proposal was a joint US/Quad initiative or that it was 
from the US alone, which would explain why there is no record of discussions of this in 
previous Council meetings and also why it featured prominently in the US' Statement at 
Geneva. 71 That it forms a separate Declaration is strange, particularly as the statement 
is so short- this may barely reflect the pressure exerted to get more into the 
Declaration, especially since the US held an eighty-five percent market share so it was 
strongly in its interest to stop trade barriers. 72 
Since it has been shown that there was little in the Declaration that tallied with what the 
Commission and Council sought, it is surprising that the European Council, 
acknowledging the results, said that it," welcome( d) the outcome of the 1998 WTO 
Ministerial... It underlines the importance of initiating a comprehensive new round of 
liberalising negotiations at the third WTO Ministerial Conference towards the end of 
1999". 73 This latter point, as was shown, was hardly the conclusion from the Geneva 
Ministerial so it would appear that this was wishful thinking on the European Council's 
part. It gave no encouragement to the Commission to work at achieving the necessary 
consensus, perhaps through developing trade-offs or bargaining, prior to the next 
Ministerial, which may have proved to be a fatal mistake. 74 
70General Report 1998- Chapter V: Role of the Union in the world, Section 3: Connnon connnercial 
policy at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/otT/rg!en!l998/x0710.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
Council's statement circulated as WT/MIN(98)/ST/90 
71 Article suggesting it was a US/Quad initiative is B La! Das in the South-North Development Monitor, 
May 5th 1998 'Electronic Connnerce in the WTO', based on the author's presentation at a TWN-
organised seminar on 'Current Issues on Trade, the WTO and Developing Countries' on 29-30 Aprill998 
in Geneva found at http://www.twnside.org.sa/titlellall-cn.htm accessed 26th July 2006. Article suggesting it was 
a US proposal was S Tangkitvanich in Cooperation South Number I (2001) 'Global E-Connnerce 
Policies Seen From the South' at htip://tcdc.undp.org/coopsouth/2001 ocV016-028.pdf accessed 26th July 2006. 
Canada also mentioned electronic connnerce although in a small paragraph at the bottom ofthe 
penultimate page of the statement, which does not suggest it was a priority. In a speech delivered by the 
Japanese Prime Minister-labelled a Statement but not accessible from the WTO's Statements page- no 
mention was given of electronic commerce at all. Accessed at 
http://www.wto.org/enalish/thewto e/minist e/min98 e/anniv eljap e.htm on March 25th 2008. 
72 See Rachel Thompson 's 2002 paper on 'Electronic Commerce and the WTO' Accessed at 
http://www.sitrends.org/downloads/statistics/pdf/ECommWTO.pdfon 26th July 2006 
73 EU Bulletin 6-1998 at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/doc/ofT/bull/en/9806/il022.htm accessed 26th July 2006 
74 Or that they were convinced the US would see that a Round was launched at Seattle. This was proved 
correct on January 19"' 1999 (as outlined by M Wolf Financial Times 24"' February 1999, page 26, 'The 
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Parliament also adopted the conclusions of the Geneva Ministerial calling on the 
Commission to take into account "interests of the developing countries" on matters of 
clothing and textiles, as well as to "examine the various aspects of world trade as part of 
the future reform of the common agricultural policy", quite a concern for the 
Commission considering agriculture had proved so divisive internally and externally in 
the Uruguay Round (see Chapter Two).75 It might have seemed from this that 
Parliament was supporting a more balanced agenda in the WTO, possibly because of 
the lack of consensus to any new work items on the part of the developing countries, by 
incorporating issues of primary interest to them. However, Parliament would later call 
"for the precautionary principle to be explicitly upheld as a priority basis for all 
decisions which have an impact on public health and consumer protection", thus 
limiting agriculturalliberalisation.76 Finally, Parliament wanted any new Round to 
address "the link between trade and ... core labour standards, environmental protection 
and public health". In the end, then, although it supported certain of the issues dear to 
the hearts of many developing countries, specifically textiles and clothing, this did not 
mean that it wanted the Commission to ignore European interests (in terms of 
agriculture and the precautionary principle) or what it perceived as the critical aspects 
of the 'new agenda' (most notably trade-labour links). 77 
The aftermath of Geneva and onwards to Seattle 
After Geneva, there were two key issues for the WTO. Firstly, it had to develop a work 
programme for Seattle and for the new Round following the insubstantial mandate 
given at Geneva. To this end, a Special Session of the Ministerial Council took place on 
24'h September. 78 At this meeting, the Commission set out its wish list of what it wanted 
to see being covered listing further tariff cuts, further liberalization of services -
right call') when Bill Clinton said; "Tonight I issue a call to the nations of the world to joio the United 
States in a new round of global trade negotiations" which "made the 'millennium' round ... almost a 
certainty" 
75 Meetiog 18th June io EU Bulletin 6-1998 at http:llwww.europa.eu.intlabcldoclofflbull/enl9806/p I04035.htm accessed 
26th July 2006 
76 Particularly applicable at the time considering a Dispute was underway with the US on hormone-
treated beef, in fact accordiog to G de Jonquieres Financial Times 27th January 1996 page 3 'US goes to 
WTO over EU beef ban', the US had "launched its long-threatened legal challenge" on the previous day. 
77 Perhaps encouraged by the ambiguous wording of the trade-labour section of the Singapore 
Declaration. 
78 C Raghavan, Third World Economics 194, l-15 October 'EC Pushes Comprehensive Agenda, 
Millennium Round' reproduced at http://www.twnside.org.sg'title/mille-cn.htm reporting on a meeting which took 
place on 241h September, accessed 26th July 2006 
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including "all sectors and all 'modes of delivery'" -investment, competition, trade 
facilitation and trade/environment. 79 Trade/labour, then, was conspicuous by its 
absence. This wish for a wide agenda was again stated by Brittan in October and was to 
eventually find favour from Japan, the only Quad member overtly supportive of the 
Commission's line. 80 The US was still going to continue to take some convincing over 
the merits of a wide ranging Round as it reportedly wanted to, "attack global trade 
problems on an industry-by-industry basis", preferring a focus on agriculture and 
biotechnology. 81 Secondly, there needed to be efforts to find a replacement for 
Ruggiero as he was due to retire in April 1999.82 The General Council had initially 
hoped to reach their decision by the end of November 1998. 
Even though the European Parliament had reservations about the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI), commenting that to date "negotiations have ... been 
conducted in the utmost secrecy, with even national parliaments being excluded", they 
agreed that global investment rules were needed. 83 Therefore, they recommended that 
work should be transferred from OECD to the WTO and UNCTAD. 84 Johnston and 
79 Even though the US was reportedly still "cool" to another Round. Raghavan pointed out that the US 
were not enthusiastic about a new Round partly because they felt sectoral negotiations might work better 
for them, partly because of the possibilities of internal dissent if the agenda was too wide and partly 
because of the upcoming Presidential elections in 2000. 
80 Speech by Leon Brittan of 19" October on 'Trade, Enlargement and the Multilateral System' at 
http-//europa.eu.intfrapidfpressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/98/207&forrnat=liTML&aged""l&language=EN&guilangu 
age=en accessed 26th July 2006. Japanese support given following meetings in December 1998 and January 
1999. See the report of the Meeting with the Minister ofinternational Trade and Industry of Japan in 
Brussels on 7th January 1999 (joint press release from the EU Delegation to Japan at 
httv://jpn.cec.eu.intlhomelnews en newsobi709.php accessed 26th July 2006) 
81 US perspective from J Choy, JEI Report Number 3 January 22'' at 
http://www.jei.org/Archive/JE!R99/9903w3.html accessed 15'h July 2006. Agriculture and biotech focus from G de 
Jonquieres Financial Times 30th January page 5, 'US wants farm trade at centre of new round' 
82 Search for Ruggiero's replacement from R Dale International Herald Tribune Tuesday April 27th 1999 
'Thinking Ahead/Commentary : WTO needs chief with people skills' at 
http:llwww.iht.com/articles/19991041271think.2.t 2.php accessed 25th March 2008. The four initial candidates 
were"Hassan Abouyoub, Morocco's ambassador in charge of trade negotiations; Roy MacLaren, 
Canada's High Commissioner in London, Mike Moore, fanner PM of New Zealand and Supachai 
Panitchpakdi, Thailand's deputy PM" This process had apparently only started on 1 '1 October, according 
to the Financial Times (on Saturday November 27th 1999 'Timeline; World Trade Organisation' at 
http://snecials.ft.comlln/specials/sp3d7e.htm accessed 15th July 2006 
83 From the 'Resolution containing Par!iament"s recommendations to the Commission on negotiations in 
the framework of the OECD on a multilateral agreement on investments (MAl)' A4-0073/1998 of 11th 
March 1998 sourced at 
http://www .europarl.europa.eu/pv2/pv2?PRG=CALDOC&TPV~DEF&F1LE=9803ll &S DOCT A""8&TXTLST = 1 &POS= 1 &LAST 
CHAP=l&Tvne Doc=FIRST&LANGUE=EN accessed 25ili March 2007 
84 C Raghavan, Sunsonline March 18th 1998 'Finance: EU Parliament Sets Conditions for MAI' at 
http://www.sunsonline.org/tradelprocess/fo\lowup/mai/03180098.htm accessed 23rd July 2007. 
This was despite the reason why the MAI was OECD's responsibility in the first place in that it may have 
been as "a response to the recognition that a WTO deal (was) not imminent and that a separate OECD 
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Laxer (2003: 42) suggested that this was the issue that proved divisive in Seattle, 
possibly because the MAl had already mobilised a great deal of attention from NGO' s 
who lobbied for its jettison from the international agenda. 85 Both Ruggiero and the 
Commission were strongly pushing for transferral referring to the MAl as a 
"constitution for globalisation". 86 Perhaps it was this 'vision' that had turned NGOs 
against the MAl, and, more than that, inspired them to focus their ire on international 
trade. 87 The network developed as a result was then put to use as a mobilizing force that 
would have disastrous effects on the negotiating atmosphere in Seattle. 
The Commission was presumably pleased at signs that the European Parliament was 
revisiting its stance on trade and labour links, evident in their January I 999 • Resolution 
on the Commission communication on the trading system and internationally 
recognised labour standards' from 1996 in which they asked the Commission to 
"ensure genuine cooperation" between WTO and ILO. 88 This was unlikely to 
demonstrate Parliament's lack of commitment to the issue of trade-labour; rather it was 
another example of a fragmented internal consensus because Austria and the UK had 
yet to ratify an ILO Convention on abolishing child labour and forced child labour. As 
Parliament rightly assumed, it would be practically impossible for the Commission to 
insist that all WTO members signed the ILO Conventions when one of the GS members 
had not. Parliament expanded upon this view in a later resolution where it asked the 
Commission to get commitments from the developing countries (that they would adhere 
to ILO core standards), which seemed more likely, even if scarcely possible, to be 
initiative was required to push forward ... an international agreement" from Drabek, Z (1999)- 'A 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Convincing the Sceptics' WTO Staff Working Paper ERAD-98-
05~ June 1998 at http://www.wto.org/english!res e/reser e/ae9805 e.htm accessed 23rd July 2006. 
Furthermore, because "the vast bulk ofFDI originates within OECD countries and is destined for other 
markets within the OECD area" (Witherell, 1997: 38-43) the OECD was considered the appropriate 
forum. 
85 One example is the WWF European Policy Office press release of 8"' May reproduced at 
http://www.cb3rob.net/-merijn89/nieuws/99~5-l3.htrnl. accessed 26th July 2006. A paper setting out these views 
can be found in a House of Commons Research Paper 98/31 from 4th March 1998 entitled 'Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment' written by M Hillyard of the Economic Policy and Statistics Section of the 
House of Commons library found at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/researchtm98/m98-03l.pdf. accessed 
26th July 2006. A number of intervewees speculated about this but were generally unsure whether the 
relationship was quite as direct as Johnson and Laxer suggested (interviewees I, 7, 8, 9 & 10) 
86 From C Denny the Guardian of October 20"' 1997, page 19, 'Fears of global 'race to bottom" 
87 M Byers Lcndon Review of Books Vol22:6, 6"' January 2000 'Woken up in Seattle' at 
http://www.lrb co.uk!v22/n0!/hye>Dl .html accessed 26th July 2006 
88 From EC Bulletin January and February 1999 at http:iieuropa.eu.intiabcidoc/offibullien!9901/pl04024.htm The 
document was circulated as A4-0423/1998) 
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accepted by the membership, and this fitted in with the Commission's own perspective 
to a much greater extent. 89 
However, the Chairs of the developing country group in the UN, the G77, meeting that 
year, made it clear that the developing countries had not budged from their previous 
position, as articulated at both the Singapore and Geneva Ministerials, of keeping a 
tight boundary on the range of items to be discussed and, primarily, to keep WTO away 
from making policies on trade/labour and trade/environment.90 This is evidence of the 
mobilisation of the developing countries against efforts seen as contrary to their best 
interests suggesting that the Commission would have to establish suitable trade offs in 
order to extend the WTO' s agenda. 
Arguably the most critical event of 1999 was the resignation of the entire Commission 
on 15th March.91 Although Brittan was not accused of any wrongdoing within the 
Report, J acques Santer announced at a press conference that all twenty Commissioners 
would resign in a spirit of collegiality.92 It was suggested that the Commissioners "had 
decided to jump before they were pushed" because of the European Parliament's threat 
of a vote of censure.93 TIJis resignation could perhaps have heralded a shift in the power 
relationships in the European infrastructure with Parliament assuming more 
89 Resolution on 'Multilateral commercial relations: the European Union and the developing partner 
countries of the European Union' on the 4th May at EU Bulletin 5- 1999 at 
http://europa.eu.inVabc/dociof£'bull/enl9905/pl 03027.hnn accessed 26th July 2006 
90 The Final Communique of the G77 Chainnen/Coordinators meeting in Geneva on 6-7 April 1999 (full 
text at http://www.unesco.org/g77/documents/fma1-coomun-geneva99.htm1 accessed 26th July 2006 
91This followed the First Report by the Committee of Independent Experts on allegations of fraud, 
mismanagement and nepotism in the European Commission The paper itself has been reproduced in the 
University of Pittsburgh's wonderful archive system at hl\P://aei.pitt.edu/4579/01/003947 l.pdfaccessed on 26th 
July 2006. 
92 V Miller and R Ware, House of Commons Research Paper 99/32 of 16th March 1999 'The Resignation 
of the European Commission~ at httn://www.parliament.uk/commom1lib/research/m99/m99--032.pdfaccessed 26th 
July 2006. It was clear from the beginning of Santer's tenure that he was not popular in the European 
Parliament. J Palmer the Guardian of22"d July 1994 page 24, 'Slim majority puts Santer on probation' 
reported that "Yesterday, Mr Santer ... sat impassively as one European Parliament leader after another 
described him as 'a man without political profile or charisma' and 'frankly not good enough for the job'. 
The British Leader of the Socialist Group, Pauline Green, criticised John Major (the UK Prime Minister) 
for vetoing the candidature of the Belgian Jean-Luc Dehaene in favour of Santer "despite their identical 
views on Europe"- she is quoted in Palmer's article as remarking uThe veto is meant to be used in case 
of a vital national interest. In God's name can anyone tell me what is Britain's vital interest in rejecting 
Mr Dehaene and accepting Mr Santer?" 
93 B Cassen , Le Monde Diplomatique April 1999 'Musical Chairs in Brussels' at 
http://mondediplo.com/l999/04/03cassen accessed 15th August 2006. Not supported by interviewees 1, 5, 6 & 7 
who thought that the Parliament would not have exercised this. 
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importance. 94 As it was, Parliament seemed to play down this aspect in their Resolution 
on the resignation by saying only that the collective resignation was "necessary and 
proportionate to the nature and scale of the criticism" yet they did not set a definitive 
timetable for the Commission's replacement.95 The resignation was discussed in GAC 
and by the Presidency, which confirmed that it would ask Romano Prodi to replace 
Jacques Santer as President of the next Comrnission.96 The rationale was that a new 
Commission would be in place from July onwards- and would hold a full five-year 
term from January 2000.97 Whether this would make any difference to the 
Commission's exercise of its roles and responsibilities will be shown later. Pending the 
new Commission, the existing Commission continued to work in a caretaker capacity. 
The resignation did not appear to have dented Brittan 's enthusiasm for a new Round. At 
the end of March, and in early April, he was travelling to encourage governments to 
support a Millennium Round. Perhaps continuing to be concerned with the breadth of 
the agenda, presciently, both Pakistan and India warned of possible conflict in Seattle, 
particularly between the developed and developing countries.98 
In spite of the WTO General Council's wishes that the leadership battle would be 
completed in the previous year, it was still ongoing in May 1999.99 There were now two 
main candidates; Mike Moore of Australia and Supachai Panitchpakdi of Thailand. It 
might have been expected that the Commission could have encouraged a supportive 
coalition in favour of one oftl1em. However, Moore appeared to have support from the 
US along with Germany, Italy and France while Supachai was supported by Japan and 
94 A Stem, Variety Magazine March 17"' 1999 'EU Panelists Quit' at 
http://print.google.com/print/doc?articleid==gxvuA48es2L accessed l31h March 2003 
95 See Parliament's Resolution on the resignation of the Commission and the appointment of a new 
Commission in the EU Bulletin 3-1999 at http://europa.eu.ilJUabc!doc!oWbulVenl99031p203001.htm accessed 25th 
July 2006 
96 GAC meeting held on 21" and 22"• March, Minutes reproduced at 
http://ue.eu.intlueDocs/cms Data!docslpressData/enloena/06776.EN9.htm accessed 26th July 2006. Presidency 
comments from EU Bulletin 3-1999 at http:l/europa.eu.int!ahcldoclofflhull/en/99031i1039.htm accessed 26th July 
2006 
97 Rather than being caretakers for six months after which another selection process would have to be put 
in train. Interviewee 6 commented that it was "much easier" for Council this way i.e. not having to select 
two groups of people. 
98 
'New trade agreement with EC in May: Leon' Dawn Wire Service of 10"' Aprill999 (at 
http://www.lib.virginia.edularea-studies/SouthAsiaiSAserials/Dawnll999/l 0Anr99 .html#newt accessed 26th July 2006 also 
'India and the WTO' A monthly newsletter of the Ministry of Commerce Voll No 4 April1999 at also 
http://commerce.nic.in!wto-apr.pdf accessed on 26th July 2006 
99 Even the Quad expressed concern at their meeting May 11"' and 12"' in Tokyo. Chair's statement (at 
https://tspace.librazy.utoronto.ca/retrieve/1068/quad33.html. accessed 27th July 2006. See also EU Bulletin 5-1999 at 
http:lleuropa.eu.int!abcldoclofflhulllen/9905/p!03099.htm accessed 27th July 2006. 
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the UK. 100 A European consensus on one candidate was still not visible and the 
situation was not resolved until June where "informal talks" in the margins of the APEC 
meeting at the end of June bore fruit. 101 The Commission suggested that it might 
support an Australian proposal to split the term of office between the two and it was 
duly agreed- the Europeans failing to speak with a single voice and agree on a single 
candidate. (Holland, 2002: 71 ). 102 The new WTO Director General was finally 
confirmed on July 20th ("twenty months late"). 103 Although a split term was not 
optimal, and would in no way set a precedent, because the Seattle Ministerial was (by 
then) looming on the horizon, it was thought that this was the best way forward. 104 
Perhaps these developments should not have been so surprising; the previous leadership 
contest saw the USA's candidate passed over and problems were only "resolved by a 
last-minute compromise which made Korean Kim Chul Su the deputy of Italy's Renato 
Ruggiero". 105 
The Commission's preparations for Seattle went on apace and they set their opinions 
down on paper for circulation to the other members. The 281h May 1999 saw seven 
documents from the Commission being submitted to the WTO General Council. The 
first, on the 'EC Approach to Services' set out the priorities for the OATS 2000 
negotiations. 106 This was followed by the 'EC Approach to Trade Facilitation', which 
asked the WTO to "simplify, harmonize and automate (import and export) procedures, 
reduce documentation, and increase transparency" for both SMEs "and developing 
countries, for who costs of compliance with procedures are proportionately higher and 
10° From A Friedman the International Herald Tribune of Friday May 14th 1999, page 5 'Deadlock on 
Chief Stymies Trade Body: WTO Fight Raises Risk ofFurther Trade Wars' at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/1999/05/14/wto.2.t 7.php accessed 25th March 2008. 
101 G Robinson, the Financial Times of June 30th page 4, 'Ministers back new trade round' 
102 Jawara and Kwa (2003: 188-189) opine that this solution was not decided in the WTO but between US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the Thai Foreign Minister which had the effect of"delay (ing) 
Supachai's term of office by three years; to shorten it by one year (and) to install Moore, a long time US 
ally ... as DG" (pl91). Split term of office from C Denny the Guardian ofJune 30th page 23, 'WTO job 
rivals offered a trade'. Agreement reported in ICTSD Bridges Trade News Digest Vol6:30 13th 
September 2002 'WTO Welcomes New Team at the Helm' at httn://www.ictsd.org/weeklv/0'>-09~13/storv3.htm 
accessed 26th July 2006. 
103 According to M Amold, the Financial Times of November 27'h 1999 'Timeline: World Trade 
Organisation', at httn://specials.ft.com/ln/sneclals/sp3d7e.htm accessed 12th May 2003. 
104 PRESS/131, 22"' July 1999 'WTO member governments agree on Director General succession' at 
http://www.wto.org/englishlnews e/pres99 e/nrl31 e.htm accessed 27th July 2006. 
105 Asiaweek editorial 'Put it to a vote- that's what the WTO should do if it cannot agree on a leader' 
16th July edition at htm://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek!99/0716/ed2.html accessed 27th July 2006. F Williams the 
Financial Times of 27th January 1995, page 8 'US-EU talks to focus on WTO', says that the US' 
preferred candidate, Car! os Salinas de Gortari (ex· President of Mexico) was not considered for the job. 
106 WT/GC/W/189 
106 
deter exports". 107 The 'EC Approach to Trade and Competition' encouraged setting up 
"negotiations on a basic framework of binding principles and rules on competition Jaw 
and policy". 108 This was followed by the 'EC Approach to Government Procurement', 
which said that because of the volume and value of Government purchasing, 
transparency should be assured so trade wasn't distorted.109 In the 'EC Approach to 
trade related aspects of intellectual property in the New Round' the Commission 
identified a number of areas coming under TRIPS which needed to be addressed 
including those where there had been: "(a) Jack of consensus at the end of the Uruguay 
Round ... new developments on intellectual property ... and ... the area of geographical 
indications".no The 'EC Approach to Trade and Environment in the New WTO Round', 
emphasized the importance of sustainable development being a central theme in the 
Millennium Round, noting that the Commission was looking at this internally in order 
to inform its own position and as a starting point for dialogue with civil society. 111 
Finally, the 'EC Approach to Duty-Free Market Access for the WCs' once again 
suggested that the best way to help the developing countries would be to allow "duty-
free market access no later than the end of the new round of negotiations for essentially 
all products" exported by them. 112 These papers may have been submitted in part for a 
meeting of thirty countries in the 'Friends of the Round' in Geneva where potential 
agenda items for Seattle were identified. These included; "industrial tariffs, electronic 
commerce ... further liberalization of information technology products ... trade in 
agriculture and services .. .investment and competition policy". 113 Once again, this list 
constituted an extremely ambitious range of policy initiatives. 
Council discussed preparations for the Seattle Ministerial on 21 ''June and supported the 
Commission's aim of a new Round being launched in order to "strengthen(ing) the 
multilateral trading system, manag( e) international monetary problems more 
effectively, improv(e) economic growth and employment and involv(e) developing 
countries". It also reiterated the importance it attached to the Round being a single 
107 WT/GC/W/190 
108 WT/GC/W/191 
109 WT/GC/W/192 
110 WT/GC/W/193 
t1 1 WT/GC/W/194 
m WT /GC/W 119 5 
113 K Eddy the Financial Times May 29'\ page 3, 'Issues for global trade talks become clearer' 
107 
undertaking. 114 Perhaps, by failing to mention it, Council took heed to what happened 
in Geneva and had decided to drop an overt reference to trade-labour standards for 
Seattle. The Commission, meanwhile, submitted another document to the WTO General 
Council entitled 'EC Approach to possible decisions at Seattle' .115 This set out the 
primary objective for the Commission, as well as Council, which was to "launch ... the 
millennium round" with the aim of making sure that everything possible was done to 
achieve this aim. The Commission again set out its proposals for increased access for 
products from less-developed countries to developed country markets, it sought the 
resolution of a number of issues concerning transparency, coherence, a general review 
of the DSU and work on electronic commerce. 116 
Further to this, and very much in advance of itself, on gth July, the Commission set out 
categorically what it wanted from a Millennium Round in a single document called 
'The EU Approach to the Millennium Round: Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament' (COM(1999)331 ). 117 This also set out positions for areas that 
Ruling 1194 had made clear were subject to shared competence. The Commission felt 
that the WTO should: reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers; further free up services 
trade; continue to progressively incorporate agriculture; develop rules on 
trade/investment, trade/competition, trade/enviromnent and trade facilitation; take 
measures to enable a "further strengthening of the WTO system" including greater 
transparency and consider SDT measures for developing countries alongside duty free 
access to markets and "health and social concerns".118 Leon Brittan was quoted as 
saying that the Commission wanted to "tak( e) special account of the interests in the 
developing countries. There can be no justification for developed countries maintaining 
high tariff peaks in sectors such as textiles. This has gone on too long and must be a 
major target in the New Round".119 "Social concerns" could be interpreted as a proxy 
114 in EU Bulletin 6-99 at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/offlbull/en/9906/pl03021.htm accessed 27th July 2006 
115 On 5th July 1999 circulated to the General Council on 6th July as WT/GC!W/232 
116 including the "derestriction of documents and consultation with civil society", increased openness of 
the DSU procedures and increased transparency in government procurement 
117 From EU Bulletin 7/8- 1999 at httpo//europa.eulbul\etinlenl9907/p104030.htm accessed 15th January 2008 
118 Possibly another way of handling trade-labour? 
119 It is interesting to note this change of heart, considering that the EC had deliberately delayed full 
implementation of the MFA (see G de Jonquieres the Financial Times of 17'h September 1994, page 2 
'EU to move slowly over fibres accord' with "the Commission ... proposing ... to carry out this 
commitment [to dismantle the MFA] in a way which would leave the range of products covered by MFA 
quotas virtually unchanged unti11998". The World Development Movement "estimate( d) (this) would 
result in the EU lifting restrictions on only 0.1% of products on which it imposes quotas" which was said 
108 
for trade-labour issues without saying it specifically. It is also of note that this proposal 
in many ways reflects the desires of the European Parliament with its insistence on 
liberalizing trade in goods with specific interest for the developing countries (textiles 
and agriculture) suggesting that the Parliament view was being taken on board by the 
Commission even if it had no formal role in the process. 120 
On the same day, the EC submitted a document to the WTO General Council on the 
'EC Approach to Trade and Investment' in which the aim was "to establish a 
multilateral framework of rules governing international investment, with the objective 
of securing a stable and predictable climate for foreign direct investment world-
wide".121 A further document to General Council was sent on 21" July on the 'EC 
Approach to the TBT Agreement' asking that the Round "provide an opportunity to 
promote regulatory cooperation ... (including) encouraging manufacturers to use 
international standards as a means to demonstrate compliance with requirements". 122 
This was followed by the 'EC Approach on Agriculture' on 23rd July putting forward 
the importance to the EC of the 'multifunctionality' of agriculture along with food 
safety and animal welfare. 123 This latter document would do nothing to quell the voices 
against European policy on agricultural support, as had been the case in the Uruguay 
Round. First it was Canada seeking "the elimination of export subsidies and a sharp 
reduction in domestic farm supports" and then the Australian Trade Minister, chair of 
the Cairns Group said that "trade in agriculture must be on an equal footing with other 
sectors" wanting the new Round to "deliver substantial cuts in government support and 
protection". 124 
to be '"a travesty' ofthe agreement to phase out the MFA". The article continued that this 'go slow' was 
inspired by a wish to encourage developing countries to open up their markets. The EC was not alone in 
this methodology- according to an uncredited piece in the Financial Times of28"' October (page 7, 
'Textile exporters hit at pace of reform') the US, the EC and Canada had "hardly liberalised any 
significant MF A restriction on any developing country" according to the International Textile and 
Clothing Bureau (a group of 21 developing country textile exporters). 
120 see also G de Jonquieres the Financial Times of9"' July, page 4, 'EU sets out its stall for the new trade 
round' where he says that France, Belgium and the US wanted discussion on labour standards but, rather 
than that, the paper proposed "a loose five point plan involving cooperation with the ILO". 
121 Circulated to the General Council on 9"' July as WT/GC/W/245 
122 Circulated to General Council on 27"' July as WT/GC/W/274. This makes it sound very like a 
multilateral version of the CE Mark. 
123 Circulated to General Council on 27"' July 1999 as WT/GC/W/273 
124 Canada's position from E Alden the Financial Times of20"' August 1999 p4, 'Canada outlines 
position ahead ofWTO talks'. Cairns Group quote from a Reuters report in the Financial Times 26"' 
August, page 4 'Boost for campaign to reform farm trade'. Interviewee 3 commented that this was still 
the aim for the Cairns Group. 
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The 'EC Approach to Capacity Building and Coherence in Global Economic Policy 
Making' was sent five days later proposing "a WTO work programme on coherence ... be 
developed and introduced by the Seattle Ministerial Declaration" and that the "relevant 
international organisations" should also participate. 125 Such capacity building would 
"ensure that when an agreement is being concluded in the WTO it is accompanied by a 
framework to be put in place to support the implementation in light of country specific 
requirements", which may have been an acknowledgement that this was why the 
developing countries had problems keeping to their Urugnay Round commitments. On 
9th Augnst a further paper was submitted to the General Council of the WTO proposing 
issues for consideration in a future 'WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce' 
for inclusion in the Seattle agenda.126 This set out some general trade principles, 
seemingly building on what had been proposed in Geneva and acknowledged the 
importance of technical assistance for the developing countries. 
Nevertheless, in the 'wish lists' for the new Round, of which all these EC papers 
formed a part, there was "little consensus on what should be included, even among the 
leading trading nations" and, more worryingly for the Commission, the US remained 
"lukewarm" about a broad-based Round. 127 In the meantime, September saw 
widespread demonstrations against the Millennium Round involving "more than I 000 
NGOs from 77 countries" suggesting that the meeting at Seattle might also be affected 
by public demonstrations. 128 Meanwhile, business leaders had a letter published in the 
Financial Times noting that a Round was essential for the global economy and that it 
should concentrate on agricultural liberalization, opening services markets and foreign 
investment rules. The idea of agricultural liberalisation would never be popular with the 
Commission because of the fragmented internal consensus but services and investment 
were very similar to what the Commission wanted. 129 
125 circulated to the General Council on 5th August as WT/GCIW/297 
126 circulated as WT/GCIW/306 
127 in the Financial Times of July 30th page 6, 'WTO members square up for new round of discord' 
128 From 'NGOs mobilise against WTO' ICTSD Bridges News 20 September 1999 at 
httn://www.ictsd.omlhtml/story2.20-09-99.htm accessed 29th January 2008 
129 The letter was entitled ''Seattle trade round needs ambitious objectives' On 31" August accessed at 
the ICC website at http://www.iccwbo.org/home!news archives/1999/trade letter 31 august.asp on 27th July 2006. 
It was signed by the Secretary Generals of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Business 
Advisory Council to the OECD, the Pacific Basin Economic Council and UN!CE, together with the 
Director General of the Commonwealth Business Council and the President of the Europe-American 
Business Council 
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Conclusions 
The internal Commission consensus appears to have been supportive, if not permissive 
on the Trade Commissioner over this period with joint working evident between Trade 
and Social Affairs and Trade and Environment on various policy initiatives. In spite of 
the 1/94 Ruling, the Commission was still able to pursue its own preferences in terms of 
achieving an agreement in the WTO for a Millennium Round, even though Council did 
not mention this in their Ministerial Statements. The Commission also dropped trade-
labour from its agenda once it became clear (at Singapore) that it would be difficult to 
make further progress; even though Santer mentioned this at Geneva, it was not pursued 
again. Council, meanwhile, was still talking about labour standards in Geneva, albeit in 
a rather oblique way, but did not seem to put pressure on the Commission to push it 
more strongly. The Council was thus supportive of the Commission at this time. 
Following the resignation of the Commission, it is possible that more evidence might be 
forthcoming (in future Chapters) of an increased role for the European Parliament in 
external trade negotiations. It has been shown that Parliament's views, particularly on 
textiles and agriculture, were incorporated into COM(1999)331 indicating that their 
informal role in this area was more important than their formal role. Whether their 
preferences can also be tracked through the sectoral negotiations will be shown in the 
following Chapter. 
There has been evidence presented here of increasing politicization. The developing 
countries felt that their concerns were not adequately taken on board at Singapore (as 
shown by the differences between the tables of preferences and the Final Declaration) 
and the ceremonial aspects of the Geneva Ministerial meant that they were scarcely 
taken on board there either. In terms of the external consensus, fragmentation (Quad 
becoming fragmented, thus more constraining, developing countries constraining) 
restricted the amount of progress that could be made in widening and deepening the 
WTO's agenda and remit. Whether this would be the case, too, with the sectoral 
negotiations will be shown in the next Chapter. It is possible that this will also be 
shown to have had further ramifications on what progress could be expected from the 
Seattle Ministerial, which will be covered in Chapter Six. Lack of progress in Seattle 
might be expected, not just because of the developing countries, but also because of 
Ill 
concerns about the MAl, NGOs becoming more mobilized in support of developing 
countries and because of the insubstantial mandate developed at Geneva. 
The next Chapter focuses on the sectoral negotiations in Leon Brittan's tenure to see 
how the Commission exercised its roles and responsibilities within those more technical 
forums. The aims and objectives of each will be shown to be much more specialized yet 
forward progress, as in the Ministerial process, demands consensus. The Chapter will 
track through the level of politicization to see if that affected the Commission's ability 
to satisfy its interests. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Case Studies in the Trade Negotiations Framework: 
From Marrakech to Seattle 
Introduction 
This Chapter looks at case studies over Leon Brittan's tenure to see how the 
Commission exercised its roles and responsibilities in the sectoral, perhaps more 
techoocratic, areas outside of the more formal Ministerial process. Although the aims 
and objectives of each negotiation will be more specialized, it remains critical that a 
supportive consensus is achieved so negotiations can be concluded. Given that their 
nature is more techoical, we might expect that these negotiations would be less 
politicized than the Ministerials allowing, perhaps, more techoocratic leadership on the 
part of the Commission. 
Because of the sheer number of issues that the Commission was taking forward to the 
Singapore Ministerial, it is not possible to look at the negotiations for all areas in the 
necessary depth. Therefore, this Chapter will focus specifically on three case studies: 
the Information Techoology Agreement (ITA), the Basic Telecommunications Services 
Agreement (BTA) and the Financial Services Agreement (FSA). Leon Brittan 
apparently referred to these three initiatives as 'the Trinity' because, in his opinion, they 
were the most important policies that he and his Directorate advanced in the WTO 
during his tenure. 1 These case studies will show the methodology and practice used by 
Brittan to pursue agreement and highlight the ways in which the Commission view 
intersected or diverged with the internal or external interests in these sectoral 
negotiations. 
1 It is worthwhile reiterating here that these were not the only negotiations taking place in the WTO at the 
time- just that these issues were the ones chosen by Leon Brittan as representing his tenure particularly 
well. It is, of course, debatable whether the outcomes generated from this chapter would be the same 
using the other negotiations. This is doubtless an area offering further research opportunities. 
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Conclusions will be drawn in Chapter Five and then this period will be contrasted with 
Lamy's tenure as Trade Conunissioner in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight before overall 
conclusions are written in Chapter Nine. 
Figure 4.1 below sets out when each negotiation started, what each was to do and when 
discussions ended in order to provide an overview of these Agreements at the outset. 
Table 4.1 Brief Overview of the Case Studies 
NAME BEGAN MAIN TOPIC LAST MEETING 
lnfonnation Teclmology In parallel with the To "completely eliminate 26m March 1997 
Agreement Uruguay Round.2 duties on IT products 
covered by the 
~eement".3 
Basic Telecommunications (part of the 'built in The "progressive 15m February 1997 
Services Agreement agenda' after the liberalization of trade in 
Uruguay Round) telecommunications 
transport networks and 
services"5 
Financial Services Agreement (part of the 'built in To give governments 30"' December 1997 
agenda' after the ''wide latitude to take 
Uruguay Round) prudential measures, such 
as those for the protection 
of investors, depositors 
and insurance policy 
holders, and to ensure the 
integrity and stability of 
the financial system". 6 
2 The ITA was not part of the 'built in agenda' (see the WTO page on 'Understanding the WTO: The 
Uruguay Round' at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact5 e.htm accessed 12th April2008), but 
appears to have been treated as such in terms of not being subject to the Single Undertaking. 
3 From the WTO's page on 'Information Technology Agreement' at 
http://www.wto.orglenulish/tratop e!inftec eiinftec e.htm accessed 12th April2008. 
4 However, !TA-Il discussions are ongoing 
5 From the WTO's page on Uruguay Round decision on negotiations on Basic Telecommunications' at 
http://www.wto.org/eno-Iishltratop e/serv e/telecom e!te122 e.htm accessed 12th Apri12008. 
6 From the WTO's page on the Financial Services Agreement at http://www.wto.org/englishltratop e/serv eflO· 
anfin e.htm accessed 12th Apri\2008 
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The Information Technology Agreement (ITA) 
It has been suggested that the ITA began in the US's private sector and that support was 
later given by both European and third country industry in late 1994.7 However, it is 
probably more accurate to suggest that both the US and EC were driving this 
simultaneously (Raboy, 2004: 227). The European Council had started to think about 
information technology and the information society as early as their Brussels meeting of 
December 1993 wherein they asked the Commission to prepare a document for 
discussion the foJiowing year, at the Council meeting in Corfu.8 On the basis of this 
report, the Council asked the Commission "to establish ... a programme covering the 
remaining measures needed at Community level".9 This prompted the Commission to 
issue COM(94)347 on 'Europe's Way to the Information Society- An Action Plan' on 
19th July 1994.10 Although this document did not suggest that the WTO would be the 
ultimate destination for discussions and agreement in the IT field, it did advocate 
involving the Quad. The Commission had already set up a dialogue on information 
technology with the USA, perhaps for this purpose.11 
In order to gamer wider support so a supportive coalition might be achieved, the 
Commission set up a meeting of the G7 in February 1995, in Brussels (Cogbum, 2003: 
139). This G7 Information Society Conference was an historic event as it was (and still 
is) "the first, and only, G7 meeting officiaJiy hosted by the European Commission". 12 
The Commission had now realised the importance of seeking global coverage of any 
agreement, specifically through multilateral forums, which is highlighted by their 
introductory 'Theme Paper' of January 1995, where they noted the need for the 
involvement of the WTO as well as national governments in setting such rules. 13 Many 
7 Quote fromB Fliess and P Sauve ,'Of Chips, Floppy Disks and Great Timing' Paper produced for the 
Institut Francais des Relations Internationales and the Tokyo Club Foundation for Global Studies Final 
Revision 1997 at btm:J/www.tcf.or.jp/data/19971011 Barbara Fliess ~ Pierre Sauve.pdf accessed 15th July 2004 page 
29 
8 Reproduced from the Bulletin of the European Communities 12/1993 sourced at 
http:llaei.pitt.edu/1425101/Brusscls dec 1993 pdf accessed 25th July 2006 
9 Found at, www.europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc!hackg/bangeman.html accessed on 15th January 2004. See also E 
Tucker the Financial Times of 2nd June 1994 page 2, 'Lines open up to Europe's information society' and 
N Bannister the Guardian of21" June 1994, page 14 "EU members 'must hasten telecom revolution"'. 
10 Accessed at www.europa.eu.int/ISPO/docs!htmlgenerated!i C0M(94l347final.html on 15th January 2004 
11 According to G Tett the Financial Times of6"' April 1994 page 6, 'Information technology on EU-US 
agenda" 
12 From www.europa.eu.int/comrnlextemal relations/g7 g8/intro/ accessed 15th January 2004 
13 Sourced at www.europa.eu.intffSPO/docs/intcoop/g8/is conf 95 theme paper.pdfaccessed 15th January 2004 
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senior personnel from multinational companies also gave speeches at the G7 meeting; 
this may reflect the importance placed on these early IT initiatives by industry and the 
amount oflobbying they were prepared to do in order to achieve a positive result. 14 The 
G7 set down core principles for an information society and made anumber of important 
recommendations, including a statement that customs duties should be abolished on 
those items deemed critical to the formation of a Global Information Infrastructure. 15 
This would become an important aspect of the IT Agreement. 
Positive results from the G7 Conference may have led the Commission to believe that 
they would be able to achieve similarly unequivocal support from the Quad. Instead, 
the Chair's statement from their May meeting seems to prefer Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) as a tool, much less ambitious than a multilateral agreement, 
suggesting that the Commission still had some way to go to establish a supportive 
coalition in that forum. 16 Another weapon the Commission had in its arsenal, to secure 
agreement with the US, was the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the inaugural 
meeting of which took place at the end of 1995 and was attended by "CEOs from more 
than 100 American and EU companies".17 Brittan jointly led the delegation with Martin 
Bangemarm, the Industry Commissioner, and the US Commerce Secretary. The overall 
conclusions of Working Group II were: 
"Both Govermnents (sic) should make a commitment to conclude negotiations of the 
ITA by December 1996 ... It is the view of the overwhelming majority that the ITA 
package should include a commitment to eliminate all tariffs by January 1" 2000 or 
sooner" _18 
14 List of speeches accessed at www.eurona.eu.int!ISPO/intcoop!g8/i g8conference.html on 17th January 2004. 
Speeches given by Robert Alien (Chairman and CEO of AT&T); Carlo De Benetti (Chairman of 
Olivetti); Peter Bonfield (Chair and CEO ofiCL); Marco Tronchetti Provera (Executive Deputy 
Chairman and Managing Director Pirelli SpA); Charles Sirois (Chairman of the Board and CEO, 
Teleglobe); lain Vallance (Chairman, BT); LR Wilson (Chairman, President and CEO, BCE !ne) and 
Haruo Y arnaguchi (Chairman, NIT) 
" From 'Of Chips, Floppy Disks and Great Timing' (page 29) Full details at footnote number 7. 
16 From the Chairman's Statement following the Quad Meeting of May 3-S 1995 in Whistler, Canada at 
www.g8.utoronto.ca/trade/quad26.html accessed 15th January 2004 
17 www.europa.eu.int1comm/entemriselenter:prise nolicylhusiness diaJogues/tahd/tabdoverw.htm accessed 15th January 
2004 
18 Report of the Working Group meeting of November I Ith and 12th in Seville, Spain sourced at 
www.tabd.com/ceo reports accessed 15th January 2004. At their next meeting of 9th November 1996. they 
said, instead, that the WTO should aim "for the complete elimination of residual customs tariffs by the 
end of the Year 2000" rather than the beginning. Information taken from the ten page Chicago 
Declaration (accessed through www.tabd comlceo reports on 6th July 2006 
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The Commission might have thought that having both the G7 and TABD onside would 
help to push the WTO Ministerial to agree the text. 19 Nevertheless, to further bilateral 
efforts, the US-EU Summit was set up a month later, culminating in the 'Joint US-EU 
Action Plan' the results of which made clear the benefits of joint leadership in order to 
achieve an IT Agreement. 20 This could be evidence to support Smith's concept of 
'bimultilateralism', whereby a bilateral agreement is used to further initiatives in the 
multilateral sphere (Smith, 2005:165). The two sides continued to discuss the issue in 
February the following year where they hoped they could make a proposal acceptable to 
the other Quad members as well as to the Asian nations.21 The only stumbling block 
was that the EC wanted to be part of an agreement on semiconductors between Japan 
and the US before it accepted the ITA. This would assume a great deal of importance 
later on in the process. 
Because of the importance of South East Asia in the IT field, it could be expected that 
the Commission would introduce this as an agenda item for the first Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM), which took place in March 1996.22 According to the background 
paper, this forum would be valuable to the Commission because of their lack of 
involvement in APEC, which meant "ties between Asia and Europe have not been 
developed to their full potentiai".Z3 It is surprising, then, that there was nothing 
specifically mentioned about an ITA in that meeting.Z4 Instead, the Commission and the 
US continued to discuss the initiative bilaterally prior to presenting it again to the Quad. 
At the same time, there appeared to be no effort made by the Commission to develop a 
common approach to this issue by the member states and France and the Southern 
19 The White House fact sheet on the TABD makes an explicit link from the TABD to "cooperation 
between the US and the EU" positions in the WTO Factsheet sourced from www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/9923.htm 
accessed 15th January 2004 
20 Meeting held on December 5th 1995 in Madrid to launch the 'New Transatlantic Agenda'. Part of this 
was a 'Joint US-EU Action Plan' (text reproduced at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edufERC/bureaus/eur/releases/951203ElJAction.html accessed 15th January 2004. The relevant part 
pertaining to the IT Agreement was under Section Ill 'Contributing to the Function of the World 
Economy' Item lg 'Market Access- Creating Additional Trading Opportunities' 
21 Report to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly entitled 'Europe and North America: Partners and 
Competitors' by Mr. Norbert WIECZOREK (Germany),General Rapporteur, Document number AN 238 
or EC (96) 11 of 20 September 1996 at http://www.naa.be/arch;vedpub/comrep/I996/an138ec.asp accessed 6th July 
2006 
22 Meeting in Bangkok on 1-2 March 1996. See the background note entitled 'ASEAN-EUROPEAN 
UNION DIALOGUE' at http://www.aseansec.orgl5612.htm accessed 6th July 2006 
23 Background information no ASEM found at htto://asem.inter.net.thlasem-infolbackground.html accessed 6th July 
2006 
24 See the 'Chainnan's Statement' of the meeting at http://asem.inter.net.th/chairman/index.html accessed 
6th July 2006 
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members expressed concern that tariffs would be reduced with no commitment on the 
part of the other WTO members to negotiate in any other areas. 25 That the Commission 
was trying to make progress in the semiconductor field might have partly satisfied the 
objectors but there could have been negative repercussions on the internal consensus. 
The April 1996 Quad meeting was a further opportunity for the US and the EC to 
convince the other members of the merits of this initiative.Z6 The Commission was later 
to comment that the ITA had been comprehensively discussed, which was to good 
effect since the Chairman's Statement from that meeting was worded more strongly 
than the previous and "reaffirmed" the importance of achieving an agreement.27 
Nevertheless, the Commission was still pressing for entry into the semiconductor 
agreement as compensation.Z8 They also seemed prepared to delay IT A negotiations 
until the issue was resolved.29 Semiconductors were brought up once again in bilateral 
meetings between the Commission and Japan at the end of April, in the second week of 
May and then at the end of May, at which point there seemed to be a slight softening of 
stance from Tokyo that it could be persuaded to acquiesce to EC demands if "the EU 
commit(ted) itself to abolishing semiconductor tariffs by the year 2000". 30 This was 
still not enough for the Commission who continued the debate at further meetings in 
June and July.31 
25 G de Jonquieres the Financial Times of 1" Aprill996 page 4 'Drive to dismantle electronics tariffs' 
26 Meeting in Kobe, Japan on 21" and 22•' April 
27 Commission comment in the EU Bulletin of April1996 at 
www.europa.int'abc/doc/offibu1Lien/9604/pl04080b.htm accessed 6th July 2006. Chairman's statement at 
www.g8.utoronto.ca/trade/quad28.html accessed 6th July 2006 
28 From E Vermulst and B Driessen (1996) 'The International Practice of the European Communities: 
Current Survey. Commercial Defence Actions and other international trade developments in the 
European Communities No. XL- 1" January 1996- 30th June 1996' in the European Journal of 
International Law Vol 7 Number 4 found at http://www.ejil.orgljourna1Nol7/No4/srl.hnnl accessed 15th July 
2006 
29 W Dawkins the Financial Times of 22•' April 1996. page 4 'EU and US clash over plan to lift IT 
barriers'. 
30 Account offrrst meeting from W Dawkins and B Clark the Financial Times of29"' Aprill999 page 4 
'Tokyo faces Brussels pressure on chips'. Account of second meeting from E Terazono the Financial 
Times of2"' May 1996 page 4 'Brittan set for Tokyo chip talks'. Account of third meeting from G de 
Jonquieres the Financial Times of 23'' May page 5, 'Japan demands end to EU semiconductor tariffs' 
31 June meeting account from G de Jonquieres and M Nakamoto, the Financial Times of 4"' June 1996, 
page 8, 'Push for chip co-operation agreement'. It was confirmed that the two sides would work together 
to seek agreement in G de Jonquieres and W Dawkins, the Financial Times of7th June 1996, page 18, 
'Chipmakers agree to co-operate on plan for global trade network'. This, however, was premature. July 
meeting report from N Buckley the Financial Times of July 9th 1996 page 4, 'Global forum on chips 
planned' 
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Another occasion for the Commission to seek support for an IT A from the countries of 
South East Asia came on 25 July when the inaugural ASEM Senior Officials Meeting 
on Trade and Development (SOMTI) was held in Brussels. This meeting was a follow-
up to ASEM (which, as was noted above, failed to mention the importance of an ITA). 
However, this SOMTI meeting also failed to bring up ITA issues (and basic telecoms 
issues), even though the WTO was one of "two key areas" to be discussed. 32 It is 
possible that the Commission was delaying discussion until the issue of compensation 
was resolved between itself, Japan and the US. 
Prior to the Quad meeting in September 1996, Brittan made a concession that "he (was) 
no longer demanding immediate ... membership of the (semiconductor) council (and 
was) offering to let the IT negotiations go forward" as long as there were no meetings 
of the council that might jeopardize European interests.33 Brittan's move may have been 
an acknowledgement that he could not use the IT A as leverage to enter the 
semiconductor agreement.34 However, as the US seemed to want to make more 
headway in the negotiations, the EC had a further opportunity to seek concessions. 35 As 
this would be the last Quad meeting before the WTO Ministerial, the conclusions 
needed to strongly endorse the IT Agreement, which meant it was imperative that a 
bilateral deal between the US and EC was reached beforehand. 
The outcome was that the EC eventually agreed to abolish semiconductor tariffs and the 
US agreed not to hold meetings of the Semiconductor Council until the implementation 
of the ITA took place.36 Nevertheless, the US was concerned, firstly, that the EC might 
seek further concessions at a later stage and, secondly, because it wanted to keep 
"capacitors and television tubes" out of the Agreement even though the EC wanted 
them in.37 The Commission said that the Quad meeting got off to an auspicious start 
32 See the eo-Chairmen's Summary of the meeting of 25th July 1996 at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/asem/min other meeting/sornti l.htm accessed 6th July 2006 
33 The Quad meeting took place on 27-28 September 1996 in Seattle, Washington. Brittan's agreement 
that an ITA could go forward from G de Jonquieres and N Dunne the Financial Times of 25th September, 
page 7, 'EU acts to unblock deal on IT' 
34 G de Jonquieres and N Dunne the Financial Times of 26th September page 5, 'Communication gap in 
IT talks' 
35 G de Jonquieres the Financial Times of 27th September page 5, 'EU condemns ultimatum on IT' 
36 A Counsel!, the Financial Times of 30"' September, page 5 'US and EU to eliminate tariffs on IT' 
37 N Dunne, the Financial Times of IIth November, page 6, 'US, EU closer on telecoms and IT accord' 
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because of this bilateral agreement. 38 The Chairperson's Summary says that the Quad 
would now be "determined to provid(e) leadership ... to complete the ITA ... by the 
Singapore Conference" suggesting a significant ratcheting up of the Quad's ambitions 
for the IT A following the Commission's lead. 39 Facilitating this was confirmation of the 
Commission's acceptance into the Semiconductor Agreement. Appended to the 
Chairperson's Summary is an 'Understanding on Semiconductors and ITA between the 
European Commission, Japan and the United States'. This states that, following an ITA; 
"EU industry will become a permanent member of the Semiconductor Council and the 
EU and its industry will have the right to participate in all industry and government-to-
government activities". Therefore, the Commission would become a member of the 
Semiconductor Council but it would have to ensure the successful completion of the 
ITA first. 
In order to be meaningful, the IT A would have to include a high percentage of those 
countries with an export trade in information technology as signatories. To assist in this 
regard, the Commission recommended a Council Decision on 27'h October, which 
would allow the Commission to negotiate with third countries on removing excise 
duties in IT.40 This proposal was approved by Council, which agreed, at the same time, 
that a revised telecoms offer could be put forward to the WT0.41 Council acquiescence 
would be an opportunity for the Commission to rally more support, through conducting 
bilateral meetings, with a possibility of using the 'carrot' of an improved telecoms offer 
to achieve a supportive coalition on the ITA. However, at the Singapore Ministerial, 
the Malaysian delegation, which was particularly important to the debate, made it clear 
that they had not come to the Singapore Ministerial "to negotiate the ITA".42 It was not 
just the external coalition that was proving elusive; although a draft ITA had been 
developed, it did not receive unanimous support from the EC member states: the French 
Trade Minister (for one), not mincing words, concluded that reaching a deal on the ITA 
38 From the report of the Quad meeting in EU Bulletin September 1996 at 
http://europa:eu.int/ahc/doc/offlbull/en/9609/pl0405l.htm) accessed on 6th July 2006. However, this statement from 
the Commission was not exactly true, as will be shown later. 
39 Sourced at https://tspace.libraN.utoronto.calretrieve/1072/quad28.htm1 accessed 6th July 2006 
40 Text at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/9610/pl03117.htm accessed 6th July 2006 
41 Text at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off:rbulllen/9610/pl04017.htm accessed 6th July 2006 
42 A. Reyes Asia week December 20th 'Rich Versus Nearly Rich. Small nations try to hold their own in 
Singapore' at www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/1220/biz4.html accessed 6th July 2006 
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in Singapore would be "impossible".43 It is likely that because of threats to the internal 
consensus, the Commission now sought a wider deal. 44 This meant, once again, a 
bilateral agreement had to be reached before further discussions could take place. 45 
Progress on the ITA was far from smooth; the European Council refused to accept it 
and coverage issues remained difficult to resolve due to ongoing EC-US disagreements. 
46 The Commission had managed to gain further concessions insofar as the US agreed 
to reduce tariffs on a number of products such as alcoholic beverages (including 
cognac) and this may have ultimately helped to secure French agreement because of the 
positive effect on their exports. 47 Brittan had also managed to persuade the US to 
include some of the previously excluded products in the draft text and, in other cases, 
the US agreed to reduce tariffs on products that they didn't want included in the ITA, in 
exchange for the EC accepting tariff cuts on "recorded music on CD-ROMs".48 Perhaps 
Barshefsky was right when she complained that the EC was "schizophrenic ... How can 
you say you're for the ITA, that you want to take a leadership role, that you want broad 
product coverage, and then say, but gee, on software, most of it really shouldn't be 
covered".49 
43
' A Friedman ,the International Herald Tribune of 9th December 'WTO Entry for Beijing Is Priority : EU 
Pushes for Talks On China Trade Status' at http://www.iht.com~HT/ECONI961af120996.html accessed 6th July 
2006 
44 G De Jonquieres. L Kynge and F Williams the Financial Times of 9th December, page 24 'Doubt over 
IT trade pact as EU calls for a wider deal' 
45 J Kristiansen, the Moscow Times of 15th December 1996 'Technology Agreement Lifts WTO' at 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/1996/12/15/048.html accessed 6th September 2006. Meeting account by the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development in 'Sustainable Developments Vol3 No 3 lOth 
December 1996 'WTO Ministerial Conference Highlights' at http://www.iisd.calwtolsdvol3no3.htm accessed 6th 
July 2006, also at http://www.ictsd.org/ministeriallsingapore/storyl0-12-96.htm accessed 25th March 2008 
46 European Council refusal from the CNN World News I Oth December 'European Council rejects 
computer tariffs pact' at lJttp:llwww.cnn.com/WORLD/9612110/briefsltmde.html accessed 6th July 2006. EU and 
US disagreements from A Friedman, the International Herald Tribune 'EU Takes Step Back on High 
Tech Pact' (at http://www iht.comi!HTIECON/961afl21196.html accessed 6th July 2006 
47 L Elliott the Guardian of 13th December page 21, 'Americans use whisky to lure EU into ending trade 
tariffs'. Also I King, the Guardian of 13th December page 21 'Scotch makers distil the news with caution' 
quotes spokesman for Guinness (owners of Bells, Johnny Walker's and Dewars [Scotch] whisky), saying 
that "the deal was only of 'symbolic benefit' although he hoped it would encourage other countries, 
particularly Chile and Japan, to increase the pace of tariff reform". Information on exports from H 
Cooper and B Bahree, the Wall Street Journal of 13th December pA2 'Nations Agree to Drop Computer 
Tariffs. Some High TechFirms See Pact as a Boost for Trade in Markets World Wide'also see the 
ICTSD report 'WTO Ministerial Conference Highlights. !I December 1996' at 
http://www.ictsd.org/ministetiallsingapore/stmyll-12-96.htm. Accessed 6th July 2006 
·
48 G De Jonquieres and F Williams, the Financial Times of 11'' December page 4, 'Information 
technology deal is close' 
49 A Reyes, Asiaweek 13th December 1996 'The WTO's Competing Agendas' at 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/1213/csl.html accessed 6th July 2006 
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There was no final agreement signed in Singapore partly because of unresolved 
concerns over flexibility, nevertheless, 29 members did agree to sign the IT A, which 
prompted the WTO to say that it had been "concluded" therein. 5° Leon Brittan was to 
remark that it was "the most important success" of the Ministerial and that it would "be 
a huge advance for the world economy".51 Although one report said that the agreement 
would include all the products that the US had previously been concerned about 
keeping out of the Agreement; "capacitors, digital photocopiers, fibre optic cables, 
computer monitors and software, telecommunications equipment, graphic display tubes 
and semi-conductors" this was not the case. 52 The agreement covered neither fibre 
optics nor photocopiers (of which there was no mention). 53 The significant achievement 
of the IT A negotiations was that the potential signatories already "accounted for well 
over 80% of world trade in these products".54 The ITA, and the BTA together meant 
that tariffs were being abolished on "more than $500 billion a year oftrade".55 The only 
catch is revealed in the Annex at Section 4: 
50 Flexibility concern from Malaysian Ministry of International Trade and Industry 'Update on the ITA' 
at www.miti.gov.my/wto3.htrnl accessed 15th February 2004. The twenty nine members which agreed to sign 
were Australia, Canada, the EC, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Norway, Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA. 
Further information from the Commission in Bulletin 12-1996 says that by treating the Community as 
one country, it was actually "thirteen countries (which concluded) a conditional agreement on (the) ITA" 
at http:/leuropa.eu.intlahc/doc/offlbull/en/9612/pl04012.htrn accessed 6th July 2006. WTO's note that the 
agreement had been 'concluded' was from the WTO's 'Information Technology Agreement Introduction' 
at http://www.wto.oWen"lish/tratop elinftec e/itaintro e.htm accessed 5th S~tember 2006 
51 From R Savill the 'Electronic Telegraph' issue 569 of Friday 13 November 1996 'Europe and US 
agree pact on high-tech trade' at http://www.telegraph.co.uk!htmiContent.jhtml?html-/archive/1996/12/13/wtradel3.html 
accessed 5th September 2006/ 
52 Report that the agreement would cover all the products was from the 'Bridges Coverage of the WTO 
Ministerial' of 12 December at httn://www.ictsd.org/ministeriaVsingapore/stmyl2-l2-96.htm accessed on 6th July 
2006. The Bridges report does, however, say that the Agreement would only exclude "software carrying 
sound recordings and films", presumably trying to appease the French who may have been concerned that 
the ITA could become an audio visual agreement through the back door. See Petiteville 2003: 131 on 
audio-visuals as a "cultural exception" and Hylton 1999: 9 on the perceived pressure on cultural 
objectives from the information society in general. Further information from the International Trade 
Administration of the US Department of Commerce sourced at 
http://www.mac.doc.gov!Tcc/DATA/commerce html!TCC 2/WTOinformation.html on 6th September 2006 
53 In a discussion paper of 12th March 1999 by the Canadian Parliament's Research Branch (by D Dupras 
of the Law and Government Division) on 'Information Technologies in the WTO', it says that the 
agreement covered only computers, telecom equipment, semi-conductors and manufacturing of semi-
conductors, software and scientific instruments, which seems a little selective. Sourced at 
http://www.parl.gc.callnfoComDoc/36/l/FAIT/Studies/References/wto/notell·e.htm on 6th September 2006. Meanwhile, 
C Hardie the Electronic News of March 31" 1997 'Most high-tech countries agree to lower tariff bars-
World Trade Organization's Information Technology Agreement- Industry Trend or Event' comments 
that it also included "certain consumer electronics". Sourced at 
http://www.findarticles.comlp/articles/mi mOEKF/is n2161 v43/ai 19288319 on 6th September 2006 
54 From WT/MIN(96)16 
55 A Friedman, the International Herald Tribune of 13'h December 1996, page I, 'Trade Ministers Agree 
on Global High-Tech Accord' 
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"Participants shall meet ... no later than 1 April1997 ... (and) ... will implement the 
actions foreseen in the Declaration provided that participants representing 
approximately 90 percent of world trade in IT products have ... notified their 
acceptance". 
This meant that there was still further work to do in order to encourage countries to sign 
up although seven additional countries had already agreed to join in principle. 56 
Charlene Barshefsky remained upset by the Commission's stance and there is some 
inherent sympathy for her view. 57 Firstly, the Commission appeared to want 
membership in the Semiconductor Council more than an IT A (hence they could be 
accused of holding the IT A hostage to it) and, furthermore, the EC then asked for 
additional concessions in order to make the agreement acceptable to Council. 
Barshefsky may also have been concerned about possible backlash directed at her and 
her office against the agreement on alcoholic beverages and/or audio-visuals. 58 There 
were already concerns about the EC's import regime for wines and spirits from the US, 
making it appear that there was general dissatisfaction that the concessions made by the 
US on grain spirits, in order to achieve EC agreement on the IT A, had not been 
. d 59 reciprocate . 
Needing commitment from more countries meant that a series of meetings facilitated by 
the US and the EC continued through January 1997 during which disagreements 
persisted. Essentially, the Commission was still angling for concessions, wanting the 
US to cut tariffs on 'sensitive items' as the EC had to cut tariffs on semiconductors.60 
The Commission eventually backed down; agreeing to eliminate duties by 1999 while 
the US agreed to cut nuisance tariffs.61 At the same time, the resistance of Malaysia 
56 From B Fliess and P Sauve 'Of Chips, Floppy Disks and Great Timing'. Full reference at footnote 7. 
The seven additional countries were Mexico, India, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, Thailand, Czech 
Republic 
57 H Cooper and B Bahree the Wall Street Journal of 13th December 1996 page A2 'Nations Agree to 
Drop Computer Tariffs' 
58 Although she was thanked by the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Microsoft 
for her and her team's "tireless efforts and excellent work in galvanizing support for this landmark trade 
agreement" in a Press Release of 12th December 1996. Press Release sourced at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/nress/1996/Dcc96/ita.mspx accessed 6th September 2006 
59 from the 'USTR National Trade Estimate- the European Union' 1999 sourced from 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document Library/Reports Publications/1999/assct upload filel36 2820.pdf on 6th July 2006 
60 See Fliess and Sauve (full reference footnote 7). 
61 Although these would not have been on sensitive products, suggesting that the US was able to hold its 
ground. 
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(along with Thailand, India and the Czech Republic) was faltering and they "apparently 
agreed the initial list of products for which tariffs will be eliminated" which meant that 
the 90% target would be reached. 62 On 3'd March 1997, the WTO issued a Press 
Release saying that the Agreement could now be signed. 63 The final meeting of the ITA 
group, on 26th March, had 25 participants representing 92% of global IT trade.64 
The Commission and the US decided to press for more. The next Quad Ministers 
meeting agreed to "work together to broaden participation in the 
agreement...(and) ... jointly pursue ... expansion of product coverage and review of non-
tariff measures in the context of this fall's review of the agreement ('ITA-11')". 65 This 
was confirmed by a WTO Press Release, which said that fourteen countries had already 
submitted wish lists in this regard. 66 They were led by the US and EC whose 
comprehensive lists included, "panel displays, power supplies, optical scanners, 
electronic transformers, color televisions, radio-cassette players, loudspeakers, VCRs, 
navigational position systems, and air traffic control systems".67 However, certain of the 
WTO's developing country members were of the opinion that, because some of the 
products seemed to have only a tangential link to IT, they could experience domestic 
unrest ifiTA-11 went ahead. Furthermore, because it was only the lists from the EC and 
US, which contained such products, countries may have been concerned that this could 
pave the way for a wider-ranging agreement. 
62 F Williams, the Financial Times of 4'h February 1997 page 3, 'Optimism on IT tariff deal' 
63 
"Ruggiero cites progress in the Information Technology Agreement" at 
http://www.wto.org/englishlnews e/pres97 e/pr69 e.lltm accessed 6th July 2006 
64 The 1997 General Report of the European Commission on Common Commercial Policy (at 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/ofT!rg/en/1997/enx60397.htm accessed 6th July 2006 
65 Chair's statement from the meeting of April30'h and May 2•• in Toronto at 
https://tsnace.libraty.utoronto.ca/retrieve/1070/quad30.html accessed 6th July 2006 
66 WTO Press Release of 16 February 1998 ("More information technology products proposed for tariff 
elimination' at http://www.wto.on!/english/news e/pres98 elpr90 e.htm accessed 6th July 2006. Lists had been 
received from Australia; Canada; the European Communities; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; 
Malaysia; Norway; the Philippines; Singapore; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; Turkey; and the United 
States and these had been submitted to the 12th February meeting of the Committee of Participants on the 
Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (sourced from the press release). 
67 J Parry TechWeb, 12'h February 'US and Europe ruffle feathers in World Trade Organisation' at 
http://www.techweb.com/wirelstorvffWBI9980212S0016 accessed 15th February 2003 
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In spite of this, both the Commission and the US remained optimistic that wider product 
coverage could be achieved and they would be working together in order to make it a 
reality.68 For all their good intentions, though, a WTO Press Release of 17th July 
revealed that negotiations on the IT A-Il had been suspended, primarily because of 
disagreements "between the EU and Malaysia regarding the coverage of consumer 
electronics, and the EC and US over the inclusion of fibre optics and computer 
monitors".69 A further press release from the WTO later in the year said that the 
Committee would continue to try to make headway and that, at their end of year 
meeting, members would be asked to consider an additional "200 IT A-Il products ... a 
revised ... draft agreement. .. and a list of some 20 products to be annexed to the draft 
agreement, whose coverage under the ITA would be confirmed". 70 As expected, from 
the negative reaction to an extension already stated by Malaysia, consensus was not 
achieved at that meeting with evident concern continuing over coverage and flexibility 
issues.71 
That there are no other WTO Press Releases on the IT area until 16th July 1999 is 
instructive. At that point, a symposium was held "to discuss trade prospects and issues 
facing the information technology sector" where, once again, there were a large number 
of people from industry but no agreement was forthcoming. 72 Although the Secretariat 
issued periodic updates on implementation, there were no further steps forward to 
68 From the Report of the Senior Level Gronp to the US-EU Summit of May 18th 1998 (at 
http://www.eurunion.org/partner/summit'Summit9805/nta9805.htm accessed 6th July 2006 
69 Press Release 17th July ('ITA-I! Talks Suspended' at http://www.wto omienglishlnews elpres98 elprl 10 e.hnn 
accessed 6th July 2006. Differences between the countries from the ICTSD Bridges Report, Vol.2 No. 5 
p6 of July-August 1998 'WTO News in Brief (at httr:llwww.ictsd.org/English/BR!DGES2-5.pdf. accessed 6th 
July 2006. The agreement does cover monitors, which are defined as "display units of automatic data 
processing machines with a cathode ray tube with a dot screen pitch smaller than 0,4 mm not capable of 
receiving and processing television signals or other analogue or digitally processed audio or video signals 
without assistance of a central processing unit of a computer as defmed in this agreement", although this 
possibly does not cover computer monitors. 
70Press Release of27 November 1998 'Final ITA I! Package to be considered on 11 December' at 
http://www.\Vto.org/english/news e/news98 e/itaprx.htm 
71 from WTO News 14th December 1998 'Participants Agree to resume ITA-II Talks in February 1999 at 
http://www.wto.org/englishlnews e/news98 e/ita2pr.htm accessed 6th July 2006, also B Driessen and M Bordalba 
'International Trade Developments, Including Commercial Defence Actions XV: I July 1998-31 
December 1998' (1999: 461-465) at http:l/www.eiil.orgljourna!NoiiO/No21sr!-OI.htmi#TopOIPagc accessed 26th 
July 2006 
72 from Press Release of the same name at http://www.wto.org/eng1ish/news e/pres99 elprl30 e.htm accessed 6th 
July 2006. Industry representatives attending the symposium came from "countries ... including Canada, 
Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Estonia, European Connnunities, India, Israel, Japan, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and the United States", with speakers from "Motorola, Hewlett Packard, IBM, 
Macronix, AJcatel, Hitachi, Ericsson, Nortel Networks, and Telsa Telecomunikace (from the Czech 
Republic)". Although few oftbese could be said to be 'developing' countries, and none are from Africa. 
See also http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/inftec elitinfi1 e.htm for links to the papers discussed therein 
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achieving an IT A-Il within this timeframe.73 The 1999 annual report of the Committee 
makes this explicit; 
"The issue of the review of product coverage was placed on the agenda ... No 
discussions took place on the matter, but the Chairman noted that delegations 
were continuing consultations ... and he encouraged delegations to continue their 
efforts". 74 
In late 2000, the ITA Committee looked at non tariff barriers to IT products and agreed 
a one year work programme in this area although there were no steps taken to extend 
the scope of the agreement. 75 On the occasion of the ten year anniversary of the ITA in 
March 2007, the Director General of the WTO commented that the ITA had been "a 
major success" but, again, this was not to herald meaningful work towards an IT A-Il. 76 
The Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement (BTA) 
Negotiations on telecommunications date back to the Uruguay Round where 'value 
added' services were discussed as part of the GATS agreement; the conclusions of 
which were eventually to form an Annex to the GATS.77 However, this annex did not 
include several important areas i.e. "basic voice, data transmission, mobile telephony or 
satellite services" so the EC along with eighteen other parties said they would continue 
discussions at the end ofthe Round. 78 The Decision on Negotiation makes clear that 
these negotiations would be voluntary although they would have the broad aim of 
73 on 617/99 [GIIT/1/Rev10] and again on 20/9/99 [G/IT/1/Rev11] 
74 G/U332 issued on 14 October 1999 
75 Document G/IT/19 circulated 13th November 2000 
76 From WTO News Item 28th March 2007 'Lamy says ITA success is inspiration to Doha negotiators' at 
http://www.wto.org 1english/news e/news07 e/symp ita rnarch07 e.htm accessed 31st January 2008. 
77 see http://www.wto.org/encrfisb/tratop e/serve e/12-tel e.htm for the full text, accessed 6th July 2006 
78 Quote from Braga, C, Fink, C and Hoekman, B (2002) 'Telecommunications-Related Services: Market 
Access, Deeper Integration and the WTO' HWW A Discussion Paper Number 158 sourced at 
http://www.hwwa.de/Forschung/Puhlikationen/Discussion Paper/2002/158.pdf accessed 15th June 2006. The other 
countries were Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, European Communities and their member 
States, Finland, Hong Kong, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Slovak Republic, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States. Report of continuing discussions from C Raghavan, SUNS 
Online, 'Basic Telecoms and Nagging Doubts' October 6th 1995 at 
http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/areas/communic/10060095.htm accessed 6th July 2006 
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liberalising trade in basic telecoms under GA TS. Furthermore, they would be 
comprehensive ''with no basic telecommunications excluded a priori". 79 
Discussions in the EC on telecommunication services had been going on for some 
considerable time before the end of the Uruguay Round. Robert Kaiser (2001: 5) 
suggests that the thinking about liberalization "start(ed) in the mid-1980's ... fol!owing 
the examples of the United States, Great Britain and Japan". However, the process of 
this thinking, in the EC, seemed to begin in 1980 with the Commission's 
'Recommendations on Telecommunications' (COM(80)422) of 1 ''September wherein 
the Commission noted the importance of"a competitive, low-cost telecommunications 
network" throughout the Single Market. 80 After this there was a further 
Communication to the Telecommunications Council on 'Lines of Action' in 
COM(83 )573, which sought to allow "the progressive development of a common 
community policy for telecommunications" followed by another Communication in 
1984 (COM(84)277), which proposed ways of helping the industry kick start some 
initiatives in order to regain their competitiveness. 81 This thinking went further in 1987 
with a 'Green Paper on the development of the Common Market for 
Telecommunications services and equipment' (COM(87)290), which concluded that 
telecoms in the EC needed to be both overhauled and liberalised. 82 
Tracking developments back through, there was a great deal of interest in this field 
within both the Council and the Commission. The Council Resolution of 19th 
November 1992 on 'The Promotion ofEurope-wide Cooperation on Numbering of 
Telecoms' cites the Council Resolution of30 June 1988 on 'The development of the 
Common Market for telecommunication services and equipment', which advocated the 
development of services, followed by the Commission Directive of 18 June 1990 on 
'Competition for Telecommunications Services Providers', then the Council Directive 
of28 June 1990 on 'The Establishment of the Internal Market for Telecommunications 
79 adopted on 15th April1994 at Marrakech (at httn:llwww.iurisint.om'publ061enldoci5Z htm, also 
http://www. \\10.org/eno-lish/tratop e/serv e/telccom e/te122 e.htm accessed 6th July 2006 
8° COM(80)422 of 1" September 1980. Text at httn:llaei.pitt.edu/504710\1001353 l.pdf accessed 1st February 
2008 
81 COM(83)573 of29"' September 1983 at httJJ:IIaei.pitt.cdu/1359101/telecommuoications COM 83 S73.pdf 
accessed 1" February 2008 'A progress report on the thinking and work done in the field and initial 
proposals for an Action Programme'. COM(84)277 of 18'h May 1984 at http:llaei.pitt.edu/3673101/000295 l.pdf 
accessed I st February 2008 
82 1997 Special Edition of Information Society Trends at 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/docs/services/trends/docs/overview97 .pdf accessed 6th July 2006 
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Services through the Implementation of Open Network Provision'. 83 This latter 
document set out the Council's view of the "very great importance" that it attached, not 
only to continuing the development of European telecoms but also recognising their 
value internally and externally (for European participation in other markets). The next 
Resolution, 93/C213/01 of22 July 1993, was a 'Review of the situation in the 
telecommunications sector and the need for further development in that market', which 
set down the main aims of future telecommunications policy and, perhaps most 
importantly, instructed the Commission: "To prepare, before 1 January 1996 the 
necessary amendments to the Community regulatory framework in order to achieve 
liberalization of all public voice telephony services by 1 January 1998". 84 
Because of the level of liberalisation that had already taken place, it would suggest that 
the European Union was in a strong position (as regards both policy making and in the 
experience of making the policy work) to get its views across once negotiations in this 
area started under the aegis of the WTO. Negotiations commenced on 30 April1994 
(Niemann, 2004: 390) coordinated by a Negotiating Group with a deadline of April 
1996.85 Just like the Information Technology Agreement, it was important for the 
Commission to build a supportive coalition in order to ensure that the most countries 
possible would give their support. To this end, there were a number of parallel 
discussions taking place i.e. in forums other than the WTO, throughout the period of the 
negotiations. 
At the same time, it was critical that the Commission continued crafting its own policies 
for the liberalisation of the internal telecoms market, setting targets for the member 
states. 86 With this aim in mind, on 25th October 1994 the Commission issued a Green 
Paper Part One on 'The Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable 
Television Networks ' 87• This set out the importance of telecommunications for enabling 
the European economy to compete with those of the US and Japan. It was noted, 
83 Council Resolution 92/C318/02 found in full at http://www.ero.dk/93EABOE2-133D4AOE-9DBB-
43094Dl8870E. W5Doc. The website of the European Radiocommunications Office. Accessed 6th July 2006. 
Kaiser (2001: 7) also mentions the Commission Directive 88/301/EEC on 'Competition in the Markets in 
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment' as starting off this liberalization process. Full text of the latter 
document at full text at http://www.dcmnr.oov.ie/files/Comms Reg 1990 387.doc accessed 6th July 2006 
84 
'See the full text at http://eumpa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/93c21301.html accessed 6th July 2006 
85See Braga et al (2002) (full reference at footnote 78). Information here from 
http://www.wto.org/englishltratop e/seJVe e!telecom e/telecom history e.htm accessed 6th July 2006 
86 E Tucker, Financial Times 26th October 1994, page 3, 'Brussels pushes hard on telecoms' 
87 full text at http://aei.pitt.edufarchive/OOOOI093!011tefecom cable gp part I COM 94 440.odfaccessed 6th July 2006 
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however, that this initiative "was certain to be resisted fiercely by countries aoxious to 
protect national telecommunications monopolies including Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Belgium and Italy" suggesting that it would not be easy to put together a supportive 
internal coalition. 88 The next initiative came about on 22 December 1994, when the 
Council issued a 'Resolution on the principles and timetable for the liberalisation of 
telecommunications infrastructures', which continued to advocate full liberalization to 
a 1 January 1998 deadline.89 
The G7's Information Society Conference in February 1995 discussed the BTA. Once 
again, several Commissioners were present and the Competition Commissioner's 
speech at the Panel Discussion on Regulatory Framework and Competition Policy, 
centred exclusively on telecom liberalisation. He informed the other attendees that, as 
has already been shown, much work had already been carried out and, for the 
Community, "1998 is the deadline". 90 This was a clear line in the sand to the other 
players - as we have set a date for the full liberalisation of our markets; you should 
follow. 91 The Commission's leadership in this area, including its firm adherence to a 
specific date, may have been why the May Quad meeting reacted differently to the BTA 
than they did the ITA, wanting to complete negotiations before April the following year 
in order to move towards a "global information infrastructure".92 Therefore, both the G7 
and the Quad were very supportive of the work in the WTO, and the Commission's 
efforts towards facilitating an agreement, from the outset. Even developing countries 
seemed to recognise possible advantages for attracting foreign investment and their 
stance was supported by the World Bank which noted, "Investment in telecoms in the 
developing world must double .. .if unfulfilled and growing demand for. .. services is to be 
met". 93 
88 J Wolf the Guardian of25th October page 19, 'Liberalise telecoms infrastructure call by EC' 
89 Council resolution is 94/C 379/03, full text at h!tn://europa.eu inUISPO/infosoc/legre•/docs/94c37903.html 
accessed 16th July 2007 
9° Karel van Miert's statement to the Information Society Conference entitled 'Universal Service will not 
be compromised by full telecoms liberalisation' at 
http://www.europa.eujnt/ISPO/docsfintcoop/g8/is conf 95 miert pdfaccessed 15th May 2005 
91 As was reported on the previous page, this deadline bad been set in 1993. 
92 May 3~5 in "Whistler, Canada. Chairman's statement at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/tradelquad26.html accessed 
15th May 2005 
93 Positive reactions from the developing countries from A Cane, the Financial Times of 21" July, page 4, 
'WTO rings the world's number'. World Bank comments from the Financial Times of October 3'd I 995, 
Survey Section on Telecommunications page I 
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The Commission submitted its first offer in early October 1995.94 This reiterated the 
implementation date of January 1998 i.e. binding the EC liberalization deadline into the 
WT0.95 There were exceptions, however- Ireland would have until2000 and Spain, 
Portugal and Greece would have until 2003 to liberalize their markets. This flexibility 
in provision made it much more likely that an internal consensus would hold and the 
Commission could build on this internal arrangement to make progress externally. 
Following this offer, a High Level Group meeting on Telecommunications was held 
within the WTO in an effort to set down some basic principles, which could be 
expanded upon in further negotiations with the objective being for significant 
commitments to liberalization. 96 
The next Quad meeting again clearly supported the Commission's proposal saying that 
significant headway was sought prior to the Singapore Ministerial.97 An opportunity to 
cement agreement bilaterally between the EC and US was afforded by the 'New 
Transatlantic Agenda' and priority was given to furthering all the services negotiations 
to meet the timetable already set. 98 The evidence suggests that, at this juncture, the 
Commission and the USA were standing firm in their joint resolution to proceed on 
schedule. This also shows that there was powerful political support for progress within 
the WTO from the EC-US bilaterally, the G7 and the Quad (and from some, at least, of 
the developing countries) to achieve an agreement, although there were still time 
constraints to achieving a critical mass of support. Leon Brittan expressed this concern 
later in the year, "We are due to complete negotiations on telecommunications 
liberalization in April. .. and to my knowledge only Singapore has even completed the 
questionnaire (on scope) ... ifwe don't get enough participation the agreement won't 
94 F Williams, the Financial Times of 4th October 1995 p8 'EU offers pledge on liberalizing telecoms' 
95 Pages 2 and 3 of the Press Review of the Commission's Information Society issue 42 5-17/10/95 at 
http://eurona.eu.inUISPO/docs/services/trends/docf:/42.pdfaccessed 15th May 2005 
96 The meeting was, (according to A Cane the Financial Times of21" July 1995 page 4 'WTO rings the 
world's number") held on 6th October 1995 in the context ofTelecoms 95 "the huge trade show and 
seminar". Objectives from the Press Release at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres95 e/pr9511 e.htm entitled 
'High Level Meeting of the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, 6 October 1995: Statement 
by the Director General of the WTO' accessed 25th July 2006 
97 Quad meeting of October 21" and 22"" in Ripley, Yorkshire. Chairman's statement at 
https://tspace.librarv.utoronto.ca!retrieve/1076/auad27.html accessed 25th July 2006. Leon Brittan was chairing this 
meeting, which may explain why the Quad was so supportive. 
98 
'New Transatlantic Agenda' launched at the EU-US Summit in Madrid on December 5th 1995 and 
contained in the Joint EU-US Action Plan. Text from the full text at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commlextemal relations/us/action plan/3 trade economy.htm accessed 25th July 2006 
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have either the width or breadth necessary to be effective".99 However, the US was 
expressing a preference for an interim agreement if they could not get full sign up by 
the end of the April deadline so their enthusiasm had not waned. 100 
Although the external consensus may have been holding up, it appeared that the internal 
consensus was not. Brittan thought that in order to encourage agreement the EC should 
make a revised telecoms offer even though it would negatively affect Belgium, France, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. This resulted in accusations from various member states that 
the Commission was giving away valuable negotiating ground without anything 
guaranteed in retum. 101 This may have been made worse as the Commission position 
had been circulated as a draft offer rather than in a neutral document. 102 It seemed, by 
then, that Leon Brittan was optimistic of bringing Belgium, France and Spain around to 
his point of view so was not particularly concerned about possible short-term negative 
views in Council. Furthermore, he continued to push for progress in the Quad as well as 
in WT0. 103 At the Quad meeting in Aprill996, Ministers once again affirmed their 
desire for an early conclusion to the negotiations. 104 They asked WTO members, and 
committed themselves, to submitting "best MFN-based" revised offers by the end of the 
month. 105 This suggested that any outstanding problems could be swiftly ironed out in 
spite of the short time left until the deadline. 106 
Perhaps the Quad was unduly optimistic. On March 26'\ Renato Ruggiero had made a 
speech to the negotiators, at their meeting, on the importance placed on the issue by the 
WTO and the wider community, reminding those present of the 30th April deadline and 
advising the "37 full participants" in the group that "only 24 (of them) had so far 
99 T Bardacke, the Financial Times of 12th December 1995, page 6 'EU urges Asean telecoms 
liberalization' 
100 G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 13th February 1996, page 8 'US looks for quick te1ecoms 
pact' 
101 G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 13th March page 5, 'EU split over liberalizing telecoms' 
102 A Reuters report in the Financial Times of March 26th 1996, page 5 'EU to match offers to open up 
teleconis', says that the foreign ministers "agreed to make a better offer on opening telecommunications 
networks in world trade talks if other countries did likewise", thus addressing the concerns about 'giving 
ground before receiving anything in return'. 
103 A Dawkins and G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 19'h April page 5, 'Quad nations seek unity on 
telecoms' 
104 Meeting which took place in Kobe, Japan on 21 and 22 April 1996 
105 From the Chairman's statement at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/trade/guad28.html accessed 25th July 2006 
106 Idea that disagreements could be dealt with quickly from W Dawkins, the Financial Times of 22"• 
April page 4, 'Quad nations near accord on telecoms', Short timescale noted by F Williams and G de 
Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 25th April page 6, 'WTO close to a deal on telecoms liberalization' 
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submitted first offers (and) only 7 of these have so far submitted revised or improved 
offers" ergo, it was crucial that more was done very quickly. 107 The US was concerned 
that the negotiations were failing because of the lack of solid market opening 
commitments being made; a clear warning that more needed to be done if they were 
going to stay at the table. 108 The decisive end came when the USA backed out of 
negotiations in April "claiming that the market opening by other nations didn't add up 
to an acceptable package" and because "the required 'critical mass' of membership (to 
prevent free riding) had not been achieved". 109 There was concern, from the other 
participants, that the US would remove satellite services from its offer, which was 
confirmed on 29th April prompting Brittan to remark that it was "a deep disappointment 
and an unpleasant surprise". 110 
Ruggiero embarked on a salvage operation for the Agreement. The WTO Press Brief 
for 1 May reported that he had suggested a one-month standstill period from January to 
February 1997 to revisit the offers and further develop positions, whilst keeping the 
original offers on the table. At the same time, the date of I" January 1998 would be 
when the Agreement would be finalised. Meanwhile, "a group on basic 
telecommunications reporting to the WTO's Council for Trade in Services would ... start 
work before the end of July". 111 This meant that although there would be a hiatus, work 
would continue with a new deadline. Leon Brittan termed the failure to reach agreement 
a "missed opportunity" adding that he "regret(ted) and deplore( d)" the US's actions.112 
This seemed to be indicative of a wider dissatisfaction on the part of WTO members, 
feeling that the US had stymied progress and this led to bitterness amongst the other 
107 see full text PRESS/45, 22 March 1996 'WTO Director-General's statement on basic 
telecommunications negotiations' at http://www.wto.omlenglishlnews e/pres96 e/pr045 e.htm, accessed 25th July 
2006 
108 F Williarns, the Financial Times of 23"' March page 3, 'Time Tight for Global Telecoms Agreement'. 
The US named the main culprits, in this article, as "Japan, Canada and a host of developing countries in 
Asia and Latin America as well as Israel and South Africa" 
109 First quote from European Business News of 12 February 1997 at 
http://www.hri.org/news/europe/ebn!1997/97-02-12.ebn.html accessed 25th July 2006. Second quote from Braga et 
al (2002)- see footnote 78 for full reference. 
110 Concern about the removal of satellite services from F Williarns and G de Jonquieres, the 
Financial Times of27"' A&ril1996 page 2, 'WTO telecoms talks stall over satellites', also F Williarns, 
the Financial Times of29 Aprill996, page 1, 'US balks at signing global deal on telecoms'. Quote from 
Brittan from F Williams the Financial Times of 30"' April 1996, page 6, 'US telecoms stance angers trade 
partners' 
111 PRESS/48 of 1" May 1996 'WTO's Basic Telecommunications Negotiations result in substantial 
offers: re-examination in early 1997' at http://www.wto.om/english/news e/pres96 e/pr048 e.htm accessed 25th 
July 2006 
112 F Williams, the Financial Times of I" May 1996 page 5 'Agreement on telecoms pact deadline'. 
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participants with a concern that this might spill over into the wider arena of multilateral 
1. aki . th WTO 113 po 1cym ngm e . 
Although the US had pulled out, the Commission continued to work on its own policies 
to support liberalization in the internal market. On 16th January 1996, the Commission 
issued a 'Directive Amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to mobiles and 
personal communications', which aimed to bring competition in to the field of mobile 
telephony, as had already been the case for fixed line telephony. 114 This was followed 
on 12'h March by a 'Commission Communication on Universal Service for 
Telecommunications in the Perspective of a Fully Liberalised Environment', which 
addressed: "practical issues ... for the future development of universal service; and ... to 
place universal service for telecommunications in the broader context of the 
information society". 115 A day later, on 13 March 1996, the Commission issued a 
'Directive Amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full 
competition in telecommunications markets', specifically because the previous 
Directive had excluded public telephone services from being opened up to competition. 
116 On 11th September, the Commission issued another draft Directive on the minimum 
standards to be adhered to by telephone companies after January 1" when the market 
would be fully opened. 117 A further 'Commission Communication on Europe at the 
Forefront of the Global Information Sodety- A Rolling Action Plan' was circulated in 
November 1996 and this acknowledged the importance of completing the negotiations 
on the Basic Telecommunications Agreement in the WTO. 118 Afterwards came a 
'Green Paper on Numbering Reform' and a 'Commission Communication on 
Assessment Criteria for National Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal 
Service in Telecommunications and Guidelines for the Member States on Operation of 
113 Feeling that the US had stymied progress from F Williams, the Financial Times orz•d May page 4, 
'US keeps rest of world hanging on the line'. Bitterness noted by T Buerkle, the International Herald 
Tribune of 2nd May page 15, 'A Setback for WTO Agenda'. Concern about spillover of these negative 
effects from the Financial Times editorial of 7th May 1996 page 15, 'World trade at risk' 
114 96/2/EC, full text at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/962ec.html accessed 25th July 2006 
115 COM(96)73 full text at http://europa.eu.inti1SPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/d8.htm accessed 25th July 2006 
116 96/19/EC full text at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/lemg/docs/961 9ec.html Also see E Tucker the Financial 
Times of 151h March 1996 page 2. 'Let there be phones for all, says Brussels' 
1l7 COM(96)49l 'Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the application of open 
network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for telecommunications in a 
competitive environment' (replacing 9 5/62/EC) httn:!/europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/96419.html accessed 
25th July 2006. Also N Buckley the Financial Times of 12th September 1996, page 2, 'Brussels sets 
phone service standards' 
118 Green Paper sent to the Council, Committee of the Regions and ECOSOC, COM(96)607 at 
http://em·opa.eu.int!JSPO/infosoc/legreg!rollcomm.html accessed 25th July 2006 
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Such Schemes' .119 The Commission, then, demonstrated its commitment to achieving 
agreement by making sure that its own framework was in place and ensured, as far as 
possible, there would be no backtracking from the consensus position or the deadline 
previously set. 
In the meantime, meetings were taking place to try to get discussions back on track. The 
Quad remained strongly supportive of an agreement prior to the Singapore Ministerial, 
and it seemed that this political pressure had a positive effect in that both the EC and 
US agreed to submit revised offers beforehand.120 In addition, the US satellite 
communications industry itself was also keen for an agreement, seemingly prepared to 
open up to competition in spite of US Government concems. 121 The TABD too had 
joined the chorus in support of achieving an agreement. 122 Spain, meanwhile, had 
agreed to full liberalization of its telecoms markets by 1998 and this seemed to 
encourage the US to get back to the negotiating table, particularly as they had been 
concerned that the Spanish telecommunications company was ''taking advantage of its 
monopoly to finance its ambitious expansion in Latin America". 123 
The WTO Secretariat hoped that the Singapore Ministerial would act as a political push 
to the continuing negotiations.124 The EC, US and the Slovak Republic provided a 
practical 'push' by tabling new offers, as the former two had promised at the Quad 
meeting earlier in the year. 125 The new Commission offer formalized Spain's 
liberalisation commitment, as well as setting out a timetable for liberalizing mobile 
telephone services also for 1998 (excepting Ireland and Portugal) and lifted restrictions 
119 Green Paper on Numbering reform COM(96)590 of 20th November 1996 at 
http://europa.eu.int1ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/d7.htm accessed 25th July 2006. Assessment Criteria 
COM(96)608) of 27 November !996 (at http:l/europa.eu.int!lSPO/infosoc!telecompolicvJenlcom96603.htm accessed 25th 
July 2006 
120 Seattle Quad meeting on 27-28 September full text of Chairman's Summary at 
https;//tspace.libratV.utoronto.calretrieve/1072/quad28.html accessed 25th July 2006 
121 A Cane and G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of October 22•', page 6, 'Global telecoms deal 
comes closer' 
122 TABD, meeting on 8th-9th November 1996 in Chicago (see Chicago Declaration at 
http://static.tahd.com'manilaGems/1996ChicagoCEORerort.pdf accessed 25th July 2006 
123 Spain's agreement to liberalisation from N Dunne, the Financial Times of IIth November page 6, 'US, 
EU closer on telecoms and IT accord'. US encouraged to return to the table from a Reuters report in the 
International Herald Tribune of 12th November 1996 page 19, 'Compromise On Telecoms Is Closer; EU 
Official Says' 
124 Idea that Singapore would provide a political push from the WTO Press brief on 'Basic 
Telecommunications' at httn://www:wto.org/english!thewto e/minist e!min96 e/telecoms.htm accessed 5th June 2004 
125 Parts of all the offers can be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/serv eltelecom e/telecom highlights commit exempt e.htm#country 
134 
on satellite telephony services. 126 That this was agreed by Council suggests that 
Belgium, Greece and Italy had fallen into line with the rest of the EC, as Spain had 
previously. The US, meanwhile, included submarine cables and satellite services in 
their revised offer. 127 Ame Niemann (2004: 379-407) detailed how the Commission 
persuaded Spain to accept this revision. He concluded that not only did the liberal 
members of the Article 133 Committee persuade the Spanish into accepting that some 
market loosening was inevitable but also the Commission conducted a two-pronged 
attack. Essentially, Spain's monopoly provider wanted to join a European association 
(p399-400) and the Commission only allowed this on the basis that they would be 
prepared to make concessions for the WTO negotiations (p400). The result was that "in 
early November, Spain agreed to a deal... to drop all its market access and foreign 
ownership restrictions as of 30 November 1998" (p400) thus allowing forward progress. 
The Commission was to finally give its approval to the alliance in March 1997.128 
The Singapore Ministerial did not provide a 'push' to developments here. The WTO 
Secretariat's own report reveals that the negotiators had only needed to meet informally 
within the Ministerial. 129 As a result of the ongoing work, Council was able to consider 
the Draft Agreement text on 14'h February 1997 where it gave the Commission its 
endorsement for them to complete the negotiations. 130 In spite of this, and in spite of 
apparent enthusiasm on the part ofthe US, discussions in the WTO went to the wire, 
with Washington delaying its verdict until the last minute. Leon Brittan remarked that 
with the number of substantially revised offers on the table, there was the potential for 
"a massive liberalization of the world telecoms market which it would be crazy not to 
grab with both hands" suggesting that the US should be content with what had been 
achieved. 131 Ultimately the revised offers may have proved decisive; "On 15 February 
1997, 69 Members of the WTO agreed to open their basic telecoms markets to 
126 F Williams, the Financial Times of 13"' November page 3, 'EU improves telecoms talks offer' 
127 F Williams, the Financial Times ofNovember 14"' 1996, page 7 'US and EU revise telecoms stance' 
128 E Tucker reported that the Commission had given its approval for the agreement in the Financial 
Times of 21" March 1997, page 2, 'Go-ahead for telecoms deal') and says that it was signed by British 
Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, Telecom Italia and Telefonica. 
129 
'History of the Telecommunication Negotiations' at 
http:Jlwww.wto.org/english!traton e/serv eltelecom e/telecom history e.htm accessed 25th July 2006 
130 EU Bulletin 1-2/1997 Council conclusions on the 'Draft Agreement on Basic Telecoms Services in the 
WTO Framework' at http://europa.eu.inUabc/doc/offlbull/enl9701!p!03024.htm accessed 25th July 2006 
131 F Williams and M Nakamoto, the Financial Times of 15"' February page 3. 'Telecoms pact waits for 
US verdict' 
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competition, thus liberalising over 90% of global trade in telecoms services (93%)". 132 
The agreement had wide support from the member states as it covered universal 
telecommunication services but left out broadcasting, which would have risked difficult 
negotiations on the cultural exception. 133 
Coming into force on 5 February 1998, with the proviso that it was "accepted by all 
members concerned", the Fourth Protocol of GATS, which the Agreement became, is 
very brief. This is because it is the agreed schedules attached to it, from each signatory 
country, which detail what the Agreement means in practice. In a WTO Press Release, 
Ruggiero offered his congratulations to those governments who took part saying they 
had "put their faith in the multilateral process of the WTO, and the WTO has 
delivered". 134 Lean Brittan was to say later that he had also put his faith into the private 
sector, in the shape of the US Coalition of Service Industries, which had helped greatly 
in efforts to reach agreement, particularly because they had built bridges between US 
and EC industries, all lobbying for completion of the Agreement. 135 Charlene 
Barshefsky also wrote a letter to the Chairman of the CSI after the Agreement came 
into force noting that their support had encouraged the US to implement the 
agreement.136 
It was accepted, however, that, as with the ITA, this Agreement was only the first step. 
The Chairman of the French Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (ART) was 
among those who acknowledged that there was "an unquestionable need for specific 
132 From the DTI (UK) page on International ICT Policy 'Market Liberalisation in the 
Telecommunications Sector. Why Liberalise?' at 
http://www.dti.gov.uklsectorslictpolicy!ecommtonicallecommmarketlib/pacrel358I.html accessed 26th July 2006, also N 
Bannister the Guardian of 15th February page 24, 'Global telecom pact is set for signing today' 
133 From Leon Brittan's 'exchange of views' with the Committee on External Economic Relations of the 
European Parliament on 18th March 1997 at http:l/www.europari.eu.inUddlsdp/newsmlen/19971n970318.htm • 6 
accessed 25th July 2006 
134 WTO Press Release 17"' February PRESS/67- 'Ruggiero congratulates Governments on landmark 
telecommunications agreement' -"This deal goes well beyond trade and economics" at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/serv e/telecom eltelecom e.htm, Press Release link accessed 15th May 2005 
135Thanks given in a speech to the Coalition of Service Industries in Washington DC on 24th September 
1998 at http://www.globalservicesnetwork.cornlcsi annual meeting hritta.htm accessed 15th May 2005. The idea of 
'bridge building' would seem to be disputed by the fact that "Brussels ... threatened to file a complaint 
against the US at the WTO because of restrictions which its telecoms licensing body intends to impose on 
European companies that want to set up telecoms operations" (N Tutt the European of 17-23 Aprill997, 
page 17). 
136 Letter dated 11 February 1998 from htto://www.uscsi.org/puhlicationslpapers/5paper2.htm accessed 25th July 
2006 
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/ 
regulation ... at world level. .. to complement the general rules of competition".137 
Perhaps the agreement didn't go far enough; Parliament asked the Commission, at the 
Seattle Ministerial to extend the BTA and encourage more countries to sign up to it. 138 
It is probably true to say that telecommunications and information technologies were 
developing so fast that there was growing convergence. The Commission was to 
identifY this later in the year noting that the advent of digital technology meant that the 
same platforms could be used for different purposes and telephones, computers and 
television were becoming more integrated. 139 
This was tantamount, in many ways, to accepting that both the IT A and the BT A were 
out of date before they had even come into force. Although the BT A is now part of the 
Services negotiations opened in 2000, there have been no changes made to it at the time 
of writing. 
The Financial Services Agreement (FSA) 
Discussions on the Free Movement of Capital, an important aspect of the FSA, began in 
the EC with Treaty of Rome Article 67, which said that capital should be moveable "to 
the extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the common market". However, 
although directives covering this area were issued in 1960 and 1962 it was not until the 
'Communication from the Commission to the Council: Programme for the 
Liberalization of Capital Movements in the Community' (COM(86)0292) in 1986 that 
there was any effort to ensure that developments in the capital market kept up with the 
pace of developments in goods and services.140 
137 From 'Communications and Strategies' Number 44, 4th quarter 2001 ppl95-209 at 
http://www.idate.fr/an/publi/revulnumln44/opinion.pdf accessed 15th May 2005 
138 From the European Parliament resolution on the Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament on the EU Approach to the Millennium Round (COM (1999)331), issued 
26th November 1999 and reprinted at from http://www.cb3rob.net/-merijn89/nieuws/99M11·26-I.html accessed 25th July 
2006 
139 COM (97) 623) of 3 December 1997 'Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, 
Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation. Towards an 
Information Society Approach' (full text at http://europa.eu.int!ISPO/convernencegp/greenp.html accessed 25th July 
2006 
140 Information on early Directives from 'Free Movement of Capital- General Framework' at 
http://europa.eu int/scadplus!leglenflvb/l25001.htm accessed 25th July 2006 
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Multilateral negotiations on the Financial Services Agreement began in the Uruguay 
Round, but agreement was not reached by the conclusion of the Round, even though 
seventy six countries had made offers in one or more financial services fields (Dobson 
and Jacquet, 1998: 81). The Commission was one of the parties that continued 
negotiating on the basis of the 'Decision on Financial Services' agreed therein. 141 The 
WTO Secretariat made it clear that these talks should take place over six months after 
GATS had entered into force (i.e. to the end of June 1995). 142 After this, it was agreed 
that members would be able to revisit all of their commitments. The first full meeting of 
the Committee on Trade in Financial Services, under Canadian chairmanship, met on 
28th March 1995 with the express aim of achieving a revised agreement within the 
given six-month timescale.143 However, the first sign that perhaps things would not go 
smoothly was at the third meeting of that Committee on 18th May where "one 
delegation", probably the US for reasons which will become clear later, put on record 
that, 
"Although it appreciated the efforts of other participants in the negotiations to improve 
their offers, it was still a long way from the goal. The offers of many countries failed to 
remove significant barriers to access to their markets and to national treatment in their 
markets. Not all countries had tabled revised offers and some commitments made 
bilaterally had not yet been reflected in the schedules".144 
Perhaps in an effort to overcome US cynicism about the process, Leon Brittan sought 
the G7's endorsement and, after discussion at the Halifax Summit in June 1995, the G7 
committed itself to liberalizing the financial services area. 145 After that meeting, Brittan 
commented that a multilateral approach was the best way forward, considering 
bilateralism "of more use for political posturing at home than for creating new business 
abroad". 146 This was also supported internally as the 'Commission Report on Treatment 
141 Accessed at http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop e/serv e/1 7-finsr e.htm 25th July 2006 
142 Secretariat view from 'The Results of the Financial Services Negotiations under the GATS' at 
httn://www.wto.org/encrtish/traton c!serv e!finance e!finance fiback e.htm accessed 25th July 2006. Six month 
timescale from the WTO Press Release on Financial Services at 
http://www.wto.org/english!theWTO e/minist elmin96 elfinancia.htm accessed 25th July 2006 
143 Minutes circulated as S/FINIM/1 
144 see para 6, S/FIN/M/3 
145 Meeting held between 15th and 17'h June in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Results page at from 
httn://www .g8.utoronto.calsummit/1995halifax/communiquelmarket.html accessed 25th July 2006 
146 Leon Brittan, Financial Times 19th June, page 18, 'Why apathy must not prevail' 
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Accorded in 3rd Countries to Community Credit Institutions' made clear by concluding 
that a multilateral solution, through successful FSA negotiations, would be preferable to 
bilateral agreements because of the likelihood of MFN arrangements for establishment 
and operation. 147 However, although the G7 conclusion may have been a political push 
to the Committee, the US still thought progress was insufficient. 148 This boiled over at 
the next Working Group meeting at the end of June where, despite the Commission 
making it clear it could confirm its commitments on an MFN basis; the US decided that 
the undertakings made by the other participants remained insufficient. 149 It responded 
by withdrawing its MFN commitments for new market entrants from 1" July even 
though it guaranteed to protect existing foreign financial operations. The Commission 
seemed shocked by this and advised the other delegations to lobby the US into agreeing 
with the majority. The other two members of the Quad were strongly supportive of the 
Commission, Japan commenting that it could not comprehend why the US would risk a 
string of MFN exceptions from others as a result. Because of what had happened, the 
Committee agreed to meet the following day when, although there was significant 
discussion about the revised offers, the US remained unconvinced in the merits of 
continuing negotiations saying that they would not propose any dates for future 
negotiations nor suggest any possible content of such meetings. 150 
Brittan led a damage limitation exercise; making an effort to defeat the US's 
"obstructionism" by agreeing an interim deal to keep the current agreements on the table 
and to try to build on these in order to make more progress while minimizing losses. 151 
The plan entailed members agreeing to open their financial services markets on an MFN 
basis, secondly, to reaffirm their best offers and, lastly, to establish a fixed time period for 
market opening at the end of which time commitments could be revisited. 152 In order to 
achieve such agreement, a "diplomatic campaign" had to be fought by Brittan and his 
147 COM(95)303 fmal of 29th June 1995 
148 SUNS Online of26 June 1995 'US wants more on fmancial services from others' at 
http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/areas/finance/06260095.htm accessed 25th July 2006 
149 Meeting of 29th June 1995 S/FIN/M/5/Rev l 
150 Minutes circulated as S/FIN/M/6 
151 Commission leading the damage limitation exercise from C Barfield, Journal of Commerce July 19th 
1995 'Financial Talks- Let's Try Again' reproduced at 
http://www.aei.ornlpublications/pubiD.5360.filter.alVpub detail.asp accessed 6th September 2006. US obstructionism 
noted by the Financial Times editorial section on page 15 of the 3nl July issue 'Salvaging a services deal'. 
Commission pushing ahead from F Williams the Financial Times of 1" July page 2, 'EU in move to salvage 
financial services pact' 
152 F Williams the Financial Times of 1" July page 18 'EU launches late plan to save global pact on 
financial services' 
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office both internally and externally. 153 He approached this by conducting a major 
lobbying exercise, seeing "ambassadors from Japan, South Korea, Thailand and India", as 
well as EC ministers, and asking Ruggiero for his support in GATS Counci!. 154 The 
success of this was shown at the July 1995 meeting where there was significant support 
for Brittan's interim agreement, as he had predicted.155 This had set the improvements, 
in offers already made, in stone rather than letting them drop back to the levels of 
commitments made at the start of the process. The Commission was also hopeful that 
the US would make its own revised MFN commitment over the months ahead, thus not 
shutting the door if improvements to the status quo could be negotiated. It was agreed to 
go ahead, prompting an effusive press release from the WTO Director General: 
"Seldom has the cause ofmultilateralism so evidently succeeded ... Naturally, 
with one major trading partner unable to improve the commitments it made in 
1993 or to offer non-discriminatory access to its market, this must be a second-
best result. But... the commitments which have been taken are substantial". 156 
In spite ofRuggiero claiming the commitments made by the agreement were 
"substantial", there was still more work to be undertaken by the Commission and the 
rest of the Working Group if the US stuck to their guns that market access had to be 
absolutely reciprocal on an MFN basis. Nevertheless, at the tenth meeting of the Group 
in July the Chairman commented that, thanks to the Commission's leadership, the 
agreement was "the best that could have been hoped for". 157 At that meeting it was 
made clear that this interim agreement would last until the end of 1997 but it was hoped 
that a permanent agreement could be established before then that the US would be 
prepared to sign.158 
153 C Southey the Financial Times of 61h July page 5 'Brittan plea on financial services' 
154 C Southey the Financial Times of 8th July page 2 'EU talks up hope of financial services deal' 
155 Meeting held on 26th July 1995, minutes circulated as S/FIN/M/9 
Brittan expecting success from P Lewis the New York Times of 25th July 1995 'Financial Services 
Agreement is Expected by End of Week' at 
http://query.nvtimes.com/gstlfu1lpage.html?res-990CE7DFI53FF936A 15754COA963958260 accessed 30th January 2008. 
The opening quote reads "Europe's chief trade negotiator predicted today that more than 70 countries 
would agree by the end of the week on the world's first agreement liberalizing trade in fmancial services 
156 
'WTO Director-General Hails Financial Services Accord' Press/18, 26'h July 1995 at 
http://www wto.org/englishlnews e/pres95 eladdpr3.htm accessed 25th July 2006 
157 28th July (S/FIN/M/1 0) 
158 JEI Chronology of US-Japan Relations and Japanese Economic Developments in 1995', JEI Number 
8, March 1st 1996 at httn://www jei.org1Archive/JEIR96/9608fapx7.html accessed 15th May 2005 
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An opportunity for the Commission to encourage bilateral commitment came with the 
launch of the 'Joint EU-US Action Plan' where both sides agreed to encourage financial 
services liberalisation and to try to secure a perill.anent financial services 
arrangement.159 In this way, pressure was kept up to ensure agreement and compliance 
by the US at the G7 meeting in Lyons in June 1996. It was agreed there, by all sides, to 
"relaunch talks in Singapore on financial services so as to reach significant, balanced 
and non-discriminatory liberalisation commitments by December 1997".160 Political 
pressure notwithstanding, the gap between the tenth and eleventh meetings of the 
Committee on Trade in Financial Services was eight months long, and the purpose of 
the second meeting was simply to check that countries were formally accepting the 
Protocol to the GATS. This meant that progress would not be made until the following 
year. The September 1996 Quad meeting was accepting of this fact although the 
language used in the Chairman's Summary suggests that a firm outcome was wanted 
once the talks restarted. 161 The TABD was also hoping that the Singapore Ministerial 
could encourage further action to ensure a completed FSA (as well as a BTA) as soon 
as possible. 162 However, the Singapore Ministerial did not prove particularly influential 
in encouraging progress, as the timetable had already been set before it took place. The 
Ministerial Declaration says only that the negotiations should; "resume ... in April 1997 
with the aim of achieving significantly improved market access commitments with a 
broader level of participation in the agreed time frame" .163 There is no suggestion, then, 
that the pace could or should somehow be quickened. 
At the Group's meeting of April1997, the Commission was still expectant of more 
offers coming in and aimed a barbed comment at the USA that "last-minute surprises 
should not be allowed". 164 That the WTO also wanted no 'surprises' was shown when 
the Chairman read a message from the Director-General, who expressed his confidence 
that the negotiations were now near the end point. Fortunately for the Commission, it 
appeared as if the US would do more to ensure agreement was reached; at the meeting an 
159 Trade text at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/us/action nlan/3 trade economy.htm accessed 25th July 2006 
160 22"d Western Economic Summit Lyons 27-291h June 1996 (see full report at 
http://europa.eu.int/ahc/doc/off/bulllen/9606/p000608.htm also at 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca'summit/19961yon/communiqueleco2.htm both accessed 25th July 2006 
161 Quad meeting Washington 27th and 28th September 1996. Chairman's Summary (at 
http://www.g8.utoronto.cattradelquad29.html accessed 25th July 2006 
162 Meeting 3rd November, see http://l28.121.145.19/tabd/media!l996ChicagoCEORenort.pdf for the full report 
163 WT/MIN(96)/DEC 
164 Meeting report circulated as S/FIN/M/13 
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offer was promised although, once again, the US wanted to see further progress made. 
No doubt influenced by Brittan, the Quad continued to express firm support for 
continuing efforts to reach agreement. 165 At the May 1997 meeting of the TABD, the 
Chairman of the CSI (so important to both Brittan and Barshefskyin the BTA) 
advocated a practical approach, asking CSI members to support the work of "the 
Financial Leaders Group (which was) working on several fronts" to help lobby WTO 
members and to encourage them to submit liberalisation commitments. 166 Therefore, 
once again, multinational business was pushing for a positive outcome. The G8 
Ministers meeting continued its political support to the process hoping for completion 
of negotiations by the end of the year. 167 
The Commission was able to report at the June meeting of the Negotiating Group that 
they had completed the Single Market in terms of financial services and had thus 
achieved "full mutual recognition without any restrictions". 168 This showed that the 
internal EC consensus was never in doubt about reaching a conclusion here. Both the 
Commission and the US then agreed to submit revised offers by 14'h July; the 
Commission commenting that early submission would act as encouragement to other 
members to do the same. At the July meeting, the Commission confirmed that it had 
submitted its offer at the end of June and that it was offering reciprocity on a full MFN 
basis. 169 The revised offer also removed some further restrictions for foreign companies 
seeking to operate in the Single Market including "the requirement that non-EU banks 
satisfy an 'economic needs' test before they can obtain a licence to operate in 
Austria" .170 The US's offer, submitted earlier that week, would also give competition 
rights to foreign companies although, as might be expected, the US still wanted other 
165 Meeting in Toronto from April 30th- May 2"' 1997 noted in the Chair's Statement (at 
http://www.g8.utoronto.caltradelquad30.html accessed 25th July 2006 
166 TABD meeting held 13th May 1997 in Brussels, report at http://static.tabd.com/manilaGems/MYM97.pdf 
accessed 25th July 2006. The Financial Leaders Group was a coalition of industry leaders with members 
from the US, EU as well as Canada, Switzerland, Hong Kong and Japan. 
167 Summit Statement from Denver of June 29 1997 at 
http://www.g8.fr/evianlenglish/navigation'g8 documents/archives from previous summits/denver summit -
1997/confronting global economic and financiaJ challenges.html accessed 25th July 2006 
168 Meeting 5th June 1997minutes circulated as S/FINIM/14 
169 Meeting 17th July, Minutes circulated as S/FIN/M/15. Also seeS Thoenes Financial Times 2"' July 
1997, page 6 'EU offers to end financial services curbs' 
170 M Reynolds, the International Financial Law Review of August 1997 'EU Makes New Offer on 
Financial Services to the WTO' at 
http://www.iflr.com/?Page=lO&PUBID=33&1SS=11950&SID=510349&SM=&SearchStr accessed 28th January 2008 
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offers to be improved as a result. 171 The outcome of the meeting was that twelve offers 
were received, one offer would come later in the day (Venezuela) and although a 
number were still outstanding, including India and ASEAN members, there seemed to 
be a general commitment that they would be eventually submitted.172 In spite of the 
delay, the Commission remarked that discussions had been fairly positive and the offers 
already received constituted a good first step in the negotiation. More new offers were 
tabled at the November meeting although the US delegate remarked that they "would 
have expected to be in a more intensive negotiating stage at this point", an observation 
backed by the Chairman who called for further, and urgent, progress. 173 
In an effort to promote the benefits that would result, the WTO Secretariat issued the 
results of a study showing that investors preferred to invest in countries with liberalized 
markets, or that had made commitments to this end for the future. 174 Interestingly, the 
article goes on to say that the report was issued to coincide with the annual World Bank 
and IMF meeting in Hong Kong where it was expected that the Commission along with 
the US would push for an agreement in the WTO by year-end. This suggests that the 
Commission was exploiting opportunities given by the other Bretton Woods institutions 
to further the possibility of an agreement. This may not have been the success that was 
anticipated as, at the negotiating group's October meeting, only five new offers had 
been tabled and the Commission commented ruefully "there was still a long way to 
go" .175 The November meeting, however, brought a glimmer oflight to the proceedings 
as eight new offers were submitted along with five revised offers, making a total of32 
although, by now, time was very short until the deadline.176 
17l F Williams the Financial Times of 15th July, page 6 'US lifts financial services hopes' 
172 Twelve offers received from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, the EC, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, 
Japan, Norway, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA. Offers mentioned at the meeting as 
being outstanding were from Brazil, Czech Republic, Egypt, Israel, Korea, Macau, New Zealand, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania and ASEAN. Also see F Williams in the Financial Times of 18th July page 
4, 'EU warns Asia on financial services deal' 
173 September 1997, minutes circulated as S/FIN/M/16. New offers submitted from the Czech Republic, 
Ecuador, Korea, Macau, New Zealand and Singapore 
174 G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 22"' September page 4, 'WTO in liberalization appeal' 
175 Minutes circulated as S/FIN/M/17. Five new offers received from Egypt, Iceland, Kenya, Nigeria and 
Slovenia 
176 Minutes circulated as S/FIN/M/18. Eight new offers from Costa Rica, Israel, Mauritius, Peru, 
Philippines, South Africa, Tunisia and Uruguay. Five revised offers from Canada, Ecuador, New Zealand, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Malaysia may have been one of the countries expected to submit an offer, 
F Williams, Financial Times 12th November page 6, 'Malaysia pressed on key offer in WTO talks' said 
that intensive discussions were ongoing with them 
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In what would prove to be the start of decisive progress, at the first December meeting 13 
additional offers were tabled bringing the total to 45 offers, with three revised offers. 177 
The Commission was still concerned over the timing but the US continued their efforts to 
bring the negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion. Ruggiero spoke to the delegates urging 
them not to allow "the best (to) be the enemy of the good", comments which were said to 
be aimed particularly at the US.178 Brittan must have been delighted that the negotiations 
could be concluded on 12th December meeting where eleven additional offers were 
received, making 56 in total, and 28 revised offers were circulated prior to the meeting. 179 
The US delegate commented that, along with the ITA and BTA, the completion of the 
FSA represented; "A triad of solid, global market-opening agreements (with) 
commitments (covering) over 95 per cent of world trade in financial services, with new 
and improved offers from 70 countries ... a truly global deal". Brittan would later put the 
size of the market in monetary terms; "equity trading ... represents US $14.8 trillion in 
1996 ... Total banking assets ... amounted to US $41.2 trillion in 1995 ... Total insurance 
prernivms ... amounted to US $2.1 trillion in 1995" .180 At the end of the meeting, 
Ruggiero was on hand to thank the 102 countries, which had agreed to open their 
markets. 
This was not, however, the end of the story. Talks continued to be difficult as the US 
wanted developing countries to commit to greater market opening.181 Fortunately, though, 
this did not go on for long; the US presumably heeding Ruggiero's words of the previous 
month. The agreement was finally signed on 301h December and Brittan was happy with 
what this represented for the multilateral trading systern. 182 The European Commission's 
177 Meeting held December 8th 1997, minutes circulated as S/FIN/M/19.Thirteen new offers from Bulgaria, 
Chile, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Poland and Senegal. Three revised offers from Australia, Hungary and Switzerland. 
178 F Williams, the Financial Times of 9th December 1997, page 8 'WTO chief issues plea' 
179 Meeting held 12 December 1997, minutes circulated as S/FIN/M/20. New offers received from Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malta, Romania, Sri Lanka and Thailand. A list 
of all the offers and their status is given on pages 3, 4 and 5 of those Minutes. 
180 From his speech of September 24th 1998 to the US Coalition of Service Industries on 'Europe's 
Prescriptions for the Global Trade Agenda' accessed at http'//www.uscsi.org/publications/papers/luncheon keynote.. 
sir leon .htm on 6th September 2006 
181 C Denny the Guardian of 13th December (page 24, 'Global pact in balance as United States digs in' 
182 That the Agreement was eventually signed on 30th December is sourced from the WTO's page on 
'Understanding the WTO: The Uruguay Round' at htro://www. wto.org/cnglishlthewto e/whatis e/tif e/f.act5 e.htm 
accessed 12th April2008. Also see Pierre Sauve and James Gillespie 'Financial Services and the GATS 
2000 Round' a Brookings-Wharton Paper on Financial Services 2000 pp 423-452 at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/brookings-wharton papers on financial setvices/v2000/2000.lsauve.html Where they say that the 
FSA "represents without a doubt one of the hallmark achievements of the Uruguay Round" accessed 29th 
January 2008 
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General Report on Common Commercial Policy of 1997 referenced its own importance 
in achieving this agreement on financial services which, in the end, was to cover in excess 
of95% of financial services trade. 183 It seems fair to conclude that the Commission's 
activism helped to bring about this agreement; "the best case of successful extensive 
liberalization in the financial services industry". 184 
Financial Services, as with Basic Telecommunications, is part of the GA TS negotiations 
opened in 2000. However, although a number of proposals have been tabled, there has 
been no extension to the agreement and it has been suggested that the developing 
countries are unenthusiastic about signing up to any new commitments in the area. 185 
Conclusions 
It was shown that the Commission had been thinking about information technology for 
some time before the end of the Uruguay Round and there was a clear appreciation of 
the need for a multilateral initiative at an early stage; using the G7 to provide a political 
push towards wider agreement. Nevertheless, in spite of their aim for a multilateral 
agreement, bilateral agreement between the EC and US was seen as a prerequisite. 
Significant involvement from industry (considering the companies who were 
represented at the G8 conference, and also T ABD) suggested that they would help to 
lobby the US to ensure purposive action. The importance of bilateral agreement can 
also be demonstrated by the fact that there was no discussion of the ITA at ASEM or 
SOMTI and little effort, until the final stages, to develop a supportive internal 
consensus within the Council of Ministers. 
183 Found at at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/otf!mlenll997/enx60397.htm accessed 25th July 2006 
184 From 'The EU Experience in Financial Services Liberalisation: A Model for GATS negotiations?' by 
P Bongini of the Societe Universitaire Europeenne de Recherches Financieres (SUERF) SUERF Studies 
2003/2 at http://www.suetf.org/downloadisludieslstudv20032.pdf accessed 29th January 2008 
185 See, for example, S/FIN/W/43 of 8th June 2005, a communication to the Group from 12 countries 
(including the EU) on the importance of further liberalisation in the Do ha Round. This appears to have 
been the most recent paper circulated to the Group (as of February 2008). Suggestion that it is the 
developing countries who are least enthusiastic about this area from the International Chamber of 
Commerce's Policy Statement of 4"' May 2004 'A business view of the benefits of opening trade in 
financial services' at http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/financial!idS92/index.html accessed 29th January 2008 
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The question oftrade-offs was very important here with the Commission's persistent 
efforts to join the Semiconductor Council and, once this was achieved, their wish for 
further concessions from the USA in order to bring the Council of Ministers on board at 
the Singapore Ministerial. Council had already agreed, two months earlier, that the 
Commission was able to negotiate with third countries on removing excise duties in IT 
so perhaps the internal coalition was not as jeopardized as French objections, and 
European Council rejection, might suggest. The Commission's consensus building 
strengths came to the fore after Singapore, ultimately persuading Malaysia, and others, 
to weaken their stance and conclude the negotiations. There was a limit to this at the 
end of the process as it did not build agreement for an ITA-I!. This was partly because 
of the wide range of goods listed; many of which it would be difficult to classify as 
pertaining to 'information technology', such as video cassette recorders. Developing 
countries seemed concerned not only about possible domestic unrest if this went ahead, 
but also that a wider agreement outside the scope of pure 'IT' might be the eventual 
aim. This hints again at the growing importance of getting the developing countries on 
board in order to achieve a supportive consensus in the WTO. 
With Basic Telecommunications, the Commission had been looking at policymaking in 
this area since 1980 and the date for full liberalisation, January 1998, had been set in 
July 1993. This suggests that internal policy drove multilateral agreement at least as 
much as the Uruguay Round negotiations may have done. As two of the nineteen 
parties seeking to continue to negotiate after the Round, the US and EC were very 
closely aligned in their wish to see an Agreement in this area and were supported by the 
Quad, the G7, the World Bank and at least some of the developing countries as well as 
influential industry bodies such as the CSI, from the outset. The flexibility in the 
Commission's first offer seemed to have helped keep the supportive consensus within 
Council and this base agreement was built on, possibly by using the Article 113 
Committee as was the case with Spain, to enable the Belgian, Greek, Italian and 
Spanish governments to agree to a revised offer. That this was successful is shown by 
Council's positive reception of the draft Agreement text in February 1997 and their 
strong message to the Commission to complete the negotiations. 
146 
Although the US was to eventually drop out at the negotiation stage, this did not change 
the internal timetable and no additional concessions were offered to them, unlike the 
trade offs the Commission secured as recompense for their agreement to the IT A. 
Ruggiero put together a rescue package for the negotiations and Quad support together 
with Spanish liberalisation (and industry lobbying) along with new offers brought the 
US back to the table and ensured that deadlines were kept. Once again, the Singapore 
Ministerial did not provide a political push to developments in this area and, also, the 
Commission was not required to embark on such a major PR venture as it had to do 
with the ITA. However, Commission enthusiasm and activism was not enough to 
achieve any further progress once the Agreement had been signed. 
With the final case study, the Financial Services Agreement, multilateral negotiations 
again began in the Uruguay Round and countries agreed to continue these talks, with a 
very short timescale, when the Round finished. It was likely that there was a general 
wish not to lose the seventy six 'offers' that had already been tabled. From the outset 
. there was strong G7 and T ABD endorsement coupled with a permissive internal 
coalition. However, once again the US pulled out, concerned that commitments made 
by the other participants were insufficient and Brittan took the initiative of getting the 
negotiations back on track. This necessitated consensus building activity, to the same 
level as the IT A negotiations had demanded, and with bilateral pressure being kept up 
through the EU-US Action Plan, together with multilateral pressure through the G7, 
TABD, the 'Financial Leaders' Group' and the Quad, not forgetting the WTO, there 
was an eventual commitment from the US to continue negotiations. Once again, nothing 
appeared to have been offered to the US as a trade-off. However, by the time 
negotiations had re-started, the deadline had, from necessity, slipped to 1997 and even 
the Singapore Ministerial process could not change the timing back. 
In spite of the US and EC making revised offers in July 1997, there was still a lot of 
work necessary to get agreement by December. Perhaps it was, with hindsight, 
inevitable that concluding the negotiations would prove difficult considering the end 
result covered a bigger percentage of trade - at over ninety five percent - than the other 
two agreements. This may also have been why Leon Brittan exercised such a high level 
of personal leadership to ensure its successful completion. 
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All three. cases detailed here are very different in tone. With the IT A, although it 
appeared that the US and EC wanted a positive outcome, in the end it seemed as if only 
the US was prepared to make concessions in order to see an agreement delivered. With 
the BT A, it first looked as if the US and EC were standing side-by-side, but in the end it 
was the Commission and Renato Ruggiero that had to push for the work to be 
completed when the US pulled out of the negotiations. In the case of the FSA, again the 
US stopped the negotiations and the Commission was responsible for getting them back 
on track. However, it is also clear that there are a number of similarities as well as 
differences. 
The Commission showed it was able to energise different groups to support its 
initiatives and, thus, to achieve a supportive external coalition. There is a very clear 
indication from what has been shown that the Commission used the G7, TABD, CSI 
and the Quad, at different times, to ensure that progress was made. As well as these 
groups, Leon Brittan was also happy to lobby other WTO members individually to 
facilitate favourable outcomes (particularly in the ITA and FSA but also in the BTA). 
The Commission also showed itself able to use trade-offs when it wanted to assure the 
coherence of the internal coalition (in the ITA) but showed a marked reticence to use 
them for the benefit of the external coalition (BTA and FSA) perhaps assured that the 
US position was more posturing than a genuine threat to eventual consensus. The lack 
of political impact of the Ministerial process on these negotiations is another area of 
commonality; this suggests that 'real' work was done in the task area negotiations 
rather than through the Ministerials and was unaffected by the difficulties of achieving 
consensus in the larger forum. 
Although not all of the negotiations were the same in this regard, the Commission was 
also able to think on its feet, i.e. without consulting Council, in policy entrepreneurship 
(the interim arrangement in the FSA) and in exercising significant policy leadership, 
expertise perhaps, in order to facilitate agreement. Amongst other characteristics that 
the Commission demonstrated was in using the Article 113 Committee to encourage 
Spanish agreement to a liberalized market (BT A) and ensuring the first telecoms offer 
gave enough flexibility to keep a strong internal coalition in place. The Commission 
also proved adept at using either bilateral agreement with the US to drive developments 
in WTO (ITA) or use the push provided by the Single Market to facilitate multilateral 
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solutions (BTA) or to work within the multilateral system from the start (FSA). Perhaps 
most notably in the IT A, the Commission also seemed less worried about possible 
fragmentation of the internal consensus, leaving it unaddressed until the last moment of 
negotiations. This may have been because the Commission was confident of eventual 
Council agreement or because it was using the threat of veto to extract more 
concessions from the US. Either way, it shows that explicit Council permissiveness was 
not a necessary prerequisite to negotiations even after Ruling 1/94. 
A note of caution can be sounded about future progress, however. Concerns expressed 
by developing countries about widening agreements, especially IT A-ll, suggest that 
sectoral negotiations might not be as successful in the later time period. If these 
countries were worried about their domestic audiences and felt that the Quad would 
push wider agreements on them without their explicit consent, they could decide not to 
participate. Due to the nature of the Single Undertaking, meaning that all countries 
would have to adhere to the Agreement even if they did not negotiate it, they could seek 
to ensure that no negotiations proceeded to Agreement stage. 
The success of the initiatives here has been shown to be due to a combination of the 
different roles and responsibilities that the Commission exercises and the positions of 
the interests that they have to satisfY over time and issue. This will be explored in the 
next Chapter where conclusions will be drawn from Chapters Three and Four before the 
analysis moves on to consider Lamy's tenure as Trade Commissioner in Chapters Six, 
Seven and Eight. Conclusions from the two time periods will then be drawn in Chapter 
Nine. 
149 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The European Commission in the WTO from Marrakech to Seattle-
Evaluation 
Introduction 
As has been shown in the previous Chapters, acting on a global stage invokes particular 
difficulties for the Commission in that it has to exercise its roles and responsibilities in 
order to satisfY different interests. Firstly, the Commission has to reach an internal 
consensus in order to develop a mandate proposal for WTO negotiations. Secondly, the 
Commission then has to submit this proposal, and take a steer from, the Article 113/133 
Committee, COREPER and the General Affairs Council (GAC). Thirdly, when the 
Commission begins negotiations, it confronts the views of the other WTO members. 
The two preceding chapters highlighted the range of the Commission's roles and 
responsibilities within WTO negotiations, from 1996 to 1999 looking at the political 
Ministerial processes in Chapter Three and the more technocratic sectoral negotiations 
in Chapter Four. The two chapters showed the different levels of politicization within 
each of those negotiating environments and the resultant difficulties of achieving 
consensus. Chapter Three highlighted that there was more complexity, and 
politicization, in the Ministerials, which impacted upon the success of the Commission 
in building supportive coalitions. The evolving dispersal of interests between the Quad 
and the developing countries were shown in tabular form to draw attention to areas of 
possible conflict. Chapter Four, meanwhile, went into much greater detail about the 
mechanics of specific negotiations by looking at three case studies; the Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA), the Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement 
(BTA) and the Financial Services Agreement (FSA). Analysing these sectoral 
negotiations showed that although there might have been less politicization in the 
smaller forums, there was more risk of defection and there were a number of occasions 
where the Commission had to either extract concessions to ensure that the internal 
consensus would hold, or to encourage negotiations back on track as a policy 
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entrepreneur. It was also shown that the Singapore Ministerial had very little influence 
on the rate of progress or on the level of consensus achieved within these negotiations. 
The purpose of this Chapter, then, is to look further at the empirical evidence on the 
evolving nature and 'mix' of the Commission's roles and responsibilities and the extent 
to which they were supported or modified by the interplay of the interests. It will also 
assess whether the growing level of politicization had a negative impact on the 
Commission's ability to pursue its agenda, and to reach a satisfactory conclusion on the 
policy issues within its purview. It will not suggest the Commission fulfilled one of its 
roles and responsibilities and none of the others. The Commission has aspects of all of 
these within its external trade portfolio, as Chapter One made clear. The purpose is to 
see which was the dominant mode of activity and to what effect and extent the 
Commission was able to achieve its aims, or the aims of its mandate, in so doing. 
Overview 
Although it might have been expected, by the Court's ruling of 1/94, that the 
Commission could become more 'reined in' and conflict could result between Council 
and the Commission impacting on the Commission's roles and responsibilities, this was 
not the case in practice. Council continued to expect the Commission's input in terms of 
suggesting policies and positions. This can be seen in the document preparing the 
Millennium Round where COM(l999)331 was used to define negotiating positions in 
all areas, not just those falling strictly within Commission competence. This suggests 
that the practicalities of dealing with negotiations overrode the political implications to 
the ruling and that Council needed the Commission to bring its experience in 
negotiating in these areas to the table (supported by interviewees 4, 6, 7 & 8). As it was, 
the Commission appeared to maintain a supportive consensus with Council (and 
Parliament) over the period. There is evidence for this in Brittan escaping censure in 
spite of his efforts to push for the 'Millennium Round' above other issues that Council 
appeared to think were more important. This different emphasis was clearly visible in 
the Council and Commission statements to the Singapore Ministerial and between what 
the Commission tried to achieve in Geneva, compared to what Council and Parliament 
wanted them to achieve. It has also been shown that Brittan's views matched the WTO 
Secretariat's expectations about the need to cement in the authority of the new 
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organisation by building on what had been achieved in the Uruguay Round to develop 
the WTO's agenda over a wider range of topics. This meant that Brittan had significant 
support from the WTO Secretariat in pursuing progress in the sectoral negotiations as 
well as in his quest for a new Round. This manifested itself in a close professional 
relationship between Brittan and Ruggiero. 
Perhaps the overriding impression of the evidence amassed here about Brittan's years as 
Trade Commissioner, is that the issue of agriculture was pretty much off the agenda, at 
least externally. The prospect of new negotiations on agriculture was one of the reasons 
behind Brittan's strong advocacy for a Millennium Round: that agriculture could be 
bundled together with other issues to enable trade offs. Considering that the view of the 
Cairns Group remained in direct conflict with the Commission's and Council's views 
and as it had also been difficult to gain consensus on reform in Council at the end of the 
Uruguay Round, it could be considered sensible to espouse a wide ranging agenda to 
talks. 
The other issue that becomes more evident, especially through Chapter Three, is of the 
growing politicisation of the trade field. Firstly, there is evidence from the Singapore 
Ministerial that the developing countries were unhappy with the level of commitments 
they had made at the end of the Uruguay Round, as was shown by the dispersal of 
preferences. They were concerned that having new items added to the WTO agenda 
would leave them further estranged from the multilateral trading system. Secondly, 
NGO mobilisation against the WTO, compared to the GATT, appears to have become 
more widespread judging by the street demonstrations in Geneva. This may have been 
precipitated partly by the widespread concern, amongst NGOs, about the implications 
of the MAl to developing countries and, leading on from that, a growing understanding 
of the WTO's mandate. This increased politicization is not only visible within the 
Ministerials but suggested at the end of the IT A negotiations where the developing 
countries chose not to participate in discussions that might extend the WTO 's agenda. 
This seems to be due to general concern about new issues and their technical and 
financial capacity to engage in them and a wider anxiety that the developed countries 
might try to strongarm them into a broader agreement (supported by interviewee 8). 
These issues and the effects that they had will be tracked in the analysis below. 
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Roles and responsibilities 
The Commission as expert 
Rometsch and Wessels (1994) identified this as one of the Commission's primary 
functions. As detailed in Chapter One, the Commission is not a technocracy, although 
this is what Jean Monnet had in mind when he developed the European infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, it does exercise policy leadership in external trade because it is asked to 
do so in the Treaty of Rome and because it is responsible for negotiating within the 
WTO. This section will pull out from the previous Chapters not only where the 
Commission was able to act as an expert, but also suggest where this was most and least 
successful. 
With the 1/94 ruling, and the fall out following the Uruguay Round (see Chapter Two), 
it could have been thought that the Commission would be subject to roll back of its 
competence from the member states insofar as the Court made a ruling on its 
competence not just its practice (see Meunier and Nicola!dis, 1999). At the very least, it 
might be expected that the Commission's expertise in all fields, especially where issues 
fell under 'mixed competence', might be questioned. This could have been exacerbated 
because the Commission's status in the WTO was different from its status in GATT i.e. 
that it was a WTO member in its own right and was able to speak on behalf of the 
member states in meetings, which may have encouraged the Council to further assert its 
authority on the Commission. 1 However, as has been shown, this was not the case. 
There was also no evidence of a concerted effort on the part of the member states to 
actively change Commission policy in the WTO as set out by Brittan after the 1/94 
Ruling even after Geneva when it appears that Council expected more than it got in 
· terms of the results it had been seeking. The Commission was still given the freedom to 
continue as it was in a supportive, if not necessarily permissive, environment. 
I See 'The European Communities and the wro· at 
http://www.wto.org/Englishlthewto e./countries e/european communities e.htm accessed 15th May 2007 
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This can partly be explained by the nature of the internal consensus. For example, in 
Chapter Three, there was no unanimity on labour standards, with the UK and Germany 
being very much against pursuing this in the WTO and in Chapter Four there were 
mixed views on the prospect of signing a finalized IT A at Singapore as well as revising 
offers in the BT A. Although there was no progress on trade/labour links in the WTO 
over this time, and indeed Brittan seemed to walk away from pursuing it after the 
Singapore Ministerial, the other negotiations continued and were later finalized. Brittan, 
then, was able to make significant progress as an expert, in spite of member state 
concerns, where issues were not contested or politicized most notably in the sectoral 
negotiations. A further issue area where the Commission was unable to ensure 
adherence to its position was in the replacement ofRenato Ruggiero. In this example, 
the Council was unable to agree on one of the two candidates and thus the EC as a 
whole failed to speak with a single voice (Holland, 2002). 
The Commission's role as 'expert' both internally (in the EC) and externally (as the 
'voice of Europe' in the WTO) also gave it the status in WTO to carry out a salvage 
exercise for the Financial Services Agreement. Brittan's rationale was to keep the new 
agreement on the table, making sure there was no slippage, at the same time as 
demanding forward progress as an incentive to bring the US back to the negotiations. 
Ruggiero was to remark later that this demonstrated significant policy leadership on the 
part of the Commission, perhaps as much of a public statement about the strong 
alignment of preferences between the WTO Secretariat and EC as it was about 
progress. 2 The Commission was not, however, always successful. Although it strongly 
pushed WTO work on trade and environment, there was no effort to 'upgrade' the 
existing Working Group at Singapore, for example by changing its terms of reference or 
by setting firm targets for its work leading to an Agreement. Externally, the US 
remained unsure of the benefits of a new Round. Furthermore, developing countries and 
NGOs criticized the European position of supporting a new Round and of pursuing an 
MAI, particularly as Brittan had made his support for both explicit. On the basis of this 
evidence, the technocratic approach, together with the supportive internal negotiating 
environment, was valuable in holding together the internal consensus, and facilitating 
2 From a speech by Ruggiero to a Conference on Trade in Services, 2"' June 1998, 'Towards GATS 
2000: A European Strategy' at http://www.wto.org/english'news e!wrr e/brusst e.htm accessed 26th March 2008. 
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the signature of the sectoral agreements, but did not help to formulate political decisions 
(Ruggiero's replacement), develop a strong line in Ministerials (support for the MAl) or 
promote a spirit of inclusivity with the developing countries. 
The Commission as government 
The suggestion by Rometsch and Wessels (1994: 21 7) was that this potential outcome 
was a direct contradiction of the above model, and would see the Commission "develop 
into the 'government', the head of which would be elected by, and ... responsible to the 
European Parliament". Unsurprisingly, then, Chapter One noted that there were a 
number of governmental aspects to the way the Commission works within the WTO 
and it was pointed out, again in Chapter One, that a number of the functions they hold 
in external trade are wholly independent of the Council, for example, import relief, 
competition and diplomatic representation. 
Examples have been given, within the preceding Chapters, of the Commission acting in 
a 'governmental' way. The Commission was authorized to sign the Final Accord from 
Singapore on behalf of the Community and the Member States thus cementing its 
intemallegitimacy in the WTO and it was able to issue a number of position papers to 
General Council, prior to the Seattle Ministerial, emphasizing its external legitimacy. 3 
Perhaps the most obvious example of the Conunission as a Government is Brittan's 
hosting of the G7 Information Society conference in February 1995. This had not 
happened before, and has not since, and demonstrates significant leadership on Brittan's 
part as well as perhaps highlighting his personal status as an ex-senior Cabinet member 
in the UK., which gave him additional credibility, one supposes, to lobby world leaders 
to attend. The purpose of this conference was to garner support for an IT A and the 'core 
principles' defined therein were influential within the final Agreement, making it a very 
worthwhile enterprise. 
3 Trade facilitation, services, trade and competition, government procurement, TRIPs, trade and 
environment, duty-free market access for LDCs, the 'EC Approach to Possible Decisions at Seattle', 
trade and investment, the TBT agreement, agriculture, 'Capacity Building and Coherence in Global 
Economic Policymaking' and electronic commerce 
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The other example of governmental status is the position of the EC in the 
Semiconductor Agreement, which formed one of the conditions to the EC's agreement 
to the IT A. In addition, the T ABD had referred to the Commission, along with the US, 
as "a government" in terms of what it wanted both sides to achieve bilaterally. 
Similarly, it could be said to be 'governmental' that Brittan was able to pursue his aim 
of a Millennium Round even when Council and other players (notably the US) were 
unenthusiastic. This is because it suggests a level of autonomy at the negotiating table 
akin to what might be expected from a WTO member government. There is more 
general evidence, too, that the Commission was able to act quasi-governmentally in the 
sectoral negotiations, where Brittan continued to push for favourable outcomes on the 
ITA, BTA and FSA, particularly insofar as he encouraged the Quad and G7 to come on 
board with the initiatives he was suggesting. 
This may indicate that the Council was concerned with other issues at the time, which 
had encouraged them to give the Commission a long leash with regard to the more 
specialist issues that were being debated in the WTO. There is evidence for this in the 
Press Releases from the sixty two GAC meetings from January 1995 to August 1999 as 
WTO issues featured strongly in only fifteen.4 However, the Commission's lack of 
agency can be shown in the Council's continued insistence that the cultural exception 
be upheld and on the 'multifunctionality' of agriculture; stopping Brittan from pursuing 
his free market ideals. Furthermore, although the ITA, BTA and FSA were eventually 
signed, there was an acceptance that the former two needed urgent updating because 
they did not reflect the speed of development in electronic communications. That the 
Commission could not encourage this to take place may be further evidence of its lack 
of governmental status. In terms oflabour standards, too, the Commission was not 
allowed to be 'governmental' in the same way as it was not allowed to be an 'expert'. 
In this example, just as there was a fragmented internal consensus, so was there a 
fragmented external consensus. Additionally, many developing countries, said at 
Singapore that they would not accept labour standards on the agenda. 
4 Press releases accessed from the portal at 
http://www.consilium. europa. eu/cms3 applications/ AnnlicationslnewsRoomlloadbook.AS P?target'-'200 1 &infoTargct~before&M A 
X=IO!&BI!F7J&LANG=!&cmsld=349 on 12th March 2008. The GAC meetings where WTO matters featured 
heavily were held on 6/2/95, 6/3/95, 17/7/95, 2/10/95, 29/4/96, 1/10/96, 25/11/96, 9/12/96, 20/1/97, 
14/2/97, 24/3/97, 12/12/97,30/3/98, 18/5/98,21/6/99 
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In conclusion, although the Commission could have been said to have acted 
governmentally or quasi-governmentally in certain circumstances, this seems to be 
more because of Council acquiescence or focus on other issues rather than the 
Commission having a governmental status in itself. The Chapters also showed that the 
Commission was much less successful where work areas were politicized or contested 
(in terms of there being a fragmented internal and/or external consensus) such as in the 
IT A-Il or in labour standards. 
The Commission as administrator 
In Chapter One it was argued that administration is akin to a secretariat function or a 
civil service/bureaucracy and suggests that the Commission can be viewed as fulfilling 
that in terms of policy implementation. This also comes back to Meunier and 
Nicolaidis' (1999) contention that the Council sought to rollback responsibility from the 
Commission after the end of the Uruguay Round with the result that the Commission 
might be seen to be more of an administrator within external trade over time. 
It could be hypothesised that if Council was concerned that the Commission would 
become more influential in the world trade field, through the creation of the WTO, and 
it wanted to guard against this, that there could be a reconfiguration of the Article 113 
Committee to ensure that the Commission was 'locked in' to adhering to the Council's 
preferences in the negotiation process (as the Committee is the Council's eyes and ears 
at this stage, see Smith, 1994: 256). Such a reaction may have been predicted in the 
wake ofthe 1194 Ruling. However, on the basis of the evidence both Council and the 
Commission carried on as they had prior to Ruling 1/94. Ruling 1194 was valuable to 
Council only in political not practical terms and although there might be informal 
rollback (in terms of Treaty responsibilities), this had no bearing on effective pursuit of 
the Commission's roles and responsibilities in external trade (supported by interviewees 
1, 4, 5 & 7). 
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In the field oflabour standards, the Commission had very little agency in that there was 
little that could be achieved over the objections of the developing countries, as well as 
the objections of the UK and Germany. It would appear that Brittan let the matter drop 
after the Singapore Ministerial although he was not censured by Council for so doing, 
suggesting that Council either tacitly agreed with the line he took or that Council 
appreciated that progress could not be made at that time. Limits to the Commission's 
agency also became clear at Geneva as, in spite of exerting political pressure, there was 
no explicit mention of trade/investment, trade/labour, trade/ competition or government 
procurement in the Final Declaration, nor any mention of a future Round, which was 
Brittan's primary objective. In addition, the cultural exception had to be maintained, 
with particular concern about the impact of the IT A expressed by Council, so there was 
a limit to the amount ofliberalisation that Brittan could propose. It is also the case that 
the Commission had less agency when it came to choosing a successor for Renato 
Ruggiero; unable to encourage a clear consensus in favour of one or other of the 
candidates. 
The Commission's position with regard to labour standards, the cultural exception and 
the replacement of Ruggiero shows it is more administrative when the content of 
negotiations is politicised. This is because of the difficulties establishing consensus 
internally and externally. However, although the Commission had those administrative 
aspects to its roles and responsibilities, these did not seem to reduce the perception of 
its authority by its partners in Europe or the WTO. Brittan was able to exert individual 
leadership in the IT A, BTA and FSA, and had the G8 firmly on-side in the IT A. These 
successes counter, at least to some extent, any negative opinion. Whether the 
Commission would become more administrative due to the increasing politicization of 
the trade field, will be shown in the course of the next three Chapters. 
The Commission as coalition builder 
Building coalitions, as was detailed in Chapter One, is essential to ensure 'buy in' from 
the member states to European initiatives. In the WTO, the Commission has to work to 
build coalitions both internally and externally in order to gamer support for policies and 
make agreements hold. There are a number of factors, which influence their success in 
this regard, for example whether the internal negotiating context or the external 
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negotiating context is pennissive or supportive on the Commission to achieve certain 
goals. The environment is also affected by the interplay ofthe interests and this will be 
explored later. 
Internally, the Commission seemed to be working closely together over this period. 
That the Environment Commissioner supported the overall Commission aims in 
Singapore, and the Employment and Social Affairs Commissioner eo-wrote a 
Communication with Brittan on 'The Trading System and Internationally Recognised 
Labour Standards' suggests the College was, on these issues at least, well aligned with 
Brittan's objectives.5 The Commission's relationship with Council also seemed very 
supportive in that Council appeared content to go along with the Commission's 
proposals even after Ruling 1194 and shared the Commission's wish to extend the 
WfO's remit to new areas. Even when Council did not get what it wanted at Geneva, it 
did not encourage the Commission to build supportive coalitions in the policy areas it 
identified as key. At the same time, the European Parliament seemed to be becoming 
more active in the field, although it appeared to be fighting an internal battle between 
pursuing a social agenda and a commercial one. As its views were taken on board by 
the Commission in COM(1999)331, its informal role appears more influential than its 
formal role. 
Brittan was instrumental in encouraging over 1 00 American and European businesses to 
participate in the T ABD, which he had helped to set up as a "framework for enhanced 
cooperation between the transatlantic business community and the governments of the 
European Union and United States".6 The TABD's website suggests that the ultimate 
objective would be for a barrier free transatlantic market place- which would impact 
on the wro because there would be more incentive for the US and EC to negotiate 
deals bilaterally rather than multilaterally. The importance of the TABD is shown in 
Brittan leading the EC delegation to the inaugural meeting along with the Industry 
5 COM(96)0402 
6 From the TABD website, www.tabd.com, accessed 15" May 2007 TABD was in existence to: "facilitate 
closer (bilateral) economic relations (and) to focus governments' attention on issues where consensus 
exists between the transatlantic business community and identify specific actions required from 
government to achieve this aim" Found at www.useu.be/DOCS/tabd.html, written in November 1996, accessed 
4th August 2006 
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Commissioner (again, a sign of a solid internal coalition).7 However, the existence of 
this forum would not stop the US pulling out of the BTA and FSA negotiations and it 
might be noted that congratulatory messages were sent from both the Commission and 
the USTR to the CSI following the successful completion of the BTA, rather than to 
TABD. TABD did not, then, live up to this proposed status as it could not break the 
deadlock so the bilateral, political process to define positions in the WTO remained 
important. 
Externally, Brittan showed he was able to use the Quad and the G8 (amongst others) in 
order to gain support and this seemed to work well over the duration with clear 
mandates supporting the Commission's perspective on the sectoral negotiations. This 
support did not, however, enable Brittan to push through the IT A-Il, though. Brittan 
also succeeded in building a supportive coalition to put the 'Singapore Issues' onto the 
WTO agenda, in spite of opposition against new items from the developing countries. 
Few LDCs appeared to be participating or to want to participate in the IT A, BTA and 
FSA, meaning that there was little effort expended to build consensus with them, and 
supportive NGOs around them, in Working Group meetings.8 Their lack of involvement 
at Working Group level may have helped to increase their suspicion at Ministerial level 
that the Commission had wider ambitions than seeing these Agreements signed. This 
also fits with the growing political problems of getting civil society on board with the 
WTO agenda, which was shown by the public demonstrations at Geneva and at the G8 
meeting in June 1999. There were also significant concerns about the MAl, and the 
Commission's efforts to move negotiations to the WTO, as well as with the 
preparations for Seattle. Whether this level of contestation would grow and how the 
Commission would respond will be shown in future Chapters. 
7 From the DG Enterprise website, T ABD section at 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/entemriseientemrise policy/business dialogues/tabd/tabdoveJW.htm accessed 4th August 
2006.The ftrst meeting took place in Seville on November 11 and 12'h 1995 
8 None in the ITA, Bangladesh and Senegal in the BTA and Senegal in the FSA 
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Interests 
The purpose of considering interests here is, as was detailed in Chapter One, to isolate 
and examine the three different levels of interests, which affect the Commission's roles 
and responsibilities in external trade. To clarify, the first is the internal Commission 
interest, the second is the internal Council of Ministers interest and the third is the 
global (WTO) interest. All of these can act individually or together to influence the 
Commission in external trade. As none are unitary actors, there can often be conflict 
within or between them. In addition, the positions of each are unstable and can change 
over time and in response to different stimuli. We might expect that the interests 
became more constraining on the Commission over time, and this would be reflected in 
the growing politicisation of the trade field or that the growing politicization of the 
trade field would encourage the interests to constrain the Commission. 
Politicization is a two-edged sword. Although politicization can keep issues offthe 
table, it might also delay the acceptance or implementation of policies, which are 
considered positive by some of the players. For example, the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, mentioned in Chapter Four, was being negotiated in OECD to "provide a 
broad multilateral framework for international investment with high standards for the 
liberalisation of investment regimes and investment protection and with effective 
dispute settlement procedures".9 This was for the benefit ofOECD members, none of 
which are developing countries. However, transferring it to the WTO, especially if it 
was under the Single Undertaking, suggested that it might apply to all countries and 
allow "corporations and investors to sue governments directly for cash compensation in 
retaliation for almost any government policy or action that undermines profits" and 
although large exporter and industry groups thought it would be a positive step, it did 
not go ahead.10 Because of this, it is important to consider the level and effect of 
politicization through this time period as well as the ways in which this was reflected in 
the needs and wants of the interests. 
9 From the OECD webpage on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment found at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0 2340 en 2649 201 185 1894819 I I I I.OO.html accessed l3ili May 2007 
10 The US pressure group Public Citizen 'Everything you wanted to know about the MAl but didn't know 
to ask' at http://www.citizen.org/trade/issues/mai/articles.cfm?ID=:5626 accessed 13th May 2007 For an example of an 
endorsement of the MAl, see the Press Release of the Canadian Alliance of Manufacturers and Exporters 
of December 5, 1997 
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The Commission interest 
The report of activities of the European Union in 1995 reveals that work in EMU, the 
single currency and job creation was prioritized throughout the year by all of the 
institutions. The same report of 1996 suggests that it was again, EMU, social policy, 
growth and employment and industrial competitiveness, which were the key areas of 
work. 11 J acques Santer' s overview of the 1997 report highlights EMU, employment 
and the Amsterdam IGC and enlargement and the 1998 report is almost identical; 
focusing on the importance of Agenda 2000 and the Single Currency along with 
growth, competitiveness and employment.12 This was also the case in 1999 where the 
emphasis was given to enlargement, the new financial framework, the euro and 
competitiveness, along with CFSP. 13 Therefore, the Commission as a whole was less 
concerned with the WTO than it was with the issues mentioned here over this time 
period. This was likely to have been why the internal (Commission) consensus was 
permissive. 
It has already been noted that part ofBrittan's success in achieving agreement to a 
broadened WTO agenda at the Singapore Ministerial was to do with agriculture being 
off the table at the time. The 'Communication on Agenda 2000- for a stronger and 
wider Europe', which had been developed following a request from the Madrid 
European Council in December 1995 showed that this would not be the case in the long 
term. 14 This document not only gave the Commission position on the ten applicant 
countries waiting to join the European Union but also set out the changes it felt were 
necessary to the Common Agricultural Policy; this position would form the basis for 
negotiations in Seattle. The Cairns Group criticized the EC position as it felt agriculture 
would still not come fully under WTO rules. 15 Only Demark, Ireland, Sweden and the 
UK supported the "general thrust" of the agricultural reform (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 
11 1995 Summary found at http:i/europa.eu/generalreport/en/1995/summarvl.htm accessed 9th February 2008. 1996 
Summary found at http:!lcuropa.eufgeneralrenort/en/1996/summaNLhtm accessed 9th February 2008. 
12 General Report of 1997 at http://europa.eu/abc/histmy/1997/index en.htm accessed on 7th August 2006. General 
Report of 1998 at http://curopa.eu/generalrcpmt/en/1998/xOOOO.htm accessed 25th March 2008 
13 Full text at http://europa.eutgencralreport!en/1999/index.htm accessed 7th August 2006 
14 Background to Agenda 2000 from the SCADPLUS archive at httn://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/enllvb/16000J.htm 
accessed 7th August 2006. Agenda 2000 was issued as COM(97)2000 on 16th July 1997 
15 From Bridges Monthly Vol 3 no 3 Aprill999 "Agricultural Subsidies Again Emerge as Top Priority of 
WTO Round' at http://www ictsd.org/ministerial/seattle!hridgesmonthly3-3.htm accessed 5th February 2008 
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2007: 13) with the latter saying that Agenda 2000 addressed current commitments but 
not future ones (Egdell and Thomson 1999: 121, Co1eman and Tangermann 1999: 402 
and Daugbjerg 1999: 424). Although, then, Brittan was very successful over this time 
period, because agriculture would be discussed in the future, there would likely be an 
impact on Pascal Lamy's tenure as Trade Commissioner.16 The extent of the impact will 
be assessed over the following Chapters. 
Internal preferences over this timescale were also convergent showing the Commission 
as a whole was supportive of further efforts to extend the WTO's agenda and saw the 
benefits of multilateralism to address problems. This is evidenced by Padraig Flynn and 
Leon Brittan undertaking joint work on labour standards; Ritt Bjerregaard supporting 
Brittan's stance on environmental work in the WTO also by Martin Bangemann driving 
the development ofTABD with Brittan. It was also likely that the Commission as a 
whole was content with Brittan exercising policy leadership (and hosting the G8 
meeting in Brussels, for example) because of possible negative implications of Ruling 
1194. Brittan making recommendations outside the sphere of 'Commission competence' 
would give them, as a group, more authority. This is outside the scope of the thesis but 
a logical inference from the evidence nonetheless. Because Brittan was not censured for 
dropping labour standards after Singapore, the internal environment was clearly 
permissive and unpoliticized. 
The evidence also suggests that in using both internal means to ensure support for 
initiatives (such as the 113 Committee in the BTA), bilateral pressures (with the US) 
and multilateral pressure from G8, the Quad and others to ensure support, Brittan was 
able to exercise a high level of influence on the international stage. This is further 
demonstrated by his close friendship with Ruggiero who commended Commission 
'leadership' in negotiations. Brittan managed to drive the Singapore Ministerial to 
accept a Declaration outlining a number of areas of future work, in spite of developing 
country disagreement with the inclusion of new items on the agenda and he achieved 
general commitment to a Millennium Round even though the US was in favour of 
holding bilateral rather than multilateral talks. 
16 UK perspective sourced from the Second Report of the Select Committee on Agriculture from the UK 
House of Commons printed 16th February 1998 at 
http://www.pubfications.parliament.uk/paicmi99798/cmselectlcmagric/3 I lii/ag0205.htm .accessed 7th August 2006 
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The member state interest 
The IGC, culminating in the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in October 1997, had 
concluded that "The Council, acting unanimously, may extend the application of Article 
113 of the EC Treaty to international negotiations and agreements concerning services 
and intellectual property insofar as they are not already covered by that article". This 
allowed Council to empower the Commission to take action in other areas, at the same 
time as being sure that the Commission continued to follow its preferences. The Treaty 
also concluded that there would henceforth only be one Commissioner for each 
Member State and, before the Union exceeded twenty members, there would be a 
meeting with the aim of undertaking "a comprehensive review of the composition and 
functioning of the institutions". This seems motivated by efficiency arguments; the 
Commission could not be as useful or effective if it became too large and 
unmanageable. The risk would be that a large Commission trying to work for a large 
Council could precipitate 'policy paralysis' (Croft et a!, 1999:84) where neither the 
Commission nor Council would be able to agree a position due to the wide variety of 
perspectives, making the formation of an internal coalition at Commission or Council 
level almost impossible. Because Council expressed concern of the dangers of policy 
paralysis, this supposes that such an eventuality would not be in their interest. As it was, 
even in areas subject to shared competence, according to the 1/94 Ruling, Council 
relied upon the Commission to propose ways forward. The similarity between the 
mandate and COM(1999)331 is firm evidence of this. 
Some commentators have suggested that the Treaty of Amsterdam was not very 
successful for the Commission (Moravcsik and Nicolaldis, 1999: 70, Dehousse, 1999: 
9) suggesting that the Council was constraining the Commission at this point. However, 
because the Commission was given a pivotal and "empower(ing)" role in developing 
proposals for closer cooperation between particular states (Philippart and Edwards, 
1999: 97) and Council could agree to extend the Commission's competence (Young, 
2000: 1 00), this cannot be considered a failure for the Commission. Furthermore, 
because the Council still wanted and expected a steer from the Commission, it could be 
argued that the political rhetoric in the Treaty did not extend to the practical aspects of 
negotiating (supported by interviewees 5, 6 & 9). It has also been shown that Council 
attention was focused on other areas and WTO negotiations were not a political priority 
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over the time period. This explains why Council was supportive of the Commission 
pursuing its own policy preferences even when they differed from Council; such as 
Brittan's pursuit of agreement to a Millennium Round. 
The previous chapters detailed what the positions of the Council and the Parliament 
were on various issues in the WTO and showed that their interests were generally 
closely aligned with the Commission's. Convergence was especially strong in the 
sectoral areas with a high priority given to completing the IT A, BTA and FSA. Both 
Council and Commission wanted to extend the WTO's competence and authority and 
this is further evidence of a supportive environment. Although Parliament seemed to be 
more active in trade policy, and had some informal importance to the process, they still 
had no specific role in inputting to trade policy development, even though the Treaty of 
Amsterdam increased their power "by more than doubling the number of Treaty articles 
that employ eo-decision" (Caporaso 2003: 375). 
The WTO interest 
It is clear from Brittan' s and Ruggiero' s strong professional relationship that they both 
wanted to see the WTO exert increased authority in the trade field by radically 
expanding its agenda as well as its visibility; to this end the WTO, Commission and 
Council seemed to be in complete agreement. In these terms, the outcome of the 
Singapore Ministerial must have seemed positive, in that so many new work items were 
mentioned in the Declaration, as well as a clear commitment to a new Round. 17 This 
was achieved in spite of concerns expressed by the developing countries, which must 
have given the Commission, Council and the WTO Secretariat hope that consensus to 
develop these new work areas could be relatively easily achieved. However, the Geneva 
Ministerial was a wake up call in that although the Council of Ministers (for one) had 
wanted agreement on a wide agenda to take forward to Seattle as a basis for the next 
Round, there was very little substance to the Declaration. Additionally, the Ministerial 
was accompanied by public demonstrations for the first time, thus affecting the 
negotiating atmosphere and, perhaps, alluding to things to come. In many ways the 
Geneva Ministerial didn't only fail as a step forward, it also made a step backwards in 
17 Even if trade-labour rules were not elaborated 
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that there was no mention of a definitive future Round as there had been in the 
Declaration from Singapore. Perhaps this was thought to be no more than a temporary 
aberration and the Seattle Ministerial would put the WTO back on track. This might be 
the reasoning behind Ruggiero's later proposal that the WTO's remit should be 
widened, covering education and health. Otherwise this demonstrates a distinct lack of 
appreciation for what had happened in Geneva and ignored indications that the WTO 
internal consensus was not as strong as might have been believed from the results of 
Singapore. However, the Singapore Declaration showed there was no room for 
complacency on the part of the Commission or the rest of the Quad. Work on 
Transparency in Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation was "exploratory", 
the Trade and Environment Group would continue its current work, services 
negotiations were ongoing but there were no new proposals and, finally, negotiations on 
investment and competition would only take place if there was "explicit consensus" i.e. 
if all members agreed. Therefore, there was very little of substance in the Singapore 
Declaration and nothing to suggest that the developing countries had changed their 
position against new work items. The likelihood of developing countries engaging with 
any of these negotiations seemed lessened at Geneva and was likely to remain so for the 
Seattle Ministerial. This will be discussed in later Chapters. 
That elite bargaining would continue to drop in importance was hinted at by the 
fragmented internal consensus, making it difficult to build agreement around any 
particular work item, especially with the added complexity of the Single Undertaking. It 
was suggested that the outcome of the Singapore Ministerial had actively encouraged 
the formation of the Commonwealth Group of Developing Countries with the aim of 
helping members to be more proactive and effective and assisting them to implement 
their commitments and, as well as this, commodity prices were dropping giving 
countries a further incentive to work together. 18 This might have suggested that 
18 In a paper by S. Rudder of the Permanent Mission of Barbados to Geneva 'The Commonwealth Group 
of Developing Countries in Geneva: A Mechanism for Capacity Building' produced for the CTA 
International Seminar on 'Meeting the Challenge of Effective ACP Participation in Agricultural Trade 
Negotiations: The Role oflnformation and Communication' held in Brussels on November 27th·29th 2002 
sourced at http"//www.cta.int/ctaseminar2002/documents!tudder.pdf#search-'WT0%20Geneva%201997' accessed on 9th 
August 2006. The members were Bangladesh, Barbados, Botswana, Brunei Darussalarn, Cameroon, 
Ghana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Pakistan, Nigeria, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. That 
commodity prices were dropping is found in UNCTAD's 1997 'Trade and Development' report at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrl997 en.pdf#search-'WT0%20Geneva%201997' accessed 9th August 2006 
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developing countries could be persuaded to go along with a future EC agricultural 
position if they were able to achieve greater market access. Bilateral measures seemed 
to be becoming less effective too. Although there were mechanisms in place to facilitate 
closer working between the US and the EC, both sides often seemed to be working 
against each other as much as with each other over the time frame. This is most evident 
in the sectoral negotiations where, first, the EC tried to extract more concessions from 
the US before it agreed to sign the ITA in spite of seemingly working closely together 
beforehand in order to develop the proposal, secondly, the US pulled out of the BTA 
negotiations even though the Quad supported them and then also pulled out of the FSA. 
However, this did not seem to adversely affect progress, except in the very short term 
by delaying the signing of certain of the Agreements. This suggests that, partly, 
opposition was a political manoeuvre designed to facilitate more concessions from 
other parties (which was ultimately the case in the ITA) and also that although there 
may have been differences on particular issues, there was still a collective desire 
betweel?- the EC and US that the WTO became stronger and more authoritative over 
time. Perhaps, then, although it appeared that the two sides were fighting opposite 
corners, there was enough common ground to facilitate agreement on the wider issues. 
However, cracks were to appear in the bilateral relationship leading up to Seattle as the 
US was still keen on a limited Round, whereas the EC continued with its efforts to 
achieve a wide-ranging agenda. This may well have been because agriculture was going 
to feature and the need for trade-offs and bargains was inevitable. 
Conclusions 
The Commission's ability to act as an expert does not seem to have been contested 
internally over the period, in spite of Ruling 1/94. There are a number of clear 
examples of policy leadership exercised by the Commission within the evidence, 
particularly in Chapter Four. The internal atmosphere was also supportive, with a 
notable exception of the political debates surrounding Ruggiero's replacement as 
Director-General and with labour standards. In Working Groups, it was shown that the 
Commission had a great deal of influence, even under difficult circumstances, but in the 
Ministerials (because of the breadth of the agenda and the sheer number of players) the 
Commission seemed far less influential. Although Brittan achieved a commitment to 
167 
launch a Millennium Round, agreement could not be guaranteed and there was no clear 
agenda developed at the Geneva Ministerial. 
In terms of appearing like a govermnent, in Rometsch and Wessels' (1995) second 
categorization, again there is evidence (the semiconductor agreement and various 
position papers submitted to General Council prior to Seattle) that the Commission held 
this status within particular work areas. However, there is no evidence to show that the 
Commission gained more powers from Council over this period, and there is no 
indication that they were able to encourage agreement within the Ministerials because 
of their status. It is possible that the Commission's status worked against it in terms of 
the concern expressed on the part of the developing countries that the Commission 
would try to drive the WTO agenda to benefit itself and not others. 19 
There is little evidence to suggest that the Commission performed more of an 
administrative role, i.e. that it had much less agency, over this time period than it did, 
for example, in the Uruguay Round (see Chapter Two). It is not visible, in any case, that 
this was the outcome of the 1/94 Ruling. With certain problematic areas such as labour 
standards and the replacement ofRuggiero, the Commission was almost sitting on the 
sidelines unable to influence the debate. Although it seems to have tried to gain 
consensus in both of these areas, perhaps especially in the latter case, it was not able to 
do so. It was also shown in the BT A case that the Article 113 Committee worked with 
the Commission rather than against it, to ensure that Spain accepted the terms of the 
revised telecoms offer. This re-emphasizes the supportive internal consensus prevailing 
for the Commission at this time. 
Building coalitions was important over both of these chapters, again helped by a 
supportive internal context with evidence of wide internal 'buy in' over this period. 
Brittan also proved adept at using influential external sources to support initiatives. The 
setting up of TABD and ASEM might have been expected to add to that process 
although there appeared to be limits with both committees. Efforts at coalition building 
19 It was thought possible by interviewee 8 who also recognised that countries would have been unwilling 
to agree to more than a baseline agreement because further negotiations might come under the Single 
Undertaking. 
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were critical after Singapore and certainly after Geneva to encourage the developing 
countries to come on side yet this did not happen to any great extent. 
In sum, these years were marked by a permissive Commission consensus and 
supportive Council consensus, and relatively supportive external consensus i.e. the 
internal relationships within and between both the Commission and the Council were 
strong, and the collective aim ofthe WTO Secretariat, the Quad, the Commission and 
Council was to make the WTO stronger and have an increased profile by building on 
what had been achieved at Marrakech. However, the table of preferences showed that 
this wish was not shared by the developing countries either at the Singapore or Geneva 
Ministerials. Furthermore, continued proposals to widen the agenda with the MAl, for 
example, risked further antagonising the developing countries as Pakistan and India had 
pointed out previously. 
This evidence seems to point to a general, but not exclusive, North-South split in the 
WTO with the South wanting no new items on the agenda and wanting time to be able 
to implement the agreements from Marrakech, while the developed countries, 
epitomised by the Quad, sought a wider agenda. Although this difference was noticed 
early on in the WTO, it will be seen in future chapters whether it had a bearing on the 
policy process. In terms of increasing the level of politicization surrounding the WTO, 
NGOs seem to have started to view the WTO as a threat. This was possibly because of 
the debates surrounding the MAl, which involved a number of groups from a number of 
different countries, helped by the growth of the Internet, making information easier to 
disseminate and access globally (Cooper and Hocking, 2000: 366-7).20 A simple search 
reveals a number of internet-based or internet-using organisations dedicated to 
disrupting the Geneva Ministerial and/or making efforts to stop the MAl being 
transferred to the WT0.21 Although this would not be likely to affect the Ministerial 
20 Also see 'The Internet as a Tool for Global Campaigns' byN Buxton ofCAFOD, 22"• July 2002, for 
the Digital Divide Network reproduced at http:flwww.globalnolicy.ow/ngosirole/policymklinternctf2002/0722tool.htm 
accessed 9th August 2006. 
21 For example: Earth First Number 46 January 1998 at http:llwww.cco-action.orglefaulissues!l9981efau1998 02.html 
accessed 9th August 2006, Public Citizen, 'Anti-MAI/WTO resolutions in the US and around the world' 
at http://www.citizen.org/trade!issues/mai/articles.cfm?ID=7615 accessed 9th August 2006, Salzburg Action Forum 
Against the MAl, incitement to action at http://www.cb3rob.net/-merijn89/nieuws/terr.html accessed 9th August 
2006, Coiporate Europe Observer 'Leaked document reveals EU attempts to push MAl-like investment 
agreement in WTO' at http://www.comorateeurope.org/mai/eu/index.html accessed 9th August 2006 
169 
-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
process as such, it would affect the negotiating environment in terms of increasing 
participants' awareness of politicization. This is an issue that will recur through the rest 
of the thesis. 
The following three Chapters will cover Pascal Lamy's term in office from 1999 to 
2003. The Commission in which Brittan played a part had finished ignominiously with 
a mass resignation. Whether this would affect what Lamy could achieve internally 
(because the Council might have used the opportunity to 'claw back' responsibilities 
and Parliament might also have tried to intervene in the trade area) and build on 
externally (because if the Commission became more of an administrator it might prove 
difficult to encourage coalition building), will be shown. Lamy' s tenure starts with the 
continuing build up to the Seattle Ministerial for which Brittan had done a great deal of 
preparatory work. Lamy' s stance within that Ministerial, and onwards to Canciln, will 
be assessed. In particular, analysis of the issues affecting the Commission's roles and 
responsibilities and the evolving preferences of the interests, will be detailed to 
facilitate comparison with this time period in Chapter Nine. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Trade Negotiations Framework from Seattle to Cancun 
Introduction 
The purpose of the following three Chapters is to look at the way Pascal Lamy handled 
the trade portfolio from 1999 until the end of the Candm Ministerial in 2003, in the 
face of what appeared to be increasing politicisation of the trade field amid the 
increasingly dispersed preferences of the interests. This Chapter is focused on the high 
political level ofthe WTO, which is the Ministerial process, while Chapter Seven will 
look at three case studies to show the methodology and practice used by Pascal Lamy to 
pursue agreement and to highlight the ways in which the Commission view intersected 
or diverged with the internal and/or external interests in these sectoral negotiations. 
This Chapter will fulfil the same function as Chapter Four for Leon Brittan's tenure as 
Trade Commissioner in that it will trace the evolving nature of the Commission's roles 
and responsibilities and the difficulties of developing a permissive or supportive 
internal and external consensus through the Ministerial process in the WTO. The 
Chapter will also track the growing politicization over the period in order to assess 
whether this impacted on the Commission's roles and responsibilities and negatively 
influenced their ability to satisfy the interests. This is important in the light of the 
previous Chapters where it was made clear that the interests are not static and can be 
constraining, supportive or permissive on the Commission not only according to 
different work areas but within work areas. This Chapter will, then, set out how far the 
Commission was able to achieve progress both on its own agenda (and where this 
differed from that of the Council) and with its mandate in the tirneframe given above. 
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Once again, this chapter uses a series of tables to show the dispersal of preferences in 
terms of expressing the Commission's positions vis-a-vis the other Quad members, the 
LDCs and also, in this Chapter, the G20, which was to become influential over the time 
period discussed herein. In addition, the theme of trade-labour initiatives, so important 
to Brittan and discussed at Singapore yet still unresolved at the end of Chapter Four, 
will highlight the problems of consensus building. 
Essentially, it will be shown that there was a good deal of continuity in the 
Commission's roles and responsibilities. This may be partly due to path dependence, 
particularly since Brittan's document setting out Commission views on the Millennium 
Round, COM(1999)331 continued to be used as the basis of Commission policy 
throughout this period. 
Overview 
Pascal Lamy was officially confirmed as a Commissioner following the series of 
hearings of all the Commissioners-delegate by the European Parliament.1 His holding of 
the trade portfolio was officially confirmed at the first Commission meeting on 18th 
September 1999.2 It appeared that Lamy had been given "a smoother ride than 
expected" at his hearing given that there were no questions asked about his supposed 
"misconduct in two controversial episodes during the years he worked for former 
Commission President Jacques Delors".3 This supportiveness on the part of Parliament 
may have been because Lamy' s stated priorities seemed to be consistent with theirs. At 
the Hearing, Lamy had given his priorities as: pursuing an MAl; upholding the cultural 
imperative (interestingly not mentioned in COM(1999)331, which could suggest a 
French bias on Lamy's part); supporting the multi functional nature of agriculture in 
Europe; ensuring that the WTO "preserv( ed) the balance between trade interests and 
social, cultural and environmental interests" such as would "reflect(ing) universal 
1 These Hearings began on 30 August and fmished on 7th September 1999. See EU Bulletin 9/99 at 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/offtbull/en/9909/p!I0004.hUn accessed May I 5th 2007. However, the Hearings actually 
appear to have finished on the 8th with the hearing ofNeil Kinnock (sourced from the Parliament's news 
index for 1999 at http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg3/sdp/newsrn/en/1999/index.htm accessed May 15th 2007) 
2 See EU Bulletin 9/99 at http://europa.eu.int/ahc/doc/offtbull/en/9909/sommaiOO.htm accessed 15th January 2004 
3 BBC, September 3, 1999, 'MEPs continue commission probe' at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/IIhi/world/europe/437223.stm accessed 15 January 2004. In fact, there was a question asked 
by Nick Clegg, then aUK MEP, about his role in "the Flechard affair (a butter export seam)'' 
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values", and for "every effort" to be made in order to include social issues on the 
agenda (including, one can presume, trade and labour linkages, which will become 
important later).4 It can be noted that there was little time between Lamy taking office 
and the Seattle Ministerial in order for him to become familiar with the extent of the 
portfolio. This would manifest itself in a conflict between the Commission and member 
states over biotechnology at the Ministerial. 
The Third WTO Ministerial- Seattle, 301h November- 3rd December 1999 
The Lead Up 
In one of the first speeches Lamy gave once appointed as Trade Commissioner, he 
presented an outline of what were, to him, the most important aspects of EC trade 
policy needing advancement in the WT0.5 As the majority of his points, again, reflect 
strands in COM(l999)331 it is clear that he was not revisiting what had been agreed 
prior to his term of office. However, the priorities he listed in that speech were not the 
same as those he had confirmed to Parliament during his Hearing (i.e. he failed to 
mention the MAl, the cultural exception, the environment or social issues), which 
suggests that tension might arise between the two later, especially if Parliament sought 
to become more influential in the trade field after practically forcing the resignation of 
the previous Commission. Another potential source of conflict, this time between the 
Commission and the Council, that came to light at an early stage was that Lamy 
appeared to see agriculture differently from his predecessors in that he wanted to input 
into agricultural policy making.6 At his first Press Conference, Lamy seemed to suggest 
there was room for negotiation on Agenda 2000 rather than that it was to be defended at 
all costs (ibid). In COM(1999)331, although the same thing may have been meant, it 
had been phrased slightly more diplomatically; "the ... reform of the CAP within the 
framework of Agenda 2000 would constitute essential elements in defining the 
Commission's negotiating mandate for the ... WTO" (page 8). The Agriculture Council 
was to conclude that there was a "need to take an offensive line in support of the 
4 Full text from the Parliament's news report of2•' September 1999 at 
httn://www.europarLeu.int/dg3/sdp/newsm/eniJ999/n990902.htm#3 accessed 15th Januaty 2004 
5 Speech of 15'" September 1999, 'Globalisation: a win-win process' at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/arcliives/commission 1999 2004/lamy/speeches articles/splaOien.htm accessed 5th January 2006 
6 G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of2"' October 1999 page 6, 'Brussels may consider more open 
farm trade' 
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European agricultural model as reformed by Agenda 2000" thus Lamy's advocacy of 
more flexibility in agricultural negotiations did not seem to be supported by Council.7 
This first press conference was in the margins of a meeting of EC foreign ministers, the 
purpose of which was to agree a common position prior to the Seattle Ministerial. 
Although Ministers seemed to agree on the merits of a wide agenda, there was still no 
agreement on what to do about trade/labour rules. General consensus appeared to be 
emerging that a looser collaboration with ILO might be more palatable to the wider 
WTO membership, which was in line with the Commission's stated position in 
COM(1999)331 i.e. that because agreement for a WTO Working Group was not going 
to be achieved, the establishment of a "joint WTO/ILO high level meeting on trade, 
globalization and labour issues" (p23) should be pushed instead. Lamy continued to 
advocate discussion of labour standards in the WTO saying this was necessary to, 
"convince European public opinion that trade liberalization was beneficial". 8 Therefore, 
he might have wanted a more ambitious outcome than was expressed in 
COM(1999)331. An EC position was still being sought on 13th October so Lamy's 
pushing was not encouraging a supportive coalition amongst the member states. 9 
As well as differences between the stances of member states on labour standards, there 
were also concerns about differences of opinion between the US and the EC on the 
breadth of the agenda. Interestingly, Romano Prodi recognised this as a problem, 
commenting that a bilateral meeting prior to Seattle was necessary since "divisions 
between the US and EU could weaken the global trading system". 10 This was a clear 
signal that they had different ideas on the next Round - the EC sought a comprehensive 
agenda while the US wanted a much more limited agenda, centring on agriculture and 
services. Pascal Lamy submitted a paper to the Commission meeting later in the month 
expressing concern about the US's "negative" approach to a wide-based trade Round. 11 
Prodi' s entrepreneurship might hint at there being more involvement from him in the 
Trade portfolio. 
7 Meeting 27th September from EU Bulletin, 9/99 at http·//www.europa.eu.int/abc/doc/offlbull/en/9909/p!0402I.htm) 
accessed 17th January 2006. Acknowledged by Council official interviewees 5. 6 & 9 
8 G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of IIth October 1999 page 8 'Conflict averted on labour rights' 
9 N Buckley, the Financial Times of 14th October, page 15, 'Brussels fails to find a common line' 
10 P Norman, G de Jonquieres and M Smith, the Financial Times of 16th October page 8 'Prodi seeks 
Clinton' s support for trade round' 
11 Financial Times editorial of 18th October 1999 page 6, 'EU doubts on US backing for new trade round' 
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The question of labour standards re-emerged in a later Lamy appearance before the 
European Parliament revealing that there was still no agreed position with just over a 
month to go until the Ministerial. Lamy admitted that trade-labour ''was 'the issue 
which is most polarizing governments and opinions"'. 12 Perhaps ifLamy had stood by 
the wording in COM(l999)331 the topic could have been depoliticized and thus made 
more palatable for the member states (in the Council) and the developing countries (at 
the WTO) to accept. Notwithstanding internal divisions, the draft Final Declaration for 
Seattle was discussed at a WTO meeting on 21" October. 13 This new version referred to 
the 'multifunctionality' of agriculture (to appease the EU, Norway, Switzerland and 
Japan [Ahnlid, 2005: 141]) and to the possibility of revisiting anti-dumping rules 
(another ofJapan's major concerns). In spite of this "virtually everything in the 
document is in square brackets signalling disagreements", which must have sounded 
warning bells in the Commission, knowing that internal and external divisions would 
jeopardise the chances of agreement in Seattle, risking a delay in the launch of a new 
Round. 14 
The EC eventually agreed a position at the end of October, and the negotiating mandate 
was apparently accepted without debate at the Council meeting. 15 Leon Brittan's 
COM(l999)331 was the guiding principle for the mandate's development; from the 
insistence on negotiations being conducted under the Single Undertaking to the three 
year duration of the Round. This suggests path dependency with a lack of reappraisal of 
Brittan's aims and their validity and currency. The mandate also set out Council's view 
of the importance of preserving the cultural imperative, again sought duty free access 
for LDC goods, said that SME needs should be considered with regard to trade 
facilitation and clarified that Agenda 2000 would form the basis of the EC negotiations 
on agriculture at Seattle, which might have sanctioned a little room for manoeuvre. 
With regard to labour standards, Lamy sent a letter to the WTO General Council 
12 N Buckley, the Financial Times of 17th October 1999 page 14 'Lamy wary on labour issues and the 
WTO'. 
13 F Williams, the Financial Times of22•' October 1999, page 16, 'Envoys discuss key document for 
WTO talks'. 
14 The full version of this 19th October draft, with the square brackets clearly visible, can be found at 
http:l/www.ictsd.org/English!Declaration3.pdfaccessed 15th October 2005. 
15N Buckley, the Financial Times of 25th October 1999 page 7 'EU agrees trade talks position'. The 
minutes have been reproduced at http://www.frnnce attac.orgla2985, catalogued as PRES/99/318, issued on 2•' 
December 1999 accessed 15'h November 2004. Although this is not an 'official' source, there appear no 
reasons to suspect that these are not as authentic as the site claims. 
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detailing Council's proposal for 'a Joint ILO/WTO Standing Working Forum on Trade, 
Globalization and Labour Issues', which he said he "fully expect(ed)" to be agreed at 
Seattle. 16 However, as Morocco, for the Group of77, categorically refused to accept 
trade and labour linkages as a WTO issue, as the developing countries had done 
previously at the Singapore Ministerial, it remained unlikely that consensus would be 
forthcoming and there seemed to be little bridge building underway to ensure 
agreement, or, at least, to quell dissent.17 Given the disagreements evident in the 
negotiating text, Council's conclusions on preparations for Seattle in November 
expressed, unsurprisingly, "serious concern at the lack of progress made so far". 18 This 
was echoed by the Presidency, which noted that in spite of the Green Room process 
again being employed, ongoing disagreements on "agriculture and implementation" 
were standing in the way of consensus. 19 Just like events in the Uruguay Round, and as 
suggested in the previous Chapter, the main protagonists in the agricultural arena, at 
this point, were the Commission and the Cairns Group "where the acceptance of the 
multifunctional role of agriculture has been linked to far going (sic) demands on 
liberalisation" (ibid).20 However, the internal consensus seemed to be supportive on the 
Commission with the Council's and Commission's positions aligned (alongside the 
European Parliarnent).21 
Even towards the end of November, the WTO was no closer to agreeing an agenda or a 
declaration for Seattle. 22 The EU Presidency, and no doubt the Commission as well, 
seemed to have been hoping that the new Director General Mike Moore would have 
presented his own draft, but this had not been forthcoming and the October draft, with 
all the square brackets, was still current.23 As well as the problems that this draft would 
cause, the Presidency had been privy to information that the negotiating enviromnent 
16 Sent 30'h October, circulated to the General Council on 5th November 1999 as WT/GCfW/391 
"Reuters, the Financial Times of 9th November page 16 'Attempt to get labour on WTO agenda 
rejected'. 
18 EU Bulletin 11-99 at http://europa.eu.inVabc/docloff/bull/s;n/9911/pl05016.htm Accessed 15th October 2005 
19 http://presidency.fin1and.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle2028.html Accessed 15th October 2005 
20 This cleavage was also reported by F Williams the Financial Times of 22"• November page 10, 
'Agriculture stalls WTO agenda'. Interviewee 3 commented that there were other countries outside the 
Cairns Group equally supportive of reform. 
21 Except, perhaps, for public access to the dispute settlement system, and greater emphasis on social 
issues. Issued 18th November 1999 at htw://europa eu.intlnbc/docloff/bul\/en/9911/pl 0S016.htm accessed 15th 
October 2005 
22 Presidency News Report of 25th November at (http://presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle21 l2.html 
accessed 15th October 2005 
23 Probably because Mike Moore, just like Pascal Lamy, was very new to the post 
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might become highly politicized by "some 80,000 demonstrators and over 3,000 
NGOs" coming to Seattle (ibid). Another outstanding problem had been the lack of 
support for the EC initiative on duty free access for products from LDCs. As late as 291h 
November, Lamy was still calling for agreement and without t11e developing countries 
on board, it would prove difficult (as it had done in Geneva) to achieve consensus for 
any further initiatives (Schott 2000: 7, Arai 2000: 46). 24 In addition, preferences of the 
main groups of members were very dispersed on matters raised by the mandate as will 
be shown in the tables beginning overleaf. 
The Seattle Ministerial 
These tables show the distribution of preferences in order to ascertain how likely it was 
that there would be a successful outcome for the Commission in areas they considered 
important.25 They outline what the different players sought from Seattle in terms of new 
issues, trade/investment, trade/labour, trade/environment and whether they thought a 
new Round was necessary. The final column identifies each country's main concerns in 
as simplistic terms as possible for the purposes of comparison. For ease of reference, 
the same LDCs looked at in Chapter Three will be looked at again here. There were, 
however, no individual statements from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Chad, Maldives, 
Myanmar or Tanzania so the first table will be a summary of the statements that were 
given by the individual countries who did submit statements, together with the 
statements from the various groups of developing countries that were also represented. 
24 Also from the Commission Spokesman's midday briefing of 29th November 1999 at 
http://www.hri.orglnews/europelmidex/1999/99-11-29.midex.html accessed 15th October 2005 
25 In terms of what the Commission wanted, not in terms of the majority WTO view. 
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111eLDCs 
Table 6.1 The positions of the least-developed countries (LDCs) in the Seattle 
Ministerial. 
New Trade! Trade!Jabour Trade! New Concerns 
investment environment Round? 
Burundi Study No No Capacity/ 
WT/MIN(99)/STII22 transitional 
periods/SDT 
Gambia Implementation/ 
WTIMIN(99)1STII38 market access 
Lesotho Possible SDT/Iinks between 
WTIMIN(99)/ST/75 Bretton Woods insts 
Madagascar Trade, Implementation 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/66 development 
and debt links 
Malawi Study Study Implementation/ 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/l42 SDT 
Mozambique No Market access/ 
WTIMIN(ii9)!ST/65 Capacity 
Nepal Study No No Accession! 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/85 transitional periods 
Senegal No No Implementation 
WT/MIN(99)!ST/61 
Sierra Leone No Promoting Marginalizarion/ 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/120 adhesion Food security 
should be 
guiding 
Principle 
Solomon Is. Compensation"0 Market 
WT/MIN(22)/ST/ll5 access/debt/accession 
Sudan Marginalisationl 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/l32 Accession 
Togo Development Implementation/ 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/76 issues SDT 
Uganda No Debt/Export 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/78 subsidies 
Zambia Study (ILO) No Capacity/ 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/ll7 Implementation/ 
Market access 
G77 Elimination of No Implementation/ 
WT/MINI99)/ST/22 tariff oeaks SDT 
LDC Group Movement of No No No Implementation/ 
WTIMIN(99)1ST!l7 natura] persons SDT 
SADC Capacity/ SDT 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/43 
26 The Solomon Islands commented that customs duties generated 50% of government revenue so there 
needed to be a compensatory mechanism to remedy this loss brought about by liberalization. 
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Comparing the tables from Seattle and Singapore, it can be noted that there is much less 
focus here on specific issues, with a correspondingly greater focus on the problems 
being experienced, many of which do not appear to have been addressed to the 
satisfaction of the developing countries up to this point. This is evident from the 
considerable level of concern over implementation and transitional periods for this 
implementation, which was mentioned by eight countries and two groups, showing that 
additional effort needed to be made to help these countries to fully implement their 
obligations under the Marrakesh Agreement (as Senegal had also said at the Singapore 
Ministerial). The next most important issue, as seen by these countries, was special and 
differential treatment (SDT), effective use of which would enable them to play a fuller 
part in the WTO. This was mentioned by three countries and three groups. Market 
access was the next most frequently raised issue, by four countries (as opposed to two 
countries at the Singapore Ministerial), which could suggest Lamy's, or rather Brittan's, 
initiative to allow duty free market access for products from the least developed 
countries might be used by the Commission as an incentive to allow other items onto 
the WTO agenda. However, Zambia commented in their Statement that unless issues of 
technical and financial capacity were addressed, other supportive mechanisms would 
not have the desired effect. No support is evident either for pursuing an agreement in 
trade-labour or in the trade-environment areas and there were no coalitions in favour of 
carrying out work on any new work items. Therefore, the collective preference was on 
the need to address problems in the multilateral system, rather than proceed with 
additional work items. This table shows that the Commission's support for a wide 
ranging agenda for the next Round would not be supported by the developing countries, 
because of an emergent coalition against new work items, different from what was 
noted at Geneva. It also shows that, unless there were suitable trade-offs, progress in the 
WTO could not be assured. 
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The G20 countries. 
The balance between players was starting to shift in the WTO prior to Seattle and the 
core countries, which would become the G20 (also the G22 or the G20+) and which 
held their inaugural meeting in Germany on December IS'h and 16'h 1999, would 
achieve a position of influence in the WTO policy initiating and making arenas. 27 
Therefore, this is a new table, tracking the preferences of the main participants; 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India and South Africa. As China did not give a statement to 
the Seattle meeting, their position has been taken from the Group of 77's Marrakech 
Declaration.28 
Table 6.2 The positions of the G20 countries in the Seattle Ministerial. 
New Trade! Trade/labour Trade! New Concerns 
investment environment Round? 
Argentina Market access/ 
WT/MlN(99)/ST/153 agriculture 
Brazil Yes 'Unfinished 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/5 business' from the 
UR/ integration of 
developing 
countries/agriculture 
China Ensuring equable No Debt/SDT 
distribution ofbenefits 
inWTO 
India E-commerce/IT No Yes Yes Anti-dumping/ 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/16 subsidies/ 
implementation 
S. Africa "Inclusivity and Yes Implementation/ 
WT/MlN(99)/ST/45 effective process" in unfinished business 
WTO 
Although the table has a number of blank spaces, reflecting no preferences being given, 
it would seem that there was majority support amongst this group for a new Round. 
However, there was much less of a consensus as to the most important issues to be 
tackled therein. It is not evident, from this table, that the Group's views would become 
much more homogeneous in what they sought from the WTO, at least not beyond the 
inclusion of developing countries (Brazil and South Africa, and perhaps China) and 
27 For further information on the 020 see their website at http://www.g20 orn/Public/ AboutG20/index.jsp accessed 
12th September 2006.The Communique from the inaugural meeting can be found at 
http://www.g20.org/Public/Communiques/Pdf/I999 gennany.pdf accessed lth September 2006. 
28 Marrakesh Declaration of the Group of77 and China from their meeting of 14-16 September 1999 
sourced at httn://www.unctad-IO.org/preprocess/marrakech.en.htm accessed May 13th 2007 
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agriculture (Argentina and Brazil). The emphasis of the latter on agriculture was 
perhaps inevitable, given their membership of the Cairns Group yet might exert a strong 
influence on the outcome of negotiations if the other G20 members followed their lead. 
The Quad countries 
Table 6.3 The positions of the Quad countries in the Seattle Ministerial. 
New Trade/ Trade/labour Trade/ New Concerns 
investment environment Round? 
Canada Working Party on * * * Yes Agriculture 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/13 Globalisation/ 
Transparency 
EC ILO-WTO Forum/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Improved 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/3 Integrated dialogue with 
environmental civil society/ 
ooHcy_ Devel't focus 
Japan Accelerated accession Yes ? Yes Implementation/ 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/26 process/globalisation E-commerce 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/44 
29 
USA Trade facilitation/ Yes Yes Yes Agriculture/ E-
WT/MIN(99)/ST/12 transparency commerce 
From this chart, the area where there is the strongest preference is in having a new 
Round although, in common with the G20, there is little specific agreement on the main 
issues to be addressed. There seemed to be a little common ground between the 
Commission's and Canada's proposals on the ILO-WTO 'Forum' although Canada 
wanted a much more wide-ranging remit for the Group to include input from UNEP and 
IMF. It is likely that seeking agreement with Canada was oflow priority to the 
Commission considering Canada's concern with agriculture, unsurprising considering 
Canada was a member of the Cairns Group, wanting "the elimination of export 
subsidies, the drastic reduction of trade-distorting domestic subsidies and substantial 
improvements in market access" as an outcome. 30 The Commission is aligned with 
Japan in wanting an Agreement on trade and investment and with the US in wanting 
• Canada's main proposal was for a "working party on globalization to ensure that the WTO works in 
coordination with UNCT AD (UN Conference on Trade and Development), the ILO (International Labour 
Organization), UNEP (UN Environment Programme), the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and 
others" (from Canada's statement to the WTO Ministerial, WT/MIN(99)/ST/13). 
29 Japan made two statements to the Seattle Ministerial. The first was from the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (26) and the second from the Minister of!ntemational Trade and Industry (44). As both seem 
equally relevant, they have both been assessed for the purposes of compiling this table. 
30 Befitting Canada's status as a member of the Cairns Group 
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agreement on labour standards but there is scant agreement elsewhere. The lack of a 
clear supportive coalition on any policy issue (aside from a new Round) meant that the 
Quad was not in a position where they could exert leadership by pushing through 
initiatives and agreeing trade-offs. This suggests that the developing countries, 
particularly on transitional periods and implementation where there was a relatively 
strong consensus, might be able to drive the policy process at Seattle. 
The negotiations 
Because of the diversity of Quad positions, the start of the Seattle meeting saw both the 
Commission and the US seeking support for their own policy initiatives in order to try 
and build a consensus around them.31 This was partly because, as the Finnish 
Presidency had already announced, Mike Moore was not circulating his own, 
compromise text.32 The Commission was convinced its draft would gain the upper 
hand, ostensibly because of the US's "hardline ... stance on labour standards" insofar as 
it was advocating the use of sanctions to ensure standards were improved, whereas the 
EC negotiating mandate specifically rejected this approach. 33 The Commission was 
also continuing to canvass the Quad and other developed countries to allow duty free 
market access for the LDCs even though, at the same time, the EC wanted to "resist 
agriculturalliberalization".34 There was a view that this duty free access proposal was 
unlikely to rally much support from the developing countries anyway as it might not 
include sensitive products such as sugar and textiles, in other words -there would be 
little for the developing countries in any such deal but perhaps (nevertheless) more for 
them in the European than the US package. 35 However, no agreement emerged and the 
lack of progress was exacerbated by the negotiating atmosphere, which was less than 
conducive given the sheer numbers of demonstrators on the streets. 
31 Rather than trying to gain consensus with each other. 
32 L Elliott, the Guardian of I~ December 1999, page 15, 'US and EU jostle to steer talks' 
33 L Elliott, the Guardian of3'' December 1999, page 16, 'Who wants what from the talks' said that one 
of the reasons why the US wanted to push labour standards was because the Trade Unions wanted this 
and "union support (was) vital to (the Democrats) in next year's presidential race". 
34 The Financial Times editorial of December 2"' page 20, 'Time to make the case' 
35 L Elliott, J Vidal, the Guardian of 3'' December, page 16, 'Sense of desperation drenches Seattle air' 
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As well as the fragmented external consensus, there was a significant disagreement, 
causing damage to the internal consensus, on biotechnology. This was because Lamy 
agreed to participate in a WTO biotechnology working group early on in the 
Ministerial: 
"European officials were visibly ill at ease answering questions about the EU's 
unexpected change of heart regarding the establishment of a biotechnology 
working group within the WTO. Journalists and non-governmental 
organisations even questioned the Commission's authority to make the proposal, 
which seems to have come as a considerable surprise not only to NGOs, but to 
several EU members as well".36 
The suggestion to establish a biotechnology group had come from Canada and Japan 
(which might suggest that there had been some kind of bargain that they might agree on 
duty- and tariff-free access to their markets for the developing countries if the EC 
committed itself to this) along with the US.37 Whether Lamy was aware of the furore 
this would cause or not, the episode did not have a happy ending. The Commission was, 
in the end, "slapped down" by environment and trade ministers who were concerned 
that it could put in doubt the UN biosafety protocol scheduled for signature in January 
2000.38 It appeared that Lamy had not consulted beforehand with the Article 133 
Committee "and it soon became clear that he had seriously underestimated the strength 
offeeling of European Ministers".39 
36 The JCTSD Bridges report of2"' December 'Piecemeal Progress Made in WTO Negotiating Groups' 
(at http://www.unc.edu/-swblack!BridgeReo !202.rtfaccessed on 15th August 2005 also 
http://www.ictsd.orglministeriallseattle/wto daily/991202 eng.htm accessed 20th February 2008 
37 M Khor Third World Network of 26th October 1999 'Biotech proposals for Seattle undermine 
Biosafety' at httn://www.twnside.org.sa/title/mk4·cn.htm accessed on 15th October 2005 
38 F Williams and G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of3'' December 1999, page 13, 'Europeans block 
biotech move' 
39 J Vidal, the Guardian of 3'' December page 17, 'Outrage as EU cedes regulation of GM foods'. In the 
end, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was agreed in Montreal on January 29th 2000. L Freeman 
Gene Watch (Voll6 No 6, November-December 2003 'Levelling the Playing Field' at http://www gene-
watch.org/genewatchlarticlesll6-6freeman.html accessed 15th October 2005) pointed out that, at least with 
hindsight, "(the) collapse (of the Seattle meeting) proved helpful to the Montreal meeting ... in 2000. The 
time was ripe for a consensus to be reached concerning GMO trade, and for a body outside of the WTO 
to establish this consensus"- making it one of the few positive ontcomes from Seattle. Richard Tapper of 
the UK Food Group (on 'The Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety' at http://www.ukahc.nWcartagena.htm accessed 
2nd January 2006) commented that, in fact, the EU delegation "strongly defended the precautionary 
principle (as per the wishes of both the Council and the European Parliament) and supported the Protocol 
throughout the negotiations", thns it would appear that the Commission redeemed itself in the eyes of 
those who criticised its line in the WTO. 
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This was not the main problem for the WTO as a whole, however. Differences with the 
agenda and priorities meant that, ultimately, negotiations in Seattle failed with no Final 
Declaration being issued. Lamy' s explanation to the European Parliament was that "the 
conference ran out of time" because there were only two days to discuss the negotiating 
text.40 This would not have been a factor if there had been political will to come to an 
agreement on the major issues prior to the meeting so preparation would have been 
more comprehensive (suggested also by Martin and Pangestu, 2003:1 and interviewee 
9). Other parties, however, stated different contributory factors, which seem equally 
valid: that the Quad could not agree on priorities so was unable lead a coalition building 
process (seemingly likely given the chart showing the dispersal of Quad preferences); 
that the agenda was too wide and because the US did not accept that the developing 
countries continued to experience problems with implementation, or the "clumsy, 
brazen chairing by Barshefsky" (Peterson, 2001: 64) were but a few. 41 This was in 
addition to suggesting that the US was wrong in trying to 'strong arm' members into 
accepting trade-labour linkages (see also Tay, 2002, Peterson, 2001) or that the EC 
sought to avoid negotiating their position on agriculture (Sharpston, 2000:37). This 
latter point tallies with what Charlene Barshefsky (the USTR) said in the Press 
Conference immediately following the Ministerial, that the EC was wholly responsible 
for the failure because of "its refusal to compromise on ... export subsidies".42 
40 From his speech to Parliament on 'World Trade Organisation Ministerial Conference in Seattle 
Appraisal and prospects' on 13"' December 1999 at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/commission 1999 2004/lamy/sm~eches articles/splaOR en.htm accessed 15th October 
2005 
41 The ICTSD 'Bridges' report of 8"' December (Volume 3. Number 47, accessed through the portal 
found at http·//www.newsbulletin.org/oetbulletin.CFM?SID= on 15th September 2005. The comment about failure 
attributed to the Quad was from Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General at UNCT AD from BRIDGES 
Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol4 No 6 15"' February 2000 'UNCTAD X Underway In Bangkok' at 
http://www.gene.ch/gcntech/2000/Feb/msg0003!.html accessed I 5th September 2005. Also J Vidal the Observer of 
December 5"' 1999 'The real battle for Seattle' quotes a British trade official as saying "The best thing 
now might be for the talks to collapse to the allow the total reform of the WTO", at 
http:/iwww.guard;an.en.uk/wnrld/1999/dec/05/wto.global;sat;on accessed 20th February 2008. Farrands (2003: 250) 
suggested, however, that the Seattle demonstrations were principally about TRIPs. 
42 R Weissman, the Multinational Monitor of December 1999, Vol.20 No.21 'Democracy is in the 
Streets' at http://multinationalmonitor.orglmmt999/mm9912.07 .html 
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In spite ofBarshefsky's assurances that she would abstain from Green Room processes 
unless absolutely necessary, allegedly preferring the openness of Working Groups, the 
negotiating process seemed, in practice, to be no more inclusive than it had been in 
previous Ministerials.43 Green Room meetings appear to have been held and were 
roundly criticized (Schott and Watal, 2000: 286, Hawken, 2000:50). There were 
warnings that this system had broken down prior to Seattle when eleven developing 
countries submitted a statement complaining about the arbitrary nature of the process.44 
Those countries that did not participate in decision-making had significant concerns 
about Green Room meetings (Arai, 2000:62) heralding suggestions that a "more 
efficient... equitable" (Schott, 2000:33) and inclusive decision making structure needed 
to be put in place.45 Whether, though, this would be at all possible must have been a 
moot point- the Financial Times editorial of 61h December 1999 suggested that one of 
the reasons Seattle failed was because of the number of members. 46 
Another reason often cited for the collapse of the Ministerial, especially by anti-
globalisation campaigners, is that the mass public demonstrations caused the meeting to 
become much more politicized (Barfield, 2001:3-4, for example, also Moon, 2004: 24). 
US President Bill Clinton in his introductory speech put a positive spin on it, saying that 
the presence ofprotestors meant civil society's voice could be more influential on trade 
issues.47 He could be said to have had some influence on the level of their attendance in 
the first place; in early November he had made a speech in which he remarked that he 
would be happy to see demonstrators at the Seattle Ministerial. He was directly quoted 
as saying that he "wanted everybody who thinks this is a bad deal to come .. .I want 
everybody to get all this out of their system".48 Larny, in a speech to the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, agreed that the attention from civil society was 
positive and would prevent "trade experts from the EU and the US clinch(ing) a deal 
behind closed doors and then ask(ing) the other WTO partners to sign on the dotted 
43 From ICTSD Bridges report of 2nd December 'Piecemeal Progress Made in WTO Negotiating Groups' 
(at http://www.ictsd.orcrlministerial/seattle/wto daily/991202 eng.htm accessed 20th February 2008) 
44 The countries were Bolivia, Cuba, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mauritius, Panama, Paraguay and Uganda according to the Bridges Weekly Trade Digest (Vol 
3 No 45, 15th November 1999 'Agreement on Ministerial Declaration eluding negotiators before Seattle' 
45 B La] Das, The Seatini Bulletin Volume 3, No. 3 of 15th February 2000 'Full participation and 
efficiency in negotiations' at http://www.seatini.orglbulletinslb03-03.htm accessed 5th October 2005 
46 page 18, 'Disaster in Seattle' 
47 From his speech at the opening lunch to the Round from http://www.staff.citv.ac.uk/n.willetts/PIE-
DOCS/CLNT!299.HTM accessed 5th January 2006 
48 M Suzman, the Financial Times of 6th December 1999 page 8, 'US domestic concerns sank Seattle' 
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line. 49 Given that there had been no agreement to move the October draft of the 
Declaration on, and little effort to build bridges between members, it would seem more 
accurate to suggest that the Ministerial broke down because of what went on inside 
(Bergsten, 2000) rather than because of what was going on outside (Hawken, 2000: 27-
8). 
Whatever the weighting of the explanations as to why Seattle failed, the evidence shows 
that the EC, with the Commission as its voice, played only a small part in the 
breakdown. Rather, a combination offactors was at work. Issues were brought up in 
Seattle within the purview of the internal interest (the problems of being responsive in 
agriculture), the Council interest (the debacle surrounding biotechnology) and the WTO 
interest (in the Green Room processes, the demonstrations and the lack of Quad 
agreement) and the Commission had to fight its way through or around all of them. In 
its report of the Seattle Ministerial, the Commission appeared to have taken some time 
to reflect on the major issues that had precipitated failure. They accepted that the lack of 
agreement between the Quad was a factor, as was general public concern over trade 
liberalization (a way of explaining the mass demonstrations). 50 They concluded that the 
EC's remit to cover global governance in the Singapore Issues along with 
environmental issues, social issues, sustainability and transparency constituted the right 
agenda although there must have been questions as to how to encourage a supportive 
coalition for this amongst the developing countries. 
The Commission's view fitted with that of the European Council, which continued to 
press for a new Round as soon as possible, with the suggestion that any reform of the 
WTO, as demanded by the developing countries, could wait until then. 51 The European 
Parliament, however, seemed to be slightly more sceptical of the Commission's 
position, commenting that the WTO needed to have some kind of watchdog body "to 
ensure transparency and democratic accountability" (although they did not [at this 
point] suggest how this should be structured) and, as if either turning its back on 
multilateralism or seeking a return to the technocratic procedures used by Brittan, asked 
49 29 February 2000, (at http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/commission 1999 2004/lamy/speeches articles/spla14 en.htm 
accessed February 3rd 2005 
50 EU Bulletin December 1999 at http://www.europa.eu.int/ahc/doc/off/bull/en/9912/pl04024.htm) accessed February 
3'' 2005 
51 In the same issue of the Bulletin at htto://www.europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off!bu11/en19912/i1025.htm and also at 
http://www.europa.eu.intlabc/doc/off!bu!Ven/9912/nl04023.htm accessed February 3rd 2005 
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the Commission to pursue more agreements bilaterally. 52 It also, either with significant 
delusions of grandeur or with a wish to undermine the Commission, asked the Director 
General of the WTO (although this would have to be presented to him by the 
Commission) to suggest to them how to "prevent procedural or organisational 
shortcomings from hampering ... political discussions" within the WTO. Perhaps 
Parliament was finally exerting the pressure expected since the resignation of the 
previous Commission. 
The Fourth WTO Ministerial Doha, 9th -14th November 2001 
The Lead Up 
If hopes of quick agreement to a new Round were resting with the General Council of 
the WTO, meeting before the end of December, they would be dashed. Although the 
EU held meetings in mid-December with Canada and the US (in an attempt to, at least, 
agree a Quad position), there seemed to be little sign ofprogress.53 Failure to reach 
agreement was not just a Quad 'problem' which was why the General Council agreed to 
put discussions about the future on hold until the following year.54 
Although Lamy confessed to the European Parliament in January 2000 that there 
needed to be urgent discussions in the WTO on how its working arrangements might be 
improved, he reiterated his belief that this should be done in the framework of a new 
Round. 55 His lack of compromise was again shown in a speech to the American 
Chamber of Commerce on February 29th where he made it explicit that the existing, 
widened agenda would stand. 56 Lamy's statements suggest he was, in the main, content 
52 Again in the same issue of the Bulletin at page 104025 accessed February 3'd 2005 
53 The Trade Policy Monitor of December 1999 'Seattle: The Price of Failure" accessed through the 
search portal at htm://www.thm>derlake.com/aoeh.html on February 3rd 2005 
54 
'General Council defers post-Seattle discussion until early 2000', WTO Press Release 17 December 
1999 from http://www.wto.org/encrJishlnews e/news99 e/gcseat e.htm, accessed on February 3rd 2005 
55 This account detailed by the Japan Machinery Centre for Trade and Investtnent, 'What are the options 
after Seattle?', Pascal Lamy's presentation to the European Parliament on 25th January at 
http://www.jmcti.org/2000round/EU/lamy/OO I 25.htm accessed on February 3rd 2005 
56 
'Keeping Pace with the Global Economy: The Challenge for the Multilateral Trading System', Speech 
to the American Chamber of Commerce 29th February 2000 at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/commission 1999 2004/lamy/speeches atticles/spla14 en.htm These sentiments were 
repeated in a speech to the Confederation of British Industty on 6th July (full text at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/commission 1999 2004/lamy/speeches articles/speech000707.htm, where Lamy 
commented""! was rash enough, or tired enough, in Seattle to describe the WTO as a medieval 
organisation ... the WTO needs improved transparency, management, and organisation, including of future 
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with the way the WTO worked. Indeed, he was quoted saying that, as far as the WTO 
was concerned, he felt the problem "n'est pas qu'on a trop de gouvemance 
intemationale, c'est qu'on n'en a pas assez". 57 This insistence that the agenda was still 
valid meant that the Council's negotiating strategy for the next Round did not change. 58 
A very small concession that the EU would be 'flexible' on trade-labour and trade-
environment with the proviso that members were also 'flexible' reflected the difficulties 
being experienced in getting new work items onto the agenda- using them as a carrot 
(or stick) was presumably seen as most effective. Although the Council of Ministers 
and the Commission shared a joint aim for a Round to take place as soon as possible, it 
was acknowledged that the time was not yet ripe. 59 This could well have been because 
of the impending US Presidential elections in November and because there was still no 
sign that the Quad's preferences had aligned, which meant there could be no assurance 
that what happened in Seattle wouldn't simply be repeated.60 
Perhaps in a response to the demonstrations in Seattle (Hocking 2004: 266), the 
Commission issued a discussion paper on 'The Commission and NGOs: Building a 
Stronger Partnership' in January 2000 and, on the basis of this, started consultations 
with civil society in April.61 The key structure within this partnership was the Contact 
Group ofNGOs.62 The aim of the DG Trade- Civil Society Dialogue was to "develop a 
Ministerial conferences .... But we must not let institutional reform get in the way of launching a new 
Round" all accessed on February 3rd 2005. Also reported by G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 7th 
July page 12, 'Lamy warns UK against joining NAFT A' 
57 Intetview in "Les Echos", n° 18157 of22 May 2000 entitled 'Mondialisation: Pascal Lamy denonce 
un deficit de gouvernance internationale' reproduced at 
httn://europa.eu.int/comm/archlves/commission 1999 2004/lamv/speeches articles/intlaOl fr.htm) 
58 
'EU Trade Meeting Sets Up Negotiating Position' from Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol4 No 
11 of 21st March 2000 at http://www.gene.ch!gentechi2000/Mar/msg00046.html Mandate reconfirmation detailed at 
http://www .parliament. thewstationarvwoffice .CO. uk/palld 199900/ldselect/ldeucom/7617 614 .htm accessed May 5th 2 00 5 
59 from A Croft, the Indian Express of Monday March 20th 2000 'EU makes up mind, to stick to trade 
proposals' at http"//www.expressindia.com/fe/daily/20000320/fco20085.htmf, also reproduced in a Reuters report for 
New Zealand at http://onenews.nzoom.com/onenews detail/0 1227 11647-1-9 OO.html accessed 15th March 2006 
60 e.g. by G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of March 20'h 2000, page 6, 'EU doubt on early trade 
round' 
61 The paper was from the 1999-2000 Annual Report of the Platform of European Social NGOs at 
www.socialplatfonn.org/module/filelib/finalreportJ999 2000.doc accessed 5th March 2006. Report of the 
consultation was from Bridges Weekly Trade Digest Vol5 No 18, 15 May 2001 'Trade and sustainable 
development on the agenda at EC' at http://www.ictsd.org/html/weeklyii5-05-0l/stmy6.htm accessed 15th October 
2005 also 'EU-Civil Society Trade Consultations' in ACTSA Trade and Development Update Voll Issue 
I May 2000 at http://www.aetsa.orgffrnde/TDU/O!Ol.htm accessed 4th March 2006 
62 Current contact group details can be found at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/civilsoc/contactgroun.cfm accessed 5th 
March 2006. Groups participating were Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry-
EUROCHAMBRES, Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs- BEUC, Cooperation 
Intemationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite- CID SE, Eurocommerce, European Trade Union 
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confident working relationship among all stakeholders interested in trade policy, to 
ensure that all contributions ... can be heard" (Hocking 2004, ibid). This may have been 
because the Commission wanted additional support for new policy initiatives in the 
WTO as a trade-off for commitments in agriculture (De Bievre, 2006: 859). The views 
that this Group held would become important although, as Hocking points out later 
(page 273), this was not without tension in terms of the different policy areas that each 
wanted to see being pursued. 
The Commission was still thinking about how it might demonstrate more flexibility by 
floating an idea, in early 2001, to make the investment and competition agreements 
plurilateral rather than multilateral. 63 This may be an example of Commission policy 
entrepreneurship- gambling that the Council would agree if a win-win result could be 
achieved. Another way of demonstrating its commitment to the developing countries 
was to get the Commission and then Council to agree on the 'Everything But Arms 
(EBA) Regulation' (Regulation (EC) 416/2001), in February 2001. This granted duty-
free access to imports from the LDCs on most products although there were limits on 
rice, sugar and bananas. 64 However, the Commission had forced changes to the 
proposal; moving the date for liberalisation for bananas and rice from 2004 to 2006 
(bananas) and 2008 (rice).65 As the developing countries would welcome it, the ACP 
countries would not because it went beyond arrangements set out in the Cotonou 
Agreement.66 Policy entrepreneurship was not the only tool at the Commission's 
disposal in order to achieve a consensus in favour of opening a new Round. Parliament 
expressed concern about the text of a negotiating mandate for an interregional 
agreement with MERCOSUR and Chile and asked for it to be amended in order to 
"eliminate any notion of making the conclusion of the new association 
Confederation- ETUC, Foreign Trade Association- FTA, The European Services Forum- ESF and 
UNICE (previously mentioned) 
63 Flexibility suggested from G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of30"' January page 14, 'WTO gets 
ready to shrug off aftermath of Seattle'. Plurilateral agreements from C Raghavan, the Third World 
Network of30"' January 2001 'EC 'trial balloon' on investment, competition in new Round'at 
http://www.twnside.ow.sg/titlelballooo htm accessed 15th August 2005 
64 From the European Commission's 'Generalised System of Preferences- EBA' page at 
http://ec.europa.eu/tmde/issues/global/gsp/eba/index en.htm accessed 15th August 2005 
65 From EurActiv.com Thursday J8'h January 2001 'Commission Compromise on Everything But Arms 
Initiative' at http:/ /www.euractiv.com/en/trade/commission-compromise-arms-initiative/article-114 582 
66 B. Wilkinson, TWN 1" March 'Caribbean to lose in EU's 'Everything-But-Arms' deal' at 
http://www.twnside.orn.sgltitle/anns.htm accessed 25th April 2008 
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agreement ... conditional on the completion of the WTO Round negotiations".67 The text 
of those mandates is not accessible but the notion of using a bilateral agreement as 
leverage for a multilateral one, as the Commission tried to do in this case, has been 
raised before. Another potentially positive development was that, following the 
Presidential elections, a new administration was in the White House including an old 
personal fiiend of Lamy' s, Robert Zoellick, replacing Charlene Barshefsky as USTR. 68 
If the two could agree priorities, they might be able to pull the WTO in a particular 
direction. 
The European Parliament's resolution on the WTO negotiations suggested that their 
views had not evolved much since Seattle, although there was much less on social 
aspects than had hitherto been the case. 69 Their position gave paramount importance to 
transparency and for closer relationships between the WTO and other international 
bodies, including NGOs. Support for the previously agreed stance on agriculture 
remained unchanged, even though it had been a factor in the Seattle failure. The 
European Council also discussed the WTO promoting multilateralism rather than 
bilateralism and noted that the Commission needed to play a more active role in order 
that it might gain support for a wide agenda in the next Round. 70 This seems an 
acknowledgement that bridge building before Seattle might have assured a more 
successful outcome and seemed to allow, if not sanction, Commission efforts to pursue 
plurilateral agreements, if this was the way to achieve agreement from the developing 
countries. 
It was to become more evident that the Zoellick-Lamy relationship was having a 
positive effect after the US-EU meeting under the Transatlantic Declaration in June 
2001. The outcome confirmed that both sides shared a "desire to launch a new round" 
even if there was no clear evidence that the aims of each side had radically changed, 
thus not ruling out a repeat of Seattle. 71 The aim appeared to be for them both to drive 
agreement by the Quad on the scope of the Round by developing a bilateral deal that 
67 EU Bulletin 3-2001 at htto://europa.eu.intlabc/doc/off'bull/eni2001031p 1 06104.htm accessed 15th August 2005 
68 Financial Times editorial of 12"' March, p27 'Banana fudge' 
69 EU Bulletin 3-2001 at http:lleuropa.eu.intlabcldoc/off'bull/en/200103/p 106039.htm accessed 15th August 2005 
70 European Council discussions at http://eurona.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200J03/il002.htrn. Proposal for 
multilateralism rather than bilateralism at http://europa.eu.intlabc/doc/offlbull/en/200103/i1033.htm accessed 13th 
May2006 
71 EU Bulletin June 2001 at http://europa.eu.inVabc/doclofflbu11/en/200106/p106076.htm accessed 13th May 2006 
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they could persuade other countries to sign up to.72 Their joint effort appeared to have 
been fruitful with the July G8 meeting firmly agreeing on the merits of a new Round, 
which might be centred on the developing countries yet "ambitious, balanced and 
inclusive ... reflecting the needs of all WTO members". 73 Mike Moore greeted this with 
some scepticism, noting that it would take more than the developed countries to 
encourage the launch of a Round; the developing countries also had to agree. 74 This was 
not to be forthcoming. When the LDCs set out their ambitions for a Round in the 
Zanzibar Declaration, their preference was for a narrow, focused agenda. 75 They saw 
the key items as addressing marginalisation and "enhance(ing) LDCs' effective 
participation in the multilateral trading system"; very similar to the concerns that some 
had raised in Singapore. 76 In spite, then, of a seemingly growing consensus on the part 
of the Quad to pursue a wide agenda at Doha, there was an equally strong consensus on 
the part of the less developed members, to pursue a Round with, at most, a very limited 
agenda which reflected their views at Seattle. Earlier in the month, a UN group had 
called on the WTO to launch a Development Round at Doha, arguing that this would 
redress the balance of benefits going mainly to the wealthier countries; this might be 
why the Zanzibar Declaration highlights that "any future negotiations (must be) based 
on an agenda accommodating LDCs interests".77 
As well as the problems forging an external consensus, there were problems forging an 
internal one; mainly because the uneasy truce in the Council of Ministers on agriculture 
seemed to be eroding. France, in particular, was getting cold feet about agreeing to 
negotiations even intimating that the decision could well have to wait until the 
72 Bridges Weekly News Digest, 'EU, US Moves Closer as WTO Gathers Senior Officials on Doha prep', 
Vol5, No 24, 26"' June 2001 at http:/lwww.ictsd.om111mVweekly/26-06-0!Istory3.htm accessed 13th May 2006. 
Also F Williams, the Financial Times of I" August p9 'WTO 'makes progress' on Qatar agenda' 
73 From the G8 Communique from Okinawa on 23 July 2000 at 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca!summiti2000okinawa/finalcom htm accessed 15th February 2008 
74 From 'D-G Moore Welcomes G8 statement on launch of new Trade Round'. WTO News Item of23 
July 2000 at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/newsOO e/g82000 e.htm accessed 15th February 2008 
75 C Denny, the Guardian of26"' July, p28 'WTO takes reality check'. Zanzibar Declaration sourced at 
httn://www.un.org/esafffd/themes/Jdc-4.htm accessed on 15th July 2005, also at 
http://www.unido.org/userfilesltimminsk/Zanzibar Declamtion.pdf accessed 13th May 2007. The document was 
developed during the LDC Trade Ministers' Meeting on 22-24 July 2001 
76 Quote from Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 'LDCs say 'Not Ready' for New Round', Vol5 No 
29 at http://www.ictsd.org!html/weekly/31M07M01/story3.htm Unwillingness to contemplate a new Round from M 
Khor ofTWN on 28th July 'LDC Ministers not prepared to negotiate on new issues' at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/preparcd.htm accessed 15th May 2006 
77 From ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest Vol5 No 25 3'' July 2001 'Expert Panel Calls for 
WTO Reform and Launch of Development Round' at http://www.ictsd.org/htmllweekly/03M07-0l/story2.htm 
accessed 20th Febrwrry 2008. 
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following year because of possible threats to the outcome of the May elections.78 
Domestic pressures, then, especially in the contentious field of agriculture, could not be 
ignored, as had been the case in the Uruguay Round. 
Perhaps in an effort to distance themselves from their support of discussing social 
issues in the WfO, the Commission approved COM(2001 )416 on 'Promoting core 
labour standards and improving social governance in the context of globalisation' in 
July. The extract from the EU Bulletin does not refer to the wro at all; rather it talks 
about discussions being internal to ILO, apart from a vague reference to the need for "a 
regular international dialogue" on trade/labour issues along with wider social 
concerns. 79 The Commission also seemed to have taken on board Canada's proposal 
from the Seattle Ministerial, wanting to begin an "international dialogue with .. .ILO and 
the WfO ... UNCTAD, the World Bank, and the UNDP".80 This was, perhaps, an effort 
to ensure that "International efforts to secure minimum labour standards (were) not 
allowed to muddy the agenda of the next round of trade liberalization talks" although it 
seemed unlikely whether Parliament, given their previous position on trade/labour 
issues, would agree to this. 81 
The first draft of the Do ha Ministerial Declaration circulated on 26th September did not 
receive a great deal of support from delegations. 82 The Commission commented that the 
wording on environment, investment and competition, in particular, were unacceptable. 
This might be put down to political posturing as it was reported that the EU had been 
forced to make significant concessions to ensure commitment from the developing 
countries, including reducing the agenda. 83 The wro Secretariat seemed to think that 
the draft Declaration for Doha was much less contested than that for Seattle as it was 
nine pages long with only six pairs of square brackets, suggesting that problems could 
78 M Mann and G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 8" September p6 'France shows nervousness 
over trade round launch' 
79 Extract from the EU Bulletin 7/8 2001 at httpo//eumra.eu.int/abcidoc/offlbull/e>tl200107/p106036.htm at htto://sed· 
trade-forum.itcilo.orWeng!Papers/eu/5 COM 2001 416 final.pdj) both accessed 13th May 2007 
80 The Bridges Weekly Trade Digest 'EU labour standards strategy', Vol5 No 28, 24th July 2001 at 
http://www.newsbulletin.org/getbullctin.CF'M?SID:: accessed 13w May 2007 
81 M Mann, the Financial Times of 18th July, p!O 'EU urges full speed on new trade round' 
82 Sustainable development lacking in draft declaration' in Bridges Trade News Weekly Digest, Vol 5 No 
3 3, 2"d October 200 I at htto://www.ictsd org/weck1v!O H 0·02/stocy l.htm accessed 15th September 2006 
83C Denny, the Guardian of 28th Septemberp27, 'WTO pares down trade agenda' 
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be resolved in the Ministerial even if not beforehand. 84 Meanwhile, the European 
Parliament clarified that it still sought a wide agenda and wanted the negotiations to 
take on board the views of civil society (although how this would be done was not 
detailed) and for the WTO to become more transparent, through the foundation of "a 
parliamentary assembly", a more refined view of the 'watchdog' they had sought in the 
aftermath of Seattle, which might have the added advantage of ensuring they had more 
say in external trade. 85 As far as the content of their agenda was concerned, social 
issues (particularly labour standards) were very much to the fore. Therefore, it seemed 
clear that the Commission's position on labour standards, as expressed in 
COM(2001)416, would not be supported by Parliament. Council's conclusions, 
meanwhile, were much closer to the Commission's, and absolutely in line with the 
existing mandate. 86 
The second version of the Ministerial Declaration was circulated in October and it 
would appear, from the lack of discussion, that the EU was happier with its content. 
However, NGOs continued to be sceptical that there was any meaningful commitment 
to a 'Development Round' .87 Lamy seemed aware of this criticism and, as if to defuse 
it, had been offering money to help the developing countries meet their WTO 
obligations "and .. .indicated (the EU's) readiness to open its markets wider to their 
textiles imports" to a range of countries beyond the LDCs (who already benefited from 
EBA) suggesting he had taken on board the need for flexibility to meet the expectations 
ofthe developing countries in a broader sense, perhaps again searching for the right 
combination of carrot and stick so the WTO agenda could be widened. 88 
84 From WTO Ministerial Conference Briefing Note: 'The Do ha Ministerial: culmination of a two year 
process' sourced at http://www.wto orglenglisftlthewto e!minist e!minOl e!hrief elbrieiD2 e.htm accessed 20th 
February 2008. This also shows the efforts made internally to address some of the developing countries 
concerns prior to the Ministerial 
85 EU Bulletin 11-2001 at httn:/leuropa.eu.int/abcldoc/offlbull!en/200!101pl06028.htm accessed 15th August 2006 
86 EU Bulletin 11-200 I at http:l/europa.eujnt/abcldoc/offlbu!llen/200!10/p!06030.htm accessed 15th August 2006 
87 Oxfam suggested that the draft was still too oriented to the developed countries (from the 'Oxfam 
position on 27 October draft Doha Ministerial Declaration' at 
http://www.oxfam.ow.uk/what we do/issues/tradeldoha271001.htm accessed 17th July 2006. Christian Aid said that 
countries were being pushed into supporting a new Round or risking having their aid revenues cut from 
Article of 2"• November 'WTO latest: poor countries face threats and intimidation' at http-(lwww.christian-
aid.om.uklcamnaignltradeldohanew2.htm accessed 16th July 2006 
88 G de Jonquieres and F Williams, the Financial Times of 9th November page 10 'Poor countries raise 
hurdle at WTO' 
193 
The Doha Ministerial 
The atmosphere in Doha would be far more conducive to reaching agreement and 
allowing bargains to hold than Seattle had been, if nothing else because the Final 
Declaration was already advanced in its development. In addition, the events of 9/11 in 
New York appeared to have discouraged travel (Yergin and Stanislaw, 2002: 379-
380).89 Possibly Friends of the Earth were closer to the mark by saying that the lack of 
demonstrators was because very few representatives from NGOs had been allowed 
entry to Qatar and this was in addition to the expense of getting there in the first place. 90 
There is, however, some evidence ofNGO direct action during the Ministerial although 
not at the level seen in Seattle.91 The calmer negotiating environment raised the issue 
that perhaps the WTO could use elite-bargaining in order to gain agreement; with the 
resultant opportunity for technocratic leadership on the part of the Commission. 
Once again, the tables below show the distribution of preferences within the Ministerial, 
in the same way as tables were produced for previous Ministerials, in order to ascertain 
how likely it was that there would be a successful outcome for the Commission. The 
structure of the previous tables has been reproduced here. Given the Zanzibar 
Declaration, and seemingly further efforts on the part of the developing countries to 
work together to agree positions, it is instructive to note the extent to which there are 
similarities within their Statements to the Doha Ministerial. 
89 Also Alan Beattie, the Financial Times of 9th November page l 0 Anti-globalisation warriors shift their 
~J~:! FOEI's Link Magazine Issue 99 at http://www.foei.org/publications/link/99/e992223.html Also see C 
Hodson ofCNN.com 'Doha Talks: Same Again or a New Era?' of 7th November 2001 at 
httn://edition.cnn.com/20011\VORLD/meast/11106/qatar.hodson/ both accessed 12th September 2006 
91 See the Indymedia UK webpage 'Protest in Doha Tonight' lOth November 2001 by Thatcher Collins at 
http://www.indymedia.om.uklen/200l/llll5915.html accessed 12th September 2006 
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TheLDCs 
Table 6.4 
Bangladesh 
(WT/MIN(O I )IS 
Tl40) 
Burundi 
(WT/MJN(O I )IS 
T/127) 
Gambia 
(WT/MJN(OI)/S 
T/53) 
Lesotho 
(WT/MJN(Ol)IS 
T/52) 
Madagascar 
(WT/MJN(OI)/S 
T/88) 
Malawi 
(WT/MJN(O I )IS 
T/121) 
Mauritius 
(WT/MIN(OI)/S 
T/66)" 
Mozambique 
(WT/MIN(Ol)/S 
T/84) 
Myanmar 
(WT/MIN(Ol)/S 
T/109) 
Nepal 
(WT/MIN(Ol)/S 
T!l48) 
SADC 
(WT/MIN(Ol)/S 
T/138) 
Senegal 
(WT/MIN(Ol)/S 
T/38) 
The positions of the least-developed countries (LDCs) in the Doha 
Ministerial. 
New issues Trade/ Trade/ Trade/ New Round Concerns 
investment labour environment 
Movement of Possibly Market 
natural persons access/Rules of 
origin! 
ImPlementation 
Technology Probably not Market access/ 
transfer/ SDT 
Zanzibar 
Declaration 
Cotonou waiver Yes Probably not Technical 
assistance/ 
Representation/ 
NTBs 
Cotonou waiver Possibly Market access! 
NTBs/SDT 
. 
Zanzibar Yes Probably not Debt! Market 
Declaration! WGs (trade/ access/ Technical 
on Trade and finance) assistance 
transfer of 
technology/ Trade 
and debt 
Infrastructure Possibly Implementation/ 
assistance/ Market access 
structure of 
commodity 
markets/ 
Technology 
transfer 
Work programme Extension for 
on small, incentives to 
vulnerable export firms/ 
developing Financial 
economies! assistance 
Cotonou waiver 
Non-trade Yes (not a Yes(nota Implementation/ 
conditionalities priority) priority) SDT/ Rules of 
origin 
Standstill clause Yes Possibly Implementation/ 
on trade baniers Future work 
programme/ 
Assistance for 
LDCs 
Zanzibar Possibly Marginalisation/ 
Declaration Accession process 
Work programme (See Implementation/ 
for small Decl. Agriculture/ 
economies/ WGs from Market access. 
on Trade and Singap 
transfer of ore). 
technoJo,ey 
Market access for Implementation/ 
tourism, health, Market access/ 
professional and SOT 
construction 
services 
92 By Mauritius on behalf of Small, Vulnerable Developing Economies including Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) 
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Sierra Leone No No No No Possibly Marginalisation/ 
(WT/MIN(O I )/S TRIPS/ Technical 
T/133 Rev.!) assistance 
Solomon Is. Cotonou waiver No No No Possibly Representation in 
(WT/MIN(OI)/S Geneva/ 
T/115) Accession/SOT 
Tanzania Technology Study Study Study No Development/ 
(WT/MIN(OI)/S transfer capacity 
T/23) building/TRIPs 
To go Possibly Implementation! 
(WT/MIN(OI)/S agriculture/SOT 
T/59) 
Uganda Trade and transfer Yes (trade/ Study Study Possibly Marginalisation/ 
(WT/MIN(O I )/S of technology/ finance) Implementation/ 
T/111) trade and debt TRIPs 
Zambia WTO structure Study Study Study Probably not Marginalizationl 
(WT/MIN(OI)/S Implementation/ 
T/123) Agriculture 
In spite of the assumption that the developing countries were working more closely 
together in the lead-up to Doha, there is little evidence of aligned preferences. This 
suggests that Seattle did not herald a level of eo-working to any great extent. 
Furthermore, the Commission may have been able to act to draw together a coalition 
around its own position and encourage adherence to it at Doha. However, there is no 
wholehearted endorsement of a new Round here even though the vast majority of 
countries expressed an opinion (excepting only Mozambique and Senegal). 
The main concerns were implementation (from eight countries) and SDT and market 
access (from six); exactly the same as at Seattle, with, seemingly, no progress being 
made towards resolution in the two intervening years. There is generally more support 
for trade-investment rules, than there was at Singapore, although this is not strong. This 
might have been seen as a way of demonstrating the 'flexibility' that the Commission 
had called for earlier although not on trade-labour or trade-environment where there 
was scarcely any support for further wro activism. Interestingly, although there were 
only five suggestions for 'new issues' at Seattle, here most countries suggested at least 
one initiative. Although their interests are dispersed, technology transfer was mentioned 
by five countries. This might suggest that the developing countries were becoming 
more enthusiastic about using the wro to discuss matters of interest to them, rather 
than being negative about others aspirations for new work items. 
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The G20. 93 
Table 6.5 The positions of the G20 countries in the Doha Ministerial. 
New issues Trade/ Trade! Trade/ New Round Concerns 
investment labour environment 
Argentina No Market access/ 
(WT/MIN(O I )/ST/16) Implementation/ 
Agriculture/ 
Brazil Yes lrnplementationf 
(WT/MIN(O I )/ST/I2) Agriculture/subsidies 
& tariffs 
China (Singapore No Decreasing 
issues are participation of 
important but developing countries 
capacity in world trade! 
restraints) Implementation/ Need 
to address issues of 
concern to developing 
countries 
India Study No No No Agricultttrel Services/ 
(WT/MIN(O I )/ST/I Q)_ market access 
S. Africa Modernization Study Study Study 'Rebalancing' WTO 
(WT/MIN(OI)/ST/7) ofWTO/ rulestrRIPS/ 
Globalisation Agriculture/tariffs & 
& linka<es subsidies 
The difference in perspective from Seattle is quite noticeable with only Brazil, at Do ha, 
calling for a new Round and India failing to express a view in support of trade-
environment work as they had done at Seattle. Furthermore, only two countries now 
emphasize the need to do something more for the developing countries; China and 
South Africa although two of the others talk about problems with implementation and 
market access, which suggests there is still a coalition to support further effort in this 
direction.94 The strong consensus position here is on agriculture with now four out of 
the five countries saying that more needed to be done. However, there is no consensus 
on new issues (with only one proposal) and a general negative, where any opinion has 
been given, on trade/labour and trade/environment. 
93 China did not make a statement at the Doha Ministerial so China's position has been taken from the 
077 and China Declaration on the 4ili Ministerial Conference, Geneva 22"d October 2001 reproduced at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/dohalg77+china.html accessed on 13th May 2007 
94 China's position has been extrapolated from the G77 position, which is a grouping of developing 
countries so it is logical that this is emphasized in the document. 
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The Quad 
Table 6.6 The positions ofthe Quad countries in the Doha Ministerial. 
New issues Trade/ Trade/ Trade/ New Round Concerns 
investment labour environment 
Canada Growth and Yes Yes Agriculture/ Services/ 
(WT/MIN(Ol )/ST/13) development! Implementation/ 
Coherence Market access 
EC Sustainability Yes Yes Yes Implementation/ 
(WT/M!N(Ol)/ST/4) Development/ TRIPs 
Japan Anti dumping Yes Yes Yes Agriculture/ Services/ 
(WT/MIN(Ol)/ST/9) Trade and sustainable 
development/ Health 
aspects of TRIPs 
USA Growth and Yes Implementation/ 
(WT/MIN(O!)/ST/3) development Agriculture/Market 
access! Health aspects 
of TRIPs 
Although, once again, the Quad is aligned in its wish for a new Round, in the other 
areas the members are not so closely positioned. It is also still evident that the 
Commission wanted a wider agenda than the US, the latter which was also noticeably 
reticent on trade-investment, trade-labour and trade-environment work.95 What is also 
interesting is that Canada was now the only Quad member to advocate explicitly the 
pursuance of trade/labour efforts. Although it appears that agriculture is the area where 
there is a strong coalition (minus the EC), Japan was considered strongly protectionist 
whereas Canada and the US wanted more openness. These differences may have been 
why Lamy again emphasised in his Statement that "we will only succeed in Doha if 
there is flexibility, on the part of all participants" or it risked another failed Ministerial. 
There is little evidence of any post-Seattle "change of spirit" in the Quad, with 
development issues assuming a new importance (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2004: 496) 
although the Commission later suggested that a development focus to the Declaration 
was their idea. 96 
95 This is important because in 'WTO Ministers close rank on new development Round' the Washington 
Trade Daily of October 15th 2001 cited Zoellick as saying "both Washington and Brussels have worked 
hand-in-hand toward the launch of a new round this year" sourced from 
http://www.tradeobscrvatorv.orglheadlines.cfm?reflD=l6822 accessed on 13th May 2007. Furthermore, the G8 had 
appeared to be aligned in their quest for an ambitious agenda for the next Round. 
96 From the European Commission's 'Doha Development Agenda' page of Trade Issues at 
http://ec.europa.eu/tradelissues/newround/doha da/index en.htm accessed 20th February 2008 
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The negotiations 
Although it might have been thought that lessons about the lack of openness and 
transparency in decision making procedures may have been learnt from Seattle, the 
management ofthe Ministerial still seemed to rely more on exclusivity than inclusivity. 
Six groups, on each of the perceived key issues had been convened under 'Friends of 
the Chair' in order to address developing countries' concerns. 97 
"These 'Friends of the Chair' were not elected- in fact, developing countries 
were not even consulted ... the heavily criticised Green Rooms had been replaced 
by even less transparent 'Green Men'".98 
After these 'Friends of the Chair' reported back, there was a general discussion on 
issues not covered by the groups including labour standards. Once again, the differences 
between developed and developing countries was highlighted, with some developed 
countries wanting an explicit reference to WTO work in the area alongside the ILO 
while a number of the developing countries refused to accept changes to the text, some 
wanting to take out references to the ILO and some wanting it to be completely 
removed because the wording had already been decided in Singapore.99 There were 
reports that the developed countries tried, in the meetings, "to extract the maximum 
amount of concessions from the weak ... for the minimum cost" rather than 
demonstrating any real commitment to development objectives.100 This suggests that a 
lack of will for a development Round and implies that it would continue to be difficult 
to persuade developing countries to embark on any negotiations. 101 
97 The six key issues were TRIPs, agriculture, implementation, environment, Singapore issues and 'rules' 
98 WDM Press Release 'Doha: It's deja-vu all over again' bl B Coates, 12 November 2001 at 
htto://www.wdm.org.uk/news/presrel/current/deiavue.htm accessed 15 August 2007 
99 WTO report of 11 November at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/minOI e/minOl llnov e.htm 
accessed 15th August 2007 
10° C Denny, the Guardian of 12th November p21-2 'Developed World Accused of Bully Boy Tactics in 
theWTO' 
101 C Denny, the Guardian of 14"' November p26, 'Europe isolated by WTO' 
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Fortunately, however, there would be an incentive to move forward when the long 
awaited waiver for the banana regime in the Cotonou Agreement, was agreed by the 
WTO so allowing a preferential trade agreement on bananas, from the ACP countries to 
the EC, to continue; at least until the EBA arrangements kicked in. 102 That this was a 
precursor to achieving agreements in the WTO was highlighted in the same article; 
"The 78 ACP countries (56 of which are Members of the WTO) had previously 
threatened to oppose any new trade negotiations - especially on Singapore 
issues, environment and labour- unless the EC waiver request was approved". 
Although this was a positive, there was also a negative likely to outweigh this gain, 
damage the internal consensus and contribute to the difficult negotiating environment. 
France, as it had threatened before, refused to give its assent to the agricultural 
negotiations agenda, specifically the part which said that negotiations would aim 
towards 'phasing out' all farm export subsidies.103 This could have had the effect of 
holding agricultural negotiations hostage to making gains in other areas, also 
exacerbating the tensions between the EU and the Cairns Group along with the 020. 
A new draft of the Declaration was circulated in the morning of the final day of the 
Conference. CID SE, one of the Commission's Contact Group members, made the 
comment that although this version was worse than an earlier draft, countries did not 
wish to be seen to be a barrier to consensus and force the collapse of this Ministerial. 104 
This must have had the desired effect as WTO members eventually agreed to launch a 
new three-year duration Round. 105 France's opposition was somewhat mollified by "a 
102 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 'EC-ACP Cotonou Waiver Finally Granted', Vo15 No 39, 15" 
November 2001 at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/Ol-ll-l5/stoN2.htm 
103France's position is detailed in G de Jonquieres and F Williams, the Financial Times of 14" November, 
page 14 'Trade talks falter as France blocks farm subsidy deal'. Page 7 ofCOM(l999)331 said that there 
were certain issues that would be raised and, with this in mind,. "the Community should pursue an active 
market access policy with a view to eliminating barriers to entry in certain third country markets, export 
subsidies (including export credits) and state trading enterprises", which suggests that all members 
realised that the question of export subsidies would be raised. This is further detailed in the negotiating 
mandate which says "The Union is willing to continue to negotiate in the process of reducing trade 
barriers ... as well as (in) both domestic and export support". The aim to 'phase out' export subsidies, with 
no fixed timescale, is so weak, that it seems unlikely that France took this stance for anything other than 
domestic political reasons. 
104 Acronym stands for Cooperation Jnternationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite from the 
CIDSE Assessment of the Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting at http://www.cidse.org/enftgi/AssDoha.hun 
accessed 15th December 2005 
105 G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 15th November, page I 'WTO agrees to launch trade round' 
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qualification" to the agricultural agenda along with "a stronger WTO commitment to 
negotiate on trade and environment" (ibid).106 The eventual agreement reached was, in 
the end, wide ranging perhaps because the meeting was extended by one day, allowing 
agreement to be reached on suitable wording for the agriculture clause or perhaps 
because the amended draft dealt much more with developing country concerns than the 
previous had done, containing more references to SDT, building capacity and technical 
assistance. 107 Perhaps, also, the Commission had been able to attract developing 
countries onside because of EBA. Furthermore, it was agreed that negotiations on the 
Singapore Issues would only begin on the basis of an "explicit consensus" at the next 
Ministerial meeting in Canctin. The Chairman was called upon to interpret this wording 
and concluded that it would "give each member the right to take a position on 
modalities that would prevent negotiations from proceeding after the Fifth Session of 
the Ministerial Conference until that member is prepared to join in an explicit 
consensus". 108 This made it clear that the Declaration was, at least with the Singapore 
Issues, a statement of what might happen as opposed to what would happen. 109 In spite 
of this, Robert Zoellick was to comment that Doha "had removed the stain ofSeattle" 
from the WT0.110 
106 That the outcome would not be "prejudged". 
107Agricultural clause wording from a paper by L Jolly, the Senior Economist of the International Sugar 
Corporation in a paper submitted to the 12th Informal Consultation between the World Association of 
Beet and Cane Growers and the ISO Council dated 26th November 2001 at 
http://www .sugaronline.com!iso/store/speeches/jolly3 .pdfflsearch-'doha%20200 I' accessed 12th September 2 006. 
Suggestion that this was due to the development focus was from the Day Five and Six Report of the Doha 
meeting by the Australian Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/tmde/negotiations/ministerialldoha 13 141101 report.html accessed 12th September 2006. B 
Coates of the World Development Movement ('WTO Ministerials: Doha 2001 ')said that the additional 
day meant that "several delegations (had) already caught their flights home" at 
http://www.wdm.org.uklnews/btogs/wto2001/index.htm accessed 15th April2008 
108 Chairs speaking notes at http://www wto.org/en{)'lish/thewto e/minist elminOl e!min01 chair sneaking e.htm accessed 
12th September2006. Additional citation from the Report of the Meeting by J Madeley for the DF!D 
'Developments"( the international development magazine) 'WTO members agree new trade round' at 
httn://www.devclopmcnts.org.ukldata/16/id wto.htm accessed 12th September 2006. This was possibly because of 
the position oflndia, see the South Centre's 14th November's piece 'Doha 'Development Agenda' 
Launched' at http://www.southcentre.org/info/doha/doha9/doha9%20.htm accessed 12th September 2006 
109 See also the Europaworld (issue 56) article of9'" November 2001 'Is Doha Doomed?' at 
htto://www.europaworld.org/issue56/isdohadoomed911 01 htm accessed 12th September 2006, noting the problems of 
achieving consensus 
110 From V Shiva for the Global Policy Forum 'Doha: Saving WTO, Killing Democracy' at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon!bwi-wto/wto/200 1 /1204dem. htm accessed 15th April 2008 
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The Conclusions of the Do ha Ministerial 
There were three papers issued at the end of the Do ha meeting: a draft Ministerial 
Declaration (WT/MIN(Ol )/DEC/W/1 ), a draft Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement 
and Public Health (WT/MIN(Ol )/DEC/W/2) and a Draft Decision on Implementation 
Issues and Related Concerns (WT /MIN (0 1 )/DEC/W/1 0). 111 
The key paragraphs of the Do ha Declaration were the sixth, which confirmed the 
WTO' s support of sustainable development, linked trade to environment issues and also 
upheld the use of the precautionary principle, and the eighth, a very brief paragraph on 
labour standards, which showed that the debate had not moved on since Singapore; "We 
reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference regarding 
internationally recognized core labour standards. We take note of work under way in 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of 
globalization". 112 Even where some of the issues covered in the Declaration had not 
been set as specific targets by the Commission, or were not in the mandate, in most 
cases the wording is so vagne that there appears little for member states to be concerned 
about. The section on WTO Rules is a little more difficult to assess in terms of judging 
whether this was positive because the focus appears to be on subsidies and regional 
trade agreements. It is not clear whether the Commission would be supportive of this 
initiative (especially as these issues do not feature in COM(1999)331) although there is 
no end date given for completion of negotiations. 
Although, then, the work programme looks very ''broad and balanced", to cite section 
11 of the Declaration, in the end much is based on the commitment to 'study' issues 
rather than immediately move forward to begin negotiations. Discussion of this 
terminology would continue to Cancl'm and beyond and will feature strongly in the 
following chapter. Perhaps it was hoped that developing countries would engage with 
the new Round as it now had a strong development focus and the Decision on 
Implementation Issues suggested that some of the longstanding concerns raised by them 
(some of which had already been tackled in Doha) might be resolved before the next 
Ill The WTO Report of 14th November (at http://www.wto.org/cnglish/thewto e!minist e/min01 e!minOI 14nov e.htm 
accessed 12th September 2006 
112 Text of the Agreement can be found at at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/minOI e/mindecl e.htm 
accessed 12th September 2006 
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Ministeriai.Jl3 Although Amrita Narlikar (2004: 420) later suggested that the consensus 
to a widened agenda at Do ha was facilitated by "flawed ... procedures" (presumably 
Green Rooms) and "sowed the seeds for collapse at Cancun", this seems unlikely 
because of the nature of the Doha document; geared as it was towards 'study' with little 
substance on the likely nature and duration of negotiations. 
The European Commission's information page seems to overplay the significance of 
what happened at the Doha Ministerial, presumably because it was for public rather 
than internal consumption. It suggests that the Declaration and related decisions: 
"Takes the WTO into a new era. Not only will the WTO continue to improve conditions 
for worldwide trade and investment; it will also, through enhanced and better rules, be 
able to play a much fuller role in the pursuit of economic growth, employment and 
d . " 114 poverty re uctwn . 
This fits with the tone of the Commission's official report of the meeting which was 
somewhat self-congratulatory. 115 In services, "the EU's objectives were fully realised" 
and negotiations on geographical indications for wines and spirits "was an EU 
priority".116 The Council seemed less enamoured with Doha, agreeing only, "the results 
of the conference as a whole were satisfactory". 117 However, Portugal had problems 
accepting the wording on textiles in the declaration on implementation and Council 
reiterated how important it was to continue to discuss labour standards and 
globalisation, showing that the ghost oflabour standards could still not be laid to rest. 
The European Parliament, which issued their resolution a month later (although it is 
mentioned here for narrative clarity) in spite ofDoha achieving nothing of note in terms 
oflabour standards or on any structural changes to the WTO, seemed generally content 
l!3 See the WTO page on the Do ha Implementation Decision Explained at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop c/dda e/implem explained e.htm accessed 20th February 2008 
114
'The Doha Development Agenda' in the European Commission's Trade Issue pages; 
http://europa.eu.int/commttrade/issues/newround/doha dalindex en.htm accessed 20th February 2008 
115 EU Bulletin 11-2001 at http://www.eumpa.eu.inUabcldoc/off/bulllen/2001111p106028.htm accessed 20th February 
2008 
116 This did not feature as a 'priority' in the mandate or in COM(!999)331. 
117 Council conclusions, adopted on 14th November (http://eurona.eu.int/abc/doc/off!bull/enl20001l/p106029.htm 
accessed 12th September 2006 
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with the outcome. 118 It simply remarked that there should be more transparency and that 
consideration should be given to a parliamentary assembly. That the internal coalition 
held together, and the Parliament and Council accepted a less than satisfactory outcome, 
could be seen as significant 'win' for the Commission. 
Interestingly, after Doha, at a meeting with civil society representatives, Larny tried to 
suggest that his commitment to labour standards was of greater priority than he had 
demonstrated thus far (including in his statement to the Doha meeting), although 
whether it meant that he would continue to promote labour standards in the WTO on his 
own volition went unsaid.119 He remarked that the Commission "had wanted a clearer 
articulation of the role of the WTO with regard to the ILO" and, instead, this was 
implicit in the Declaration rather than explicit. 120 This appeared to be a thinly veiled 
attempt to encourage civil society representatives to be supportive of his efforts, rather 
than criticise the EU for failing to address social issues although it ignored the 
Commission's position, upon which the mandate was based, as set out in 
COM(1999)331.121 
The Fifth WTO Ministerial- Cancun, 101h-141h September 2003 
The Lead Up 
After Doha, Lamy must have been pleased that the OECD was actively lobbying for his 
proposal for duty and tariff free access for products from the developing countries as 
there had been insufficient progress on this issue in the WT0.122 On the negative side, 
118 13th December 2001 in http'//www.europa.eu.int/abc/doc/offlbu!Vew'200112/pl06024.htm accessed 12th September 
2006 
119 Presentation on 'What next for our dialogue with civil society?' (from 
httn://europa.eu.inVcomm/archives/cornmission 1999 2004/lamy/speeches articles/spla89 en.htm accessed 3rd January 
2006. Statement to the meeting, as cited earlier, Statement accessed via the portal at via the portal at 
http://www.wto.orglenglish/thewto elminist e/minOI e/minOl statements e.htm on 12th November 2005 
120 These remarks were given pride of place in the ILO January 2002 newsletter at 
http://www.us.ilo.org/archive/news/2002/ilowatch 0201.cfm accessed 14th November 2005 
121 This need to encourage a supportive relationship with civil society partners might have resulted from 
an open letter to Pascal Lamy on ll"' May 200l,wherein a coalition of ninety nine NGOs from nineteen 
European countries "sharply criticiz(ed) the EU's stance in the WTO in pushing for 'a comprehensive 
new WTO trade round focusing on investment and competition"' from C Raghavan, the Third World 
Network on 11th May 'European Civil Society denounces EC's WTO stance' at 
http://www.twnside.org.sgltitle/european.htm accessed on 6th August 2005 
122 Report from the OECD Ministerial meeting in Paris of 15th -16"' May 2002 in EU Bulletin 5-2002 at 
http:!/europa.eu.intlabc/doc/off!bull/en/200205/pl 06033.htm accessed 1Oth November 2005 
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the Commission was concerned about the US Fann Bill, which had been criticised by 
the Cairns Group for going against the Doha Declaration on abolishing farm 
subsidies. 123 Although the Deputy USTR expressed his willingness to negotiate on 
agricultural reform, suggesting there might, after all, be an opportunity to make 
progress on this at Cancl'm, Lamy was sceptical "whether (he) can speak in the name of 
the United States", speculating whether the US would really be prepared to open this up 
for debate.124 In spite of this, another important step towards a positive outcome at 
Cancl'm was when President Bush finally achieved fast-track authority from Congress at 
the end of July. Lamy agreed that this "removes an important roadblock to the Doha 
Development Agenda ... Now we have to ... generate real momentum in these 
negotiations".125 This optimism was shared by the WTO as, once Fast Track was in 
place, decisions taken at Cancun would hold rather than risk protracted internal 
ratification. This also added an incentive for Lamy to continue to bridge-build with 
Zoellick. 126 
Despite the optimism about transatlantic relations, the internal consensus was reported 
to be fragile again on CAP reform particularly between the UK and France. 127 Lamy 
urged quick reform, attempting to guard against too much entrenchment of positions. 
Under the Commission's new plan, "aid would be more de-coupled from production 
and linked to compliance with environmental, safety and animal welfare standards" -
this was argued to be more in line with the 'rnultifunctionality' argument advanced in 
the WTO and showed a linkage between internal reforms giving an external capacity to 
act. In spite of this, tensions with France were to become more explicit with President 
Chirac commenting that he would be prepared to veto talks on agricultural reform in 
"'Information about the Farm Bill from ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest of22nd May (vol6 
no 19) 'Despite Internal Trade Spats, OECD Members Advocate Free Trade' at 
http://wwwjctsd.org/weekly/02-05-22/stOty6.htm accessed 14th November 2005. Criticism levied by Cairns 
Group in ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest of22nd May (vol 6 No 19) 'Cairns Group Joins In 
Criticism OfUs Farm Bill'at http://www.ictsd.or•lweekly/02-05-22/wtoinbrief.htm accessed 14th September 2005 
124 BBC News, Thursday 16th May 'Protectionism 'may hurt growth" at 
http://news.bbc.co.ukll!lli/business/199J787.stm accessed 15th September 2005 
125 The Commission Spokesman's Briefing of 2nd August 02 at http://www.hri.orcrlnews!europelmidex/2002/02-08-
02.midex.htm1, also seeP Blustein International Herald Tribune 29"' July, page 1, 'Bush wins battle for 
trade powers' 
126 WTO Press Release of 2nd August Press/308 at httn://www.wto.aro/english/news elpres02 e/pr308 e.htm 
accessed 15th September 2005 
127 The Bridges News Digest of9 October vol6 no 34 'Split On EU's Ag Policy Reinforced By British 
Minister's Comments~ at http://www.ictsd.org'weekly/02-l0-09/stcny3.htm accessed 15th September 2005 
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Europe and, thus, in the WTO. 128 The WTO expressed 'disappointment' at the lack of 
progress on agriculture and with the lack of political will to make a breakthrough. 129 
The concern could have been exacerbated by emerging details of the EU's new 
agricultural aid regime, which would also cover "olive oil, tobacco and cotton", the 
latter of particular interest to the developing countries and so liable to draw criticism, 
and affect the negotiating environment, in the WT0.130 
The European Parliament's resolution on Cancun was, once again, in line with existing 
Commission views. 131 The main exceptions were that it specifically asked the 
Commission to ensure that a Parliamentary Assembly was set up and sought further 
action on sustainable fisheries, trade defence instruments (there was an 
acknowledgement in the mandate that this might be of interest to developing countries) 
and for a unit to be set up allowing cheaper access to the DSU for developing countries 
(again, there was a suggestion in the mandate that "decisions could ... be taken on 
improvements of the DSU", although this does not cover Parliament's points 
specifically). Council's conclusions on Canclin also broadly fit with the mandate 
although did not mention the Singapore issues, perhaps an acknowledgement that 
without substantial changes to agricultural support, which would not happen, no 
progress could be made. 132 On the same day as it gave conclusions for Cancun, Council 
also issued its conclusions on the Commission Communication on 'Promoting Core 
Labour Standards and Improving Social Governance in the Context of Globalization' 
(COM(2001 )416 fina\). 133 Council agreed there should be "incentives to promote core 
labour standards", including corporate responsibility measures, alongside increased 
dialogue and monitoring but, just as the Communication did not, Council did not 
mention WTO had a role in this regard. 
128 I Black, A Osbom and C Denny, the Guardian of 21" June page 7 'Agriculture- Chirac Threat to veto 
reform of farm subsidies' 
"' G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of23'd June page 9 'Ministers fail to break deadlock on farm 
trade' 
130 I Black, the Guardian of27"' June page 15 'EU agrees to agriculture shake-up' 
131 Bulletin 7/8-2003 at http://europa.eu.int/abe/doe/offibull/en/200307tnl06043.htm accessed 15th November 2005. 
132 Same issue of the Bulletin (7-8/2003) at p\06044 also accessed 15th November 2005. As the mandate 
does not appear to have been formally changed, this suggests that the new issues were not of much 
import in determining the Commission's position in Cancun 
133 Same issue of the Bulletin (7-812003) at p\06045 (accessed same date) 
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Negotiations on agriculture continued between the US and EC with Lamy and Zoe!lick 
agreeing to work to reach a common view. This was achieved, finally, in August 
2003. 134 The joint position was then tabled at an informal WTO meeting, which may 
have been a way for the EU to defuse the acrimonious exchanges with the Cairns 
Group, or as a way to bypass domestic pressures on both sides. 135 In reality, however, 
there seemed little of substance in the outcome as it "outline( d) broad principles but 
contain( ed) no specific figures or target dates" and there was no effort to eliminate 
export subsidies, as had been set out at Do ha. 136 Perhaps the most useful initiative was a 
single formula for cutting agricultural tariffs although this, in itself, was unlikely to 
encourage countries to sign up, which might adversely affect progress in negotiations in 
other areas.137 Lack of support for the US-EC proposals became clear a day later when 
India officially rejected them for not going far enough while Japan and Switzerland 
criticized them for being too radical. 138 This seemed to galvanise other countries to 
express their opinions and was to culminate in the emergence of the G20 as a separate 
and distinct group within the WTO (Kerremans, 2006: 185). The G20's response to the 
paper sought a complete removal of subsidies and noted that this had delayed the 
preparation of an agricultural draft for Canctin. 139 Washington and Brussels would then 
label the G20 responsible for the 'impasse' on agriculture by "making demands on rich 
countries but offering nothing in retum". 140 
134 See Briefmg on the 'EU-US Agriculture Framework Agreement' from the Centre of North American 
Studies dated September 12'h 2003 at http://cnas.tamu.edu/publications/AoWT0803.PDF accessed May 13th 2007 
also in Europaworld of 15th August 2003 'EU US joint approach ou agricultural questions' at 
http://www.europaworld.orglweekl40/euusjointl5803.htm accessed 13th May 2007 
135 Report of informal meeting, which took place on 13th August is at 'Agriculture: Real negotiations start 
as EU US table joint modalities text' ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest Vol 7 No 28 21" 
Augnst 2003 at http://www.ictsd.org/weeklv/03-()8-21/story2.htm accessed 13th May 2007. Details of position in G 
de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of31" July, page 8 'EU and US to seek common ground on farm 
trade'. This is also supported by an article by C Rammanohar Reddy, The Hindu of September 22•• 2002 
'Road to Cancun Collapse', which says that the EU-US proposal was worded so that "it would leave their 
subsidy mountain largely intact but open markets for their agricultural exports in the rest of the world" 
(sourced at http://www.hindu.corn!bizl2003/09/22/stqries/2003092200090200.htm on 13th May 2007) 
136 G de Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 14th Augnst page 8, 'US and EU unveil plan to cut farm trade 
subsidies' 
137 See also The Economist Special Report on World Trade talks September 6th 2003, pp73-75 
138India rejection in C Denny and A Osborn, the Guardian of 14th August p 18, 'Farm deal puts WTO talks 
at risk' Japan and Switzerland concerninG de Jonquieres, Financial Times 161h August page 7, 'US-EU 
farm proposals leave WTO members in dilemma' 
139 F Williams, the Financial Times of 22"• August page 8, 'Rifts over farm trade add to delay ou Cancun 
plans' 
140 L Elliot and C Denny, the Guardian of September 131h p21 'Crisis talks as poor nations stand firm' 
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The Cancun Ministerial 
Once again, for ease of comparison, the preferences of each country have been given in 
a table to show whether the Commission was likely to obtain an outcome close to what 
it wanted from the Cancun Ministerial. As there was now to be a development focus to 
this Round, alongside a commitment to address implementation issues, it would seem 
likely that the developing countries would be more willing to consent to additional 
negotiations, particularly for the Singapore issues, as these were being strongly pushed 
by the Commission (see the following Chapter). 
TheLDC/ 41 
Table 6.7 
Burundi 
(WTIMIN(03)/ST/J 
26) 
Chad 
(WTIMIN(03)/ST/l 
12) 
Fiji (for Small, 
Vulnerable 
Economies) 
(WT/MIN(03)/STI8 
7) 
Lesotho 
(WTIMIN(03)/ST/8 
2) 
Madagascar 
(WTIMIN(03)/ST/5 
2) 
Mauritius (for the 
African Union) 
(WTIMIN(03)/ST/6 
9) 
Malawi 
(WTIMIN(03)/ST/l 
31) 
Mozambique 
(WT/MIN(03)/ST/7 
4) 
Myanrnar 
(WTIMIN(03)/ST/l 
05) 
The positions of the least-developed countries CLDCs) in the Canctin 
Ministerial. 
New issues Singapore Issues Concerns 
No Simplification of rules of origin/ 
implementation, market access and 
SDT/agriculture 
Mandatory Yes? Market access/agriculture/cotton 
and binding 
SDT 
obligations 
C1arification Lack of resolution of outstanding 
should continue concerns/SDT/preferences 
No Keeping to deadlines! amendments to 
TRJPsl agriculture. 
Reduction of poverty/encouragement 
of investment! technical assistance and 
greater market access 
Poverty/infrastructure/SDT 
Compensation Improved financial and technical 
for assistance/affordable access to 
agricultural medicines/ agriculture. 
liberalisation 
Food security Study Keeping to deadlines/addressing 
implementation and SDT/ increased 
technical assistance 
Study Reciprocity/greater market access/ 
technical assistance. 
141 As Bangladesh's statement (WT/MIN(03)/ST/35) was concerned solely with membership issues, and 
neither Gambia nor Nepal made a statement, these three countries have not been listed here. 
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Senegal Cotton TRIPs/SOT/elimination of agricultural 
(WT/MIN(03)/ST/7 subsidies 
8) 
Sierra Leone Insufficient SOT/greater market access and supply-
(WT/MIN(03)/STII capacity side constraints/technical and financial 
15) assistance 
Solomon Is. Flexibility/SDT/fisheries 
(WT/MIN(03)/ST/6 
Sl 
Tanzania Agriculture/ transparency/SOT 
(WT/MIN(03)/ST/7 
9) 
Togo Cotton Premature Market access/elimination of 
(WT/MIN(03)/ST/I imbalances and SOT/agriculture 
38) 
Uganda Extend Insufficient Market access/ elimination of 
(WT/MIN(03)/ST/7 geographical capacity subsidies/ compatibility in 
5) indicators/ environmental rules 
market access 
for services 
Zambia Provision of opportunities for growth 
(WT/MIN(03)/ST/! and development/ responsiveness to 
16) needs of developing countries/ 
transparency in WTO 
There are fewer 'new issues' proposed here than there were at Seattle, so much less 
evidence here that the developing countries were trying to take over the agenda with 
matters of collective interest. There is also a clear lack of will for negotiations on the 
Singapore Issues, which suggests that trade-offs, if made by the Commission, were not 
very successful. Eight countries raised concerns on the need for agriculture to be 
incorporated into WTO rules and also for a level playing field in terms of subsidies 
reflecting, and adding to, the debates between the Cairns Group/020 and the EUIUS. 
The same number of countries mentioned SDT provisions, which were still unresolved 
from Singapore. Furthermore, seven countries mentioned market access as a particular 
problem, again as six countries had done both at Singapore and Doha. This suggests 
very little in the way of a concrete effort towards a Development Round as the issues of 
greatest concern to the developing countries were still seemingly unaddressed. 
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The G20142 
Table 6.8 The positions of the G20 countries in the Cancun Ministerial. 
New issues Singapore Development Concerns 
Issues focus? 
Brazil Yes Agriculture 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/ 
28 
China Equal Yes Market access/agriculture/SDT and 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/ participation implementation 
12 inWTO 
India No Yes Implementation/agriculture/tariffs & 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/ NTBs/ the 'Transfer of Trade' and 'Trade, 
7 Debt and Finance' working groups/cotton 
S. Africa Yes Structural issues/agriculture 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/ 
43 
There is strong consensus evident here on having a development focus to the next 
Round combined with a perceived need to reach agreement on agriculture. Further to 
that, the theme of equal participation is also important; India mentioned the need for 
inclusivity in decision making for both this and preparatory processes for future 
Rounds. The G20 was primarily concerned that simply calling the Canclin Ministerial 
the start of a 'Development Round' would not be good enough. India said that unless 
there was substantial improvement in addressing matters of concern to developing 
countries (especially implementation) they "would be forced to conclude that the 
"development" element in the Doha Development Agenda is only rhetoric". Brazil 
agreed that development dimensions needed to be fully integrated "into the core" of the 
WTO not stuck on the edges as only this would ensure that developing countries 
could "genuinely benefit" (China) from the WTO. Perhaps because of the outstanding 
issues in the way development was dealt with, there is no agreement here on 
incorporating the Singapore Issues in the WTO agenda 
142 This time it was Argentina, which did not make a statement in CancUn. It has not been included in the 
table however as it was a member of the Cairns Group it seems likely that it would have agreed with any 
general position on agriculture. 
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The Quad 
Table 6.9 The positions of the Quad countries in the Canclin Ministerial. 
New issues Singapore Development Concerns 
Issues? focus? 
Canada Rules to Hand in hand Greater cooperation between 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/9 "strengthen with envt'I agencies/agriculture/market access for 
the flow of protection, goods and services 
trade" health and 
human rights 
EC Tariffs in Yes Yes being Market opening/NAMA/trade and 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/5 textiles careful not to environment 
be 
confrontational 
Japan Single Yes Yes and to do Agriculture 
WT/MIN(03)/ST/22 formula for this we need to 
WT/MJN(03)/ST/23 NAMA improve ''the 
143 governing 
system" of the 
WTO 
USA'"" Ensuring On the basis Yes Missed deadlines (TRIPS and public 
trade/envt of explicit health, SDT, implementation, 
mutually consensus DSU,NAMA)/ Capacity building/CAP 
supportive refonn 
Although it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion on the Quad position, they were 
not strongly aligned over what they sought from the Round, or even on including the 
Singapore Issues in the WTO agenda. The criticisms levied at the Quad at Seattle and 
Do ha, and the problems that this might have created for their leadership of the 
consensus-building process, could be repeated here. In spite of the G20' s comments 
about the need for action rather than rhetoric, Lamy said that the development Round 
was "a genuine process" although he continued that this 'process' was "to address the 
needs and concerns of all WTO members, including developing countries" suggesting 
that this was not necessarily primarily aimed at the LDCs. Although the Commission 
did not comment on trade/labour, as neither did Canada nor Japan, the Presidency did 
143 There are two statements from Japan to the Cancun Ministerial. The first is from the Minister of 
Economy Trade and Industry (22) and the second is from the Minister for Foreign Affairs (23). Both are 
equally relevant so have been used for the purposes of compiling the table 
144In spite of requests to the WTO Secretariat and to the USTR's office (twice) I have not been able to 
source the statement from the USA to the Canclin Ministerial. Therefore, this is based on the results of 
the 2003 Meeting of APEC Ministers responsible for Trade held in Khan Kaen Thailand on 2-3 June. 
Statement of the Chair at httn://www.apec.org/apec/ministerial statements/sectoral ministerialltrade/2003 trade.html 
accessed 20th February 2008. It has also noted the 2002 Economic Leaders' Declaration from Los Cabos, 
Mexico on 27th October at http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders declarations/2002.html accessed 20th February 2008 
where the WTO was discussed in some detail (and which is also cited in the first document). 
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bring it up again, saying "our final objective is to spread welfare around the globe ... We 
need a major effort from all parties to assure ... social conditions linked to the 
fundamental labour rights" although it must have been clear by now that there was no 
chance at all of success in the WTO context. 145 
The negotiations 
The meeting started on I Oth September and, in the same way as at Do ha, four 'Friends 
of the Chair' were chosen to deal with specific issues although the Groups that they 
presided over would be open to all. 146 News circulated that the Commission had 
produced an internal paper "planning to ... remove all mention of eliminating export 
subsidies from the ... final declaration" although Lamy had also suggested that WTO 
members eliminate export subsidies on cotton and allow free market access from the 
least developed countries, suggesting that the Commission would not propose such an 
absolutist measure. 147 Lamy's call for the elimination of such subsidies was, anyway, 
seen as without substance; the EU did not subsidize cotton exports and already gave 
cotton from LDCs free access through the EBA. 
Although a further draft Ministerial Declaration was circulated, consensus would not be 
easy to reach.148 Progress on agriculture was, again, holding up proceedings as the US 
and EC had still not succeeded in building any bridges with their agriculture draft. 149 
Although the rumour above was unsubstantiated, the Commission said now that it 
would only agree to eliminate export subsidies in areas "of particular interest to 
"'From the Statement from Italy on behalf of the Presidency of the EU WT/MIN(03)/ST/6 11th 
September 2003 at http://www.wto.org/englishJthewto elminist e!min03 e/statements e/st6.doc accessed 21st February 
2008 
146 WTO report of lOth September at htto://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/min03 e/min03 IOsept e.htm 
accessed 15th August 2005. However, the problems with capacity, considering some delegations were 
extremely small, would no doubt mean that not all countries could have a representative in all groups thus 
making very little difference whether they were 'open' or 'closed'. 
147 Rumour about removing reference to export subsidies from L Elliott and C Denny, the Guardian of 
11th September page 16, 'EU reneges on pledges to third world'. Larny's suggestion on cotton found at 
the Bridges Daily Update of 13th September issue 4 'New Ministerial Text to be issued 
today'(http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto daily/ben030913.ndf) accessed 5th March 2006 
148 See http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancunldocs/draft cancun minist text rev2.pdf for the complete draft 
Declaration, accessed 15th November 2005. Consensus issues raised in WTO's report of the 13th 
September meeting at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e!minist e/min03 e/min03 13seot e.htm accessed 15th 
November 2005 
149 Bridges Daily Update of 14th September issue 5 'At the Eleventh Hour, divergence all over again' (at 
http:!Jwww.ictsd.orglministerial/cancunlwto daily/ben0309I 4.mif accessed 9th March 2006 
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developing countries" (ibid) although there was no suggestion as to what this might 
mean in practice and it must have inflamed the Cairns Group (as interviewee number 3 
seemed to suggest). 150 Other barriers to achieving consensus were that the Singapore 
issues section of the draft Declaration proposed that negotiations should begin in all 
areas except trade and competition (much to the chagrin of the EC) and the reference to 
'explicit consensus', had been removed (unpopular with the developing countries, as 
supported by interviewee 8). On the final day of the conference, the EC started to seek 
four sets of talks on the Singapore issues rather than bundling them together. 151 It must 
have been clear, though, that (once again) this would not compensate for the lack of any 
significant movement on agriculture. Nevertheless, surprisingly, Chairman Derbez had 
concentrated on the Singapore issues in meetings which had continued through the 
night although this would ultimately prove to be a waste of time as no agreement was 
forthcoming. 152 
Explanations for the failure of the Ministerial are as varied as the reasons given after the 
failure of Seattle. They range from accusations of "the sheer bloody mindedness of 
Lamy and the EU in insisting that the WTO dance to its tune" to problems brought 
about by the inclusivity of the process meaning that more developing countries were 
involved in decision making and less quick to give up concessions. 153 Other 
contributory factors cited include the lack of transparency and non-participatory 
structure to NGOs who "deluged poor countries with muddle-headed positions and 
incited them to refuse all compromise" to general North/South tensions. 154 Perhaps the 
150 There is no clear cut answer to why the Commission may have chosen to do this, except, perhaps, to 
pacify the French. After all, the results ofDoha had been agreed with the only concern being Portugal's 
views on textile tariffs. 
151 G de Jonquieres and F Williarns, the Financial Times of 15th September page 6, 'Last -<!itch bid to get 
trade talks on track' 
152 WTO Report of the I 4th September meeting at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist elmin03 e/min03 14sept e.htm accessed 15th October 2005 
153Quote about Larny and the EU from C Melamed of Christian Aid's feature on 'The Collapse of the 
WTO talks' of 16th September 2003 at http://www.christianaid.org.uk/cancun/030916feature.htm. accessed 15th July 
2007. Issues about inclusivity in 'The Cancful WTO Ministerial Meeting September 2003: What 
Happened? What Does It Mean For Development?' at 
http://www.cafod.orn.uk/archive/policy/cancunaUalysis20030924.sbtml submitted for the UK's International 
Development Select Committee accessed 15th July 2005 
154 Lack of transparency brought up by Martin Khor Third World Network 21" September 2004 'Behind 
the CoUapse of the CancUn Ministerial' at http://www.twnside.om.sg/title2/gtrends030J.htm accessed 13th May 
2007 Criticism ofNGOs from 'The WTO Under Fire' in the Economist September l81h 2003 reproduced 
at http://www.globalpolicy org/soceconlbwi-wto/wto/2003/0918underfire.htm accessed 13th May 2007. General North South 
tensions mentioned as a factor in the January 2004 US General Accounting Office report 'The World 
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developing countries simply ran out of patience with the 'development round' given 
that they had been waiting since Singapore to have some of these issues of importance 
resolved. 155 Furthermore, the seeming consensus on agriculture from the Cairns Group 
alongside the 020 and the developing countries meant there was a highly politicized 
negotiating environment.156 The Commission also identified agriculture as precipitating 
failure along with non-agricultural market access, the Singapore issues, development 
and "outstanding issues". 157 That agriculture, specifically the CAP, would be a barrier 
to agreement was recognised long before the meeting and articulated by one of the 
members of the Commission's Contact Group, the BEUC, which commented in 
September that supporting the CAP in Cancun was "defending the indefensible".158 
Although it was thought that the European Parliament might give Lamy a "particularly 
rough ride" for failing to get agreement in Cancun and for stressing the importance of 
investment over the need to reduce agricultural subsidies, Parliament's resolution on 
Canctin was supportive of the Commission. 159 Although it "regretted" the failure of the 
meeting it commented that the "EU had acted with great unity" and expressed its 
"satisfaction" with the Commission's stance. Once again, just as happened after Doha, 
this represents a major 'win' for the Commission as it managed to keep Parliament on 
side. The European Council's comments were made in October and also expressed 
"regret" at the outcome but said that the EC should be ready to.restart the negotiations 
and, to this end, it suggested that the Commission should "reflect on the EU strategy 
and ... explore ... the possibility for future progress in the DD A'', perhaps a tacit 
acknowledgement that in order to achieve success in Hong Kong (the site of the next 
Trade Organisation. Cancun Ministerial Fails to Move Global Trade Negotiations Forward; Next Steps 
Uncertain' at http:l/www.gao.gov/new.items/d04250.ndf accessed 13th May 2007 
155 As noted in the charts showing preference dispersal 
156 A note on the significance of the G20 is found at BBC News, Monday 15"' September 2003 'World 
Trade Talks Collapse'. This says "For once, a coalition of developing countries, led by Brazil, China and 
India, worked as a bloc to counter-balance the weight of the much richer US, EU and Japan" (found at 
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilbusiness/31 08460.stm accessed on 13th May 2007) 
157 EU Bulletin of9-2003 (at http:lleuropa.eu.int/abc/doc/offlbulllen/200309/pl06041.htm accessed 16th September 
2005 
158 BEUC Press Release of 9"' September 'EC in Canclin- Swimming with boots on' (ref 026/2003) 
159 Quote on 'rough ride' from TBuck, the Financial Times ofl6'h September page 9, 'Lamy returns 
home to face anger and disappointment'. Importance of investment over cutting subsidies from G de 
Jonquieres, the Financial Times of 16" September, page 21, 'Crushed at Cancun: failure leaves a divided 
WTO facing marginalisation as countries tum to bilateral deals'. Parliament's supportive conclusion in 
the EU Bulletin 9-2003 at p!0604! accessed l51h November 2005 
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Ministerial), the mandate would have to be rewritten and/or the expectations 
downgraded. 160 
Conclusions 
This chapter, which is concerned with the trade policy framework through Lamy's 
tenure as Trade Commissioner, has shown that Lamy was able to keep the internal 
consensus intact (or, at least, as intact as was necessary) all through this timeframe. 
Despite Prodi's input to relations with the US and the outcomes ofSeattle and Canclln; 
neither the rest of the College, Parliament nor Council directly criticized the 
Commission for its stance (except in biotechnology in Seattle). This meant that Larny 
was able to pursue his preferences (e.g. the Singapore issues) even where there 
appeared little or no chance of gaining agreement amongst the wider WTO 
membership. One reason for the lack of progress might have been that Larny failed to 
revisit COM(l999)331 as the basis for Commission positions, even in Canclln. 
Although it may have been prudent to do this for Seattle, because he was relatively new 
to the portfolio, it is open to question whether it continued to be a good idea into Doha 
and Cancun particularly given the antipathy of other members to the Singapore issues, 
for example, and significant diversity of opinion in agriculture, especially in Canctin 
where the Cairns Group, G20 and many of the developing countries were clearly in 
support of greater liberalisation. 
It is significant that there was little progress made with the WTO agenda over this time, 
rather it became clearer that progress would become even more difficult in the future 
because of the entrenched positions on agriculture indicated by the growing influence 
(perhaps even homogeneity) of the G20 and the Cairns Group. Similarly, the lack of 
progress on some of the issues of interest to developing countries would suggest that 
would become a factor in the future. It is also instructive to note the internal and 
external problems that accompanied the arrival of agriculture back into the WTO. 
Progress seemed to be significantly delayed in the Ministerials because of the 
fragmented internal and external consensus and the idea of having a short deadline for 
the Round, as had been suggested at the outset, vanished. This also meant that although 
160 EU Bulletin I 0-2003 at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/enl200310/il021.han accessed 15th November 2005 
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efforts had been made by Lamy to come to joint agreements with Robert Zoellick of the 
US, particularly on agriculture but also in other areas like the scope of the Round, these 
efforts came to naught because they were unable to get wider agreement from the other 
players. This is indicative of the 'sense of stagnation' going through the WTO at the 
end of Cancful alluded to at the beginning of the Chapter. 161 
The following chapter will explore these points in much more detail by looking at the 
negotiations on the Singapore Issues over the time period. Chapter Eight will draw 
some conclusions about Lamy's and Brittan's tenure and Chapter Nine will then return 
to a more comparative evaluation by drawing some conclusions by looking specifically 
at the Commission's roles and responsibilities and the evolving positions of the interests 
over the two time periods. 
161 See Walden Bello 'The Crisis of the WTO and the Crisis of the Globalist Project: Update on the WTO 
and Global Trends' (Revised version of a presentation at the Hemispheric and Global Assembly against 
the FTAA and the WTO held in Mexico City on May 12-13, 2003. A brief version was also delivered at 
the Transnational Institute Fellows Meeting in Amsterdam on May 16, 2003, and at the Jakarta 
International Peace Conference on May 18-21, 2003.) at http://www.ifg.orglanalysis/wto/cancun'bellowto.htm 
accessed 13th May 2007 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Case Studies in the Trade Negotiations Framework: 
From Seattle to Cancun 
Introduction 
This Chapter looks at case studies during the period of Pascal Lamy' s tenure as Trade 
Commissioner to see how the Commission exercised its roles and responsibilities in 
task areas outside the more formal Ministerial process. This chapter will cover the 
period from the lead up to the Seattle Ministerial to the immediate aftermath of the 
Canctin Ministerial. As was the case in Chapter Four, the aims and objectives of each 
negotiation will be much more specialized than those covered in the chapters focusing 
on the trade policy framework in general yet it will be shown that there is still a need 
for the Commission to balance the various interests that are at play. Chapter Four 
suggested that the sectoral negotiations in Leon Brittan's time seemed relatively free of 
the politicization evidenced in the Ministerials and we will see whether this remains the 
case here. If not, this might affect the Commission's ability to exercise its roles and 
responsibilities as well as to satisfy the interests. 
Once again, because of the sheer number of issues that the Commission was taking 
forward, it is not possible to look at the negotiations for all areas in the necessary depth. 
Therefore, this Chapter will focus specifically on three case studies, which wiii be three 
of the four Singapore Issues (investment, competition, government procurement, 
excluding trade facilitation) that Lamy tried to advance over his tenure. These issues 
had been high in Brittan's priorities both in the lead up to, and follow-on from, the 
Singapore Ministerial. In spite of many developing countries trying to block new 
negotiations, there was a great deal of political support for such initiatives on the part of 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, as well as some of the 
Commission's Contact Group members (such as UNICE). It is because of the existence 
of this supportive coalition that three of the Singapore Issues have been chosen as case 
studies. 
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Although the Commission sought to negotiate these issues as a single package, this did 
not mean that it was agreed by the WTO to treat all four uniformly. At the Ministerial 
meeting in Singapore, Working Groups were established for the first three, and the 
Trade in Goods Council was asked to look at the latter. 1 As far as investment and 
competition were concerned, the Ministerial Declaration stated that the existence of the 
groups would not "prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the future" and, 
furthermore, that the General Council would "determine after two years how the work 
of each body should proceed", which would only be on the basis of"explicit 
consensus" amongst the membership. The group on government procurement, 
meanwhile, would conduct a study of national policies in order to develop an eventual 
agreement. Because the trade facilitation group was dealt with differently, i.e. that it 
was the only Group for which a Working Group was not established, and because the 
basis for t11ese meetings would be "informal", according to the appropriate General 
Council Minutes, making the necessary information difficult to access, this will not be 
used as one of the case studies. 2 
The appropriateness of this approach is confirmed by the Commission's acceptance, post 
CancUn, that the Singapore Issues could be unbundled and considered on their own merits. 
At Canctin, and at least in the immediate aftermath, there was no effort to push forward 
with WTO work on any of the Groups, including trade facilitation. This further suggests 
that nothing is lost by not considering it within this work. 
1 Sourced at htW://www.wto.orgfenglish/thewto e!minist elmin96 e/wtodec e.htm on 12th September 2006 
2 Meeting of 5th June and 8th July 1998 minutes referenced G/CIM/34 
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Figure 7.1 below sets out when each negotiation started, what each was to do and when 
discussions ended. 
Figure 7.1 Brief Overview of the Case Studies 
NAME BEGAN MAlNTOPIC LAST MEETING 
Trade and Investment 2"' June 1997 To "conducts(s) 11 ID June 2003 
analytical work on the 
relationship between 
trade and investment".3 
The Interaction Between Trade 7"' July 1997 "To study various aspects 27"' May 2003 
and Competition Policy of this issue, with the 
participation of all WTO 
Members".4 
Transparency in Government 23'"May 1997 "'To conduct a study on 18w June 2003 
Procurement transparency in 
government procurement 
practices, taking into 
account national policies 
and, on that basis, to 
develop elements suitable 
for inclusion in an 
appJ:"QI!riate ~eement". 5 
Trade and investment 
In the 'EU Approach to the Millennium Round', the Commission clearly appreciated 
that work in trade and investment had to be made acceptable to the other WTO 
members, and, in order to do this, the methodology needed to be different from that 
used to pursue the development of the ill-fated MAI.6 Perhaps the insistence on a 
framework, in which individual sovereignty would be maintained, was an effort to this 
end. Also in COM(1999)331, the Commission recognised the need for flexibility for 
individual countries even though this did not extend to developing special and 
-differential treatment (SDT) provisions in this field. On the contrary, the Commission 
thought that if the promotion of sustainable development was paramount, there would 
be no need for SDT measures. The eventual negotiating mandate was, as might be 
3 Fi-om the WTO's page on 'Trade and Investment' at httn://www.wto.orgfenglish/tratop e/invest elinvest e.htm 
accessed 9th April2008 
'From the WTO's page on 'The Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy' at 
http·//www.wto.org/english/tratop elcomp elcomp e.htm accessed 9th April2008 
'From the WTO's page on 'Transparency in Government Procurement' at 
http://www.wto.org/english!tratop e!gnroc elgptran e.htm accessed 9th April 2008 
6 COM(l999)331, issued on gth Jnly 1999 
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expected, very similar to the Commission's position in COM(l999)331. 7 Essentially, 
Council agreed with the Commission's objectives, even though they thought an 
agreement should also set out "investors' responsibilities" and put greater emphasis on 
"access to investment opportunities and non-discrimination, protection of investment, 
and (a) stable and transparent business climate" although most, if not all, had already 
been mentioned by the Commission. This proposed work area was later supported by 
Parliament, which shows that there was a strong and supportive internal consensus. 8 
However, indications of the level of external dissent with this initiative could be seen in 
the October 1999 report from the Trade and Investment Group to the General Council 
just as Lamy was getting his feet under the table. 9 The report clearly shows the 
contested nature of the most basic principles, even after three years ofwork.10 Even 
smaller groups of countries who had been discussing this (perhaps most notably APEC) 
and who had committed to working in this area through the WTO could not achieve 
consensus, and the US, in particular, remained unconvinced of the merits of a WTO 
agreement. 11 It was also difficult for Lamy to use the views of industry to encourage 
the US to come on board as T ABD, for one, was also said to be openly sceptical of the 
benefits of an investment agreement in the WT0. 12 The conclusions of their meeting 
tend to refute that, however, as they read; "Governments should seize the opportunity 
(afforded by the Seattle Ministerial) ... to push forward the process of developing ... high 
7 Which was agreed on 26th October 1999 - see full text at http://www.france.attac.org/a2985, accessed 16th 
January 2006 
8 Resolution on the Commission Communication to the Council and Parliament on the EU Approach to 
the Millennium Round (COM(1999)331) !8th November 1999 at 
http://europaleu/int/abc/doc/offlbulllen/9911/pl05017.htrn accessed 5th October 2005 9 Issued on zz•d October as WT/WGTI/3 
10 The issues which needed to be resolved were: the definition of investment; the interface with TRJMS 
and GATS work; Government intervention; domestic versus multilateral policy solutions; FDI and its 
relationship to economic growth and development; FDI and technology transfer; negative effects; costs 
and benefits; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the need for WTO involvement in this 
area and the use of the dispute settlement mechanism in investment disputes 
11 This is interesting because, according to the Chairman's Statement from the ASEM Economic 
Ministers' Meeting, the EC's parallel forum to APEC, held on 9lh and IO'h October 1999 nothing was said 
about the importance or otherwise of investment in the WTO (see 
http://europa.eu.int/cornrnlextemal relationslasem/min other meeting/eco min2.htm) This is in spite of the outcome of 
the ASEM SOMTI V meeting of7., and 8th July 1999, where a strategic report from the Asia-Europe 
Vision Group was tabled, giving as its first priority to move ASEM forward, "trade liberalisation and 
investment promotion, including both multilateral issues and other measures to facilitate and encourage 
Europe-Asia two-way trade and investment flows, taking into account different levels of development" 
(see the Cc-Chairs' Summary at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/asernlmin other meeting/somtiS.htm) 
12 Corporate Europe Observer Special Report on the outcomes of the TABD meeting of 29th and 30th 
October 1999 in November 1999 'Doing Business in Berlin' at 
http://www.comorateeurope.om/tabdJberlinbusiness.html accessed on 21st July 2005 
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standard rules for investment" suggesting, at least, gentle pressure from transatlantic 
business towards opening negotiations, even if not from the US government itself. 13 
Given the stance of the US government, it is not very surprising that it proved difficult 
for the Commission to include trade and investment on the agenda for Seattle. 14 
However, papers had been submitted to the Ministerial from five countries plus the 
Commission showing that there was an emergent interest in this issue even if not yet a 
firm consensus. 15 The Commission paper itself was an amalgam of COM(l999)331 and 
the mandate with one difference; that international rules on FDI "must respond to the 
concerns expressed by civil society concerning their impact on the environment and 
labour conditions", which could almost suggest that it was an effort to address trade-
labour and trade-environment issues by the back door. 16 The other papers were 
strongly supportive of negotiations being launched although Poland's acknowledged the 
need for certain flexibilities, for the developing countries, to be included.17 It cannot be 
said that the Commission was "the strongest supporter" (see footnote 14 for this source) 
-next to some of the other papers it even looks a little lukewarm. In spite of this small 
coalition, however, it was clear from the first meeting convened in Seattle to address the 
'Singapore Agenda and other issues' that no agreement was possible- instead there 
were polarized opinions ranging from a number wanting negotiations to begin to others 
wanting the study process to continue. 18 Although those present were asked to try to 
find consensus it can be assumed that this was unsuccessful, as the Singapore Issues 
were not discussed again as a whole package after the first day. The draft Seattle 
Declaration, which was the basis for discussions, had outlined both the option to begin 
negotiations, in Paragraph 41, and the option for continuing with the existing work in 
-
13 Conclusions of the T ABD meeting at http://static.tabd.com/gems/1999BerlinCEOReport.pdf accessed 5th October 
2005 
14 JCTSD Bridges Daily Update on the Seattle Conference 3'' December 1999, Issue 4 reproduced at 
www.unc.edu/-swblack/BridgeRep l203.rtf accessed on 21st July 2005 
15 Japan (WT/GC/W/239), Switzerland (WT/GC/W/263), Korea (WT/GC/267), Hong Kong, China 
(WT/GC/268), Poland (WT/GC/277) and Costa Rica (WT/GCfW/280) 
16 WT/GCfW/245 
17 Although this need for flexibility seems to have been recognised by the Commission in 
COM(I999)331, at least in part; "a bottom-up approach to the question of admission (of international 
investors to a market), based on commitments undertaken by each Member, is the way to allow for the 
flexibility that many WTO Members require". 
18 From the daily WTO Briefmg Notes of I" December at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/min99 e/english/about e/resumOl e.htm accessed 3rd November 2005 
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Paragraph 56. 19 Because no consensus emerged, and because the meeting broke down 
without issuing a Final Declaration, work simply continued as before. The Commission 
commented later that the outcome of the Ministerial showed "confirmation of the 
validity of the aims ... (of) the EU, which .. .included rules to govern globalisation 
in .. .investment" although this seems to be premature since there was no sign of general 
agreement.20 
At the February 2000 General Council meeting, the Commission was still not managing 
to achieve 'explicit consensus' on any ofthe key issues.21 A further barrier to progress 
was that there would be no additional money in the kitty for technical assistance, which 
had caused, in the words of the Chairman, "a gross imbalance between the core funds 
currently available ... and the needs of members". At the next meeting, the Commission 
tried to clarify its position vis-it-vis national rules and sector coverage by suggesting 
·that the GATS model, whereby countries specified sectors where they would be 
prepared to open their markets, could be applied to a multilateral agreement in this 
area.22 This would ensure that national rules could still be applied to sectors not 
covered in the lists. A further paper was written to address some of the arguments 
(twelve are detailed) that had been taking place within the group, in an attempt to move 
forward from discussing semantics. 23 However, Malaysia argued that a stable 
investment infrastructure could not be considered without "political stability, 
macroeconomic stability, a sound regulatory framework, including protection of 
intellectual property rights, the provision of incentives (and) joint research and 
development and investment in human resources" suggesting these interrelationships 
meant it would be practically impossible for most developing countries to be able to 
participate. 24 Strangely the Commission commented that the Working Group did not 
rg Draft Declaration of 19th October 1999, reproduced at http://www.ictsd.org/English/Dec1aration3.rtf accessed 
5th October 2005 
20 EU Bulletin of December 1999 at http:lleuropa.eu.inVabcldocloff/bulVen/99 12/p !04024.htm accessed October 
2005 
21 Meeting 7th and gth February, Minutes circulated as WT/GC/M/53 
22 Commission paper for the Working Group was circulated on 16th June (as WT/WGTI/W/84) entitled, 
'Checklist of issues, Agenda item IV: Advantages and disadvantages of entering into bilateral, regional 
and multilateral rules on investment, including from a development perspective', subtitled 'Impact of 
international investment rules on current national policies~ 
23 With the same title as the previous (although subtitled 'Some ideas on flexibility and non-
discrimination') submitted by the Commission to the Working Group on 9" October 2000 as 
WT/WGTI/W/89 
24 See Dunning and Narula 2004: 39-40 on the anti-competitive nature of incentives and subsidies in 
investment, which would mitigate against a 'stable ... infrastructure' 
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exist to reach consensus, although how it felt 'explicit consensus' could be achieved on 
a wider level, if the Group itself could not, was left unsaid. The Commission also 
acknowledged that a multilateral investment agreement was not a panacea for all the ills 
of a particular country in itself and that there needed to be other measures taken to 
address "education, infrastructure, transparency and stability". The role of a multilateral 
agreement, then, was seen as complementary to internal efforts and could not replace 
them. This, as Malaysia had already pointed out, had implications for the 'real' level of 
technical assistance needed to support such transformation, in addition to the assistance 
needed solely for any new investment regime. 
The Commission also failed to make headway at the October meeting and it was clear 
that issues were not coalescing; in fact, there seemed to be a growing focus on 
complexity.25 The Commission was part ofthis, mentioning the importance oflocal 
capacity building, "effective competition policy and adequate protection of IPRs in 
order to enhance and encourage technological transfers and spillovers", surely hugely 
problematic for the developing countries.26 Once again, questions were raised as to the 
value of a multilateral agreement, suggesting that a level playing field might have the 
opposite effect by acting as a disincentive to investors. There were questions as to how 
countries might achieve their development targets and even a suggestion that these 
negotiations were similar to those of the MAI although the Commission was quick to 
interject that the comparison was inappropriate due to the "major 
differences .. .in .. .institutional context, participation, aims and level of ambition". 
The T ABD, meanwhile, seemed to be becoming more enthusiastic about the possibility 
of an agreement and asked the WTO to give preparation for it "more emphasis" 
although it remained silent as to what this might involve.27 It concluded that although a 
full agreement might be a longer-term aim, there could be some effort to achieve a 
'softer' agreement with a narrower scope.28 This may have been a good idea but it was 
not acted upon at the time. In the Group's Annual Report to the General Council for the 
year 2000, once again even the definition of investment was disputed and possibilities 
25 Meeting held on IIth October (minutes circulated on 31" October as WT/WGTI/M/12). 
26 
'Some ideas on flexibility and non-discrimination' circulated gth October 2000 as WT/WGTI/W/89 
27 TABD had met in Cincinnati on November !6th-18th and, in its Recommendations (see 
http://static.tabd.com/gems/2000CincinnatiCEORenort.pdf accessed 5th October 2005 
28 This suggestion was repeated in their Mid Year Report from Washington DC on May 15th 2000, but 
does not appear to have been seriously considered at this juncture 
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of consensus remained distant. 29 Section 31 could be said to sum up the deliberations 
thus far: "Support was expressed for the view that there was a lack of evidence on the 
benefits of multilateral investment rules" this was followed by an acknowledgement 
that "no convincing case had been made that a multilateral agreement could help 
countries better achieve their developmental objectives". Issues of transparency also 
loomed large, as well as questions regarding the interface between transparency and IT. 
It seemed, then, that not only was the Commission's mandate not responsive to these 
concerns, in that it was not changed to take account ofthem, but the Commission was 
failing its promise in COM(l999)331 to "make the launch of this negotiation acceptable 
to our WTO partners". 
It was reported that, in an effort to get around this impasse, the Commission might seek 
to pursue a plurilateral agreement as it had apparently suggested to a number of 
developing countries that agreements on both investment and competition could take 
this form. 30 This is an example of the Commission as policy entrepreneur- gambling 
that any agreement was better than none - facilitating Council acceptance. As it was, 
issues had not demonstrably moved on in the first meeting of the Group in 2001 and it 
was again accepted that investment could not be considered in a vacuum? 1 This time it 
was Canada, which highlighted the interaction of a considerable number of factors 
including; "effective education and training of workers and management...efficien(t) 
... capital markets, the existence of competitive domestic markets, secure access to 
international markets, the availability of mechanisms to facilitate economic adjustment, 
and tax and regulatory policies" all deemed necessary to ensure a positive enviromnent 
for investment. In a further effort to move forward, the Commission presented a paper 
on the nature of technical assistance that would be needed, which distinguished between 
assistance to improve capacity for attracting FDI and the assistance needed to enable 
------- --- countries to participate in negotiations and to transpose the results into their 
legislation.32 This, however, did nothing to encourage agreement. At the next meeting 
29 circulated on 27th November 2000 as WT/WGTI/4, agreed at the meeting of 16th November (minutes 
circulated at WT/WGTI/M/13 on 7"' March 2001) 
3° C Raghavan in the North South Development Monitor of31" January 2001 'Trojan horse to get 
investment and competition in the new Round' reproduced at http://www.twnside.om.sg/title!trojan.htm accessed 
21" July 2005 
31 Meeting 7/8 March 2001 (mi!Rltes circulated as WT/WGTI/M/14 dated 30"' April 
32 WT/WGTI/W/102, 'Techuical assistance and capacity building' dated 23'' May, accessed through the 
document search portal of the WTO 
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of the Group, there were further significant discussions on mergers and acquisitions and 
transfer of technology, Malaysia and the US both disagreeing with the Commission's 
line.33 
Lamy recognised that the problems with the US needed to be addressed if any progress 
was to be made in the Working Group and, ultimately, at Doha. Following a meeting in 
Washington on 16'h and 17th July 2001, it was reported that there was, finally, 
"rapprochement" between the two sides. 34 The July Statement of the Genoa G8 summit 
seemed supportive of WTO action in the field of trade and investment, which might 
have been due to this understanding. 35 However, at the General Council's final meeting 
prior to Do ha, the consensus among the developing countries seemed to be that the 
educative process in the Working Group should continue rather than that negotiations 
should be launched. The Commission view was that the Group had "bent over 
backwards to integrate all possible development aspects" within the draft and they felt 
that there was a strong likelihood that negotiating modalities could be agreed. 36 This 
might reflect the efforts of the Commission to get countries to support a plurilateral 
agreement although it seems more likely to be a statement of wish, rather than a 
statement of fact, that there could be any consensus within the Group, let alone in the 
wider forum of a Ministerial, to gain agreement to start negotiations.37 
It is hard to imagine that there was any surprise on the part of the Commission when, at 
the first meeting in Do ha on the Singapore Issues, positions remained very much akin to 
those expressed in the preparation phase and, indeed, similar to what had been said at 
the Seattle Ministerial.38 Some countries wanted negotiations to begin, allowing the 
33 Meeting on 13/14 June 2001 (Minutes circulated as WT/WGTIIM/15 on lOth August 
34 ICTSD-Bridges weekly trade review 5:28 of 24th July 200l'EU's New Strategy on Labour, EU-US 
Draw Closer on Investment' at http://www.ictsd.orglhtml/weeklyi24-07-0llstory2.li!m accessed 1st November 2005 
35 The Statement acknowledged that "open trade and investment drive global growth and poverty 
reduction" and that this is what was behind the G8's decision "to support the launch of an ambitious new 
Round of global trade negotiations ... " even though it is not clear from this whether the new Round would 
actually include negotiations on investment. Meeting of 22nd July reproduced at 
http://archives.cnn.com/200l/WORLD/eumpe/07/22/summit.text/.accessed 4th August 2005 
36 Discussion took place at the General Council meeting held 31" October and I" November, minutes 
circulated as WT/GC/M/71. The developing countries which supported this position were Barbados, 
Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Uganda, Costa Rica 
seemingly the only party to say this should be advanced at Doha 
37 Particularly considering that scope was still contested. 
38 See report at htto://www.wto.org/eno-Jish/thewto e/minist elminOl e/min01 lOnov e.htm accessed 4th November 
2005 
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possibility for developing countries to opt out at the end; other countries said they 
weren't ready to negotiate on these issues at all, while others made their agreement and 
participation conditional on progress in other areas. On the second day, the Chair 
reported that developing countries were still unwilling to negotiate on investment and 
competition and said, simply, about meetings on the third day that discussion "had not 
been 'very comforting"'.39 
However, the trade and investment section in the Doha Final Declaration is substantive 
even though it is not clear how progress could be made considering many of the 
highlighted issues had been debated since the group was inaugurated. 40 The 
Declaration acknowledged the importance of investment and agreed, "Negotiations will 
take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a 
decision ... by explicit consensus" thus re-emphasizing the need to achieve a supportive 
coalition at least, as a first step, within the Working Group itself. The importance of 
technical assistance was acknowledged in the Declaration with the WTO agreeing to 
work with other donors to ensure that needs were met. The final paragraph set out a 
comprehensive list of the areas, which needed to be agreed by the Group prior to 
Canctm. The extent ofthis is significant: "Scope and definition; transparency; non-
discrimination; modalities for pre-establishment commitments based on a GA TS-type, 
positive list approach; development provisions; exceptions and balance-of-payments 
safeguards; consultation and the settlement of disputes between members".41 
Therefore, the Doha Declaration gave specific instructions to the Group as to what had 
to be achieved, what had to be taken into account and the basis upon which work could 
proceed after the Ministerial, acknowledging in so doing that there was very little 
agreement at the present time.42 Surprisingly, the Commission, commenting on the 
framework suggested at Doha, said that this was "a completely new objective"; rather 
strange considering this was what the Group had been building up to since the 
39Report of the second day's meeting at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/min01 elminOl 1 lnov e.htm 
accessed 4th November 2005Report on the third day's meeting at 
httn://www.wto.orgtenglishlthewto e/minist elminOI e/minOl 12nov e.htln accessed 4th November 2005 
40 Circulated November 20th 2001 as WT/MIN(Ol)/DEC/1. Some reasons for this are given in the 
previous chapter 
41 Although, of course, the Group had been meeting for five years and were still no closer to agreement 
on these very basic principles so it beggars belief that it was thought they would be able to do this in two 
more years. 
42 In spite of, it must be remembered, negotiations having been conducted since 1996 
226 
------------------------------------------------------
Singapore Ministerial, the aim of which had been set out in both COM(1999)331 and 
the mandate. 43 
At the first meeting of the Group in 2002, the Commission commented that it was 
"important not to arrive so much at common positions but at a common understanding" 
of them, perhaps reflecting a change of negotiating style.44 They submitted a further 
two papers; the first was a 'Concept paper on the definition of investment' which 
suggested that definitions needed to include two distinct aspects of investment i.e. 
money changing hands (dynamic) for a particular asset (static). 45 Once again, it seems 
unlikely that drawing attention to interlinkages would facilitate agreement of 
definitions, considering how contested they were proving to be. The second 'Concept 
paper on transparency', looked at the importance of procedural as well as information 
transparency and suggested that the developing country members should consider what 
help they needed in the fields of infrastructure, human resources and regulatory 
capacity to enable them to set up publication, notification systems and enquiry points 
(possibly electronically).46 However, the administrative structures needed to ensure 
such transparency were not discussed.47 
At the following meeting, there were further, but again unresolved, discussions on 
transparency and flexibility. 48 The Commission led the debate by introducing a new 
'Concept paper on Modalities of Pre-establishment' saying that the OATS model 
provided a good basis to work from.49 The most important thing, according to the 
Commission, was that countries had to be supported in order that they might maximise 
their capacity to attract FDI and technical, and primarily financial, assistance had to 
address this. This had already been made clear in the Doha Declaration. Their 'Concept 
Paper on non-discrimination' expanded COM(1999)331, setting out the Commission's 
views on transparency by covering the principles ofMFN and non-discrimination and 
the stage of FDI to which they applied (pre- or post-establishment). 50 The paper also 
43 From http://europa.eu.inVabc/doc/ofE'bu11/en!200lll!p106028.htm accessed October 2005 
44 Meeting on 18''-19th April (minutes circulated as WT/WGTI/M/17 on 31" May) 
45 WG/WGTJ/W/!15 circulated on 16th April2002 
46 WG/WGTI/W/110 circulated 27th March 
47 Considering there was no extra technical assistance money available, it seemed likely that this 
suggestion would rt short shrift from the General Couocil 
48 Meeting held 3' -s•• July minutes circulated as WT/WGTI/M/18) 
49 WG/WGTI/W/121 circulated 27th Juoe 
50 WG/WGTI/W/122, also circulated 27th Juoe 
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attempted to identify possible exceptions to MFN and national treatment although 
Brazil remarked that these exceptions were "only hypothetical and not (considered) as a 
necessary ingredient in a possible multilateral framework on investment". Perhaps this 
continued disagreement inspired the Foreign Trade Association (FTA), one of the 
members of the Commission's Contact Group, to sound a cautionary warning about 
expectations for success in Cancun, noting that progress in the Singapore Issues and 
'explicit consensus' depended on progress in other areas like textiles and agricultureY 
At the penultimate meeting of the Group, the formal review of the seven issues, as set 
out in the Doha Declaration, was completed. 52 The WTO, in the front page of the 
'Investment' section on their website, acknowledged the importance of this meeting in 
keeping to the Do ha timescale. 53 However, there was still no consensus as to what this 
meant for negotiations in practice. The Commission continued to try to structure the 
discussion by circulating a 'Concept paper on development provisions', which again 
argued that due consideration of flexibility, meant there was no need for SDT, and a 
'Concept paper on consultation and settlement of disputes between members', saying 
that the DSU should be used for investor-state disputes where other mechanisms had 
failed. 54 The consensus view on the first paper was that there needed to be an agreed 
definition of the scope before development provisions could be defined although China 
pointed out that however narrowly the scope was defined, it was still unlikely that 
developing countries would agree to embark on negotiations. New Zealand, Malaysia 
and India spoke out strongly against the second paper, while Pakistan and Morocco 
thought that such discussions were premature. India nailed its colours to the mast by 
stating its belief that the DSU should not be used by private parties engaged in disputes 
with states. Furthermore, they declared that investment had no place in the WTO as it 
was not to do with trade. 55 The question oftechnology transfer was also raised, and the 
Commission tried to pre-empt discussions by saying this was in the purview of the 
Working Group that had been set up at Doha, not this group.56 The evidence shows that 
51 In their August 2002 Bulletin, vol2 number 2 at httn://www.fta-eu.org/en/new/b~rlletin/bulletin02 2002.htm 
accessed 15th January 2006 
52 Meeting held on 16-18 September (minutes circulated as WT/WGTI/M/19 on 3'• December 
53 From http://www. wto.org/english/tratop e/invest e./invest e.htm accessed 1st August 2005 
54 The two papers are WG/WGTl/W/140 circulated 12th September, WGIWGTIIW/141 circulated 11th 
September 
55 At the same time, Malaysia pointed out this had been one of the reasons why the MAI failed 
56 In the paper submitted to that Working Group, the EC had urged members to concentrate on three main 
issues: to arrive at an agreed understanding on "the defmition of technology transfer", to establish how 
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the Commission was still not managing to 'sell' this to the other members of the 
Working Group and the prospect of a consensus within the Ministerial, when one could 
not be achieved within the Group itself, remained small. 
The Council of Ministers showed that they remained strong supporters of achieving an 
agreement on trade and investment in their seven 'Conclusions on trade and 
development'. 57 They agreed that a number of measures were needed in order for 
poverty reduction through trade to be realized of which one was to achieve an increased 
level ofFDI by making markets more attractive. Perhaps this was also a tacit reminder 
to the Commission that it should go back to basics in justifying the importance of this 
work to the other members. The Commission continued to pursue consensus in the final 
meeting of the Group for the year although it did not go back to basics; it submitted a 
further 'Concept paper on balance-of-payments safeguards', which proposed 
mechanisms that could be resorted to if there proved to be a problem with capital flows 
in the event of"balance of payments crises".58 This paper seemed to have more to do 
with the issues that had been brought up in Do ha and ignored the level of contestation 
around the key concepts. Furthermore, the issue of flexibility continued to prove 
difficult to resolve. India, particularly, felt a multilateral agreement on investment 
would prevent countries keeping 'policy space' and this was indicative of a wider lack 
of consensus on this point. 59 The Commission's position was that regulation capacity 
would be maintained because the structure was only a legal framework. Once again, 
this (somewhat semantic) view did not attract widespread support. Although an 
informal meeting had been held afterwards to allow delegations to discuss the work 
programme and the annual report, there was no new 'checklist of subjects to be 
covered' or any attempt to focus the attention ofthe Group on particular issues. 
Therefore, it would appear that the Commission had appreciated that the Group would 
not reach consensus on the outstanding issues, at least not before CancUn. 
teclmology transfer occurred and, finally, to define under what conditions teclmology transfer was 
optimised. This could, he felt, result in improved teclmology flows to the developing countries and, 
because the factors influencing one were similar to the factors influencing the other, increased FDI could 
also result. 
57 Issued in November 2002, at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200211/pl06020.htm accessed 15th November 2005 
58 Last meeting of the Group held on 3-4 December(minutes circulated as WT/WGTI/M/20 on 6th · 
February). Concept paper on balance of payments safeguards circulated asWG/WGTI/W/153 on 28th 
November. 
59 Argentina, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Pakistan and Venezuela all expressed support for 
India's view 
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Nevertheless, at the first formal meeting of the Group in 2003, the Commission 
submitted a 'Concept paper on Policy Space for Development', in an attempt to further 
clarify the scope countries would have for independent action under a multilateral 
agreement following discussion at the previous meeting. 60 The introduction clarified 
that the GA TS approach could be shown to "accommodate domestic policies" and 
disputed the arguments either that foreign investment 'crowded out' domestic 
investment or that there would be insufficient policy space to allow country-specific 
legislation. The first country to disagree was India, which commented that developing 
countries could not use the flexibilities of the GATS approach when negotiating 
because of: a) the progressive nature of GATS; b) pressure from the developed 
countries, and, c) IMF and World Bank stipulations. In addition, their attempts to 
renegotiate what was on the lists had proved difficult and did not, in India's opinion at 
least, constitute 'policy space'. Once again, this perspective was indicative of the gap 
between developed and developing countries with the other Quad members broadly 
supporting the paper and the developing countries broadly disagreeing with it. 61 The 
Commission's frustration boiled over later in the meeting, accusing certain (nameless) 
countries of stating positions, which were "tactical" and repetitive. Again, this would 
hardly encourage countries to rally round in support of the Commission's stance and 
continued to ignore the extent of the opposition. 
In terms offacilitating an internal consensus and pushing for a strong external 
consensus, on 30th April the European Social Forum (ESP), another Contact Group 
member, sent a letter to Pascal Lamy calling for trade and investment negotiations to be 
launched in the WT0.62 Although they felt that this would send a strong message that 
governments were ready to develop a strong foundation for FDI, ESP accepted that 
investors would still need to know "the host government's attitude to business in 
general. .. the financial infrastructure, the quality of public governance (and) the quality 
of the administration that affects legal security and stability", all requiring high levels of 
6!1 Meeting held on 14'h -151h April (minutes circulated as WT/WGTI!M/21 on 28"' May) Concept paper 
for policy space for development circulated as WTIWGTI/W/154 'on 7"' April 
61 In support were the Quad members plus Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Korea and Switzerland. Against 
were Brazil, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand and Venezuela There were other delegations who, although they did not specifically disagree 
with the paper, sought clarifications on it: Argentina; Chinese Taipei; Colombia; Peru; Poland and 
Uruguay 
62 At http'//www wtomg!English/fonuns e/ngo e/esf agree trade inv e.pdf accessed 15th March 2006 
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resources for the developing countries beyond those solely involved in implementing 
the Agreement. As far as dispute settlement was concerned, the ESF made it clear that 
they would prefer the DSU to apply to all parts of the agreement, ignoring the problems 
other countries had already mentioned with investor/state relations. The letter 
commented on the "good atmosphere" in the Working Group, which, considering the 
Commission's outburst in the previous meeting did not appear to reflect the actual 
situation. 
At the last meeting of the Working Group prior to the Cancun Ministerial, the meeting 
progressed to discussing whether negotiations on investment could commence. 63 Once 
again, as at the previous meeting, there was a distinct split between the developed and 
the developing countries, which did not seem to constitute an 'explicit consensus' as 
required by the Do ha mandate. 64 The Commission was, however, responsible for the 
paragraph closing the Minutes, which said, "The harvest of the Group was impressive", 
although how this could have been concluded given the level of contestation even to the 
terminology is difficult to fathom. 65 On the same day a Hearing took place at the 
European Parliament on 'WTO, Agriculture, TRIPS and the Singapore Issues' at which 
the President ofEuroCommerce (another of the Commission's Contact Group 
members) spoke. He felt that a trade and investment agreement would increase 
investment by minimising risk, although he acknowledged, correctly, that agreement 
"might be difficult to achieve". 66 This would seem to have been in line with the 
European Parliament's own perspective.67 As well as a lack of agreement between the 
group members in general on the definitions, there was also no agreement on them 
63 1 o'h and 11th June (Minutes circulated as WT/WGTI/M/22 on 17th July 
64 with support for this coming from the Quad and also Australia, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Hungary, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Norway, Poland and Switzerland and a negative view being expressed by Cuba, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya and Malaysia while countries seeking further clarifications were Argentina, China, 
Morocco and Thailand 
65 At the same time as this meeting, a group of four NGOs were also holding a Press Conference to 
protest about efforts to open investment negotiations at Canctin. Third World Network, the Centre for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL), the International Union ofFoodworkers and ActionAid 
strongly disagreed that this would be a positive step for developing countries (from K Raja Corporate 
Europe Observer Geneva lOth June 2003 'NGO's voice opposition to WTO investment negotiations' at 
http://www.comorateeurope.org/investmentwatch-archive!articles/twnl3june.html accessed 15th January 2006 However, 
the representatives also acknowledged "it was clear that no consensus exists on if or how to approach the 
issue of whether to begin negotiations on investment" suggesting, almost, that their public stance was not 
necessary. 
66 From the 'Contributions' paper to that Hearing at 
http·//www.europarl.eu.int/hearings/20030611/itre/contributions en.pdf accessed 15th March 2006 
67 European Parliament Resolution on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference of3'd July (at 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/offlbull/en/200307/p106043.htm accessed October 2005 
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between the EC and the US. Lamy highlighted that "the EC want(s) to limit it to foreign 
direct investment and the US want(s) to also include portfolio investment".68 The two 
could not, then, jointly encourage wider agreement in Cancun as at Seattle. 
However, according to Corporate Europe Observer, perhaps the key relationship 
pushing agreement was not the Commission/US but the Commission/Japan. They 
noted a report suggesting tbat "the EU and Japan ... have agreed to deliberately avoid 
any detailed discussions on what a future investment pact should cover so not as to 
antagonize any wavering WTO members, leaving the scope of an agreement to be 
determined in the negotiations" 69• This seemed a risky strategy; gambling that WTO 
members could be persuaded to give their support when there was evidently no 
consensus in the Working Group. 
A session on 'Investment in the WTO - Myths and Realities', organised by seven lobby 
groups and held as part of the 2003 WTO Public Symposium, revealed that NGOs were 
likely to come out solidly against an investment accord. At tbat meeting, Martin Khor 
ofTWN commented tbat, were this agreement to go ahead, developing countries would 
"be exposed to financial instability from free capital flows and ... their ability to place 
performance requirements on firms and to have industrial policy would be curbed". 70 
He urged against any efforts on the part of the supporters to "artificially create ... a 
consensus" prior to Cancun. 71 The Commission delegate (bravely!) said that a 
multilateral agreement would rationalise the 2000 bilateral investment treaties (BITS) 
and encourage investment by clarifying rules, promoting transparency and providing a 
predictable environment. India was of tbe opinion, meanwhile, that the plethora of 
BITS would not disappear and Oxfam stated that even the World Bank couldn't see 
how more investment would take place because of such an agreement thus challenging 
68 From TWN News Service of 12th June 'European Parliament Hearing Discusses Siugapore Issues' at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twninfo27.htm accessed on 21st July 2005 
69 From 'Corporate Conquistadors in CancUn.' InvestmentWatch Info Brief of July 2003 reproduced by 
Corporate Europe Observer at http://www.comorateeurope.or2:/mai/con<;~uistadors.html accessed 15th March 2006. 
The footnote for this gives the source as "U.S., EU Service Industry Groups Diverge on WTO 
Investment Pact", International Trade Daily, June 18th 2003. 
'" WTO Public Symposium on 16th, 17th and 18th June 2003 on the theme 'Challenges Ahead on the Road 
to CancU.n'- see programme at http://www.wto.org/englishltratop e/dda e/symp devagenda nrog 03 e.htm accessed 
on 12th August 2005TWN report of that meeting reproduced at http://www comorateeurope.org/investmentwatch~ 
archivelatticles/twn17june.html, 'WTO Symposium Debates Investment Issue' accessed 26th March 2006 
71 Using such methods as defining procedure rather than substance, by ignoring developing country 
positions in draft agreements or by pushing an agreement through a Green Room process 
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one of the central tenets of the Commission's argument. The ESF, at the same meeting, 
felt that it was the negative position taken by NGOs that risked an unsuccessful 
conclusion to the negotiations thus perpetuating a 'bullying' relationship from strong to 
weaker countries. They felt that the arrangement envisaged under this Agreement would 
give the weaker countries more opportunity to "put their view across together", 
although if that had been seen to be the case, perhaps the Working Group would not 
have been so conflict-ridden and the definitions would have been less contested. 
Under the final heading of the Group's 2003 Report, it is pointed out that some 
members "felt that. .. deliberations had revealed the extent to which the substance, 
implications and rationale of a prospective multilateral investment framework were still 
unclear", which seems to be a good summation of the progress to that date. 72 The 
report continues that there were a number of different opinions being expressed with no 
clear consensus to launch negotiations. This was a further reminder that explicit 
consensus could not be expected at the Ministerial. However, the Commission's 
position was still supported by some of their Social Partners, for example 
Eurochambres, the FTA and UNICE even though it was not supported by others, 
notably CIDSE.73 Notwithstanding the influential internal coalition achieved by the 
Commission, it is possible that the Council of Ministers had continued to consider the 
likelihood of obtaining explicit consensus. When Council issued its conclusions on the 
preparation of the Canctin meeting, although it "stressed that the DDA established a 
comprehensive programme" it did not mention investment specifically. 74 
72 Report of the Working Group to General Council, 2003 circulated on 11"' July 2003 as WT/WGTI/7 
73 Eurochambres September 2003 'Position Paper on 'The WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun 10-
14 September 2003' at http://www.eurochambres.be/PDF/pdf trade/Global%20Chambet';920Platfonn%20PP%20Cancun.pdf 
accessed 15"' March 2005 FT A expressed their view in their 2003 position paper 'FTA Posz!ion 
Regarding the WTO Investment Agreement' sourced from http://www.fta· 
eu.orgldoc/unp/opinionlen/position paner investment logo en.odf accessed on 15th March 2005 On 18th July, 
UNICE issued a brochure on the Doha Development Agenda, 'Cancun. Moving Forward Together' (at 
http://www.unice.org/1/FFEJDNHAKNHAHFEKJNJIDMHM PDB69DP6WN9L171 KM/UNICE/docs/DLS/2003-02316-EN .pdf 
accessed on 1st November 2005. CIDSE (International Cooperation for Development and 
Solidarity)'Global Trade at the Service of Human Development: A position paper on the occasion of the 
5'' WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico 1 O'' -14'' September' at 
http://www.cafod.oq?.Uklarchive!policy/CIDSE Cl Cancun Paperpdf accessed 1Oth March 2006 
74 Meeting on 21" July 2003 from EU Bulletin 7/8-2003 at 
httn://eut·opa.eu.int/abc/doc/offlbul\len/200307/pl06044.htm accessed on 15th October 2005 
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As far as the external consensus was concerned, serious disagreement about the 
Singapore Issues still raged at the July WTO General Council meeting.75 Divergent 
views ranged from, on one hand, Japan's assertion that "Ministers agreed (in Doha) that 
negotiations would take place after Canciln", thus relegating the primacy of the 'explicit 
consensus' concept, to Kenya and Cuba, which "did not believe that conditions were 
right for. .. negotiations". This chasm between perspectives seemed intractable 
particularly as the Singapore Issues were being treated as one. Bangladesh pointed out 
that each Singapore Issue had "a separate identity and merit" but this remained 
obscured in favour of the 'package deal'. This difference of opinion along North/South 
lines was again put into sharp focus following the submission of a paper from 
Bangladesh for the LDC Group and fifteen other countries. 76 The suggested text on 
investment for the Cancun Declaration therein highlights the wide-ranging 
disagreements on scope, definition, the involvement of the DSU, discrimination, 
transparency, incentives and BITS. This text was discussed at the August General 
Council meeting along with the draft Ministerial Declaration. 77 The Philippines 
commented that many developing country members had already rejected the draft 
investment text and Argentina added that there were still a number of outstanding issues 
to address such as investor obligations and SDT. Lamy later said that the Commission 
would consider the problems raised by the developing countries and was prepared to 
table "a project that brings a certain number of general rules, which could be adopted in 
those developing countries wishing to do so without obliging those countries who do 
not wish to do so to apply them". 78 The Commission may have thought they could 
progress this outside the working group, perhaps in a Green Room process or as a 
separate plurilateral exercise. 
75 Meeting on 24th and 25th July, minutes circulated as WT/GC/M/81) 
76 WT/GC/W/514 of 28th August from Bangladesh (on behalf of the LDC Group), Botswana, China, 
Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, Venezuela, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe entitled 'Paragraphs 13,14,15 and !6, Dealing with Singapore Issues of the Draft 
Cancun Ministerial Text contained in JOB(03)!150/REV 1'. 
77 Meeting on 25th, 26th and 30th August (minutes circulated as WT/GC/M/82 
78 Meeting on 2•' September 2003, from MEP Eryl McNally of the East of England at 
http://www.eD'lmcnallymep.om.uk/plenaryspeeches.htm#2nd%20July%202003:%201nvestment%20and%20competition 
accessed 21" July 2005 
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As if to support the earlier contention that the Council of Ministers may have 
recognised that agreement would, perhaps, not be forthcoming at Cancful (see the 
previous page), their Statement to the Ministerial said only that "As far as the Singapore 
Issues are concerned we ask all partners to support the launching of new negotiations, 
because we are convinced this will help to accelerate growth in all countries", which 
did not make it seem that they thought these negotiations would, realistically, go 
ahead. 79 It was also the case that the Ministerial Declaration from Cancful did not 
mention trade and investment although the Derbez Draft contained one section on 
investment written wholly in line with the Commission's thinking. 80 Using this 
methodology, the Group would be asked to "intensify the clarification process" and to 
develop negotiation modalities including SDT provisions (that the Commission had 
seemingly been trying to ignore throughout. The Group would also have been asked to 
clarify the relationship between this and the single undertaking, once again revealing a 
lack of appreciation that negotiations had been ongoing since 1996 and had still not 
managed to clarify terminology. The final part stated that these modalities would be 
adopted by General Council by a specified date, thus also ignoring the principle of 
'explicit consensus'. This was far removed from what the developing countries had 
argued in Group meetings prior to Can coo and it is unsurprising that there was no 
agreement given to open negotiations. 
The ESF Daily news from the Ministerial followed the progress of trade and investment 
in the negotiations. 81 On 11th September it was reported that, for the Japanese, 
investment was the "deal breaker" possibly concerned that any dilution of the proposal 
would compromise benefits. On 12'h September, "the idea of optional participation to a 
final Agreement on Investment (had) been floated" however, the Commission did not 
give this initiative any support. It was also stated that the US wanted to limit an 
investment agreement to transparency although, again, neither the EC nor Japan would 
agree. On 14'h September, a Green Room meeting took place chaired by Mr Derbez 
who asked members to show some "flexibility" on the Singapore Issues. Lamy 
reportedly left the meeting to consult with the Member States, who gave him 
79 From the Statement of Italy on behalf of the Presidency of the European Union WT/MIN(03)/ST/6 
dated !I th September 2003, once the Ministerial had started, suggesting some last minute negotiations as 
to its content. 
8° Found at httn:l/www:wto.orglenglish/thewto e/minist e/min03 eldraft decl rev2 e.htm, presented to the Conference 
on 13th September 2003, accessed on 12th August 2005 
81 ESF Daily News from CancUn at www.hkcsi.org.hk/reports/cancun/09Daily_ESF_Newsletter_1-6.doc 
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permission to drop trade and investment and trade and competition. However, the 
African Union refused to agree to negotiations being opened on any of the four so the 
meeting ended. 
That there were no further meetings of the Group after Canctm shows that the gap 
between the developed and developing countries could not be bridged. Although Lamy 
appeared to believe in the importance of such work, he did not pursue it further. 
Trade and Competition 
The Commission's work in this area began because of the OECD Recommendations on 
Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade from 1967 onwards. These 
Recommendations "encouraged informal contacts, mostly for the purposes of 
consultation and information sharing on specific competition cases (Darnro, 2004:200). 
It appears to have been Leon Brittan who suggested that competition rules should be 
multilateralised in 1992 (Darnro, 2006:221) and the EC began to lead in this area so the 
informal relationships set up through the OECD system could become binding. At the 
same time, the US held the opposite view perhaps because they thought it might 
impinge on their use of anti-dumping rules (Jawara and Kw a, 2003:41 ). 
The 'EU Approach to the Millennium Round', COM(1999)331, clarified that a WTO 
agreement in this area was one of the Commission's key aims (pp11-12), in order to 
tackle anti-competitive behaviour by businesses, promote closer relationships between 
competition authorities and minimize costs because of the application of different 
legislation.82 Four parts to the Agreement were proposed along with a "development 
dimension" suggesting SDT could comprise transitional periods and flexibilities in 
application rather than any distinct measures. 83 This is very similar to what was detailed 
in the negotiating mandate, although it suggested that an agreement should cover "anti-
competitive practices with a significant impact on international trade and investment" 
and adhere to the key WTO principles of transparency and non-discrimination. 84 
82 Therefore, very much an extension of SEM ideals. 
83 Core principles; common approaches (on hard core cartels, abuses of dominance and international 
mergers); cooperation mechanisms (e.g. "notification, consultation and surveillance") and dispute 
settlement 
84 Given to the Commission on 26th October 1999 (sourced from http://www.france.attac.org/a2985) 
236 
The 1999 report from the Working Group to the General Council seems to show more 
progress and less disagreement than in the investment negotiations at this stage; 
although this could reflect the drafting skills of the Secretariat as there were evidently a 
number of outstanding issues requiring resolution just as there had been with the trade-
investment agreement.85 Such areas included the interface with other WTO rules and 
the trade and investment work; objectives and principles; elements for inclusion in 
WTO rules; unilateral, bilateral and multilateral rules; measures to promote the 
development of necessary capabilities; principles of transparency; "approaches to a 
mandatory requirement for competition legislation"; possible notification procedures; 
international cooperation mechanisms; cartels and antidumping. Perhaps Section 37 of 
the paper summarizes the position, "the Group was in an exploratory and educative 
process and was still a long way off (from being able to) gauge the need for multilateral 
rules". 
Work going on in APEC suggested timeliness on the part of the WTO in considering 
competition issues as APEC members might be expected to push forward work in WTO 
and their experiences of implementing such policies could be shared. The Economic 
Leaders Group had agreed 'APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory 
Reform', which covered all areas of competition although the principles were voluntary, 
flexible and allowed exceptions. 86 That APEC was moving in a similar orbit to the 
WTO was not enough to generate a supportive consensus within the Working Group. 
The draft Declaration for the Seattle Ministerial highlighted the lack of agreement as 
two possible options were detailed. 87 The first was that negotiations will (italics mine) 
focus on four issues: (i) main issues, (ii) developing common positions, (iii) modalities 
for cooperation and, (iv) SDT provisions, with an associated "educative and analytical 
process" taking up to two further years. The second option, although clear that 
negotiations would not be opened, suggests either that the group would continue with 
the Singapore mandate or with the current mandate "building on the work undertaken to 
85 Issued on 11th October (WT/WGTP/3) on the basis of the three meetings of the Group held in 1999 (on 
19-20 April, 10-11 June and 14 September) and two Symposia held on 17th April and 131h September in 
conjunction with UNCTAD and the World Bank. 
86 APEC Economic Leaders meeting on 13th September 1999 (Declaration at 
http://www.apecsec.om.sg!apeclleaders declarations/1999.html accessed 1Oth October 2005) 
APEC Principles for Regulatory Reform at http://www.apecsec.org.so-/apec/leaders declarations/1999/attachment -
apec.html accessed 15th October 2005 
87 Sent to Members on 19'h October 1999 as JOB(99)/5868/Rev I (reproduced at 
httn:/lwww.ictsd.om/English/Declaration3.pdf accessed 3rd October 2005 
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date" and then either "present a final report" or "present concrete findings" to the next 
Ministerial. One of the problems was a lack of agreement (in spite of APEC's work) 
between the Commission and the US, which was highlighted at the TABD meeting in 
late October. The Commission failed to receive support for competition going on to the 
Seattle agenda as "negotiations on competition policy are regarded unrealistic by the 
TABD as a whole".88 The conclusions from the meeting itself were even starker, 
commenting that it "seems to be impossible" to develop a common line "on whether or 
how this issue should be negotiated within the new Round" and so advocated the 
continuation of the educative process. 89 The ESF felt that this lack of agreement was 
indicative of a need for harmonization of competition regimes between the EC and US 
although it seemed more an issue of different perspectives than a lack of 
harmonization. 90 
Eight papers had been submitted on this issue to the Seattle Ministerial conference.91 
The Commission's paper, 'The EC Approach to Trade and Competition', contained 
nothing different from what had been set out in COM(l999)331 and the negotiating 
mandate, suggesting that their views had not evolved even though the level of 
contestation seemed to be high. Turkey, Cuba and Kenya thought negotiations should 
be delayed while the others supported their beginning as soon as possible. As 
88 Corporate Europe Observer, November 1999 'Doing Business in Berlin' at 
http·//www.comorateeurope.org/tabd!ber!inbusiness.html accessed on 21st July 2005 
89TABD meeting in Berlin on 29th and 30"' October at http://static.tabd.com/gems/1999BerlinCEOR"Jlort.pdf 
accessed 5th October 2005. That the TABD failed to mention trade-competition at their Cincinnati 
meeting of November !6th-18th 2000 (see the 'TABD Recommendations' at 
httn://static.tabd.comlgems/2000CincinnatiCEOReport.pdf accessed 15th November 2005) and again in their lviid 
Year Report from Washington DC on May 15"' 2001,( reproduced at http;//static.tabd.corn!gems/MYMOI.rdf 
accessed 5th October 2005), suggests that their position remained unchanged 
90ESF letter to Pascal Lamy of 23'' November 1999 on their 'Preliminary Views on Trade and 
Competition Policy' sourced at httn://www.esf.be/pdfs/documents!position papers/competit.pdf accessed on 15th 
March 2005. Damro (2007: 891) says that the US-EU agreement on competition was signed in 1991 and 
was the EU's "first international agreement on competition policy''. The Europa site, meanwhile, 
suggests that cooperation in competition regimes between the EU and US had been going on since 1996 
(from http://europa.eu.inUscadplusOegienflvb/126101.htm accessed 17th January 2006). In particular, in 1999, 
"cooperation was very close and fruitful, and facilitated ... growing convergence" and the two sides also 
"strengthened their contacts with respect to combating global cartels during 1999 and concluded 
administrative arrangements allowing for the possibility of attending key meetings in individual cases of 
mutual concern". This is sourced from the 'Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government 
of the United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws 1 January 1999 to 31 
December 1999' COMC2000) 618 final. According to the site, this cooperation would continue through 
the time period covered by this thesis. 
91 Apart from the EC (WT/GC/W/191), papers were also circulated from Cuba (WT/GCIW/389), Japan 
(WT/GCIW/308), Kenya on behalf of the African Group (WT/GC/W/300), Korea (WT/GC/W/298), 
Norway (WT/GC/W/310), Poland (WT/GC/W/293) and Turkey (WT/GCIW/250) 
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suggested by the draft Declaration, there was no agreement as to whether negotiations 
should take place following Seattle. The WTO briefing notes from the Ministerial show 
that no consensus was forthcoming and it was noted that a positive outcome was by no 
means assured as the Commission was the most enthusiastic member of the Working 
Group.92 
The nature ofthe support from the Council of Ministers before Seattle and support from 
the European Parliament afterwards suggested that the internal consensus on 
competition policy would remain supportive. 93 The external consensus was not. At the 
first post-Seattle meeting of the Group, the Chairman identified nine priority areas that 
needed consideration, suggestive of the general lack of conviction of the need for a 
WTO Agreement in this area.94 Of particular note is the need to use "concrete 
examples" to support arguments, avoiding theoretical debate, and for SDT provisions to 
be developed; going against the Commission's stance in COM(l999)331. The 
Commission introduced a paper in an effort to clarify the relationship between 
competition law and "domestic economic reform", which accepted developing countries 
might experience difficulties in drawing up a law and in designing an appropriate 
agency to meet their needs (and acknowledged that flexibility needed to be built in). 95 
The Commission's view that there was no need for SDT provisions persisted; their 
position was that there would not be a high development and set up cost and any cost 
would be offset by the added value gained from being able to cooperate and collaborate 
92Brieflng note of 1" December meetings at 
httn://www.wto.org/englishlthewto e!minist elmin99 e/englishiabout e/resumOl e.htm accessed 15th March 2005 and 
Briefing note of 2"• December meetings at 
httn://www.wto.org/englishlthewto e/minist elmin99 e/english/about e/resum02 e.htm a1so accessed 15th March 2005. 
Questionable outcome suggested by ITCSD Bridges Daily Update on the Seattle Conference on 3'd 
December 1999, Issue 4 reproduced at www.unc.edul-..wb!ack/BridgeRen 1203.rtf accessed on 21st July 2005 
93 
'Resolution on the EU Approach to the Millennium Round' 18"' November 1999 from EU Bulletin 11-
99 at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/offfhulllen/9911/pl05017.htm accessed on 15th October 2005. 'Council conclusions 
on preparation for the third WTO Ministerial Conference' EU Bulletin 6/99 at 
htt,p:l/europa.eu!bulletin/en/9906/p10302l htm accessed 15th October 2005 
94 Meeting held on 15-16 June 2000 (minutes circulated as WT/WGTCPIM/11. The list is as follows: 
"Relating national treatment, MFN and transparency to competition" and vice versa; Methodologies to 
facilitate "cooperation and communication" and the provision of technical assistance; Defining the 
relationship between competition policy and WTO objectives to facilitate trade; Considering "other 
relevant issues pertaining to the subject"; Using "concrete examples" to support arguments; Emphasizing 
the 'development dimension', which would include "benefits, challenges ... downsides ... in implementing 
competition policy ... including the problems .. .in establishing competition 
agencies ... enforcement. .. benefits and costs"; Developing a 'competition culture', which could include 
an "exchange of national experience"; Elucidating "practical aspects of competition policy", and, 
Clarifying the interface between trade and competition. 
95 WT/WGTCP/W/140 
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with other members. A number of members expressed reservations about the 
Commission's approach. Hong Kong China was particularly critical about the lack of 
emphasis on flexibility and both Pakistan and, notably, the US questioned whether a 
focus on the core principles (the aim of the Commission's paper) was enough and 
openly speculated as to whether the WTO was the right place to pursue this issue 
anyway. 
The Commission continued its activism by submitting a further paper on 'A Multilateral 
Framework Agreement on Competition Policy' to the next meeting of the Group, 
clearly trying to identify the necessary elements of an agreement.96 This document was 
a more comprehensive explanation of COM(l999)331 with a few procedural additions 
so it was not indicative that there had been much blue sky thinking in order to address 
the concerns expressed up to that date. 97 The paper clarified that signatories would be 
expected to have a competition authority with appropriate powers and status and to 
have domestic systems for dispute resolution. Considering many countries 
acknowledged that they did not yet have the necessary infrastructure, it seems odd that 
the Commission wanted them to have all of it in place prior to signing. This almost 
suggests an acceptance that reaching agreement was not a short-term but a long-term 
aim. In the end, nine members (including the Commission) expressed support for this 
position with Pakistan and India accepting the principle. 98 Three countries raised issues 
of capacity although Pakistan noted there was scant prospect of additional funding; 
perhaps of concern considering the Commission's prerequisites apparently for all 
countries including developing countries.99 The US, meanwhile, clarified that although 
it felt trade and competition was important, "it remained an open question as to whether 
the WTO was the appropriate institute (sic) in which to initiate the development of rules 
on competition in a multilateral context", meaning it was still not categorically 
supportive. 
96Paper on 'Multilateral Framework Agreement on Competition Policy' is WT/WGTCP/W/152. Meeting 
held on 2nd and 3'd October 2000 (Minutes circulated on 5'h November 2000 as WT/WGTCP/M/12 
97 Which is unsurprising since neither COM(1999)331 nor the mandate went into procedural detail. 
98 Canada, EC, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland, Pakistan and India 
99 possibly recalling the discussions at the General Council meeting in February 2000 cited in the earlier 
case study 
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The Group's 2000 report to General Council acknowledged that any trade and 
competition agreement would impact on issues such as investment and TRIMs, 
suggesting that the issue of 'policy space' (so important in the trade and investments 
case study would be equally important here. 100 There was also a wider question as to 
whether there would be any added value for developing countries in implementing an 
agreement, questioning whether those countries would be able to see any "dynamic 
efficiency gains or gains in productivity". The Commission's paper for the March 
meeting of the Group, meanwhile, focused on the principles of non-discrimination and 
transparency. This centred on using the TBT Agreement as an example of how basic 
principles could be included, particularly on the acceptance of exclusions and measures 
to help SMEs or to protect state-owned businesses.101 Once again the US expressed its 
lack of conviction by making a number of negative remarks, for example, how 
cooperation could be seen as 'voluntary' and (under such circumstances) whether it 
would be possible to apply WTO rules. The US also openly speculated, together with 
Hong Kong China, upon why the Commission had deemed the WTO as the best place 
for a competition agreement. India and the Philippines were similarly negative about 
the need for an Agreement to ensure cooperation between competition authorities. 
Therefore, the Commission still had a substantial amount of work to do in order to 
encourage consensus within the Working Group. 
The Commission's next two papers to the meeting in July detailed the "fundamental 
values" to which all Members could subscribe- i.e. the need for transparency, non-
discrimination and protection against hard-core cartels.102 These first two did not, it was 
suggested, require harmonized competition legislation, enforcement practices or 
institutional structures. This may have been a way to acknowledge that a previous 
paper, in calling for a significant level of infrastructure to be in place prior to signature 
was overly ambitious. The rest of the first paper discussed coverage and definitions and 
clarified that any Agreement would exist to "support the application of competition 
law", not interfere with any other policy area nor make any statement about a country's 
100 WT/WGTCP/4 of 30th November 
101 Commission paper WT/WGTCP/W/160 on 'Principles of non-discrimination and transparency' The 
Working Group meeting took place on 22"•-23'd March 2001 (minutes circulated as WT/WGTCP!M/14) 
102 WT/WGTCP/W/174 on the 'Implications of a competition Jaw for developing countries' and 
WT/WGTCP/W/175 on 'Regional competition arrangements'. Meeting held on 5"'-6'h July 2001 
(minutes circulated as WT/WGTCP/M/15) 
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openness to investment. 103 Considering both the 1999 and 2000 Reports had admitted 
the possibility, if not the actuality, of overlap between competition and investment 
(amongst other areas), it appears the Commission was trying to back pedal by denying 
this possibility. Once again, a general, but not exclusive, North-South divide seemed to 
be evident. 104 Hong Kong China thought that the Commission had failed to consider the 
extent of costs and had not considered countries, which did not want a "comprehensive 
competition law" although many of the countries supporting the EC thought that the 
Agreement would help countries to design and implement a policy to suit.105 The 
second paper clarified that the Commission supported no specific design for regional 
competition arrangements but, for "effectiveness", they had to include technical 
assistance, case-specific cooperation and an exchange of experience between competent 
authorities.106 It seems premature for the Commission to have addressed such issues, 
when there was still a lack of agreement about the general principles. 
Lamy's July meeting with Robert Zoellick in Washington was, at least partly, designed 
to encourage the USA to be more positive towards the idea of putting trade-competition 
on the agenda. 107 It was reported afterwards that the US had changed its tune since the 
somewhat acrimonious March Working Group meeting. However, this was still not 
enough to encourage a supportive coalition on this issue. The 2001 report to the General 
Council acknowledged that some countries remained uncommitted although it also 
emphasized that the importance of addressing anti-competitive cartels was clear from 
the evidence received from both the World Bank and OECD, which had both 
commented on the increased level of such practices and noted the negative effects "on 
the economies and development prospects particularly of poor countries" 108 There had 
been a suggestion that the work be divided into two areas - domestic and international 
103 This clarified a point in COM(l999)331 which had said an agreement could cover "common 
approaches on anticompetitive practices with a significant impact on international trade and investment", 
suggesting that there was some overlap between trade/investment/competition. 
104 This proposal seemed well received by Canada, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Morocco, 
Norway, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland and Ukraine, but not by Egypt, 
Hong Kong China, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
105 Although the Commission had previously opined that each country would need a competition 
structure in place prior to signing an agreement. 
106 It is not clear, for example, that APEC's arrangements included these elements 
107 The ICTSD-Bridges weekly trade review 5:28 of24lh July 200l('EU's New Strategy on Labour, EU-
US Draw Closer on Investment' at http://www.ictsd.or,.lhhnl/weekly/24-07-0l/storr2.htm accessed 1st November 
2005 
108 WT/WGTCP/5 of gth October 2001 
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competition policy- with negotiations taking place either in the first only, or in both 
areas with developing countries being able to opt out. 109 The main problem noted was 
that one third ofWTO members still did not have a competition policy, which may have 
been why they remained uncertain of the benefits of a multilateral policy.110 
The Council of Ministers' conclusions on the latest state of preparations for Doha 
mentioned nothing at all about competition, suggesting either that they were content 
with the Commission's stance and/or the progress to date or that there were more 
pressing objectives to achieve.111 At the WTO General Council meeting prior to the 
Ministerial, the general consensus seemed to be that the study process should 
continue. 112 Interestingly, although the Commission remarked that it had ''bent over 
backwards to integrate all possible development aspects" in trade and investment, 
government procurement and trade facilitation, it did not mention that it had done so in 
competition policy. This may have been because the Commission was content with 
what was going on in the Group or because it had, in effect, given up efforts to achieve 
more than a baseline consensus on the most general principles. 
Although there was no agreement to launch negotiations on trade and competition 
policy in Doha, the final version of the Declaration had substantive sections on the 
'Interaction between trade and competition policy' .113 The first paragraph stated that 
there was a strong case to pursue the work and continued that Ministers "agree that 
negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the 
basis of .. . explicit consensus", meaning that the ability of each member to express a 
preference before negotiations went ahead could not be overlooked. Paragraph 24 said 
the WTO would work together with other donors to maximise the effectiveness of 
technical assistance and paragraph 25 gave a list of issues that the Group would be 
asked to focus on prior to the Cancun Ministerial including, "core 
principles ... modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive 
109 Although there is no indication in the Report as to where this suggestion came from. 
110 See the Report of the Working Group meeting of 5-6 July 2001(WTIWGTCP/M/15), page 31 where 
the Commission says that an agreement would exist to "assist Members in implementing effective 
competition policies and in related institution-building processes" 
111 Council conclusions on latest state of preparations for the Doha Ministerial Conference of 29"' and 
301h October at http://europa.eu. int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200110/pl06030.htm accessed 1st November 2005 
112 General Council meeting on 31" October and 1" November, minutes circulated as WT/GC/M/71 
113 Issued on 201h November 2001 (WT/MJN(01)/DEC/1 
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reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through capacity 
building". This was probably the best the Commission could have hoped for, given the 
broadly negative view of the Working Group towards opening negotiations. It would 
also give the Commission more time to build the necessary 'explicit consensus' before 
Can din. 
Perhaps seeking to address the concerns of the developing countries at an early stage, 
the Commission submitted a paper on 'Technical assistance' to the first meeting of the 
Working Group in 2002 saying they foresaw assistance being targeted at five main 
areas in order to support competition policy. 114 However, as if to admit that this was 
only the first step towards their goals, the Commission went on to detail the long term 
aims of establishing a 'competition culture' in countries, encompassing "the 
judiciary ... the business community and ... the public in general". It further reiterated 
that cooperation between competition authorities was key and the multilateral context, 
in which an Agreement would operate, meant that cooperation could be significantly 
widened from that in existing bilateral or regional arrangements. This proposal makes a 
WTO Agreement look like the tip of an iceberg in terms both of aim and eventual 
agenda and it is surprising that there were no negative responses minuted in the meeting 
report. 
A further paper on 'Domestic and international cartels' was circulated by the 
Commission to the next meeting explaining the effects that they could have on an 
economy, for example placing restrictions on the transfer of technology- suggesting 
possible overlap between this group and the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of 
Technology. 115 Critically, the Commission saw an Agreement as a complement to, and 
not a replacement of, existing bilateral and regional arrangements in line with the 
Group's Report of 1999, cited earlier), thus questioning (implicitly) this particular 
114Paper circulated as WT/WGTCPIW/184. Meeting held 23'd to 24"' April2002 (minutes circulated as 
WT/WGTCP/M/17) The five main areas identified were countries without a horizontal law; countries 
installing enforcement or authority measures for the purposes of the law; a 'European Competition 
Academy' (a virtual forum of"well known European institutions and universities, which had particular 
knowledge in relation to the development/competition policy interface"); "residential seminars" for 
competition authority officials from developing countries and exchange prograrmnes for officials 
115 Paper circulated as WT/WGTCP/W/193 for the meeting on I" and 2"d July 2002 (minutes circulated 
as WT/WGTCP/W/193) 
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aspect of added value to this agreement.116 Perhaps aware that so many countries had 
yet to develop competition law, the penultimate Group meeting of2002 opened with an 
assurance from the Commission that although an agreement would mean all members 
would be committed to establishing a competition framework, this did not mean that a 
competition law was necessary, at least in the short term, especially if regional 
arrangements filled that gap, although there was an open question about how 
comparability could be assured. 117 The Commission accepted that it had so far failed to 
detail SDT but confirmed that no cooperation would be sought outside the commitment 
to the main issues at least at present. Perhaps this indicated an appreciation that the 
ambition in COM(1999)331 would be unlikely to happen given the lack of a supportive 
consensus in the WTO and that the best that could be hoped for would be a baseline 
agreement that could be built on.118 The Commission also clarified that notification 
would only be expected where decisions had the potential to directly affect the 
competition agreement although the US commented that as all decisions by their courts 
had the potential to change existing legislation, they might face a major burden; this 
was accepted by the Commission. Hong Kong China and India, meanwhile, continued 
to express concern about financial costs. 
Perhaps apprehensive that 'explicit consensus' was still not forthcoming, the 
Commission submitted a paper reflecting discussions on core principles to the last 
Working Group meeting in November held (primarily) to agree the Annual Report. 119 
The Commission confirmed it was aiming for a rigorous system, which would deter 
cartels and other anti-competitive behaviour and noted that technical assistance would 
be required to address capacity constraints and to give advice and guidance on the 
content of the necessary legislation. However, it assured members that there would be 
no attempt to harmonize the content of domestic legislation in the WTO, again 
116 The text in the 1999 Report to the General Council from the Group is on page 17 and comments that a 
multilateral competition agreement would "augment and reinforce bilateral and regional initiatives" not 
that it would replace them. 
117 Meeting held on 26th and 27th September 2002 (minutes circulated as WT/WGTCP/M/19) 
118To reprise, COM(1999)331 suggested that, firstly, SDT was unnecessary if there were "transitional 
periods and flexibility in the rules" and that cooperation should include, apart from hard-core cartels, 
"criteria for assessment of vertical restrictions or abuses of dominance with a foreclosure effect (and) 
principles for cooperation on export cartels and international mergers". 
119 WT/WGTCP/W/222 setting out the core principles and "how these principles would operate in (and 
what they would mean for) domestic competition laws (considering) members had different le£al 
traditions and administrative systems". Paper circulated for the Working Group meeting of 20 
November (minutes circulated as WT/WGTCP/M/20) 
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suggesting comparability would be difficult, and it accepted that there needed to be 
more work to develop dispute settlement mechanisms. The annual report of 2002, 
meanwhile, was structured differently from the others, in five substantive parts in 
accordance with paragraph 25 of the Do ha Declaration, and seemed akin to the 
Commission's view, being much more positive in outlook.120 The first section on core 
principles ends, "Delegations should ... adopt a more positive stance" and the section on 
hard-core cartels reads, "the importance of the issue ... was self-evident", even though 
members had not agreed that it was 'self-evident' why this needed to form part of a 
WTO agreement. 
The next meeting of the Working Group did not take place until February 2003. 121 The 
Commission once more reiterated that it wanted to concentrate on defining a set of 
principles to which all members could subscribe and said it could not see any basis for 
countries to be exempted.122 As far as scope was concerned, the Commission agreed it 
would be better if countries had systems, which were not solely concerned with the 
adverse effects of cartels (i.e. along the lines of COM(l999)331) but only in this area 
would there probably not be a transition period.123 Thailand questioned the relationship 
between a competition law and the vaunted "ability to deal with cartels", suggesting 
that it still remained unconvinced. After this meeting, the ESF sent a letter to Pascal 
Lamy in which they "express( ed) their support" for the work being undertaken in the 
Working Group and suggested developing "a basic set of competition standards" which 
could then be used to "benchmark" competition authorities and as principles in the 
setting up phase.124 The ESF also called for establishing further commonalities between 
120 Annual Report to the General Council circulated as WT/WGTCP/6 on 9th December. The Doha 
declaration had set out the core principles; provisions on hard-core cartels; modalities for cooperation, 
and, "support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through 
capacity building" 
· 
121 Meeting held on 20th and 21" 2003 (minutes circulated as WT/WGTCP!M/21 
122 His argument was that no specific model was advocated and that agencies could be multipurpose if 
capacity was an issue. The only criterion was that the competent authority had to be able both to 
implement and enforce competition law and "be a credible and real partner for international cooperation" 
and peer review. The Cuban delegate pointed out that many developing countries had neither competition 
legislation nor a competent body so this was premature. She also said there should be further 
consideration given to SDT to enable countries to build appropriate legislation and bodies at their own 
pace to fit their own needs without being "subject to time constraints". 
123 However, how long it would take to set up a credible 'competent authority' was not mentioned; it 
could obviously not be instantaneous upon signing the agreement if one of the purposes of signing it was 
meant to help countries that did not have a competition authority, to put one in place. This was also 
pointed out by the Cuban representative. 
124 Letter sent on 20th May, 'ESF Call for Progress Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Trade and 
Competition' found at http://www.wto org/Englishlforums e/ngo e/esf agree trade comp e.pdf accessed on 3rd May 
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the EC and US and suggested that this would facilitate the launch of "substantive 
multilateral negotiations ... at ... Cancun". It is difficult to see how such standards would 
be enforceable unless cited in the Agreement's text (with an association to the DSU), 
which would also give more room for dissent. 125 It is also difficult to see, given the 
politicized environment and the insistence on the part of the developing countries that 
they did not want to open negotiations in new areas, how improved relationships 
between the Commission and the US would automatically facilitate 'explicit consensus' 
at Canc1ln. 
At the last meeting of the Group in May 2003, the Nigerian delegate, expressing 
concern that developing countries views had not been taken on board, read out lists of 
areas he felt needed clarification. 126 These were elaborated upon by other delegations, 
leaving a list of some fifty outstanding issues. 127 It deserves highlighting that the 
existence of this list put the 'explicit consensus' sought at Canrun seemingly out of 
reach. The Commission, however, almost ignored these concerns by saying that they 
needed to be dealt with within a negotiation not prior to a negotiation. This might 
confirm, as suggested before, that the Commission was planning to seek agreement only 
on the bare principles in order to establish 'explicit consensus' prior to beginning 
negotiations. The Commission later introduced a paper on 'Dispute Settlement and Peer 
Review: Options for a WTO Agreement on Competition Policy' and opined that the 
DSU could be used to assess whether national competition laws adhered to the 'core 
principles' .128 However, individual competition authority decisions, patterns of 
decisions, and complaints from individuals or firms would not be subject to the DSU. 
The Commission also remarked that peer review, because it was "non-conflictual", 
2006. It must be borne in mind that "Standardisation is not a simple technical activity but is influenced by 
political, economic and administrative factors. With the search for standards that are international, and 
increasingly comprehensive, standard setting must cater for an ever increasing range of players. Thus, it 
is little wonder that the formal standards setting processes of e.g. the International Standards Organisation 
(ISO) ... tend to be extremely slow at times". From K Jacobs, R Proctor and R Williams at the University 
of Edinburgh School of Informatics 'Users and Standardisation - Worlds Apart?' at 
http://www.cogsci ed.ac.uk/-mplpapers/standardsView-96/dmft.doc accessed 6th October 2006 
125 The British Standards Institution, the oldest standards body in the world, in their Website section on 
'What is a standard?' notes that "Standards are designed for voluntary use and do not impose any 
regulations. However, laws and regulations may refer to certain standards and make compliance with 
them compulsory''. (found at http://www.hsi-global.com/British Standards/Standardizationtwhat.xalter accessed 3rd 
May2006) 
126 Meeting held on 26'h- 27th May 2003. Minutes circulated as WT/WGTCP/M/22 
127 Some are much wider than the strict competition remit of this case study so they have not been 
elaborated here. 
128 WT/WGTCP/W/229, 
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would be positive for both developing and developed countries. The paper attracted 
negative comment from India, China and Hong Kong China. The Commission 
presented a further paper on 'Flexibility and Progressivity', which was not discussed in 
any depth but seemed to be a genuine effort to focus squarely on the administrative and 
technical infrastructure 'basics' and how these might best be applied for the developing 
countries. 129 This included suggesting individual time periods and implementation plans 
to be drawn up for each LDC with the developed countries having the "responsibility'' 
to support their efforts. In order to achieve this, there would almost need to be 
individual negotiations in each case; bringing up issues of technical capacity in the 
beneficiaries. 
The European Consumers' Association (BEUC), another of the Commission's Contact 
Group members, was supportive of the Commission's stance. Their 'Priorities for 
Cancun' urged the advancement of competition policy negotiations noting the 
importance to consumers.130 BEUC also demanded that technical and financial 
assistance be tied to commitments from the destination countries to open particular 
sectors of their markets although they made a small concession that developing 
countries should have the framework regulations in place first. UNICE too was 
supportive; expressing a perspective practically identical to the Commission's. 131 
Further, UNICE identified six elements for inclusion into an Agreement, again very 
similar to what the Commission had proposed. 132 Eurochambres, however, was less 
129 Paper on 'Flexibility and progressivity' circulated as WT/WGTCP/W/234 
It is suggested that it covered 'the basics' as this document sets down the general criteria for the 
legislative and administrative requirements for a competition framework. For example, only on hard-core 
cartels would there be a "substantive provision" and all the other policy areas would be left to the 
individual members. Also laws and regulations should be made available but this could be by auy means, 
that there should be no interference in the competition authority's decision making and that permitting a 
judicial review did not set down what kind of body had to conduct that review. In addition, it 
aclmowledged that regional bodies might well satisfy these requirements so countries were under no 
obligation to develop a national strategy and that policy exclusions and exceptions would be allowed if 
they were transparent and predictable. 
130
'BEUC Priorities For Cancim' BEUC/X/028/2003 of30th June, 
http://www.beuc.org/ I/GNKLGFDBFDNPKDDGAFOIBDNNPDB69DW1 A69DW3571 KM/BEUC/docs/DLS/2003-01533 -01-
Y<I.f accessed 16th January 2006 
131 Brochure of ISm July, on the Doha Development Agenda, 'Candtn. Moving Fonvard Together' (at 
http:/1212.3 .246.117/1/BUN H01CGDHGMOFDCLEMDDKEPDB69DP6WN9L171 KM/UNICE/docs/DLS/2003-02316-EN .pdf 
accessed 161h January 2006) Interestingly, an e-mail from UNICE on 12 December 2005 said lhat lheir 
positions on lhe Singapore Issues were "subtly different" from lhose of lhe Commission although quite 
how lhey differ is difficult to identify. 
132 The principles of ''transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness"; action against hard core 
cartels; voluntary cooperation and ensuring confidentiality; institutional strengthening and transition 
periods; voluntary peer review, and, lhe DSU being used to assess lhe compliance of national legislation. 
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optimistic and advocated careful consideration as to whether a plurilateral agreement 
might be more "realistic". 133 Similarly, the FTA position paper on Canclill, although 
agreeing that the WTO was "an appropriate forum" for the work, suggested 
consideration should be given to establishing a plurilateral agreement probably because 
of the difficulties in achieving consensus. 134 Meanwhile, the European Parliament, as 
before, continued to support the Commission, whilst ignoring the level of dissent within 
the WTO suggesting their preferences were strongly in alignment with the 
Commission's. 135 However, when the Council of Ministers issued its conclusions on 
the preparation of the Canclill meeting, competition was not mentioned specifically 
although there was no effort to change the Commission's mandate to take account of 
this. 136 
At the Group's next meeting, and the last meeting before the Cancun Ministerial, in 
August, Argentina, Hong Kong China, Sri Lanka and the US called for a 'soft 
agreement' on trade and competition.137 This would be much less broad in scope, 
encourage voluntary cooperation and establish a system for peer review. It may have 
been that this idea was expressed too late to give it a realistic chance of success at 
Cancun although the Commission's mandate had remained unchanged so it was still 
negotiating the Singapore Issues as a package. As in the case of investment, the August 
paper from Bangladesh for the LDC Group and fifteen other countries made it clear that 
there were a number of areas where further clarification was necessary- non-
discrimination; the relationship with bilateral and regional arrangements; transparency; 
definitions and criteria for 'hard core cartels', the burden of information provision and 
the scope of application of the DSU again suggesting that 'explicit consensus' would 
not be achievable in Cancllr!.138 
. 
133 Eurochambres position paper 2003, 'The WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun I 0-14 September 
2003' at httn://www.eurochambres.be/PDF/pdf trade/Global%20Chambet'A,20Piatfonn%20PP%20Cancun.odf 
134 
'FTA Position on the Fifth Ministerial Meeting in CancUn' at http://www.fta-
eu.org/doc/unp/opinion/en/0316attachment.pdfaccessed 15th March 2007 
135 On 3'' July 2003, the European Parliament, as before, agreed, "that. .. competition ... should form part 
of the formalised negotiations" (from EU Bulletin 7/8 2003 at 
http:l/europa.eu.inUabcldoclof!:'bulllen/200307/pl 06043.htm accessed on 15th October 2005 
136 Meeting of 21" July 2003 from EU Bulletin 7/8-2003 at 
http://eumra.eu.int/abc/doc/off!bull/en/200307/p106044.htm accessed on 15th October 2005 
137 Meeting held on 25th, 26th and 30th August (WT/GCIM/82, accessed 1" November 2005. This 'soft' 
agreement could be said to be more akin to the TABD position than the EU position. 
138 WT/GC/W/514 of 28th August from Bangladesh (on behalf of the LDC Group), Botswana, China, 
Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, Venezuela, 
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That the Ministerial Declaration from Cancun did not mention trade and competition is 
instructive. However, the Derbez Draft of the Declaration that was presented to the 
Ministerial for agreement on 13th September 2003 did have a section (number 15) on 
competition. This began by acknowledging the "valuable work" of the Group and went 
on to agree to continue the work being undertaken with the aim of modalities being 
submitted to General Council by a date to be specified, acknowledging that the 
concerns expressed by the developing countries were insurmountable at the present 
time. 139 
Once again there were no further meetings of this Group after Canclin. Thus the gap 
between the developed and developing countries proved intractable and even the 'soft 
agreement' was not pursued. Although, then, the Commission had approached the issue 
slightly differently- in that it appeared to want only an agreement on the principle of 
having an agreement- this was no more successful than the methodology employed for 
trade and investment i.e. seeking an 'explicit consensus' in the Working Group itself. 
Transparency in Government Procurement 
The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) was signed in 1979 to enter 
into force from 1981. It was then amended in 1987 and an extension of scope and 
coverage was signed on 15th Aprill994 to enter into force on I st January 1996. As of 1 '' 
February 2005 it only had thirteen signatories (including the EC as one), none of which 
were developing countries. The complexity of the AGP, and the difficulties of working 
out what is and what is not covered, is acknowledged by the WTO in its 'Overview of 
the AGP.' 140 
Zambia and Zimbabwe entitled 'Paragraphs 13,14,15 and 16, Dealing with Singapore Issues of the Draft 
Cancun Ministerial Text contained in JOB(03)1150/REV 1'. 
139 Once again, the Daily ESF Newsletter from Cancun (at 
www.hkcsi.om.hk/reports/cancun/09Daily ESF Newsletter l-6.doc, accessed 7th May 2006) should be read in 
conjunction with this. 
140 At http://www.wto.org/english'tratop e!gproc e!over e.htm (accessed 18th January 2006) 
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"When reading the schedules ... to ascertain whether a particular procurement 
contract is covered by the Agreement, it is important to check ... not only 
whether the procuring entity is covered, the threshold level and, if the contract is 
for a service, whether the service is covered, but also the General Notes at the 
end of most parties' schedules, which provide for a number of exceptions" 
Therefore, although an AGP existed in the WTO, it suffered from limited scope, limited 
applicability (because of the number of signatories) and many exceptions. It was this, 
which created the incentive for the Commission to seek to develop a multilateral 
Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement (ATGP). However, in 
COM(l999)331, the Commission was not specific about the work to be undertaken in 
this Group. It noted that the AGP needed to be modernized and made more attractive 
but acknowledged that this transparency Group was only one of three dealing with 
procurement issues, all of which were important in order to achieve the necessary 
liberalisation. The mandate to the Commission for the negotiations set out more 
comprehensive! y what this particular Group should achieve; a multilateral agreement 
with a wide scope covering both goods and services and all levels of government. 
The Group's 1999 report to the General Council shows a lack of agreement on even the 
most basic principles in the same way as the trade and investment case study (detailed 
earlier in the Chapter). 141 At this stage, then, it appeared that concrete policy 
recommendations were a long way off. This was also in spite of ongoing work in APEC 
on government procurement, which could have acted as a push towards a multilateral 
agreement. 142 Although APEC noted that acceptance of their principles "should not and 
will not prejudice the WTO discussions on GP nor the positions taken by member 
economies in the WTO" and even though only a 'best endeavour' initiative, it could be 
141 Minutes circulated on 12th October (WTIWGTGP/3), on the basis of the Group's meetings on 24-5th 
February, 28th June and 6th October. The contested basic principles were: the definition of transparency; 
the definition of government procurement; clauses on exceptions, concessions, flexibility and transitional 
periods; bidding mechanisms; scope and methodology of providing information on national legislation 
and procedures; bribery and corruption; interface between government procurement disputes and the 
WTO DSU, and, the need for, and methods of, appropriate technical assistance. 
142 2"" September 1999, the APEC Govermnent Procurement Experts Group issued their 'Non Binding 
Principles on Government Procurement' (accessed through 
http://www.apec.org/contentlapec/apec groups/committees/committee on trade/government procurement/resources/overview.htm 
1 on 31st October 2005 
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anticipated that the APEC members in WTO may have been supportive of the 
Commission's efforts to develop an agreement. 
As if to show that this might be the case, the report of the Group's meeting in October 
1999 highlighted that the Commission was not alone in wanting an agreement in this 
area; the US was also particularly keen on progress.143 As further emphasis, the 
Commission, the US, Australia and Japan all submitted proposed Agreement texts- the 
US saying this was because of the level of agreement in the Group. Lest they be lulled 
into a false sense of security that this might be more easily achieved than agreements on 
the other Singapore Issues, eleven countries said that these drafts exceeded the Group's 
mandate as the 'study phase' had not been completed and general principles remained 
undefined. 144 In spite of this, the Chairman backed the Commission, arguing that if 
some members wished to actively pursue an agreement at Seattle, informal meetings 
could be held in order to develop a draft Agreement. 145 The TABD meeting in Berlin 
later in October was also supportive, hoping that the US and BC would be able to 
"achieve adoption of a universally subscribed A TGP". Furthermore, the CEO Report of 
the meeting commented that it was TABD, which claimed credit for this initiative in the 
first place. 146 The WTO Director General was also firmly behind these efforts, in a way 
that was not evident in the previous case studies. A statement made by Mike Moore to 
the General Council read; "decisions in Seattle to move to (an) agreement ... would be a 
modest start albeit with a profound message". 147 A more explicit message came from 
APEC too; that it would "make efforts to reach agreement on transparency in 
government procurement at Seattle" which might have assured that the APEC members 
backed the achievement of this common goal in Working Group meetings.148 
143 Meeting on 6"' October 1999 Minutes circulated as WT/WGTGP/M/9 
144 Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and 
Turkey 
145 Although how this could get mass support was not made clear. 
146 
'Doing Business in Berlin' November 1999 at http://www.comorateeurope.org/tabd/berlinbusiness.html accessed 
on 21" July 2005 
147 on 3'• November (paper circulated as WT/GC/29 
148 as reported by New Zealand in the General Council Special Session of 23'• September 1999, minutes 
circulated as WT/GC/M/49 
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Once again, the Commission and the Contact Group appeared to be in broad agreement. 
The ESF forwarded a position paper for the Millennium Round, seeking a wider 
agreement on public procurement with any agreement on transparency as only a first 
step; perhaps not the best thing to advocate ifthere was any discontent within the 
Working Group at all. 149 The Commission also submitted a paper to the Working Group 
very much in line with ESF's view. 150 In tones, which must have worried their 
detractors, the Commission noted that although the Group's mandate covered 
transparency only, procurement distortions meant a wider scope to the discussion was 
necessary. The attachment is again written as an agreement, in spite of criticisms raised 
at the previous meeting about exceeding the Group's mandate, although it appears not 
to have been officially circulated at Seattle. 
There were very few texts on government procurement submitted to the Seattle 
Ministerial and those that were, were extremely positive again suggesting that this 
might be a political push towards agreement. 151 The Commission submitted two papers 
for Seattle; 'The EC Approach to Government Procurement' which said that the 
Ministerial should "endorse the results ... (already achieved) and- if necessary-
mandate the WTO to ... complete the work ... within a given timeframe" and the 'EC 
Approach to Possible Decisions in Seattle', which seemed to backtrack from the 
previous paper, no longer anticipating a possible formal agreement in Seattle and 
instead advocating "taking the time to get the elements right". 152 Either the Commission 
accepted that agreement was inevitable, and thus a delay didn't matter, or they realised 
that agreement wasn't as likely an outcome as they had previously anticipated. 
149 in the 'ESF Declaration of the European Service Industries for the Third WTO Ministerial Conference 
towards the Millennium Round' of 25th October 1999 at htto·//www.esf.belpdf.<;/documents/position papers/seattle.pdf 
accessed 12th March 2005 
150 5th November 1999 on 'Elements for an Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement' 
(WT/WGTGP/W/26) 
151 The US- WT/GC/W/289 of 4th August, Venezuela- WT/GC/W/305 of 13th August 1999, Hungary, 
Korea, Singapore and the US- WT/GC/W/385 of 9th November 1999 
152 
'EC Approach to Government Procurement' circulated as WT/GC/WI192 dated!" Juue 1999, 'EC 
Approach to Possible Decisions in Seattle' circulated as WT/GC/W/232 dated 6th July 1999 
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Although it was in the mandate for the Commission to pursue, the European Parliament 
in their 'Resolution on The EU Approach to the Millennium Round CO M (I 999)331 ', 
failed to mention anything about transparency in Government procurement so did not 
seem to see it as a priority issue. 153 Problems in obtaining a supportive external 
consensus are signified by the four choices for possible progress presented to members 
in Seattle as outlined in the Draft Declaration.154 Paragraph 44 says that "negotiations 
shall (italics mine) take place to conclude an agreement", for possible adoption at the 
Fourth Session. Paragraph 58 offers two options but these are variations on the idea that 
the group should continue its work with a view to developing negotiation modalities. 
Paragraph 76, meanwhile, says that Ministers "adopt the agreement ... attached". The 
WTO' s own briefing notes, reveal a distinct lack of appreciation of the absence of 
consensus within the Working Group. The wording highlighted that there was a great 
deal of commonality even though questions remained on ''the scope of the transactions 
that would be covered ... the treatment of single tendering practices ... domestic review or 
challenge procedures and the applicability of WTO procedures for settling disputes 
between governments". 155 However, as has already been shown in the previous case 
studies, there was no agreement in the Singapore Issues group set up at Seattle to pursue 
negotiations in any of the areas and, as the meeting failed, work simply continued as 
before. 156 
At the Group's next meeting in June, the Commission seemed to backtrack from the 
level of certainty it had previously expressed and set out very specifically what it 
wanted from an agreement. 157 Regarding 'definition and scope', it thought an 
agreement should cover all levels of government, purchasing by state-owned 
enterprises, both goods and services and that there should be a minimum threshold level 
below which transparency would not apply. 158 On 'procurement opportunities, 
153 Meeting 18th November 1999 'Resolution on the EU Approach to the Millennium Round' from EU 
Bulletin 11-99 at h<m://eurora.eu inUabc/doc/off/bulllen/991\/pl 05017.h1m accessed 15th October 2005 
154 As before, this can be found at at httn://www.ictsd.org'Enalish!Declaration3.pdf 
155 
at http://www.wto.org/eno-Jishlthewto elminist e/min99 e/english/about e/17proc e.htm accessed on 24th October 
2005 
156 In addition, transparency in govermnent procurement was seemingly not thought very important by 
the ICTSD as none of the BRIDGES Daily Updates of the Ministerial mention it at all. The Seattle 
section from which all BRIDGES Updates from each day of the Ministerial can be accessed is at 
http://www.ictsd.or"/ministerial/seattle!index.htm accessed 15th March 2006 
157 Meeting of 7th June 2000 minutes circulated as WT/WGTGP/M/10 
158 Some of these issues had not been included in COM(l999)331 or in the mandate, suggesting that the 
Commission's views were evolving internally 
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tendering and qualification procedure', it reconunended that the agreement give general 
principles about how much information was needed on procurement tenders and where 
this information should be sited. Finally, on 'time periods', the Conunission suggested 
that this should depend on the nature of the procurement and on other information that 
companies might need, such as why their bid was not successful and applicable laws 
and regulations.159 At the September meeting, the US conunented that APEC already 
acknowledged the principle of domestic review of procedures as imperative to ensuring 
transparency. 160 This prompted the Conunission to ask one of the main objectors, 
Malaysia, how it had assumed the transparency requirements demanded by APEC if it 
did not support what was proposed in the WTO. In response, Malaysia revealed that 
countries were "more relaxed" about APEC requirements as they were not binding and 
only required best effort. Therefore, not only was it proving difficult to achieve a 
supportive external consensus but also APEC was not providing as much of a 'push' 
towards agreement as might have been thought. 
At the first meeting of the Group in 2001, India said that because of coordination 
difficulties, an Agreement should be limited to goods procured by "central or federal 
govenunent departments" and services should be outside the scope. 161 This was 
practically the polar opposite to the Conunission's stated position. To add to the impact 
of this threat to agreement in Do ha, Malaysia later conunented that it would be "unable 
to agree to anything on government procurement in the Qatar negotiating agenda".162 
This gives further evidence that the external consensus was fragmented in spite ofUS-
EC agreement. 163 The state of the internal consensus was also unclear because when the 
Council of Ministers issued their conclusions on 'The latest state of preparations for the 
WTO Ministerial Conference' they said nothing specific about transparency in 
government procurement, except if it can be considered to come under the general 
159 As in the trade and competition case study. 
160 Meeting held 25th September 2000 (WT/WGTGP/M/11 
161Meeting held 4th May 2001 (WT/WGTGP/M/12) 
162 Malaysia's view was shared by 16 island economies, (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Fiji Islands, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Maldives, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, St 
Kilts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands and Trinidad and Tobago) in 
their paper of 6th August 200 I, submitted to the General Council in the context of preparations for Doha 
(paper circulated as WT/GC/W/441, 'Issues of concern to small economies' 
163 4'h May 2001 (WT/WGTGP/M/12) 
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heading of"strengthening the rules" on trade. 164 Perhaps they appreciated there was 
little chance of achieving explicit consensus, or that there were more important issues to 
try to achieve. 
The Commission must also have been concerned when, at the last meeting of the 
General Council before the Do ha Ministerial, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction 
expressed with the draft declaration. 165 Tanzania, for the LDC Group, went so far as 
saying there was "no basis" for seeking negotiations in this area. A number of other 
countries also spoke out against pursuing negotiations. 166 Before Doha, the TABD 
expressed their continuing support and welcomed the "concordance" of the EC and US 
on this issue.167 However, TABD made it clear that they saw this as a step towards 
"market access ... based on MFN and national treatment principles ... covering all 
eligible areas" rather than as a standalone agreement in its own right. If the developing 
countries suspected that agreeing to open negotiations on transparency in government 
procurement would eventually lead to requests for open access to markets, it seems 
highly unlikely that they would have supported any forward movement at all. 
According to the WTO's website, there were no papers specifically on goverurnent 
procurement submitted to the Doha Ministerial. Section 26 of the Do ha Declaration said 
that work would continue to achieve an agreement within the Working Group. 168 The 
text made clear, however, that any agreement would only be concerned with 
transparency and not market access, shutting the door to any widening of the agenda on 
the part of the Commission. The meeting concluded "we agree that negotiations will 
take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a 
decision to be taken, by explicit consensus ... on modalities of negotiations", exactly the 
same wording as for the two other case studies. 
164 at their meeting on 29~" and 30m October 200 I (from the EU Bulletin 10-200 I at 
httn://europa.eu.int/ahc/doc/off!hull/en/200110/pl06030.htm accessed 1st November 2005 
165 Meeting held 31" October and 1" November 2001 (minutes referenced as WT/GC!M/7 
166 Also Brunei Darussalam, Egypt, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Uganda 
167T ABD meeting in Brussels on November 16fu (CEO Report at 
http://static.tabd.com/gems/2001 DCBrusselsCEOReport.pdf accessed 2nd November 2005 
168 Doha text assessed at http://www.wto.om/enolish/thewto e/minist e/minOI e'mindecl e.htm on 25th October 2005 
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In their report of the Doha meeting, the Commission seemed to be putting a very 
positive spin on the outcome of the work on transparency in government procurement 
and said negotiations would start after the Canc(m Ministerial. 169 Perhaps, as in trade 
and competition, they were expecting to be able to get an agreement on the general 
principles, which might be enough to ensure the opening of negotiations. This wish 
became clearer at the next substantive meeting of the Group where the position of the 
Commission along with Canada and the US was that any outstanding issues could only 
be dealt with in the context of a negotiation, rather than as part of the ongoing study 
process. 170 
Following a comment by the Commission (that agreeing the fundamentals would 
"provide the Group with a springboard to move on to the next stage"), India expressed 
its horror of the "threat" that the Commission was expecting to use an agreement in this 
area to further rules on market access and remarked that this would impact negatively 
on support received for this initiative from the developing countries. The Commission 
clarified that it was simply suggesting that the work done by the group this year could 
feed into the next year's work, and confirmed that it supported the current mandate 
including the scope limited to transparency. 171 The last substantive meeting of the 
Group in 2002 saw the Commission leading discussions in this area.172 It, along with 
Australia, Japan and Switzerland, thought that the time was now ripe to decide what 
transparency requirements should be built into an agreement. Failure to do this, they 
argued, risked Ministers being unable to agree the modalities at Canc(m. The 
Commission accepted, however, that, to achieve this, further efforts needed to be made 
to develop a consensus on the key principles. Egypt suggested that this would not be 
easy considering that there was still no agreement on "definition and scope, 
procurement methods, time-periods, domestic review procedures and the application of 
(the DSU)". 173 
169 EU Bulletin of November 2001 at http;//www.europa.eu.iot/abc/doc/offtbull/en/2001!1/pl06028.htm accessed 31st 
October 2005 
170 Meeting on 29th May 2002. Minutes circulated as WT/WGTGP!M/14 
171 Whereas COM(l999)331 stated that the Commission did want to move on from a transparency 
agreement to include market access and national treatment 
172 Meeting on lOth and IIth October. Minutes circulated as WT/WGTGP/M/15 
173 This was also supported by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and the Philippines. 
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In terms of domestic review procedures, the Commission thought that there should be 
an independent ']udicial or ... administrative" body but that implementation of these 
administrative requirements should not be prescriptive. In addition, there should be an 
enquiry point in every country to provide information about relevant rules and 
regulations -this was supported primarily by Brazil, Korea and Switzerland. Pakistan 
disagreed, commenting that because of the wide variety of government departments 
involved, it would be difficult to achieve. This is similar to the argument about 
coordination expressed by India and shows that discussion was not moving fast. In 
addition, the Commission supported the association of this agreement to the DSU in 
order that there might be common interpretations of the policy requirements. Once 
again this highlighted the North South cleavage in the debate and the danger of this 
being the "deal breaker", as Pakistan later commented. 174 
There was a general view from the 'Southern countries', at the first meeting of the 
Group in 2003, that the Agreement ought to be confined to goods only. 175 This was 
disputed by the Commission, the US and Chinese Taipei, arguing that the rules 
governing both types of procurement were similar if not identical. The Commission set 
out some specifics on the level of independence of the review body and the review and 
challenge procedures, even though it did not expand on SDT provisions. 176• Malaysia, 
once again, warned that 'explicit consensus' would not be given at Canciln; "domestic 
review procedures and application of the DSU had nothing to do with transparency and 
were therefore outside the scope of a transparency agreement". This position was 
supported by Egypt, India and Pakistan. In later discussion about the DSU, the 
Commission said that transparency and procurement rules were closely aligned and had 
to be dealt with together (which was different to what had been agreed at the Doha 
Ministerial). Furthermore, the Commission argued that if enforcement provisions were 
not developed, the Agreement would be seen as "merely a general list of requirements". 
This seems to ignore the situation that there was no 'Agreement' at all, and that if the 
Ministerial outcome had made it clear that the agreement should focus on transparency, 
174 The Commission view was supported by Chinese Taipei, Hungary, Japan, Switzerland and the US but 
not by Egypt, India, Malaysia and Pakistan (along with China and Nigeria). 
175 Meeting held 7th February (WT/WGTGP!M/17) The 'Southern countries' in this scenario are 
Malaysia, Venezuela, India, Pakistan, and Egypt 
176 Paper of 3rd February on 'Domestic Review Mechanisms related to transparency in government 
procurement' (WT/WGTGP/W/39) 
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then the Commission's argument about needing further procurement rules (at least rules 
that needed to be discussed within this group) did not hold water. 
Perhaps aware of the problems with the transparency issue, the Commission submitted 
a further paper on the 'Positive Effects of Transparency in Government Procurement 
and Its Implementation' to the final meeting of the Group before Cancl!n commenting 
that the meeting, ''would be the last step of the Working Group's study phase and ... on 
the next occasion, following the Cancun Ministerial Conference, Members would have 
a negotiating mandate" .177 This seems remarkably assured, although with dubious 
foundation, which was again pointed out by Malaysia (which had, after all, already said 
at a previous meeting that it would not give its approval for this in Cancl!n). Perhaps the 
statement more reflected the Commission's anxiety that decisions might be postponed 
in Cancl!n. Later in the meeting, the Commission said that it expected this agreement to 
apply equally to central, federal, regional and local tiers of government much to India's 
consternation. In addition, the Commission wanted the agreement to apply to all 
procurements above a certain threshold rather than procurements above a certain 
threshold and open to foreign bidders, as Malaysia had previously sought. 178 There 
were also issues raised about costs, especially as "The representative of Malaysia stated 
that the European Communities tied the provision of technical assistance to an eventual 
agreement on transparency in government procurement or to the demonstration of a 
readiness to negotiate", perhaps seeking agreement by slightly shady means, very close 
to BEUC's previous suggestion on competition. 
The Group's Annual Report to the General Council of2003 seems to have been written 
in order to achieve a general agreement on the principle of an Agreement, i.e. in order 
to encourage a low level 'explicit consensus'. 179 The report says that the majority of 
_________ members felt that the benefits of transparency were incontestable, although the way to 
achieve this transparency was the subject of significant argument, proposing that 
opening negotiations would be the best way to address this cleavage. It could be 
construed from the WTO's briefing notes for the Cancl!n Ministerial, that it would be 
177 Paper on the 'Positive Effects of Transparency in Government Procurement and Its Implementation' 
(WT/WGTGP/W/41). Meeting held on 18th June 2003. Minutes circulated as WT/WGTGP/M/18. 
178 Rather going against the statement that they would not "seek to limit countries' ability to decide which 
procurement opportunities would be open to foreign bidding". 
179 Report dated 15th July 2003, referenced WT/WGTGP/7 
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possible to gain explicit consensus solely on the basis of whether members recognised 
that the work area was important. 180 However, the Report highlighted that it would be 
difficult for countries to give 'explicit consensus' if they had no idea what the eventual 
agreement might look like, which made it difficult to estimate costs, furthermore the 
level of divergence of views in any areas made a commitment to negotiation difficult. 
In spite of the problems with the external consensus, the Commission was supported 
internally by UNICE, whose brochure on the Doha Development Agenda seemed to 
mirror the Commission's own position, as well as the ESF, even though other Contact 
Group members did not express their views on this issue.!81 UNICE's rationale did not 
disguise European self-interest commenting on the value of the market as well as the 
advantages European companies would have if they could compete on a global level for 
contracts. In spite of this influential support, once again, in the Council of Ministers' 
conclusions on the preparation of the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, transparency 
in government procurement is not mentioned. This seems almost an acknowledgement 
that explicit consensus would not be forthcoming at CancUn. 
180 Briefing notes accessed at htln:f/www.wto.org/englishlthewto elminist elmin03 e/brief e/brieffi9 e.htm on 25th 
October 2005 
181 UNICE's brochure entitled 'Cancun. Moving Forward Together', (at 
http://www un;ce.or•ll!FFEJDNHAKNHAHFEKJNJ!DMHMPDB69DP6WN9L17!KMIUNICE/docs/DLS/2003-023\6-EN pdf 
accessed on 1st November 2005. ESF Press Statement of3'd September 2003 'European Services 
Businesses Call Upon All WTO Members to ensure success in Cancun' at 
http :1/www. esf.belpdf<;/documentsfpress releases/ES P't(,20Press%20Statement%20on%20Canc! m%20final.odf accessed I st 
November 2005 and others. BEUC's view, for example, was that transparency in govermnent 
procurement was not a priority. Although they advocated unbundling the Singapore Issues, doing away 
with investment negotiations and continuing to work urgently on competition policy, they did not make 
any suggestions as to how to proceed with these govermnent procurement negotiations 
(BEUC/X/028/2003, 30th June 2003, 'BEUC Priorities for Cancun' at 
http·//docshare.beuc.org/4/P JHBKPCDAKAMOKBHM1CJLMHLPDB69DWJ A69DW3571 KM/BEUC/docs}DLS/2003-0!533-
~, BEUC/X/032/2003, lOth July 2003 'A Consumer's Agenda for Cancun WTO Ministerial 
Conference' at 
~ ~ ~ http://docshare.beuc.orFI3/PJHBKPCDAKAMOKBHM1CJLMHLPDB69DW!2W9DW3571 KM/BEUC/docs!DLS/2003-0 I 558-
0\-E.pdfand, in addition, BEUC/X/047/2003, 3rd November 2003, 'WTO Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
After Cancun. Preliminary Views' at 
http://docshare. beuc.ore'SIP JHBKPCDAKAMOKBHMLCJLMHLPDB69DPNA W9DW3571 KM/BE\JC/docs/DLS/2003-02638-
~.) Similarly Eurochambres, in it's position paper of2003, 'The WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancun 10-14 September 2003' at 
http://www.eurochamhres.be/PDF/pdf trade/Global%20Chambef'l;{,20Platfonn%20PP%20Cancun.pdfalso failed to mention 
anything about transparency in government procurement. This is the same as the FTA in its 'FTA 
Position on the 5'' Ministerial Meeting in Cancun' of July 2003 at http·/lwww.fta-
eu.org/doc/unp/opinion/en/fta pos cancun en.pdfand even CIDSE (and Caritas Internationalis) in their 'Global 
Trade at the Service of Human Development. A Position Paper on the Occasion of the 5'' WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico 10-14 September 2003' (undated) at 
http://www.cafod org.uk/archive/policy/CIDSE Cl Cancun Paner pdf simply says that none of the Singapore Issues 
should be progressed, rather than making TGP significant. (all papers accessed 8th May 2006) 
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The draft Ministerial text was discussed at the last meeting of General Council prior to 
Canclin where concerns were raised that countries with a negative opinion on TGP had 
not been invited to assist in drafting the relevant wording. 182 The Philippines concluded 
that the only alternative to dropping the issue was to continue the educative work in the 
Group. This theme was continued in the August paper from Bangladesh for the LDC 
Group and fifteen other countries, as for the previous two case studies, which 
highlighted the outstanding issues needing resolution and concluded that the 
educational process had to continue in order to address the outstanding areas of 
dissent. 183 This added weight to Malaysia's position that "explicit consensus" would not 
be forthcoming in Canclin, even on the base principles of an agreement. According to 
the WTO, there were no other papers specifically on this matter circulated for the 
Canclin Ministeria1. 184 
Although the declaration from Canclin did not contain a reference to negotiations in the 
area of transparency in government procurement, paragraph 17 of the Derbez Draft said 
that Ministers agreed to "commence negotiations on the basis of the modalities set out 
in Annex D to this document". 185 Annex D confirms that this agreement would only 
deal with transparency so domestic preferences could still be exercised. In addition, as 
the developing country members had wanted, "any coverage of the agreement beyond 
goods and central government entities is not prejudged". There would be thresholds, 
below which value the agreement would not apply, no commitment to refer to the DSU 
and an assurance that it would not, in any case, be used to challenge individual 
contracts. The Annex also refrained from prescribing any structure for the domestic 
review mechanisms. In addition, development priorities would be considered and SDT 
would include transitional periods and higher thresholds. There was also an 
acknowledgement that technical assistance and capacity building would be necessary 
both during and after the negotiations. Although this paragraph confirmed negotiations 
182 Meeting on 25m, 26th and 30th August (minutes circulated as WT/GC/M/82, accessed z•d November 
2005 
183 WT/GC/W /514 of zgth August from Bangladesh (on behalf of the LDC Group), Botswana, China, 
Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, Venezuela, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe entitled 'Paragraphs 13,14,15 and 16, Dealing with Singapore Issues of the Draft 
Cancun Ministerial Text contained in JOB(03)!150/REV 1'. Areas of dissent included definitions, scope 
and coverage, methods and procedures of procurement, domestic review, recourse to the DSU and 
development issues. 
184 Inane-mail dated 13lh February 2006 
185 Presented to the Conference on 13th September 2003Sourced at 
http://www.wto org/englishlthewto e/minist e/min03 eldraft decl rev2 e.htm accessed 12th August 2005, as before 
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would be launched, which would obviously not be popular, the content of the proposed 
Agreement seemed to be a better reflection as to the needs and wants of the Group. 
Nevertheless, 'explicit consensus' was not reached. 
The ESF's 'Daily News' from Cancun is instructive here, primarily because they note 
on 12'h September that "Transparency on Public Procurement (sic) seem(s) not to have 
raised much controversy", although on the final day of the meeting, the African Union 
would not accept negotiations opening on any of the Singapore Issues, even though 
investment and competition had both been dropped.186 
At the first General Council meeting after Cancun, there was still discussion as to 
whether an agreement in transparency in government procurement could be salvaged. 
187 The minutes show that "Members would continue to explore the possibilities of 
agreements on a multilateral approach on ... transparency in govermnent procurement 
and that this work would take place at the level of the General Council". However, 
there are no records of any subsequent meetings of the Transparency in Government 
Procurement working group, or any working papers, or any notes, suggesting that the 
differences that had persisted since the Singapore Ministerial eventually proved 
insurmountable and that the Commission had failed to achieve consensus on the way 
forward. 
The Singapore Issues as a Package 
The Commission's plan (to negotiate all the Singapore Issues as part of the Single 
Undertaking, as a package) stayed the same through Seattle to Cancun, even though, as 
has been shown, there was no evidence to suggest that an 'explicit consensus' on all of 
them, or indeed any of them, was going to be easily achieved. In order to counteract 
this, at least with the groups on Trade and Competition and Transparency in 
Govermnent Procurement, the Commission appeared to try and achieve explicit 
consensus on a very basic 'do you want it or don't you' level. Although this had the 
advantage that it ignored the need for Working Group agreement on every aspect that 
might potentially have been covered in a negotiation, it seems to have ignored the spirit 
186 at www.hkcsi.org.hk/reports/cancun/09Daily ESF Newsletter 1-6.doc accessed 7th May 2006 
187 on 15th and 16th December 2003 (minutes circulated as WT/GC/M/84) 
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of 'explicit consensus' as well as the need for agreed negotiating modalities. In 
addition, the complaint from countries about costs and the insistence on SDT also 
seems to have been ignored. 
Even in 2003 the Commission was still convinced that the 'package deal' approach 
would pay off. It circulated a paper to the WTO General Council in February, which 
opened with the statement that "The Singapore Issues, which until the WTO Fifth 
Ministerial are in the stage of "clarification", but for which negotiations will commence 
after Canctin, are a key element of the DDA and part and parcel of the Single 
Undertaking".188 It suggested that flexibility should be paramount although noted that 
care needed to be taken to ensure negotiations would begin on all four Singapore Issues. 
Further to this, both Lamy and Fischler produced a note for the March meeting of the 
College in which they confirmed that launching negotiations on the Singapore Issues 
was a priority. 189 Although they acknowledged that it had not proved easy to get 
members on board, they hoped countries would see the merits of progress although how 
they would do this, when they had not already done so, is not addressed. On 30'h June 
(perhaps realising the impossibility of achieving 'explicit consensus') the BEUC, in 
their 'Priorities for Cancun' paper, said, for perhaps the first time, that the Singapore 
Issues should be unbundled and efforts to reach agreement to open investment 
negotiations should be abandoned. 190 As the Council of Ministers had not mentioned 
any of the Singapore Issues in their note on the preparation of the Cancun Ministerial, it 
appears that they might already have understood that negotiations would not begin. 
188 Circulated on 27th February 2003 (as WT/GC/W/491) on 'Singapore Issues- The Question of 
Modalities' 
189 (SEC(2003)317) on March 19th 2003 entitled 'Information sur les progress des negociations de 
l 'OMC concernant l 'agenda de developpement de Doha' (at 
httn:/lwww.tradeobservatoN.orgt1ibrary.cfm?refiD=25878 accessed on 26th October 2005 
190 BEUC Priorities For Cancun 'BEUC!X/028/2003 of 30th June, 
http://www.beuc.org/1/GNKLGFDBFDNPKDDGAFOffiDNNPDB69DW1 A69DW3571 KM/BE\ IC/docs/DLS/2003-01533.0 1· 
E.pdf as before 
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A rejoinder to the Commission's February paper to General Council was circulated on 
gth July from twelve countries. 191 This opens by saying that negotiations should not be 
considered inevitable after Canctm and the idea of 'explicit consensus' should not be 
ignored. They also argued that the Singapore Issues should be unbundled, to be 
considered on their own merits, and more focus given to SDT provisions.192 In case 
there might be any doubt that the developing countries would not go along with an 
'explicit consensus', CAFOD pointed out "since the beginning of June 2003, seventy-
seven developing countries (including over half of the WTO's developing country 
members) have said they do not want negotiations on the Singapore Issues to be agreed 
in Canctm". 193 The ESF daily news from Canctm makes interesting reading on the 
progress of the Singapore Issues through the Ministerial. 194 First they note that more 
countries, particularly from Latin America, were beginning to support negotiations 
being opened on all of them. However, because agreement was not unanimous, the 
mandate was eventually changed on the final day allowing the Commission to drop 
trade and investment and trade and competition. Ultimately, however, this was not 
enough as there was still no agreement on pursuing negotiations on the other two issues. 
The European Council had asked the Commission, in October 2003, to see whether the 
negotiating strategy should be changed in order to make more progress with the 
DDA. 195 In their response a month later, the Connnission made a proposal that they 
could be removed from the single undertaking and/or negotiated separately, suggesting 
that their view was gradually evolving; this also fitted in with BEUC's position 
(although they wanted to lose the investment negotiations).196 However, this was not 
191 WT/GC!W/501 entitled 'Comments on the EC Communication on the modalitiesfor the Singapore 
Issues' from Bangladesh, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Venezuela, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe 
192 This also fits with the 'G77 and China's Declaration on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference' dated 
22nd August 2003 sourced at httn://www.g77 org'doc/docs/FinalG77Decl-22auo-5thWTO.pdf accessed on 13th May 
2007. This suggests that the developing countries were not unanimously against the Singapore Issues in 
principle, rather the problems that such countries faced in beginning negotiations. 
193 Aligned with CIDSE, one of the Commission's Social Partners, hence mentioned here. Webpage 
'Singapore Issues in the WTO: What do developing countries say?' Details where and sometimes what 
was said by a number of developing countries. Sourced from 
http://www.cafod.om.uklarchive/policy/singapore200307t4.shtmt accessed on 7th May 2006 
194 ESF Daily News from CancUn at www.hkcsi.org.hk/reports/canrun/09Daily ESF Newsletter l-6.doc 
195 From EU Bulletin 10-2003 at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/ofJ'Ibull/en/2003!0/il 021.htm accessed on 15th October 
2005. 
196 
'Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the EP on Reviving the DDA negotiations 
-the EU perspective', adopted on 26" November 2003, from the EU Bulletin 11-2003 at 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/dne/off/bull/en/200311/pl06022.htm accessed on 15th October 2005). BEUC's paper on 
'WTO Multilateral trade negotiations after Cancun - Preliminary Views' circulated on 3'd November 
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wholeheartedly agreed by the Social Partners. In their letter to Pascal Lamy on 1 '' 
December, Eurochambres regretted the problems being experienced with the Singapore 
Issues and reiterated its position that they should be negotiated under the Single 
Undertaking. However, they agreed to accept plurilateral agreements in one or more of 
the areas so as to ease the blockage on negotiations. 197 This was also supported by ESF, 
which argued that a plurilateral solution might be found for investment and competition 
even though they preferred the idea of pursuing these within the Single Undertaking.198 
The Commission revealed that they would, finally, unbundle the Singapore Issues at the 
General Council meeting in December 2003.199 The proviso was that "the Do ha 
mandate stood in its entirety", progress was wanted "on all Singapore Issues" and they 
were, "in any event, part of the work programme". What this meant in practice seemed 
to be that they would be unbundled but, apart from that, nothing had changed even 
though the chances of obtaining an 'explicit consensus' on any was still unlikely. The 
US also expressed support for unbundling commenting that efforts shouldn't be made to 
agree on four before one was agreed. 200 However, as the Commission appeared not to 
want to change the substance of the Singapore Issues, neither were other countries 
prepared to budge from their positions. African trade ministers meeting in Kigali, 
Rwanda on 27th and 28th May 2004 issued a statement on the WTO post-Cancun 
making it clear that that they would not support any future negotiations on investment, 
competition or transparency in government procurement.201 That there were no further 
meetings of any of the Working Groups it can be assumed that, even with unbundling, 
the Commission was still unable to put together a supportive consensus in the WTO. 
2003 as BEUC/X/04 7/2003 sourced at 
http://www.beuc.oW1/DCHHAHICPKMJPLDNPN!ODNINPDB69DPNA W9DW3571 KM/BEUC/docs/DLS/2003-02638-D!-
ful<!f accessed on 15th March 2005 
197 Entitled 'Eurochambres post-Cancim reflections on EU trade policy' at 
http://www.eurochambres.be/PDF/pdf trade/letter to Lamy final.pdf accessed 15th March 2005 
198 
'New ESF Priorities for the DDA' 5ili November 2003 at 
http://www. esf. be/pdfs/ documents/position papers/ESF%20N ew%20 Priorities%20fot'&20the%20 DD A. pd f accessed 15th 
March2005 
199 Meeting 15th- 16th December 2003. Minutes circulated as WT/GC/M/84 
20° From the Statement by Ambassador Linnet Deily to the WTO General Council meeting on December 
15th 2003 reproduced at http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2003/1217Deily.pdf accessed 13th May 2007 
201 From TWN Jnfo Service on WTO Issues 31" May 2004 'African ministerial meeting on WTO 
welcome dropping three Singapore Issues from work programme' at 
http://www.twnside.org.sgltit!e2/twninfot t5.htm accessed 15th May 2007 
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Conclusions 
In the Trade and Investment Working Group, it would appear that the Commission tried 
hard to ignore the level of contestation; this was such that even the definitions were not 
agreed to all participants' satisfaction. The Commission did not help to achieve a 
supportive consensus even within the Group by failing to make solid SDT provisions, 
which might have brought the developing countries on-side. The Commission might 
also have done well to play down the interlinkages between trade and investment and 
other policy areas, making it seem as if going ahead with negotiations would be a huge 
burden. What made it worse was that there was an acknowledged lack of funds to give 
developing countries support. Furthermore, although there appeared to be a supportive 
internal consensus, with Council and Parliament broadly agreeing on the priorities, 
there was notably no push from APEC or even wholesale Quad buy in, which might 
have helped to facilitate external agreement. 202 There was also no obvious push from 
the WTO itself. Even with the level of contestation evident from the Working Group, 
the Commission's mandate was not changed to reflect the different circumstances. 
With the Trade and Competition negotiations, the Commission again seemed to try to 
ignore the level of contestation in the Working Group even though the evidence shows 
that the scope of the Agreement continued to be debated. The Commission similarly 
failed to develop SDT provisions so did not encourage developing countries to come on 
side. They possibly even caused more friction within the Group by highlighting the 
complexity of the interlinkages with other policy areas and then failing to identifY 
measures to simplifY or explain them (supported by interviewees 1 and 4). There was 
longstanding debate as to the extent and nature of the legal and physical infrastructure 
required prior to signature. Although the Commission seemed to change its mind on 
this, there was still general confusion as to the prerequisites for each policy issue and 
how the costs would be met, bearing in mind the lack of technical assistance money as 
stated in the previous case. In spite of the fact that APEC had been doing similar work 
in this area, not only did this not act as a push on the WTO but also the US did not want 
an agreement in the WTO so did not try to bring the dissenters in the Working Group 
into line. Internally, the consensus appeared relatively supportive although, in the same 
202 Only Japan appeared to be extremely supportive of the Commission's efforts 
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way as in the previous case study, perhaps not wholly energised to support the 
Commission. The fragmented nature of the external consensus, though, could not be 
overcome. 
In the Agreement on Transparency in Govermnent Procurement, again even the basic 
definitions of the scope remained contested from the period before Seattle to Canc(m 
and afterwards. However, in this case, the Commission was supported externally by the 
US, Japan and a very positive APEC. The Chairman of the Working Group also 
allowed informal meetings to take place prior to Seattle with the aim of achieving 
agreement and this was supported by the WTO Secretariat. Perhaps the Commission 
realised that an agreement on transparency wasn't wide enough hence hoping, until 
Do ha discounted it, for the agreement to also cover market access and procurement at 
every tier of government be that national, federal, regional or local. Disagreements 
made it clear there would be no 'explicit consensus' to begin negotiations. Even the 
influential support of the US and Japan could not override the general concerns. In 
addition, support from the Council of Ministers and Parliament seemed muted on this 
issue over this period. 
The cases here are, perhaps with the short term exception of the Transparency in 
Government Procurement Working Group, very similar. The evidence from this 
Chapter has shown politicization had percolated through into the sectoral negotiations. 
There may be a number of reasons for this. The first is that progress had not been made 
in agriculture to the satisfaction of all WTO members (supported by interviewees 8 and 
10). At the last meeting of the General Council before Canc\m, Brazil made the 
comment that "unless there was clear, comprehensive progress on agriculture ... 
members might run some risks at Cancl.m", and the FTA pointed out that there needed 
to be significant progress on both agriculture and textiles, suggesting that the Singapore 
Issues may have been hostages to fortune.203 Secondly, the positions of the developing 
countries, although in no way identical, strongly suggested that they would not be 
prepared to give their agreement to open negotiations in any new areas, and this is 
evident from the tables of preferences in the previous chapter. Thirdly, there seemed to 
203From the minutes of the General Council meeting 24th and 25th July 2003 (Minutes circulated as 
WT/GC/M/81) 
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have been very few opportunities for the Commission to exercise policy leadership in 
. the WTO and expect the other members to go along with what they proposed. Even in 
the 'Transparency in Government Procurement' Group, where there was strong support 
from the rest of the Quad, this did not facilitate eventual agreement. 
The Commission consensus appears to have been supportive over the duration; the 
Competition Commissioner was later to remark that it was "a disappointment" when 
Cancim failed. 204 However, although Lamy seems to have been enthusiastic about 
pursuing the Singapore Issues, the Council of Ministers may have acknowledged before 
the Commission that 'explicit consensus' would not be forthcoming at Cancim and so 
(even though they appeared generally supportive) failed to mention it in their key 
preparatory document. If this was the case, it does not seem unreasonable to expect that 
they might have changed the Commission's mandate so as to unbundle the Singapore 
Issues prior to Cancun (suggested too by interviewee 6). It is also of interest that where 
some members of the Commission's Contact Group had expressed reservations about 
the Commission line that was being taken for Doha or, especially, Cancun, these 
seemed to be ignored. This suggests that the Group was used by the Commission when 
it was supportive but ignored when it was not. Furthermore, some of the proposals (like 
the BEUC' s suggestion that EC technical assistance should be given on the basis of 
market opening) were highly politicized and could have had an impact on the 
negotiating atmosphere were this picked up on by the negotiating partners. As it was, 
the preferences of the external interests were fragmented on each of the Singapore 
Issues meaning that there could be no supportive consensus; explicit or otherwise. 
The lack of success evident here could be related to the Commission failing to grasp the 
right combination of its different roles and responsibilities. It could also be that the 
nature of the interests that the Commission has to satisfy has evolved yet the 
Commission's response has not been recast to reflect this. This will be explored in the 
following Chapter where the evidence from Chapters Six and Seven will be analysed. A 
comparison between this time period and that ofLeon Brittan's (from Chapters Three, 
Four and Five) will then be made in the concluding Chapter Nine. 
204 From a speech by Mario Monti, the Competition Commissioner, on 'EU Competition Policy after May 
2004' to the Fordham Annual Conference on International Anti-Trust Law and Policy in New York on 
October 24th 2003 at http://www.eurunion.ocginewsisrcechesi2003/031024mm.htm accessed 9th April2008 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The European Commission in the WTO from Seattle to Cancun -
Evaluation 
Introduction 
It has been shown in the preceding Chapters that there are a number of problems 
confronted by the Commission in exercising its roles and responsibilities effectively in 
external trade. Consensus is demanded at all levels in order for policy initiatives to 
proceed through the Commission internally then Council and, finally, within the WTO 
both in the more high political ministerial processes and the technocratic sectoral 
negotiations. At the end of Chapter One, and in Chapter Two, we anticipated that the 
extent to which the Commission was able to make progress would depend upon the 
level of agency that it is given by Council; the room for manoeuvre it has to ensure 
trade offs and the level of politicization surrounding each issue. Progress was also 
thought to be dependent upon the Commission's ability to align the preferences of the 
diverse interests and to innovate and act as policy entrepreneur in order to respond to 
these challenges in the context of politicization and change. 
In the same way that Chapters Three and Four were structured, Chapters Six and Seven 
focused on the Ministerial process and then the Working Group negotiations in order to 
detail discussions in the WTO from 1999 to 2003. These chapters showed evidence of 
the increasingly politicized environment and the difficulties of putting together a 
supportive consensus. In Chapter Six the level of fragmentation of preferences within 
the Ministerial process was demonstrated through the tables outlining the positions of 
the LDCs, G20 and the Quad. Chapter Seven went into detail about the mechanics of 
sectoral negotiations by assessing the progress of three case studies: Trade and 
investment; Trade and competition and the Agreement on Transparency in Government 
Procurement. These chapters showed how politicization had increased both at 
Ministerial level and had percolated through to the Working Group level. In addition 
there was more scope for defection within Working Groups because the principle of 
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'explicit consensus' meant that each member could give a view as to whether 
negotiations began or not. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to .look further at the empirical evidence from the 
previous two Chapters of the evolving nature of the Commission's roles and 
responsibilities and the extent to which they were supported or modified by the 
constellation of interests centred on internal Commission dynamics, the member states 
and the WTO. The Chapter will consider this by, firstly, looking at the roles and 
responsibilities of the Commission over this time period and, secondly, at how the 
evolution of key interests impacted upon their exercise of these roles and 
responsibilities. 
Overview 
There has been a strong element in these Chapters of path dependency, which can be 
shown by Lamy continuing to base his position on Leon Brittan's 'Communication to 
the Council and European Parliament on the EU Approach to the Millennium Round' 
(COM(1999)331 ), rather than developing a different draft, which might have been more 
closely allied with his own views. This could have been a pragmatic approach, 
considering that decisions were being made about the Seattle Ministerial immediately 
after Lamy gained the portfolio. In this sense, it may have made more sense to Lamy to 
concern himself with interpreting the ways and means of achieving the objectives, 
rather than redefining the objectives themselves. What is not clear, though, is why 
Lamy continued to use COM(l999)331 as a basis for the Commission position after 
Seattle; not just for the Do ha meeting but also for Canclill and appeared to make no 
effort to encourage the Council to change the Commission's mandate even when it 
appeared evident that 'explicit consensus' would not be forthcoming. 
It may have been the case that because there was a fragmented internal consensus on 
the thorny questions of agriculture, trade-labour and trade-environment, there was no 
political will in the Commission or in Council to attempt a revision. This might also 
explain why, in spite of clear evidence in Chapter Seven that there was merit in 
suggesting that each Singapore Issue should be considered individually, or that 'softer' 
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agreements should be sought, there was no effort made by the Commission to do this 
prior to Cancful. 
The fragmented internal consensus, and the arrival back on the agenda of agriculture, 
might also be blamed for the level of direct criticism that Lamy attracted on his 
approach to agricultural policy making by Council, by the Contact Group and third 
countries and on his efforts to put in place a working group on biotechnology in the 
WTO (by Council and environmental groups). Indirect criticism arose from the 
Commission's stance in the three working groups detailed in Chapter Seven (by the 
Parliament, third countries and some members of the Contact Group) and there were 
also questions raised on the Commission's philosophy on labour standards (by Council 
and Parliament, for different reasons) and on the EBA initiative (from European 
farmers). Whether this meant that the negotiating environment was very different from 
Brittan's tenure as Trade Commissioner, and whether this encouraged Lamy to attempt 
less during his time as a result, perhaps with implications for future Trade 
Commissioners, will be discussed in Chapter Nine. 
As before in Chapter Five, it must be noted that the purpose here is not to suggest the 
Commission fulfilled one of its roles and responsibilities and none of the others. The 
Commission has aspects of all of these within its external trade portfolio, as Chapter 
One made clear. The purpose is to see which was the dominant mode of activity and to 
what effect and extent the Commission was able to achieve its aims, or the aims of its 
mandate, in so doing. 
Roles and responsibilities 
Commission as expert 
In spite of conflict between the Council and the Commission (in the examples given 
above), politicisation, personality changes and more players to consider in the field, 
there is no evidence of' claw back' of Commission competence on the part of the 
Council. There was also no evidence of a concerted effort by the member states, or by 
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the interests, to actively change Commission policy in external trade either in the 
Ministerial process or in the sectoral negotiations. This is partly because of the 
fragmented nature of opposition, as was suggested earlier. It is an example of the 
Commission's technocratic approach that COM(l999)331 was the basis for the mandate 
(even though Lamy' s arrival meant that this could have been revisited). Therefore, 
although the competence issue may not have been fully resolved, with some areas still 
officially falling under 'mixed competence' after the Nice Treaty of 26th February 2001, 
the Council remained dependent on the Commission's expertise to develop policy 
proposals and to elaborate the ways and means to carry them out. 
The EBA initiative is another good example of the Commission acting as an expert as it 
brought about an hitherto unexpected role in that Lamy was able to input into 
agricultural decision making, something that even Brittan had been unable to achieve 
although he had tried to seek agreement for it.1 The EBA had an additional use, as a 
'carrot' to encourage acceptance of negotiations on the Singapore Issues by the 
developing countries, except that this proved unsuccessful. What is particularly 
important here is that the internal (Commission) view was more firmly cemented than 
before, particularly as those holding the agriculture and trade portfolios had 
traditionally been seen as rivals. 
The Commission also used its position as expert, after Seattle, to inaugurate the DG 
Trade-Civil Society Dialogue. This would provide another authoritative aspect to the 
Commission's position by allowing it to cite other supporters of a particular viewpoint, 
and thus increase its negotiating credibility. However, as the Commission appeared to 
practically ignore the Contact Group if members stood against their position (for 
example, when the FTA and Eurochambres said plurilateral agreements on trade and 
·----··- ...... competition would stand a greater chance of success) it would appear that this was an 
exercise primarily to benefit the Commission rather than being a policy development 
forum. This can be at least partly explained by the fragmented consensus in the Contact 
Group; for example with trade and investment where negotiations were wanted by FTA 
1 G de Jonquieres Financial Times 2•' October 1999, page 6, 'Brussels may consider more open farm 
trade' 
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and UNICE but not CID SE or BEUC. Nevertheless, the Commission had the authority 
and the expertise to enable it to put this group together and to encourage engagement 
with the trade portfolio. 
The Commission's 'expert' status was not, however, without its detractors. Internally, 
Parliament wanted labour standards to be pursued even though the Commission made 
clear in COM(l999)331 that there was "no realistic prospect of consensus for the 
establishment of a working group within the WTO". Because of Parliament's informal 
position in determining trade policy, even after the resignation of the previous 
Commission, the Commission was able to continue without taking account of these 
concerns. Externally, the Commission attracted criticism from WTO members by its 
insistence, within a February 2003 paper to the WTO General Council that negotiations 
would begin for all the Singapore Issues after Canctm. Twelve countries responded that 
this was by no means inevitable; and considering there had to be 'explicit consensus' 
which was not even achieved in the Working Groups on some of the basic principles, it 
seemed unlikely that this could be a realistic expectation unless 'package deals' could 
be put together or the nature of the agreements sought changed to become plurilateral 
or, at least, unbundled. 
The example above seems to show that although Lamy did not favour the technocratic 
approach in Ministerials he did use it in Working Groups. This could be because the 
more political process in the Ministerials meant that there could be more trade-offs, 
which would facilitate agreement- one reason for the relative success of the Doha 
Ministerial (interviewees 2, 6, 9 & 1 0). Although the developing countries did not seem 
to accept agenda setting by the developed countries where this was not in their interest, 
within the Ministerials, it may have been felt that by the Commission adopting a 
position of 'expert', countries might be persuaded into explicit consensus. There is 
evidence for this in the number of papers circulated by the Commission to each 
Working Group in an effort to encourage agreement. 
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Unfortunately, for the Commission, its 'expert' stance in the Working Groups, and its 
insistence on continuing to advocate negotiations beginning on 'the package' of 
Singapore Issues, was entirely unsuccessful. This may have been due to path 
dependency in terms of demonstrating a staunch belief in 'the way things are done' but, 
if so, it backfired. Given the difference in nature of these negotiations, in terms of them 
coming under the Single Undertaking, and that they were being developed at the same 
time as agricultural negotiations were taking place, this should not have been a surprise. 
The technocratic approach, then, was definitely showing its limitations up to Canctin 
given the politicization of trade negotiations in the WTO. 
Commission as Government 
Because of what was going on in the EC, and globally, it might be expected that the 
Council would concentrate on the more political issues and leave the Commission to 
demonstrate its capacity for policy leadership in the WTO, almost like a defacto 
government. In terms of 'high politics', the early years of the 21 ''Century were 
characterised by the invasions oflraq and Afghanistan and terrorist bombings in the 
USA, and of foreign targets e1sewhere.2 Internally, the Euro was fully introduced in 
January 2002, with progress towards this taking up much Council time, and a great deal 
of effort continued to be put into the enlargement project.3 
As noted in the first Chapter, and in Chapter Six, that the Commission sat at the table 
with representatives of Heads of States in WTO Ministerials and Working Groups is 
indicative of its quasi-governmental status. In addition, its work to build bridges with 
the US in a critical bilateral Washington meeting in July 2001 primarily concerned with 
trade and competition and again in August 2003 on agriculture showed how important it 
was as a player on the global stage, even if it could not use the outcomes to build a 
supportive coalition. There is some further evidence that the Commission was able to 
2 Most notably the atrocity of September IIth 2001, where aeroplanes were flown into New York's World 
Trade Center towers, which caused 2,986 fatalities. An example of the bombing offoreign targets is, the 
Bali nightclub bombing of October 12th 2002, where 202 people were killed and 209 injured 
3 BBC Business News Wednesday 2"d January 2002 'Euro cash switch hailed a success'at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/llhi/business/1736938.stm accessed 1Oth March 2008 
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act quasi-governmentally in certain areas, particularly in the sectoral negotiations 
encompassed by the Singapore Issues, where it continued to push for a specific outcome 
in spite of significant opposition from other parties. However, the Commission appears 
to have been impeded from making any substantial progress by a failure on the part of 
the Council to seriously address the demands for significant agricultural reform so, to 
some extent, the Singapore Issues were held hostage pending such concessions, which 
were not forthcoming. Although the Commission was, then, able to act as a 
'govermnent' in the area of the Singapore Issues, it was reduced to being an 
'administrator' in agriculture- unable to make headway because of the position of the 
Council and the strictures of the mandate allowing it little flexibility and/or the ability 
to be a policy entrepreneur.4 
There is not much evidence that Lamy was able to count on the overt support of the 
Quad and G7/8 or APEC as Brittan was. Although APEC agreements seemed to 
shadow much of the work being done on the Singapore Issues, this did not mean that 
their agreements would translate to the legally binding nature of the WTO and, as such, 
would not stop defection by its members against the Commission view (perhaps, most 
notably, by Malaysia). Similarly, the OECD lobbied for EBA but did not seem to have a 
profound effect on getting this principle accepted by other WTO members. It is 
important to note, though, that the Commission's governmental status, within the Quad 
was not challenged. That the Commission was not always successful in getting the 
Quad 'on side' in negotiations, and thus using them to help build a supportive coalition 
in favour of an initiative, cannot detract from their visibility as a player in that forum. 
Although the Commission was able to function in these governmental and quasi-
governmental ways, this did not mean that the Council was necessarily being 
permissive. The Council was content with putting the key elements of what it wanted in 
the mandate based, as has been shown, on COM(l999)331, and then allowing the 
Commission to decide on the ways and means to achieve the objectives set out within it. 
Because the Council acquiesced to the Commission operating in this manner, this tends 
4 Although this was Fischler's and not Lamy's responsibility. It was clear that Agenda 2000, as it had 
been painful for Member States to negotiate, was not going to be changed quickly. 
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to cast doubt on the idea that the Commission has been "ever more constrained" by its 
mandate (Nicola'idis and Meunier, 1999:498). 
The Commission was, however, thwarted in its efforts to be 'governmental' in the area 
oflabour standards, in the same way as it was not allowed to be an 'expert' either. 
Lamy seemed to have been left behind by Canada's proposal in Seattle (see Chapter 
Seven), which expounded on the merits of setting up a Committee on Globalisation 
with representation from the ILO, WTO, UNCTAD, UNEP and IMF, amongst others. 
Perhaps this showed an element of path dependency as, at the time following the line 
set out in COM(l999)331, the Commission was still looking at a 'Standing Working 
Forum' between the WTO and the ILO instead of a more wide-ranging body. The EC 
position changed on 21 ''March when it agreed that it might be prepared to be more 
flexible on trade-labour issues and eventually moved to echo Canadian opinion on 24'h 
July. At this point it was impossible for the Commission to be seen as leading this 
policy area. One might argue that this vision of the Commission as a leader is a 
prerequisite to seeing it as 'governmental' within external trade. 
Commission as Administrator 
It has already been pointed out that the Commission was acting more like an 
administrator in that it had very little agency with regard to agricultural issues. Lamy 
had authority in agricultural policy only through EBA, and had to simply convey the 
messages given to him by Council to the Ministerials due to the insistence on Agenda 
2000 being the 'front line' of Council's position. Although the bilateral meeting on 
agriculture with the US might have suggested more of an ability to iunovate, as the 
multifunctionality aspect was still upheld, the meeting seems to have echoed existing 
Council views and, in any case, did not attract a supportive consensus because either it 
was too radical or too tame (Losch, 2004: 336).5 Lack of progress in agriculture had the 
effect oflogjamming negotiations as insufficient flexibilities were built into the 
5 Also shown by the Commission's information brochure on 'EU Agriculture and the WTO. Doha 
Development Agenda Canct\n - September 2003' at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculturetextemallwto!backgroutcancun en.pdf accessed 21st April 2008 
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mandate. Furthermore, because of a lack of political will for reform due to domestic 
pressures (France, for example), change was seen by Council as less desirable than 
maintaining the status quo. Domestic pressures also seem to have affected Portugal's 
view of the textile wording in the Doha Declaration, which might have given rise to 
greater concern on the part of the developing countries, for whom textiles were such an 
important product. Agriculture was, at least partly, to blame for the breakdown of talks 
in Seattle and for the emergence of the G20 at Canctrn. 
Lamy was also unable to encourage any weakening of the cultural imperative as no 
audio visual issues were discussed over this time period; perhaps he did not want to be 
active in this area anyway considering what he had said to the Parliament at his 
Hearing. Before Doha, implementation issues had also delayed forward progress on the 
Singapore Issues. Parliament had tried to use the Commission as an administrator, 
which was suggestive of them exerting the authority within the structure as expected 
since being instrumental in the demise of the previous Commission. They asked the 
Commission to facilitate a discussion between them and the WTO Director-General on 
how to "prevent procedural or organisational shortcomings from hampering ... political 
discussions" within the WTO although this was clearly not in Parliament's remit. 
There is no evidence here to suggest that the Commission let significant issues 
disappear, in an effort to evade their mandate, except perhaps for trade environment 
linkages, which seemed to become much less important as time moved on and 
trade/labour, although, as was said earlier, their stance entirely reflected 
COM(1999)33 I even if much of Council, and Lamy at the beginning of his tenure, 
seemed to want more than this. Furthermore, a shortage of money for technical 
assistance given through the WTO meant that although, in a number of cases, the 
Commission could say what it thought necessary for each country in terms of 
infrastructure, it had no way to ensure that financial support would be forthcoming. 
This gave a much more administrative orientation to the Commission's roles and 
responsibilities in such discussions in Working Group meetings. This lack of money 
was difficult given the level of support necessary because of the interlinkages between 
the Singapore Issues and other policy areas, which suggested that a high level of 
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financial assistance would prove necessary at the implementation, even if not at the 
signing stage. 
There did not appear to be any reduction in the perception of the Commission's 
authority by its partners in Europe or in the WTO because of its lack of agency in these 
areas. It seems highly unlikely that countries would have changed their views on the 
Singapore Issues, or on labour standards, if Council had been sitting at the table rather 
than the Commission. The lines to distinguish where the Commission was acting as a 
'government' and where it was acting as an 'administrator' are often blurred because 
the level of agency that the Commission possesses can change over time and different 
individuals have different perspectives. Although, then, the Commission may have been 
acting as an administrator in agriculture, it is unlikely that other countries around the 
table altered their perceptions of the Commission in response. 
In sum, there is little evidence of the Commission being more confined to its role as an 
'administrator' or that it was becoming more administrative over time. In agriculture, 
though, it had very little room for manoeuvre because of the lack of agency it was 
given. Within the politicized enviromnents of the Ministerials and Working Groups 
there often seemed little the Commission could do to exert any influence on what was 
going on in the different forums. This is not because they were acting in an 
administrative capacity, rather that they could not take any particular stance to 
encourage agreement in terms of acting as an expert, working in a quasi-governmental 
way or building a supportive coalition. This is shown by the number of factors, which 
contributed to the failure of Seattle and to Cancful, in which only a small part was 
played by the Commission. It suggests that path dependence meant the Commission 
was almost reduced to an observer; seeing that its methodology did not work but unable 
to do anything about it. 
278 
Commission as coalition builder 
The Commission's lack of success in achieving what it wanted here through coalition 
building could be because of the wider issue of politicization of the negotiating process 
both within the Ministerials and the Working Groups. This is shown by the 
dissatisfaction on the part of many developing countries with 'traditional' agenda 
setting processes and with the Green Rooms, particularly post-Seattle. This was not 
helped by the mass public demonstrations on the streets. Dymond and Hart (2000:32) 
remark that although demonstrations did not kill the Seattle meeting directly, indirectly 
they did make "politicians skittish ... of publicly supporting a new round of negotiations" 
and this could go some way towards explaining the failure of Seattle to launch a 
Millennium Round. This shows further evidence of path dependency, this time on the 
part of the WTO, by continuing with plans for Seattle regardless of the deep-seated 
problems evident in Geneva that had not been resolved. The developing countries were 
also unenthusiastic about negotiations being opened in new areas and this is clear from 
the tables of preferences. It is highly unlikely, given this view, that negotiations on the 
Singapore Issues would have launched in Cancun, even with a supportive consensus 
evident in the Working Groups, as many countries would not have given 'explicit 
consensus' to further expand the WTO's agenda under the Single Undertaking. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out before, there seemed to be a relatively supportive internal 
consensus over the time period excepting in agriculture and labour standards. In 
Chapter Seven, the Commission's position of negotiating the Singapore Issues as a 
single package remained unchallenged by member states. Even after Cancun, Council 
seemed content to wait for the Commission's suggestions about how to push 
negotiations forward. As well as Council consensus, the Commission consensus also 
. seemed extremely supportive with the traditional antipathy between the Agriculture and 
the Trade Directorates put aside in an effort to obtain a positive outcome for them both; 
at least once the transition periods had been extended in the EBA. Indeed, Franz 
Fischler and Pascal Lamy appeared to be working closely together both in the run up to, 
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and follow on from, Can coo. 6 However, Lamy' s efforts to build a supportive coalition 
in Council to revisit the decision made in COM( 1999)331 on labour standards proved 
unsuccessful in spite of his contention that this would assure the European publics that 
the WTO continued to be "relevant". Apart from, perhaps, the Singapore Issues (which 
seemed to be eventually almost ignored by Council) the mandate remained unchanged 
and there was no defection from the agreed position by Commission or Council. 
Externally, efforts to build coalitions were much less successful. First, there were 
continuing problems with agriculture, in that the same tensions emerged as in the 
Uruguay Round with the Commission on one side and the Cairns Group on the other.7 
As for the Singapore Issues, particularly trade and investment and competition, the US 
did not agree with the line that the Commission was pursuing. This disagreement 
manifested in the undignified jostling for position in Seattle with each trying to attract 
support for their individual drafts. This was not helped by the lack of a consensus 
Declaration text from Mike Moore. Perhaps it was the case that the WTO leadership 
was "inept" (Dymond and Hart, 2000: 22) due to the amount of effort put in to resolve 
the leadership question. This would help to explain why there had been no effort to 
produce even a discussion paper setting out the main areas of dissent and suggesting 
ways to resolve, or at least work through, them. However, because of the other 
contentious issues that were raised in Seattle a consensus agricultural draft may not 
have saved the Ministerial from failure. With the Singapore Issues, the Commission 
6 Particularly clear in Lamy's presentation to the EP plenary meeting on 'The European Approach to the 
WTO Agriculture Negotiations' on 1Oth February 2003, where he outlined the modalities for the 
agricultural talks in the absence ofFischler (at 
htm://ec.europa.eulcomm/archives/commission 1999 2004/lamy/speeches articles/splal52 en htm ), Franz Fischler 
commenting at Cancun, "! regret that it was impossible to reach consensus on the Singapore Issues" 
(from the South Centre Bulletin 64/65, 'Cancun a 'political shock' to the European Union' at 
http://www.soutbcentre org/info/southbulletin!buiietin64-65/bulletin%1064-65-I l.htm ) and both of them commenting on 
the results of an independent French stndy on the openness of the EC market to farm product imports, 
which included consideration of products from third countries, developing countries and the LDCs from 
Europaworld 1st September 2003 (at, hnp://europaworld.org/week138/studyshows1803.htm, full report at http://trade-
info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2003/july/trndoc ll3490.pdf, both accessed 15th March 2006) 
7 However the US was less able to play a major role in this because of the passing of the 2002 Farm Bill. 
As was noted at the time, the $1 Obn aid package that President Bush was putting together, "would not be 
enough to offset the damage inflicted on Africa's small farmers" considering the value of the domestic 
bill was·$!90bn in subsidies particularly for "wheat, corn, cotton and other basic crops" (from an article 
in the LA Times by W Vieth, May 27th, 2002 "USA- Farm Bill will export misery to Africa' sourced at 
http://www.cornwatch.org/article.php?id=2615 ) 
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appeared to change its mind as to the nature of 'explicit consensus' and tended towards 
gaining agreement on the bare principles hoping that would be enough, which it was 
not. 
Even post-Seattle, though, attempts to 'sell' the Singapore Issues to the developing 
countries, even when emphasizing the possibility of developing plurilateral not 
multilateral agreements (a good example of their policy entrepreneurship), proved 
unsuccessful. In the main, this was because of a lack of a suitable agricultural 'trade 
off giving little incentive for other countries to accept additional items on the agenda 
(supported by interviewees 2, 6, 9 & 10 as above). Once again, this emphasizes the 
importance of the internal consensus and the need for the Commission's positions to be 
supported by Council; this almost repeats points made in the Kennedy Round of GATT 
(supported by interviews 6 & 9). 
Interests 
As defined in Chapter One, there are three general 'interests' that have a bearing on the 
Commission's roles and responsibilities in external trade. These are the internal 
Commission interest, the internal Council of Ministers interest and the global (WTO) 
interest: All of these interests can act individually or together to influence the 
Commission. In addition, none are unitary actors so there are often conflicts within as 
well as between them. The other important factor to note is that their positions are not 
stable and can change over time and in response to different issues. 
The Commission interest 
In the mid-term review of the Prodi Commission in 2002, it was noted that "the most 
important achievement of this Commission on the trade front to date was its pivotal role 
in launching the Doha Development Agenda at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
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November". 8 This had been after "two years of pace-setting since Seattle" (ibid) thus 
suggesting the Commission interest was allied towards achieving this aim. The review 
notes that internal and external agreement on the EBA initiative had been achieved, 
along with successful completion of the Cotonou Agreement.9 Indicative of the 
Commission as a "multi-organisation" (Cram, 1999: 49), the Cotonou Agreement is 
heralded as a success in both Development and Trade policy areas, suggesting that there 
was overlap between the two DGs, with regard to developing countries. 
Problems with structure exacerbate policy problems. It was noted by the European 
NGO Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD) in their Strategic Plan 
in December 2004 that, "consistency between the various EU policies that affect 
developing countries (development, trade, migration, external relations, etc) remains no 
more than a pious hope".10 Although, when Romano Prodi became President, there had 
been efforts to rationalize portfolios, in particular by combining the Humanitarian and 
Development portfolios into one; this did not have a positive effect in the trade field. 11 
For example, Lamy and Poul Neilson both had responsibility for ACP- Neilson for 
"EU relations" and Lamy for "trade policy" although Lamy would also be expected to 
"draw on the appropriate geographical services of the other external relations services" 
as well. 12 This would be unlikely to help with policy coherence. 
8 4th June 2002, 'Closing the gap between rhetoric and reality' at 
http·//europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEM0/02/124&fonnat=HTML&aged=O&language=en&guiLanguag 
Fen accessed 5lh May 2006 
9 The Cotonon Agreement governs relationships between the ACP countries and the EC. It was signed on 
. 23'4 June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin. Sourced from the Introduction to the Cotonou Agreement by DG 
Development at 
http:/ I ec. europa euldevelopment/geographicaVcotonouintro en. cfm ?CFID= 3 5077 &CFTO KEN""4 5fdae22a0c68 87 4-F4 B7 5 829-
EfLO.C8DJ.JI70A9869CBDIC30&jsessionid~2430ed82aed53d6c5a5d accessed IIth March 2008. This agreement 
replaced the Lome Agreement, which ran from 1975-2000. The Cotonou Agreement expires in 2020. 
10 Sourced from www.bond.org.uk/pubs!eu/concplan.doc accessed 5th May 2006 
11 i.e. replacing the portfolio division between Bonino (Humanitarian aid) and Pinhero (Development) by 
Neilson 
12 EUROSTEP is another NGO network on European development cooperation. Its paper on the July 
1999 restructuring was sourced from http://eurostep.antenna.nLidetail pub.phtml?page==pubs position coherence rescom 
accessed on 5th May 2006 
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Perhaps this lack of appreciation of the two policy areas persuaded Lamy that he would 
be able to make headway on the Singapore Issues, even though the Commission 
persistently came up against the developing countries' refusal to negotiate. Looking at 
this from a development rather than a trade perspective, it has been shown that there 
were significant overlaps between what Lamy was asking for, and other areas of the 
economy, which highlighted the importance of considering this development aspect. 
Nowhere was this emphasized to a greater extent than with Malaysia's comments on the 
proposed trade and investment agreement, which was said to require the pre-existence 
of "political stability, macroeconomic stability, a sound regulatory framework, 
including protection of intellectual property rights, the provision of incentives, joint 
research and development and investment in human resources ... " making it difficult for 
most if not all developing countries to be able to participate. This lack of coherence 
may also have been reflected in Lamy's lack of appreciation for the need to develop 
specific SDT provisions for the Singapore Issues; going beyond transitional periods. 
However, in spite of vehement objectors like Malaysia, Lamy did not radically alter his 
. viewpoint on the Singapore Issues; the internal consensus was thus strong enough to 
withstand such 'shocks' and to maintain the course that Brittan had set in 
COM(l999)331, a further example of path dependency. Perhaps this problematic 
explains why CAFOD, for one, blamed the failure of Cancun on the Singapore Issues, 
whereas Pascal Lamy did not. 13 
It has already been noted that Lamy worked very closely with Fischler both in EBA and 
at Canclin. EBA allowed duty free access to the Single Market for practically all goods 
from the least developed countries with the exception of rice, bananas and sugar, for 
which duty would be gradually phased out (following internal Commission discussions 
13 CAFOD's paper in 'The WTO. The Role of the EU post-Cancun' Submission to the European Union 
Conunittee, House of Lords (UK) Subconunittee A (Economic and Financial Affairs, Trade and External 
Relations) January 2004 accessed via the link from 
http:!/www.cafod.om.uklpolicy and analysis/oublic nolicy papers/trade/eu and wto post cancun on 15th May 2006. 
Lamy seemed to be at pains not to blame anything specific for the failure of Cancun and, indeed, failed to 
mention the Singapore Issues as a factor at all in his speech to the European Institute in Washington of 4th 
November 2003 'Trade Crisis' (at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapidlpressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/03/514&fonnat=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLangu 
age=fr on 15th May 2006 
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the latest phase-out of September 2009 for rice).14 As Fischler was concerned that EBA 
would "derail" any efforts to drop rice and sugar subsidies, which Spain and Portugal 
would not support, he asked for the longer phase-out period. 15 Because EBA gave 
Lamy the opportunity to input into agricultural policymaking it was likely he was happy 
with this arrangement; as he told the Oxford Farming Conference about the WTO, "I 
share responsibilities with Franz Fischler on the agricultural side". 16 The Agriculture 
and Trade Commissioners also worked together in the lead up to, and aftermath of the 
Canc!ln Ministerial holding a joint press conference prior to its launch and at a further 
conference at the end of the Ministerial, alongside Romano Prodi. For example, on the 
G20's proposal for the abolition of export subsidies, they commented it was, given the 
difficulties that the Council had in agreeing any agricultural line, in a "space odyssey" 
and "asking for the moon". 17 Immediately after the failed Canciin Ministerial, Fischler 
expressed his disappointment that the Singapore Issues weren't progressed, as Lamy 
pointed out that "An agreement on agriculture was within reach". 18 
Although this meant there was a supportive internal consensus within the Commission 
for achieving the goals, this did not help in encouraging a consensus on a revised 
agricultural policy in Council, nor did it (or could it) encourage consensus in the WTO 
on the Singapore Issues. 
14 From the European Commission's Generalised System of Preferences 'Everything But Arms Initiative' 
at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global!gsp/eba/index en.htm accessed 12th March 2008 
15 P Chap man, European Voice 11th January 200 1 'F ischler turns up heat on Lamy over trade deal for 
poor nations' at http://www.europeanvoice.com/archive/article asp?id-12306 accessed 12th March 2008 
16 From Pascal Lamy's speech to the Oxford Fanning Conference on 4th January 2001 'Special Treatment 
for Agriculture. The Way Ahead' at 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission 1999 2004!lamy/speeches atticles/spla44 en.htm accessed 12th March 2008. 
17 Space Odyssey quote from Deutsche Welle of 7th September 2003 'EU Moots Lowering (Some) Trade 
Barriers' at h!W:I/www dw-world.deldwlarticle!O 964094 00 html accessed 12th March 2008. 'Asking for the moon' 
quote from 'The Hindu Business Line' Thursday September 11th 2003 'Agriculture holds key to success 
at Canctin' by G Srinivasan at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2003/09!11/stories/20030911 02600100.htm accessed 
12th March 2008. Also found in the Guardian of Friday September 5th 2003 'EU Farm Chief Slams Poor 
Nations' Demands' A Osborn and L Elliott at http:llwww.r;mardian.co.ulduk/2003/seo/05/world.poJitics accessed 
12th March 2008 
18 Statements after Canct\n by Lamy and Fischler. From the press conference closing the World Trade 
Organisation's 5th Ministerial Conference in Canct\n, 14 September 2003. News Release 57/03 at 
http://www.eurunion.org/newsfpress!2003/2003057.htm accessed 12th March 2008 
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The member state interest 
The sense of deja-vu must have been palpable when the same problems that had 
emerged in Council before the Uruguay Round came up again here, essentially the 
cultural issue and agriculture. The debacle on the biotechnology working group at 
Seattle may have showed, as one commentator put it, "the risks of shifting more 
negotiating power to the European Commission in the field of foreign economic policy" 
but Council did not change the Commission's mandate as a result nor did it appear to 
seek to 'clawback' any authority from the Commission.19 Even though the Seattle 
Ministerial failed, this still did not prompt a revisit of the targets set for the 
negotiations, although it seems clear from the tables of preferences that the developing 
countries would be highly unlikely to agree to open negotiations on the Singapore 
Issues - certainly not as a package. 
Do ha, though, seemed to bring a hearty measure of optimism- there was, after all, an 
agreement to a wide-ranging development Round- perhaps Council believed that the 
good intentions set out in that agenda would be achievable, in spite of ongoing debates 
on agriculture and the insistence on 'explicit consensus' prior to negotiations opening 
on the Singapore Issues. At Canciln, however, it was shown that substantive 
disagreements remained on agriculture, particularly as the Cairns Group and the G20 
were pushing for further liberalisation, and additional efforts were necessary if that 
meeting was not to end in failure.20 It is important to note that although there had been 
an effort to make some changes to European agricultural policy prior to Cancun, these 
were insufficient for the G20 making it difficult to move forward.21 
19 From the 'Cmporate Europe Observer', Issue 6 April2000 'Intergovernmental Conference 
2000:Business and the Amsterdam Leftovers' at httn://www.comorateeurope.org/observer6/igc.html accessed 12th 
March2008 
20 The Food and Agriculture Organisation also recognised that "agriculture was one of the major 
contentious issues" alongside US cotton subsidies. From 'Overview of Developments in the Doha 
Round' at http://www.fao.ol1:!:1trade/negoc under dda en.asn accessed 12th March 2008 
21 From the Global Trade Negotiations Homepage ofHarvard University' Agriculture Sururnary' at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/agriculture.html accessed 12th March 2008. Also the European 
Movement page on 'The EU and the Doha Round of World Trade Talks' at 
http://www.euromove.org.uk/index php?id=6525 accessed 12th March 2008 
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The main concession made by the Council, through the Article 133 Committee, was to 
drop two of the Singapore Issues (investment and competition) at the final meeting. 22 
However, this agreement to drop two issues was "pending the outcome of the 
negotiations on the rest of the agenda".23 The 133 Committee seemed, then, to be 
demanding that the Commission achieve concessions elsewhere before final agreement 
on the fate of the two Singapore Issues could be reached. In the end this effort at 
reaching consensus was thwarted because, as was mentioned, the African Union refused 
to accept negotiations on the remaining two issues and Korea and Japan refused to 
accept them being unbundled. Although Council may have shared the other delegates' 
"surprise" when the Chair refused to negotiate further on the Singapore Issues, because 
their stance on agriculture would not have been supported by all present, there would 
seem to have been nothing gained by continuing the meeting. 24 
It is important to note that Parliament appeared to become more influential in trade 
policy although it was still not in a position where it could dictate policy positions to the 
Commission. Parliament was not successful in achieving more of a social focus to the 
WTO negotiations; nevertheless it did achieve the convening of a WTO Parliamentary 
Conference. According to Erika Mann, MEP (who wrote about this for the Steering 
Group on the WTO Parliamentary Conference, and who was instrumental in 
Parliamentary discussions), this came about because of what happened at Seattle, at the 
end of which a conference was held with representatives from all the Parliaments 
present.25 There it was agreed to set up a Standing Parliamentary body of the WTO. A 
further conference was arranged in Geneva in 2001, at Doha, in Geneva again in 2003, 
and then at Canclin.26 Lamy was seemingly supportive from the outset, telling 
22 AJ; Lamy put it, in his email updates from Cancun, "drop two and keep two" (reproduced ou the Cercle 
de Cooperation website at www.cercle.lu/article.php3?id articlF353&tpl= accessed 15th May 2006 
23 C Raghavan 'Process and Substance Caused Failure in Canclin' of 161h September 2003 for the Third 
World Network at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/5420a.htm accessed 15th May 2006. 
24 C Raghavan 'Process and Substance Caused Failure in Canclin' of 16th September 2003 for the Third 
World Network at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/5420a.htm., accessed 15th May 2006 
25 See the paper dated 28th August 2003 at www.erikamann.com/scripts/getdata.php3?DOWNLOAD-YES&id=89 
accessed on 15'• May 2006 
26 Also on 24-26 November 2004, and again in December 2005 at Hong Kong. For further information on 
these meetings, and proposals for the future involvement of the European Parliament in the WTO, seeP 
Berg and G Schmitz (2006) 'Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight ofintemational Trade Policies and 
Negotiations: Recent Developments in Canada and Internationally' 9'• February 2006, paper PRB 05-68£ 
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Parliament in January 2000 that "members of Parliament must be more closely involved 
in the deliberations taking place within the WTO in order to strengthen the democratic 
control of this work".27 Perhaps reflecting this new-found role for the European 
Parliament, Lamy also said to them, after Canctin, that the Commission was 
"responsible as negotiators to you and to the Council".28 This suggests that, internally, 
their informal role was more influential than their formal role, and it highlights their 
evolution as an influence in external trade. However, in spite of their growing status 
internally, there is no evidence to suggest that Parliament used this as a means of 
changing the Commission's mandate or modus operandi. 
The WTO interest 
The Seattle Ministerial was to become the most visible example of the failure of the 
coalition building process within the WTO (Danaher and Burbach 2000: 7), specifically 
because "never before had countries come together to start a negotiation and failed to 
do so" (Schott, 2000: 5). The combined impact of the factors given at the end of the 
account in Chapter Six meant that there must have been a general awareness that urgent 
work needed to be done to address the chief concerns of the developing countries or 
risk long-term deadlock. From further evidence in that Chapter it is shown that the 
WTO Secretariat felt the failure of Seattle acutely, and it might be expected that this 
acted as a spur to achieve consensus in the future. Criticism was levied at the WTO 
after Seattle from a number of sources; the BBC, for example, commented that the 
WTO had been inexorably "tamished".29 The Third World Network noted that one of 
the main factors in the failure was "the ineptness, bordering on incompetence, on the 
from the Parliamentary Information and Research Service accessed at 
http://www.parl.gc.calinfonnation!librazy/PRBpubs/prb0568-e.htm on 15th May 2006 
27 From Lamy's report to the European Parliament on 25th January 2000 'What are the options after 
Seattle?) reproduced at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/november/tradoc 120137.pdfaccessed 15th April 
2008 
28 Lamy's presentation (SPEECH/03/429) to the Parliamentary Plenary Session on the Ministerial 
Conference of the WTO in Cancun, held in Strasbourg on 24th September 2003 at 
http://europa.eu/rapidlpressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECHI03/429&fonnat-HTML&aged-O&Ianguage=EN&guilanguage 
=en accessed 151h May 2006 
29 From BBC News Online, R Pigott, 4th September 1999 'WTO tarnished by Seattle Failure' at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/llhi/snecial rnport/1999/ll/99/battle for free trade/549794.stm accessed 15th May 2006 
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part of the secretariat and its Director-General".30 As was noted earlier in this chapter, 
there was no draft declaration circulated by Moore for consideration at that meeting and 
perhaps, after what had happened in the Geneva Ministerial, Moore should have 
realised earlier that without consensus the meeting would be unsuccessfu!.31 
After the Seattle meeting, Charlene Barshefsky, as Chairperson, asked Moore to 
"consult with delegations and discuss creative ways in which we might...( achieve) 
... consensus (and) develop an improved process".32 In early February, Moore reported 
to General Council on a number of bilateral meetings that he had held in order to take 
this forward. 33 However, he did not make a statement on draft texts for the following 
Ministerial until 271h September 2001 suggesting that it had proved difficult for him to 
achieve consensus for negotiations to go ahead. 34 Even though Doha was considered a 
success, in that the Ministerial Declaration stated the intention of developing a wide 
range of work areas, there seemed very little substance behind that intent. Furthermore, 
after Do ha, Moore had to conduct a further PR exercise in order to get work started. 35 
This suggests that the WTO was struggling with a fragmented consensus and could 
achieve little else than what looked like vague promises (interviewee 8). 
3° C Raghavan 'Seattle WTO Ministerial Ends in Failure' at http://www.twnside.orn.scr/title!deb2-cn.htm accessed 
20th September 2006. Perhaps it is instructive that in his speech to the Parliamentary Forum in Seattle, 
Moore commented that, in terms of hiS position as Director-General, he was "1not really a Director, even 
less am I a General. I am, I guess, a navigator, a facilitator and a public servant". (found at 
http://www.wto.org/englishlnews etpres99 e/nrl59 e.htm accessed 19th May 2006) 
31 Moore was to say later (in his 2003 book) that he had only just installed his senior management team at 
the time of Seattle and had not had the opportunity to develop his own draft although, considering he 
knew he was going to take over at that point, it seems a little strange that he wasn't prepared enough to 
hit the ground running. That Moore should have realised this before comes from M Fleshman Africa 
Recovery Vol 13 No 44th December1999 'WTO impasse in Seattle spotlights iniquities of global trading 
system' at httn://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol13no411 wtol.htm accessed 19th May 2006 
32 From his post-Seattle statement of? December 1999 at http://www.wto.org/english!news e/pres99 e/pr160 e.htm 
accessed 19th May 2006 
33 The full text of his statement to General Council on 7th February can be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news elpresOO e/prl66 e.htm accessed 19th May 2006 
34 WTO Press/248 27th September 2001 'Moore praises draft texts, urges Govermnents to move forwards' 
at http://www.wto.org/englishlnews elpresOI elpr248 e.htm accessed 19th May 2006 
35 In his 'informal end of year message' ,(Moore outlines successes of200!, roadmap for 2002') Moore 
cited Zoellick saying Doha had "removed the stain of Seattle" (Press/265, 20th December 2001 at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/presOl e'pr265 e.htm accessed 19th May 2006. PR exercise revealed in 
Press/269 of22 January 2002 'Moore meets ministers, senior officials in Doha follow-up' says, as well as 
Lamy, he met Ministers from Mexico, South Korea, Canada and the U.S. and was plarming to meet 
"senior officials from India, Japan and Pakistan in the coming days" (at 
http://www.wto.org/englishtnews elpres02 e!pr269 e.htm accessed 19th May 2006) 
288 
. ----------------------------------------------------------
Supachai Panitchpakdi of Thailand replaced Moore on 1 ''September 2002, because of 
the term sharing agreement and it remained to be seen whether he would be more 
supportive of the developing countries' agenda within the WTO, and most importantly, 
whether he would be more able to build a supportive consensus amongst members.36 
Supachai clearly exercised personal leadership as, in an effort to reach a resolution on 
the cotton issue at Cancun, he chaired the appropriate Working Group although he, like 
Moore, did not develop a consensus draft for the Ministerial and, ultimately, Cancun 
also ended in failure. There was a question raised as to whether, given his "softly 
softly" approach he might be unable "to engineer the confrontations so often needed to 
break deadlocks". 37 
As well as changing personalities at the top of the WTO, although probably not in 
response to them, the context had become much more politicised, particularly with the 
growing activism of the developing countries and their wish to influence the agenda. 
Warden Bello called the mood of developing countries in Seattle "mutinous" noting that 
many issued strong statements that they would not give their agreement to any 
Declaration if the Green Room process continued. 38 Their attitude remained much the 
same at Doha, with their wish for, and agreement on, 'explicit consensus', before 
negotiations could commence on the Singapore Issues at Canctin. Greenpeace . 
International reported: 
"Several delegations ... flatly stated that they would walk out... without an additional 
... statement from the Chairman ... that these negotiations were not proceeding and 
(would) require a consensus decision in two years to proceed". 
36 As had been agreed in September 1999. 37 
'Softly softly' approach from ABC News (Australia) Wednesday g•h October 2003 'WTO chief risks 
~lame duck' status as talks collapse' at http://www,abc net au/news/stories!2003/10/08/962809.htm accessed 12th 
March 2008. 'Need to engineer confrontations' from T Crampton, International Herald Tribune 
September 10"' 2003 'Low Expectations for Cancun Meeting: Agriculture at the heart of Trade Talks'. at 
http://www.iht.com/articlesi2003109/JOisummit ed3 .php accessed 12th March 2008 
38 From his article in Business World of 6 December 1999 'Debacle in Seattle. A Blow-by-Blow 
Account' found at http://www.tni.org/archives/belloldebacle.htm accessed 20th May 2006 
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CancU!l also heralded the birth of the G20, which, along with the Cairns Group, 
provided a strong front against the perceived lack of agricultural liberalization on the 
part of the EC and other adherents to the 'multifunctionality' argument. 39 
In terms of factors working against a strong WTO line, it is clear that the EC and US 
were not necessarily mutually supportive of each other, as they had been in the past and 
could not encourage other countries to build a consensus position. Rather, there had 
been a number of difficult trade disputes between them in the post-Seattle period (on 
steel, for example) and, in spite of the personal friendship ofZoellick and Lamy, the 
bilateral relationship did not return to that prevailing in the Tokyo and Uruguay 
Rounds, possibly because of the difference of opinion on the need for a wide ranging 
Round (Taylor, 1986, McDonald, 2000).40 
Conclusions 
This time period for the Commission was marked by a supportive internal consensus, 
except in agriculture and labour standards, and a constraining (because it was so 
fragmented) external consensus. Internally, COM(l999)331 formed the basis for the 
Commission's mandate for the Ministerials from Seattle through to Cancl.'m, and Lamy 
did not issue a revised version, or ask Council to change the mandate in any significant 
way, even after the failure of Seattle. In addition, Council seemed content to leave the 
methodology as to how to proceed with negotiations to the Commission, whose position 
remained uncontested by Council either collectively or individually apart from with 
biotechnology at Seattle. Although Parliament became involved to a greater extent in 
the WTO over this period, it did not use its new role (in the Parliamentary Forum), or 
the part it played in the resignation of the previous Commission, as leverage to force 
changes to the mandate. 
39 
'Greenpeace Comments and Annotations on the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration' January 2002 at 
http://archive.greenpeace.orn/earthsummit'docs/Dohafinal.pdf accessed 21st May 2006. ICTSD 'Trade and 
Environment Issues at Canc!ln. Background note June 2003' suggests that the 'Friends of 
Multifunctionality' were Japan and Norway alongside the EC and Switzerland at 
http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/environmentlresourcesrrE-Cancun.pdf accessed 21st April 2008 
40 Information on the steel dispute, starting in March 2002, can be found at 
http://news bbc.co uk/llhi!busine..c;s/3259749.stm accessed 21st April2008 
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In terms of the Ministerials, Seattle is the ultimate example of weak external cohesion 
in that the meeting failed to agree a Declaration or even agree the way forward to 
achieve a consensus. However, even the statements of intent in the Do ha Final 
Declaration were unlikely to be progressed to their fullest extent, given the antipathy of 
the developing countries to negotiating in any new areas and the lack of will on the part 
of Council to change their position on agriculture as substantially as required. Lack of 
progress on agriculture and the lack of 'explicit consensus' on the Singapore Issues 
would together bear a large chunk of the blame for the failure of Cancun This may 
have been compounded by the lack of consensus drafts for Ministerial meetings as well 
as by a lack of meaningful trade-offs being proposed. In addition, although much may 
have been expected from APEC's parallel work, this did not build consensus within the 
WTO and the Quad's preferences were also not aligned through the period showing the 
Commission's quasi-governmental role had not helped to achieve a supportive 
consensus. Therefore, any wish that the Commission may have had to achieve progress 
was limited internally by the entrenchment of agriculture negotiations and because no 
suitable bargains could be put together to encourage wider agreement externally. This 
was the case even though the internal context was generally permissive. 
Although the WTO working groups may have provided a sound basis for Lamy to begin 
plurilateral negotiations on the Singapore Issues, there seemed to be less of a focus for 
· the Commission on arriving at consensus within those Groups, except on the very basic 
modalities for negotiation (which was not achieved either). The insistence on 
negotiating them as a package, under the Single Undertaking, was a disincentive for 
countries which were not prepared to open negotiations on them all. Coalition building 
may have been a more successful approach to take than the 'expert' approach in the 
Working Groups; particularly by focusing on the key elements such as terminology and 
coverage as well as SDT issues. The Commission may have been helped by the WTO 
Secretariat stepping in to try to address problems, as it seemed Mike Moore might try in 
the TGP negotiations, but this was not done and the Groups did not make headway. 
Although the developing countries have been highlighted (see the tables of preferences, 
for example), it is important to note that the 'North-South' split in the WTO is not an 
absolute. India and Pakistan, for example, did not want agreements in the field of trade-
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investment or trade-competition but were happy to discuss transparency (interviewee 
8). Costa Rica maintained its support of all of the Singapore Issues whilst the 
Dominican Republic spoke eloquently on the need for developing countries to adopt an 
agreement on trade-investment. Their general view about not having new items on the 
agenda appears to have been the same at the beginning ofthis account as it was at the 
end. However, these countries did become prepared to demonstrate their strength of 
feeling, and their collective interest, by threatening to walk out ofMinisterials and 
made it clear that they would not agree to negotiations being opened in areas where 
they did not have an interest. 
Another factor in the lack of progress evidenced in these previous Chapters, was that a 
nnmber ofNGOs appeared to have become more militant over the timescale, and the 
Seattle demonstrations must be seen as the culmination of that. This could have been 
because of collective mobilization against the MAl, and that when the MAl 
negotiations came to an end in the OECD, and it was suggested that they might be 
transferred to the WTO, NGO focus shifted in that direction. Although there were not 
such wide demonstrations in Doha and at Cancun, there was still a civil society 
presence which appears to have impacted on the politicization of the enviromnent. 
This chapter has clearly shown that there were a nnmber of factors explaining the lack 
of progress made by the Commission from Seattle to Canciln and that this was affected 
by the Commission's roles and responsibilities as well as the preferences (over issue 
and over time) by the interests. The conclusions that can be drawn from this, 
particularly in the light of the conclusions from the previous set of chapters (in Chapter 
Five), will be further explored in Chapter Nine. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Conclusions 
Introduction 
The central assumption forming the basis of this thesis was that the extent to which the 
Commission could carry out its obligations in external trade depended upon the 
interaction offour forces: roles, responsibilities, interests and change. In order to 
address this assumption, we initially identified the roles and responsibilities that the 
Commission held both in general terms and then specifically in external trade and 
identified, too, the constellation of interests to which the Commission had to respond. 
The thesis then tracked the evolution of those forces primarily through the methodology 
of process tracing, in order to consider the impact of change and politicization; focusing 
on the GATT Rounds and then the WTO. The material on the WTO fell naturally into 
two time periods, which allowed for an empirical investigation based on process 
tracing. The two time periods were Leon Brittan's tenure as Trade Commissioner in the 
WTO from 1997 to1999 and Pascal Lamy's from 1999 to 2003; ending at the failed 
Ministerial in Canciln, which was the last Ministerial meeting for which Lamy held that 
position. 
Looking at the results achieved by the two Commissioners, detailed in Chapters Five 
and Eight, might suggest that Brittan was more effective at exercising the full range of 
roles and responsibilities, and at aligning the interests, than Lamy was. After all, Brittan 
managed to achieve the signature of the Agreements detailed in Chapter Four when 
Lamy achieved agreement on none of the three that he was trying to advance during the 
period. However, in many ways the Geneva Ministerial might be said to have failed, as 
did Seattle. Brittan presided as Trade Commissioner in the former and was instrumental 
in much of the preparation for the latter. Lamy was the Commissioner who negotiated 
in Seattle and was then to negotiate in the failed Cancun Ministerial. In this respect, 
their level of success in the political process of Ministerials is similar. However, the 
balance of continuity and change between the two time periods is very different and 
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suggests that the Commission failed to adapt because of path dependence and 'lock in' 
as outlined in the Introduction. 
At the end of Chapter One, the research questions were transmuted into positive 
propositions about what we expected to find as we further investigated the 
Commission's role(s) in the GATT and the WTO. The propositions provided a broad 
conceptual framework for the investigation and were further appraised and refined 
following Chapter Two when the Commission's evolving roles and responsibilities in 
GATT were discussed. Therefore, this Chapter will return to those propositions in 
order to examine them in the light of the evidence that has been amassed over the 
previous six Chapters. The discussion will focus on what we expected and what we 
found in a broad, horizontal sense, reflecting on the content of previous Chapters. 
The European Commission's Roles in the WTO 
The proposition at the end of Chapter One suggested that within the GATT and the 
WTO we would find traces of all four key Commission roles: expert, govermnent, 
administrator and coalition-builder. We also expected that the 'mix' of these roles 
would vary across levels of activity, across issues and across time, and that reconciling 
the roles would be a key aspect of the Commission's 'self-management'. This 
proposition brings into play a number of issues including the nature of Commission 
agency and autonomy. At the end of Chapter Two we further suggested that the level of 
agency that the Commission has is dependent upon the flexibility it is given by Council, 
the room for manoeuvre it has to ensure trade offs and the level of politicization 
surrounding each issue. Because negotiations take place in a dynamic environment, this 
means that the nature of the interests is of critical importance. 
Commission as Expert 
Although the Quad consensus did not look firm from Geneva onwards, the sectoral 
negotiations that Brittan presided over showed a high level of elite bargaining led by the 
Commission between itself and the US, the G7 and the Quad amongst others. This is not 
something that Lamy was able to echo because the fragmented preferences of the Quad 
had become evident both at Ministerial and sectorallevels; elite bargaining as a policy 
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motor, then, was definitely on the wane. Brittan was also able to demonstrate his status 
as expert by developing COM(1999)331, which was the basis for the negotiating 
mandate even at Cancun. However, Brittan was unable to encourage support for the 
Commission's stance in politically sensitive areas such as Ruggiero's replacement, within 
the Council of Ministers, or to develop a strong line in Ministerials for the MAI or labour 
standards, to give but two examples. This shows that Brittan had most agency to act as an 
expert, internally and externally, where the subject areas were not contested and less, or 
very little, where matters were deemed politically sensitive by Council or within the 
WTO. 
Lamy was able to push for EBA so appeared to have more formal input into agriculture 
policy than Brittan did. However, Lamy could not encourage wider buy-in to EBA 
within the WTO Ministerial process, highlighting that the external WTO interest was 
not aligned on this issue even though the internal interest was strong. Lamy was also 
able to act as an expert, allowing him to set up the DG Trade-Civil Society Dialogue 
following Seattle. However, the preferences within the Contact Group were shown to be 
widely dispersed and this did not help the Commission build a more supportive 
consensus externally for the sectoral negotiations. The problems confronted by Lamy in · 
exercising expertise in the sectoral negotiations may have been mitigated had the 
negotiation mandate been changed or Lamy had urged more flexibility on the part of 
Council. This could have been achieved by unbundling the Singapore Issues or 
negotiating them as 'softer' agreements (as suggested by UNICE) or plurilateral 
agreements, which had proved more successful for the sectoral negotiations assessed 
over Brittan's tenure. 
Commission as Government 
Because of the role that the Commission has in the WTO, we might expect that the 
Commission's governmental status would be more noticeable in the Ministerials than 
within the sectoral negotiations. That Brittan signed the Singapore Final Declaration 
and achieved agreement from the Council and the US (as well as the WTO Ministerial) to 
a new Round of trade talks suggests he was able to exercise a governmental role at some 
level. The Semiconductor Agreement also stated that the Commission would be treated 
like 'a government' within that infrastructure. However, although this indicates an 
295 
amount of autonomy and authority, there was no evidence to suggest that Brittan 
achieved more of a governmental status over the time he was Trade Commissioner-
nor does it suggest that the Commission's status was rolled back to make it less 
governmental. 
Lamy, too, signed off the Do ha Final Declaration and seemed to get a more solid 
agenda for the new Round by so doing. The Commission's position in the Quad was not 
contested, even though Lamy was unable to get the Quad to give unqualified support 
for the Singapore issues just as he was unable to develop a shared vision for the Seattle 
or Canctin Ministerials (and Brittan was unable to do in Geneva). Perhaps most 
importantly, as was noted in Chapter Two in the Uruguay Round, because agriculture 
was being discussed in the WTO and was highly contested, this significantly impacted 
upon the Commission's ability, under Lamy, to act in a governmental way. Firstly, 
Council had a great deal of difficulty arriving at a consensus and this limited the room 
for manoeuvre that they were prepared to give the Commission (commenting, for 
example, that Agenda 2000 was the 'frontline' of their position). Secondly, the level of 
interest and enthusiasm for seeking a more liberal approach in agriculture from the EC 
was a priority for a number of third countries, which seemed to want an agreement here 
prior to commencing negotiations in other areas. Thirdly, the level of politicization that 
resulted because of agriculture meant it became much more difficult for the 
Commission to seek trade-offs. Although it may have wanted to use agreement from 
other countries to pursue the Singapore issues, before it committed to any flexibility on 
agriculture, the Singapore issues were also highly contested and subject to 'explicit 
consensus' as well as the Single Undertaking. 
Commission as administrator 
The 1/94 Ruling had no effect on the day-to-day relations between the Council and 
Commission as the Commission continued to suggest policy positions even in areas 
subject to mixed competence. There is no reason to suspect that this was different after 
Brittan left the Commission except that Lamy did not ask for the mandate to be re-
written and so did not write his own version of COM(l999)331. In the field oflabour 
standards, though, both Bri ttan and Lamy had far less room to manoeuvre. Brittan 
appeared to jettison labour standards from the agenda after Geneva suggesting he did 
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not think it was in his interest to try to pursue an issue where a strong internal or 
external consensus was not forthcoming. Larny simply had to withdraw from labour 
standards once he realised that there would be no chance of the developing countries 
agreeing to pursue it, just as Brittan had noted earlier. Why Lamy thought he could get 
an agreement on labour standards is unclear; perhaps he felt that the Council and the 
WTO would commit to this because of the need to get civil society on board with the 
agenda. 
Although there is no evidence to suggest the Commission was becoming more of an 
administrator over time, for Lamy agriculture was back on the table. In spite of the 
Commission interest appearing to be supportive, Council was constraining because of 
the level of contestation including domestic pressures (particularly in France). Rather 
than the Blair House negotiations and re-negotiations taking place after the Uruguay 
Round was allegedly completed; with Lamy the Seattle and Cancun Ministerials never 
got to this stage as they both failed before agreement could be reached. For Brittan, the 
internal consensus was the main problem with agriculture at the endgame of the 
Uruguay Round. Lamy had to contend with the fragmentation of both the internal and 
external consensus rallying against the EC position in Agenda 2000. Even the EBA 
initiative was unsuccessful as a bargaining chip to encourage developing country 
agreement at Doha or Canclin. This may have been made more acute because the 
'carrot' of more technical assistance money, if the developing countries agreed to go 
ahead with the Singapore Issues, could not be used because of a shortage of WTO funds 
for that purpose. 
Commission as coalition builder 
Under both Brittan and Lamy as Trade Commissioners, the Commission was shown to 
have worked closely together over the duration; the Commission interest, then, seemed 
broadly supportive, or even permissive, of what the Trade Commissioners sought to do 
in the WTO. Council was also relatively supportive over the tenures of both 
Commissioners; broadly agreeing with the priorities given by the Commission 
although, perhaps, not putting enough pressure on the Commission to ensure that the 
external consensus was as strong as possible or giving them as much agency as was 
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needed where agriculture was concerned. However, the external consensus was very 
fragmented. 
Whereas Brittan was also able to encourage support from the Quad, G7 and the CSI, as 
well as from all the signatories to the ITA, BTA and FSA, Lamy was not. This is partly 
because of the fragmentation of the Quad's positions spilling over into the sectoral 
negotiations as well as the Ministerials. It is also because of the Single Undertaking (as 
explained before), which did not affect the sectoral negotiations that Brittan pursued. 
Furthermore, the politicization surrounding the agricultural talks affected the 
politicization of the WTO at all levels. Neither Brittan nor Lamy were able to develop 
coalitions where the debate was too politicized. For Brittan there was the problematic 
choice of a replacement WTO Secretary General or encouraging the wider WTO 
membership to support his initiative to allow duty free market access for goods from the 
LDCs. For Lamy there were labour standards and the Singapore issues. Although 
Brittan 'just' had to contend with the subjects themselves, Lamy also had to contend 
with agriculture influencing the whole environment. 
Both Lamy and Brittan missed the importance of what had happened at the Geneva 
Ministerial where there appeared to be a cleavage between countries of the North and 
South. Post-Geneva there needed to be significant coalition building prior to the Seattle 
Ministerial and, because there was not, Seattle failed. Lamy had the excuse that he was · 
new to the portfolio but Brittan did not. Furthermore, Brittan also appreciated that 
agriculture was coming back to the agenda and his experiences at the end of the 
Uruguay Round might have been expected to inform his actions. The number of square 
brackets persisting on the negotiating mandate by the time of the Seattle meeting 
suggests that they did not. Lamy not only failed to recognise what had happened in 
Geneva but did not pick up on the general dissatisfaction of the developing countries 
following the Do ha Ministerial, which was strongly suggestive of the CancUn 
Ministerial also failing. This fragmented external consensus meant that coalition 
building had a new importance over Lamy's tenure but this was not recognised. 
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The European Commission's responsibilities in the WTO 
We anticipated that we would encounter questions relating to the Commission's ability 
to carry out its responsibilities - in other words, how the Commission fulfils the 
functions entailed by the roles. As with the roles themselves, it was shown in the 
previous chapters that the Commission's ability to fulfil its responsibilities varied 
across levels of activity, issue areas and time. This suggests that the institutional 
structures, which facilitate role performance, need to be addressed here. This leads to 
discussion on role conception and performance, and thus the institutional, political or 
personal constraints that may be encountered by Commission leaders in achieving 
success. Chapter Two noted that there appeared to be a gap between the Council's 
conceptions of the Commission's role performance, which had been brought into sharp 
contrast at the end of the Uruguay Round heralding Opinion 1/94. 
Earlier we suggested that Brittan seemed more successful than Lamy because of what 
he managed to achieve within the sectoral negotiations, but we also highlighted that 
there were factors affecting the Commission's success that Brittan simply missed and it 
is those delivery and institutional aspects that we need to focus on here. Even though 
the Conunission was shown to have remained unaffected by Ruling 1/94, it still had to 
build coalitions and facilitate decision making in often highly contested policy areas in 
order to ensure policy delivery took place internally and externally. This was less of a 
problem for Brittan, except with the cultural exception issues inherent in the ITA, but 
much more of a challenge for Lamy because of agriculture. 
Brittan had anticipated the member states' positions well judging by the alignment of 
COM(l999)331 to the eventual negotiating mandate. Even in areas subject to mixed 
competence, the Commission line was generally taken including the suggestion that the 
new Round be of three years duration. Council, at this point, was permissive on the 
Commission developing this document and then supportive of the aims and objectives 
contained therein. On this basis, Council's views on the Commission's role 
performance must have been positive; contrary to what they appeared to be after the 
Uruguay Round. As Brittan was an ex-senior politician perhaps it is to be expected that 
he would know what other senior politicians would be prepared to accept. Lamy did not 
revisit the mandate or COM(l999)331 so was in the position of having to follow 
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something he did not necessarily agree with~ This was very obvious in the field of 
labour standards where Lamy wanted much more activism from Council so to get civil 
society back on board with the trade agenda after the demonstrations in Geneva. Failing 
to revisit the mandate meant Lamy could not account for the problems that developing 
countries were experiencing or propose bargains or plurilateral agreements. 
Even if the mandate had been changed it was clear prior to the Seattle meeting that the 
Commission's negotiating partners in the WTO wanted to make significant headway on 
agriculture. Lamy was unable to deliver this and had to suffer the defeat of the 
Singapore issues at Cancun because of it. Council was locked into a battle on 
agriculture; pitching (simplistically) the North against South (Ahnlid, 2005). Because 
the member state interest is paramount, and veto power demands consensus, there was 
no way to develop a supportive coalition in Council. Therefore, the failure of the 
Canctin Ministerial was better for Council as it was able to keep the status quo on 
agriculture. The Commission's room for manoeuvre was thus severely curtailed 
because of the lack of institutional flexibility in politicized negotiations, adversely 
affecting the Commission's fulfilment of its responsibilities. Brittan had more scope 
here because the level of politicization in the sectoral negotiations was far less than in 
the Ministerials, which gave him a greater ability to exercise technocratic leadership. 
Lamy's efforts at acting as an 'expert' were entirely unsuccessful because of the level 
of contestation on the basic principles, which the Commission seemed to ignore. This 
did not, however, prompt Council to try to rein the Commission in showing, again, that 
Council's conception of the Commission's role remained the same. 
The WTO's institutional structure is also important here as it is within this that the 
European Commission has to work. The 'birth defects' that were discussed in Chapter 
Two become important as Green Room preparatory processes and consensus-based rule 
making had not changed from GATT to the WTO. Developing countries had been 
critical of Green Rooms at the Singapore Ministerial yet the process had not been 
changed at Canctin. Brittan had not made any effort to change this and although Lamy 
had said that the WTO was 'medieval' after Seattle, and again after Canctin, he insisted 
that the necessary institutional changes could only take place in the context of a new 
Round. It seems more than unfair to be prepared to continue to exclude many 
developing countries from rule-making unless they agree to a broad agenda for a 
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Round; almost blaming them for the Commission's failure to exercise its 
responsibilities. 
In both Brittan's and Lamy's terms of office as Trade Commissioner, progress in 
Ministerials was less than might have been expected from the relative success of the 
Uruguay Round. Although the results of the Singapore Ministerial seemed to be 
generally supportive of what the Commission was trying to achieve, Geneva was not. 
Then, in Lamy's tenure, Seattle and Canclln both failed. This was made worse because 
of the nature of the Single Undertaking where all members had to agree to implement 
agreements even where they had not negotiated them. This impacts countries without 
local delegations as they would not have the capacity to attend many (if any) 
negotiations. 
Changes between GATT and WTO are not just about procedures as the aligrunents have 
also changed. The preferences of the Quad, which had been so important to drive 
agreements in GATT, were shown to be becoming less cohesive over time. The spill 
over of politicization into the Working Groups also meant that elite driven processes 
were not as effective as they had been in Leon Brittan's tenure. Agricultural 
negotiations, which became entrenched, repeated the battles seen in the Uruguay 
Round, this time between the Cairns Group, joined by the G20 against the 'Friends of 
Multifunctionality', of which the EC played a major role. New coalition building efforts 
were important here (as well as changes to the mandate) but because the Commission 
was not encouraged to do so, even once it seemed Canclln would fail, there was no 
response. This was not helped by the continued use of COM(l999)331. 
There is no 'quick fix' , then, for ensuring that the Commission is able to deliver the 
responsibilities connected to its roles but rather a number of value judgements need to 
be made as to 'best/worst' case scenarios prior to any changes taking place. 
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Interests and the European Commission in the WTO 
It was expected that the interests would play a key part in shaping the Commission's 
combination of roles and condition the extent to which the Commission was able to 
fulfil its responsibilities. The degree to which the interests would be 'permissive', 
'supportive' or 'constraining' was seen as key as was the combination of interests at 
three levels: within the Commission, within the Council of Ministers and within the 
GATT/WTO context. 
Both Leon Brittan and Pascal Lamy were able to keep the internal consensus aligned 
over this time; reflecting a high level of internal support. This was especially true with 
the Ministerial process. Even where the results from these meetings were less than 
successful, Council seems to have let this pass without censure and neither Trade 
Commissioner was encouraged to change their stance by the College or by Council. 
With the sectoral negotiations, Chapter Four clearly shows Council supportiveness 
throughout. Although Council was not necessarily as supportive in Chapter Seven, and 
dropped mention of the Singapore issues prior to Cancfm, this does not suggest a lack of 
support rather an appreciation that without radical changes to the agricultural position, 
there would not be a supportive external consensus for the Singapore issues. This is 
further demonstrated by Lamy not being told to drop them or consider unbundling them 
(until the closing hours of the Cancful Ministerial when this was conditional on progress 
in other areas). 
Part of the reason for Brittan's success was because agriculture was off the agenda over 
the duration, which allowed him more agency and room for manoeuvre. That he did not 
achieve agreement for duty free access for products from the LDCs being included in 
the Ministerial Declaration from Singapore was indicative of the impact of further 
agricultural talks within the WTO that Lamy would have to deal with. Furthermore, 
four of the countries who rejected Brittan's initiative were Member States, suggesting 
that Brittan had not worked hard enough to achieve a supportive internal consensus 
beforehand and alerting him to, as in the Uruguay Round, Council's fragmentation over 
agriculture. Within the sectoral negotiations, Brittan made more headway by mobilising 
the G7 and other influential country groups to give their support and because they did 
not come under the Single Undertaking. This became extremely important when the US 
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left the negotiating table (on FSA, for example) and Brittan had to launch a salvage 
exercise to ensure successful completion of the agreement. He may have been able to 
do this because of his senior Cabinet experience in the UK that gave him the credibility 
to invite leaders around the table. Lamy did not have domestic political experience, 
although because of the agricultural negotiations polarizing even the Quad, it is unlikely 
that any such manoeuvre would have been successful. 
The incentive for Brittan to achieve a new Round oftalks in the Singapore Ministerial 
may have been because agricultural negotiations would be coming back to the WTO 
and he foresaw a need for the Commission to develop package deals and trade-offs, just 
as they had done at the end of the Uruguay Round. Lamy could not take advantage of 
this, though, because of the level of politicization that was to surround those 
negotiations. The WTO interest could not have been aligned in order to be permissive 
or supportive so it was very much constraining. This was partly because the preferences 
ofthe developing countries seemed to have coalesced to some extent over the period; 
especially in Canc\ln with the G20 lining up on the side of the Cairns Group in calling 
for greater agricultural liberalisation and because the Quad's preferences were dispersed 
meaning they could not lead a coalition building exercise. The enviromnent may well 
have been made more supportive if the EC had been able to show some flexibility in 
agriculture but the constraining internal consensus meant that was not possible. 
Brittan also had the explicit support ofRuggiero about increasing the authority of the 
WTO whereas although Lamy might have thought Moore would intercede with the 
ATGP, as he seemed to be enthused about the possibilities of an agreement, he did not. 
This was not a factor in the Ministerials, though. Perhaps more might have been 
achieved in the Ministerials had there been evidence of WTO leadership over the 
duration. From Seattle onwards there were no consensus drafts covering all areas to 
encourage agreement. Although Chairman Derbez tried to achieve agreement on the 
Singapore Issues at Canc\ln, this was not successful possibly because of the clear 
message from the developing country members of the Working Groups that 
negotiations should not go ahead. Therefore, although the internal Commission and 
Council interest seemed to be generally supportive of Brittan and Lamy (although not in 
agriculture), Lamy was not able to encourage more support for the Commission view 
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from external sources and his ability to achieve manoeuvre by using any policy space 
was minimized due to the contentious and politicised nature of agriculture. 
Change and Politicization 
We expected the interaction of roles, responsibilities and interests to be linked to and 
conditioned by processes of change, both within and outside the Commission and the 
EC. In particular, we would expect changes in Commission structure and leadership, 
changes in the alignment of Member States and changes in the political context for 
GATIIWTO negotiations to be significant. More specifically, we anticipated that 
changes in institutional structure and membership and changes in the level of 
politicisation around trade negotiations would play a key role in the capacity of the 
Commission to develop a stable mix of roles and responsibilities and to balance 
competing interests in the pursuit of its aims, and thus to link with issues such as 
innovation, path dependency and entrepreneurship. 
It did not take a change from GATI to WTO to politicize the trade environment. As 
soon as GATT Rounds became more than negotiations on tariff reductions (i.e. from the 
Kennedy Round); the level of politicization increased, elite bargaining became 
progressively less significant and civil society became increasingly aware of global 
trade and its impact on the poor. That politicisation was not entirely due to the transition 
is evidenced by a protest of more than 500,000 people in Ban galore in October 1993 
against the Uruguay Round. 1 Although Mike Moore may have commented that "The 
Uruguay Round was launched in the silence of public apathy" it did not end that way. 2 
The difficulty of reaching agreement was made worse once agriculture was 
incorporated with a view to bringing it under GATT disciplines. In the Uruguay Round, 
noteworthy disagreements in agriculture could have caused the negotiations to fail 
especially when France threatened to withhold its agreement to the Final Accords. 
However, it was not just France, which jeopardized the successful conclusion of Seattle 
1 From the 'Stop the War Coalition' 'Neoliberal Governance and Social Resistance: A Chronology of 
Events' compiled by C Buckley for 'The Commoner' Spring/Summer 2003 found at 
http://www.commoner.org.uk/07bucklevtable.htm accessed 2nd April 2008 
2 From Moore's speech of 28th September 1999 to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC 
entitled 'Challenges for the Global Trading System in the New Millennium' at 
http://www.wto.omlenglishlnews e/spmm e/spmm08 e.htm accessed 3rd April 2008 
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or Cancun but a whole host of other players. The Cairns Group had been seeking 
agricultural liberalisation since the Uruguay Round and the developing countries had 
waited for their major concerns to be addressed since the Singapore Ministerial. 
There is little evidence that changes in the Commission's leadership made much of a 
difference, unlike as suggested in the opening Chapter: J acques Delors had very little 
impact on the Uruguay Round (in fact, he stood in the way of the MacS harry plan that 
was so instrumental in achieving success at Blair House); J acques Santer' s tenure as 
President seemed to have little effect on external trade and, although Romano Prodi 
recogoised that agreement between the US and EC was essential prior to Seattle, this 
made no difference to the outcome. This lack of input could be due to the extent and 
technical nature of the trade portfolio (as was outlined in Chapter One). It has also been 
shown that treaty changes or other policies had little effect on the Commission in 
carrying out its roles and responsibilities. For example, Opinion 1/94 appeared to have 
no impact on the Commission's work at all and although Amsterdam may not have 
been considered a success for the Commission it did not appear to change the day-to-
day relationships between Council and the Commission as neither did the Nice Treaty. 
The greatest impact of politicization is linked to the transition between GATT and 
WTO and this was the prime limitation to the Commission's ability to innovate and act 
as a policy entrepreneur. Lamy later remarked that one of the main outcomes of the 
Uruguay Round was that although the developing countries made the same 
commitments as all other members, because their institutional infrastructure needed 
sigoificant upgrading, it was not going to be easy for them to meet their obligations.3 
This would also have a knock on effect in terms of what they wanted from the WTO 
such as greater market access and no new items on the agenda (especially items that 
were subject to the Single Undertaking such as the Singapore Issues or which might be 
said to impact on their competitive advantage such as labour standards) except, perhaps, 
for matters of concern to them. It was the Commission's failure to properly appreciate 
this that precipitated failure at Seattle and Cancun. At the same time, the developed 
countries (such as the Quad), along with the WTO Secretariat, sought to widen and 
deepen the agenda of the WTO. This extended to areas such as the MAI, which caused 
3 Lamy's speech to the First Annual Lecture of the Europeao Foreign Affairs Review, Brussels s•• 
November 2000 'Challenges confronting the world trade system today' at 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission 1999 2004/lamy/speeches articleslspla36 en.htm accessed 3rd April 2008 
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a great deal of negative interest from NGOs. Furthermore, bringing agriculture into the 
WTO fragmented both the internal and external consensus. The Commission's efforts 
towards widening and deepening the agenda would result in almost inevitable conflict 
between the developed and the developing countries. Agriculture is suggestive of 
further conflict between the EC and agricultural exporters further limiting the 
Commission's room for manoeuvre and its ability to develop innovative solutions to 
problems because of the extent of cleavages. 
Policy Implications 
The evidence evaluated here shows a great deal of continuity in how the Commission 
fulfilled its roles and responsibilities over time as was anticipated in the Introduction to 
this thesis. However, in so doing, the Commission failed to take account of the 
significant changes within the negotiating environment particularly with regard to the 
growing politicization, evident since the Kennedy Round of GATT and growing since 
the birth of the WTO. Although the Commission's roles and responsibilities did not, 
and have not, come under threat from the Council of Ministers, as might have been 
predicted, a supportive internal interest is not enough to enable headway to be made in 
negotiations. Even if elite bargaining remained plausible as a way to dictate the 
negotiating agenda, as it seems to have done in the Tokyo Round of GATT, the 
fragmented preferences of the Quad would make it impossible to build a supportive 
coalition in that forum. Furthermore, the views of the developing countries with regard 
to WTO priorities, suggests preferences are becoming ever more difficult to align. If the 
Commission had recognised the problems at the Geneva Ministerial, or at least at 
Seattle, they may have been able to develop a response although the entrenched debates 
surrounding agriculture meant that such initiatives might not have had a great effect. 
Even the EBA was insufficient as a bargaining chip to encourage the developing 
countries to accept the status quo in European agriculture making significant change to 
the CAP essential before further progress can be made. 
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It was not just agriculture (or the Singapore Issues), which showed that the trading 
system had changed since GATT. Unlike the Marrakech Agreement, the Final 
Declarations of the WTO Ministerials lacked substance partially reflecting the 
cleavages between North and South. In spite of this, there was no suggestion that the 
developing countries should be further integrated into the system, for example by 
participating in decision making. Instead the somewhat opaque 'Green Rooms' and 
'Green Men' continued to play a part; this would continue in the Hong Kong 
Ministerial.4 Lamy's view that such procedures could only be altered in the context of a 
new Round was not generally supported. As the developing countries had been waiting 
since Singapore to see issues such as SOT and market access addressed, it is little 
surprise that they failed to engage with this proposal, just as there was little surprise that 
they would not give their 'explicit consensus' to begin negotiations on the Singapore 
issues at Do ha, or would have done at Canctin. This means it would be necessary to 
ensure the external interest is aligned before policies can be advanced and that failure to 
address this might risk policy paralysis. 
Coming back to the central contentions that were outlined in Chapter One and then 
Chapter Two, we can conclude from the evidence that the Commission being able to 
exercise its roles and responsibilities in the WTO depends upon: 
i) A clearly aligned internal interest allowing the Commission flexibility and room for 
manoeuvre to enable it to be a policy entrepreneur and propose innovative solutions to 
problems in order to relieve logjams where they occur in negotiations. This seems to be 
becoming increasingly more difficult (especially since the Uruguay Round) as interests 
are clearly fragmented. Agriculture, labour standards and audio-visuals are three areas 
where there have been evident cleavages. 
4 From TWN Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues, 21" December 2005, 'How the WTO's Hong Kong 
Ministerial Adopted Its Declaration' at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo336.htm accessed 12th April 
2008. This document says that at Hong Kong there were a number of "Green Room ... meetings to which 
a select few were invited .... There will be no records or minutes .... Who said what, indeed which countries 
were invited or were present, will not be known or at least will not be made public. For all intents and 
purposes these were "non meetings." The WTO spokesman referred to the Green Room meetings in 
terms of: "If the Green Room does exist, and if there was a meeting ..... " Yet, the leaders of the conference 
kept congratulating themselves for the ''transparent, inclusive and bottom-up'' process". 
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ii) A negotiation mandate, which reflects the situation on the ground. There is a need 
for the Commission to act as a 'critical friend' to Council by giving a realistic appraisal 
of the likely success or otherwise of different initiatives.5 The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) 
sets out that the Commission has competence in CCP and also "exclusive competence 
for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a 
legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope", 
which suggests that the Commission might have more say when it comes to achieving 
agreements in the future. The UK' s Law Society in its guidance concludes that the 
initiatives set out in the Treaty will make "The EU's international policies ... more 
predictable and carry more weight on the international stage". 6 
iii) Addressing the problems experienced by developing countries. It was shown in the 
analysis that failure to ensure agreement from the developing countries meant that 
initiatives had little chance of being progressed. In order to facilitate this, then, there 
· needs to be consideration of appropriate measures to assimilate these countries into the 
global economy. A number of measures might be appropriate here such as further 
technical and financial assistance, greater market access commitments and additional 
SDT measures. Many countries have been asking for help since the Singapore 
Ministerial and it seems appropriate to address them now on a country by country basis 
in collaboration with other multilateral agencies. Similarly, the Green Room process 
needs to be changed, before further talks, in order to give the maximum assurances of 
transparency to the most members. 
iv) Sensitivity to the structure ofWTO negotiations, in particular whether or not they 
take place under the Single Undertaking. In order to get buy-in from as wide a 
constituency as possible, consideration should be given to negotiating plurilateral 
agreements or for multilateral agreements to be more 'best endeavour' in nature. There 
is an obvious impact on the WTO as an institution becoming less multilateral and a 
clear effect on the Single Undertaking, however, failure to consider this might 
exacerbate existing North-South cleavages and lead to policy paralysis because the 
5 In the way that the Commission acted as 'critical friend' to the Council advising on enlargement in 
Agenda 2000 
6 From The Law Society Guide to the Treaty of Lisbon, January 2008 at 
http://lawsocietv.org.ukldocuments!downloads/guide to treatv of Jisbon.pdf accessed 15th April2008. 
308 
WTO interest cannot be aligned. The scope of agreements should also be made clear 
before negotiations are opened. 
v) An acceptance on the part of Council members that the European view of agriculture 
is highly unlikely to be accepted by the Cairns Group and the G20 and steady yet 
progressive change is necessary. This ultimately demands consideration of the 
perceived value of the WTO for the EC - is it prepared to engage with the WTO or is it 
not? 
Contribution to research 
The thesis shows that, within the external trade portfolio, the Commission assumes a 
number of different, and sometimes conflicting, roles and responsibilities and the 
'mix' of these is significant as was suggested at the outset. Although Meunier and 
Nicolai:dis (1999) highlighted that trade was "the longest and deepest integrated policy 
in the EU" (p478) this did not mean that the Commission was, though GATT or the 
WTO, able to get what it wanted as a 'government' or that it could build coalitions 
easily in every area that it wanted to progress. Furthermore, the relationship between 
Council and the Commission, which seemed to be given primacy by Meunier and 
Nicolai:dis, was not as important in terms of making progress in the WTO as the 
relationship between the Commission and the rest of the WTO membership. 
The growing politicization of the trade field meant it was increasingly necessary for 
the Commission to listen to the rest of the WTO members in order to identity the 
opportunities for progress. That they failed to take heed of the warnings at Geneva, 
which led to the failure in Seattle and then in the aftermath of Do ha, resulting in 
further failure at Cancllr!, suggests that this was not something the Commission or 
Council did very effectively. Internally, however, and in spite of Opinion 1194, this 
work has shown that Council did not "rollback" (1999:477) the Commission's roles 
and responsibilities within external trade after the Uruguay Round. Although, 
formally, Opinion 1194 enshrined the principle of 'shared competence', the 
Commission was still responsible for all aspects of the trade portfolio, which extended 
to proposing Council policy in shared competence areas as indicated by 
COM(\999)331. Clearly, the formal effects of this Opinion were a lot greater than the 
practice surrounding it. Nevertheless, it has been shown that COM(l999)331 was not 
309 
'future proof and did not meet with the requirements of the other WTO members, 
particularly once it became clear that the developing country members were unhappy 
with the focus on task expansion rather than at addressing existing problems in 
Seattle. That Lamy persisted with using the document as the basis for the 
Commission's positioning even up to Cancun, is a demonstration of path dependence 
with its associated characteristics of 'self-reinforcement' and resistance to change. 
Path dependence is also instructive when looking at the Seattle Ministerial itself and at 
the aftermath to Doha and Canclin. Meunier and Nicolatdis (1999) may not have 
suggested that the Seattle Ministerial was a watershed in terms of backlash on the part 
of the developing countries with the WTO but clearly another contribution made by 
this work is to reveal the interlinkages between WTO Ministerials, and the 
negotiations surrounding them, especially in the way the interests were grouped. This 
explicit inter linkage means that the outcomes of Seattle and Canclin should not have 
been as much of a surprise to the European Commission as they seem to have been. 
Inevitably, this has implications on future negotiations in the WTO. Whether 
agreement can be reached in the future seems a moot point considering that the Doha 
talks are still continuing. The report from the latest Agriculture and NAMA 
negotiations (as of August 2008) is that there remains no agreement on modalities 
even though Green Room processes had been employed thus minimizing the level of 
dissent that would occur in a wider and more inclusive forum. 7 It has been shown, 
then, that not only are there indications of path dependence on the part of the 
Commission and Council but also within the WTO. This has manifested in an inability 
to develop new ways of working (such as institutional restructuring to abandon the 
Green Room process) and thinking (on ways to reach agreement) to reflect the highly 
complex and 'messy' reality of many players and many ideas. This is the case even 
though the existing patterns have been shown to be "manifestly inefficient" and 
widely criticised (Pollack, 2005:363). 
7 From JOB(08)/96 NAMA negotiating group. Report by the Chairman on 12th August also JOB(08)95 
Committee on Agriculture Special Session. Report by the Chairman on 11th August 
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The methodology of using process tracing has shown, in the way that the Introduction 
outlined, the motivations behind and the impact of a wide range of Commission 
activities, and related them to the ways in which key interests were arrayed. The 
narrative showed the evolution of the Commission's roles and responsibilities in 
external trade, the growing politicization of the trade field and the related difficulties 
of arriving at consensus in both the 'high political' and latterly the sectoral 
negotiations (partly because of the Single Undertaking). The Commission changed its 
approach very little even when it became evident that there were major disagreements 
with the agenda on the part of the WTO membership. Further evidence was that 
forward progress was simply not being achieved even in the smaller sectoral groups. 
This shows the level of continuity on the part of the Commission and its failure to take 
into account the changes that had taken place in the trade field as indicative of 'lock 
in'. Historical institutionalist concepts have therefore highlighted, as we suggested in 
the Introduction, the importance of the 'mix' of roles, responsibilities, continuity and 
change alongside the choices that have been perpetuated over time (such as 
COM(l999)331) together with unanimity rules backing the status quo (agriculture). 
In terms of future research, there is clearly further scope to expand this work both in 
and outside external trade. Consideration could be given, in particular, to looking at 
development or competition policy (where the Commission also has distinctive roles 
and responsibilities) and assessing the 'mix' of the Commission's roles and 
responsibilities in that policy area. The Commission's roles and responsibilities might 
also be examined as they play out in other institutions such as within the United 
Nations. There are opportunities to look at Peter Mandelson's handling of the Trade 
portfolio now that Pascal Lamy has left the Commission and thus continue the work 
after the Cancilll Ministerial. It would be interesting to see whether the lessons Lamy 
learnt as Trade Commissioner have been reflected in his work now he is the Secretary 
General of the WTO, especially with reference to agriculture and relationships with 
the developing countries. Another possible area of research would be to explore the 
'formal' and 'informal' roles and responsibilities of the Commission in external trade 
more closely over time. It may be this has evolved and become more important 
perhaps as a response to Euroscepticism and the lack of will on the part of Council to 
transfer further formal responsibility to the Commission. Related to this, the 
implications of moving to 'best endeavour' in the WTO might also be examined and, 
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in the future, it would be instructive to see whether the Treaty of Lisbon lives up to 
the Commission's expectations. Finally, a version of the methodology deployed here 
might work elsewhere, such as in the study of the roles and responsibilities of US 
Trade Representatives. All of these are worthy avenues for further research. 
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